Federal Court of Australia

Thompson v Lane (application for stay) [2026] FCA 1782

File number(s):

QUD 447 of 2023

QUD 176 of 2024

QUD 490 of 2025

Judgment of:

HILL J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for a stay pending outcome of an appeal – primary judge ordered that the applicant provide vacant possession of a property, and that the respondent trustee have authority to sell the property and dispose of the applicant’s possessions on the property – significant risk of irremediable prejudice to the applicant if a stay not granted – applicant seeking to re-agitate key points that have previously been determined against her – no serious question to be tried – stay not in the interests of justice, having regard to the litigation history and the competing interests of creditors – application refused

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 58, 132, 149

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.08(1)

Cases cited:

Coshott v Prentice [2014] FCAFC 88; (2014) 221 FCR 450

D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 223 CLR 1

Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (No 2) (1990) 22 NSWLR 178

Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 17; [2004] FCAFC 189

Frigger v Trenfield (Application for Stay Pending Appeal) [2021] FCA 1605

Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75

Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; (2019) 265 CLR 164

Pegler v Dale [1975] 1 NSWLR 265

Pekar v Holden (Trustee) [2019] FCA 442

Pekar v Jess (Trustee) [2022] FCA 1367

Quach v MLC Ltd [2022] FCAFC 202

Queensland v Mr Stradford (a pseudonym) [2025] HCA 3; (2025) 99 ALJR 396

Robinson Locke Litigation Lawyers Pty Ltd v Thompson [2026] QCA 170

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238

Shaw v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2026] FCAFC 32

Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 3) [2021] FCA 1569

Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 88; (2017) 252 FCR 267

Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (No 2) [2010] FCA 1212; (2010) 88 IPR 633

Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2025] FCA 951

Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86

Thompson v Lane (No 3) [2026] FCA 766

Thompson v Lane (Trustee) (No 3) [2022] FCA 128

Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCAFC 32; (2023) 410 ALR 439

Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234

Wyman on behalf of the Bidjara People v State of Queensland [2015] FCAFC 108

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Queensland

National Practice Area:

Commercial and Corporations

Sub-area:

General and Personal Insolvency

Number of paragraphs:

52

Date of hearing:

18 November 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

The Applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the Respondent:

Ms S Philippou

Solicitor for the Respondent:

O’Sullivan Sneddon Law

ORDERS

QUD 447 of 2023

BETWEEN:

EMMA NARELLE CATHRYN THOMPSON

Applicant

AND:

MORGAN LANE

Respondent

order made by:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The Applicant’s interlocutory application dated 16 November 2026 is dismissed.

2.    The costs of the application before this Court are to be costs of the bankruptcy and paid from the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

QUD 176 of 2024

BETWEEN:

MORGAN GERARD JAMES LANE AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF EMMA NARELLE CATHRYN THOMPSON

Applicant

AND:

EMMA NARELLE CATHRYN THOMPSON

Respondent

order made by:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The Respondent’s interlocutory application dated 16 November 2026 is dismissed.

2.    The costs of the application before this Court are to be costs of the bankruptcy and paid from the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

QUD 490 of 2025

BETWEEN:

EMMA NARELLE CATHRYN THOMPSON

Applicant

AND:

MORGAN LANE

Respondent

order made by:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The Applicant’s interlocutory application dated 16 November 2026 is dismissed.

2.    The costs of the application before this Court are to be costs of the bankruptcy and paid from the bankrupt estate of Ms Emma Thompson.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HILL J:

A.    Introduction

1    This is an urgent interlocutory application for a stay, pending an appeal from Thompson v Lane (No 4) [2026] FCA 1599 (J), which was handed down on 30 October 2026. This application has been referred to me as general duty judge. In that judgment, Collier ACJ made the following orders in proceedings QUD176/2024:

    Requiring the Applicant (Ms Thompson) to vacate property on Glen Road, Toowong (the Toowong Property) by 13 November 2026 (Order 13);

    Issuing a warrant of possession, to be acted on only if Ms Thompson does not vacate the Toowong Property in accordance with Order 13 (Order 14);

    On the Respondent (the Trustee or Mr Lane) taking possession of the Toowong Property, Ms Thompson be restrained from entering on or remaining on the Toowong Property, going within 30 metres of the Toowong Property, or hindering the sale of the Toowong Property (Order 15);

    By 13 November 2026, Ms Thompson remove from the Toowong Property all vehicles, rubbish and chattels which have not vested in the Trustee in his capacity of trustee of the bankrupt estate (Personal Property) (Order 16);

    If Ms Thompson fails to comply with Order 16, the Trustee is empowered to remove and dispose of any Personal Property left on the Toowong Property (Unremoved Personal Property) as he sees fit, without being required to account to Ms Thompson or any other person (Order 17).

    The costs of removal and disposal of any Unremoved Personal Property under Order 17 be paid from the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson (Order 18).

    The Trustee be at liberty to sell the Toowong Property and to sell any Unremoved Personal Property, and receive the net proceeds of sale into the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson (Order 19).

2    In this application, Ms Thompson seeks the following interlocutory orders:

    An order that would restrain the Trustee from taking any step in reliance upon the Order made 16 November 2026, pertaining to the Toowong Property;

    In the alternative, that the Court cause an undertaking to be made, by or on behalf of the Trustee as to being restrained from taking any step in reliance upon the Order made 16 November 2026, pertaining to the Property.

As discussed below, the relevant orders were made on 30 October 2026 (not 16 November): see [8] below. Ms Thompson states that she first lodged a Notice of Appeal from the orders of Collier ACJ electronically on 12 November 2026.

3    For the following reasons, the application for a stay is refused.

4    Materials: Ms Thompson has filed an affidavit sworn by her on 16 November 2026, and amended written submissions dated 18 November 2026. The Trustee has filed an affidavit of Mr Roderick O’Sullivan, solicitor for the Trustee, affirmed on 18 November 2026, and written submissions.

B.    Background

B.1    Key events

5    The primary judge outlined the background to the bankruptcy in J [6]-[9]. The key events leading to the judgment of Collier ACJ on 30 October 2026 are as follows:

(a)    On 1 July 2020, a debtor’s petition lodged by Ms Thompson was accepted by the Official Trustee (J [6]). On the debtor’s petition being accepted by the Official Trustee, Mr Lane was appointed trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson, and the property of Ms Thompson vested in the Trustee, under ss 58 and 132 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (see J [160]).

(b)    On 18 February 2022 Logan J dismissed Ms Thompson’s application for annulment of the bankruptcy: Thompson v Lane (Trustee) (No 3) [2022] FCA 128;

(c)    On 10 March 2023, Ms Thompson’s appeal from Logan J’s decision was dismissed: Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCAFC 32; (2023) 410 ALR 439 (Thompson v Lane FC).

(d)    On 2 July 2023, Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy, by reason of the operation of s 149 of the Bankruptcy Act (see J [3], [7]).

(e)    Around 23 February 2024, the Trustee became the registered owner of the Property, with the registered owner recorded on the title as “The trustee of the property of Emma Thompson, A Bankrupt” (see J [163]);

(f)    On 24 October 2024, Collier J dismissed Ms Thompson’s application for interim relief in proceedings QUD447/2023: Thompson v Lane (No 3) [2026] FCA 766. Ms Thompson’s leave to appeal was refused by Vandongen J: Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2025] FCA 951 (Thompson v Lane (leave to appeal)).

(g)    On 30 October 2026, Collier ACJ delivered judgment in proceedings QUD447/2023, QUD176/2024 and QUD490/2025 (the subject of this stay application).

6    Since that judgment was delivered, the following events have occurred:

(a)    Mr O’Sullivan’s evidence is that, between 30 October 2026 and 9 November 2026, the Trustee has made various attempts to facilitate access to the Property to allow Ms Thompson to remove her possessions. (I note that Ms Thompson disputes the adequacy of these attempts.)

(b)    Ms Thompson states that she lodged a notice of appeal electronically on 12 November 2026, appealing against the whole of the judgment. (The Court’s internal systems in the appeal proceedings record this notice of appeal as being lodged on 16 November, but nothing turns on this point.)

(c)    On the morning of 16 November 2026, the Trustee, by his authorised agents, took possession of the Toowong Property, in reliance on the orders of Collier ACJ.

7    Ms Thompson contends that the Trustee should not have taken possession of the Toowong Property on 16 November 2026, because she had by then lodged a notice of appeal. However, an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution or stay of any proceedings under the judgment under appeal, or invalidate any proceedings already taken (Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.08(1)). The lodging of the notice of appeal therefore did not prevent the Trustee from taking possession of the Toowong Property and I would not seek to undo this step through the provision of undertakings. That step could be undone, if necessary.

8    Undertakings provided: On the other hand, I did require the Respondent to provide undertakings at the hearing on 18 November 2026 that it would not take any further steps to give effect to the orders of the primary judge while I provided written reasons on the application. The reason for requiring that undertaking is I considered there was a real possibility of the Trustee taking steps permitted by those orders that could not be undone, if I were to grant a stay (such as disposing of Ms Thompson’s possessions).

B.2    Judgment of Collier ACJ

9    Proceedings and issues: The primary judge was dealing with three proceedings: in QUD447/2023, Ms Thompson applied for orders that the Trustee cease to act as trustee of her bankrupt estate and interim orders (see J [7]-[8]); in QUD176/2024, the Trustee made an application for possession of the Toowong Property, pursuant to s 30(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act (J [9]); and in QUD490/2025 (which was transferred to this Court from the Supreme Court of Queensland), Ms Thompson sought orders to the effect that the Trustee transfer the title in the Toowong property into her name (J [15]-[16]). The primary judge made orders that these proceedings be listed together.

10    The primary judge identified the questions to be determined in the three proceedings as follows (J [57]):

    whether Mr Lane remained appointed as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee following the discharge of Ms Thompson from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023;

    if so, whether Mr Lane is to be removed as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee;

    if Mr Lane remains as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee, whether Mr Lane is entitled to an Order granting him possession of the Toowong Property in his capacity as trustee or in the alternative, whether Ms Thompson is entitled to an Order transferring the legal title of the Toowong Property to her; and

    if Mr Lane remains as Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy trustee, whether Mr Lane is entitled to an amount of approximately $523,528 held in trust (the liquidated amount) in his capacity as trustee, or in the alternative, whether Ms Thompson is entitled to an Order requiring Mr Lane to pay the liquidated amount to her.

The fourth issue above does not affect the possible sale of the Toowong Property and disposing of Ms Thompson’s personal possessions (which is the subject of this stay application), and will not be considered further.

11    Trustee remains appointed: On the first issue identified above, the primary judge held that Mr Lane remained as Ms Thompson’s trustee in bankruptcy. Her Honour held that, although discharge from bankruptcy means that a bankrupt is freed from indebtedness and able to start afresh, it does not mean that an ongoing and incomplete administration of the bankrupt estate is halted (J [100]). The key points underpinning this conclusion were as follows:

(a)    Property vested in a trustee during a bankruptcy continues to be vested in the trustee after discharge of the bankrupt from bankruptcy if the administration of the bankrupt estate is otherwise ongoing (J [72], citing Pegler v Dale [1975] 1 NSWLR 265 at 266-267 (Needham J), and Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (No 2) (1990) 22 NSWLR 178 at 182-183 (Kirby P, with Clarke and Meagher JJA agreeing)). The definition of “end of the administration” did not support Ms Thompson’s argument (J [76], citing Pekar v Jess (Trustee) [2022] FCA 1367 at [44] (point (2) (Hespe J)).

(b)    On the evidence of Mr Lane, the administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate is ongoing (J [78] (affidavit evidence), J [80]-[81] (cross-examination)). The primary judge concluded on an assessment of the affidavit and oral evidence (J [85]):

•    There is a continuing statutory purpose for the ongoing administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate, namely the adjudication of proof of debts from parties claiming to be creditors of Ms Thompson and the declaration of dividends to creditors with enforceable debts.

•    Mr Lane has received 14 proofs of debt totalling over $1.3 million from parties claiming to be creditors of Ms Thompson. Mr Lane has not yet ruled on these proofs of debts.

•    In accordance with s 102 of the Bankruptcy Act, the reason why Mr Lane has not yet ruled on these proofs of debts is because he has not yet declared a dividend from the bankrupt estate pursuant to Pt VI, Div 5.

•    Mr Lane has not declared a dividend because he has not yet realised all of the assets, including but not limited to the Toowong Apartment, in Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate.

The primary judge accepted Mr Lane’s evidence that a reason why the administration of Ms Thompson’s estate has taken over six years was because it was decided to slow down the administration when Ms Thompson applied for annulment of the bankruptcy (ie the application that was determined by Logan J) (J [86]).

(c)    The primary judge rejected Ms Thompson’s argument that a decision of Judge Barlow in the Queensland District Court demonstrated that Mr Lane was holding property of the bankrupt estate on a “bare trust”. The primary judge found that the question of whether Mr Lane remained the trustee of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate was not a question before Judge Barlow, and his Honour did not make any ruling on that matter (J [92]).

12    Mr Lane should not be removed as trustee: The second issue was whether Mr Lane should be removed as trustee of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate. The primary judge held that Mr Lane should not be removed as trustee, and therefore dismissed QUD447/2023 (J [157]-[158]). Her Honour’s key conclusions on this point were as follows:

(a)    The primary judge held that, for the reasons given in dealing with the first issue, there was a basis for the continuation of the administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate, and this purpose had not been exhausted (J [118]-[119]).

(b)    The primary judge rejected Ms Thompson’s argument that Mr Lane should be removed as trustee because of alleged misconduct by him in administering the bankrupt estate. The primary judge concluded as follows (J [141]):

•    the allegations made by Ms Thompson against Mr Lane are so broad-ranging that they effectively encompass almost every aspect of the administration of the estate.

•    the question of removal is to be assessed on the basis of the two-stage process applied in Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 3) [2021] FCA 1569 at [190]-[194] (Wigney J), upheld in Shaw v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2026] FCAFC 32 at [62]-[67] (the Court).

•    Ms Thompson had not adequately answered Mr Lane’s evidence to the effect that he had administered Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate according to law; in particular, the primary judge accepted Mr Lane’s evidence that he had not failed to provide information to Ms Thompson (J [129]-[131]); accepted Mr Lane’s evidence that he had not made any improper payments out of the bankrupt estate (J [132]-[134]); and found on the basis of Mr Lane’s evidence that he had not failed to administer the estate efficiently (J [139]-[140]).

•    Ms Thompson had not established substantial grounds that Mr Lane erred in the administration of the estate or had engaged in misconduct; and

•    for that reason, there are no proper grounds for conducting an inquiry into Mr Lane’s administration of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson, and the first stage of the two-stage process has not been met.

(c)    The primary judge found that there was a breakdown in the relationship between Mr Lane and Ms Thompson, but that this was attributable to the conduct of Ms Thompson. Her Honour found that Mr Lane had not lost the objectivity demanded of him as trustee in bankruptcy (J [144], [148]).

13    Order for possession of Toowong Property: The third issue was whether the Trustee was entitled to an order in QUD176/2024 granting him possession of the Toowong Property in his capacity as trustee. The primary judge found that this order should be made (J [159]).

(a)    Ms Thompson’s property vested in the Trustee as the trustee of the bankrupt estate on the day of Mr Lane’s appointment, under ss 58 and 132 of the Bankruptcy Act (J [160]).

(b)    There was a complication that the Toowong Property was not registered in Ms Thompson’s name on the day of Mr Lane’s appointment (J [161]). The primary judge found that: (i) Ms Thompson had an equitable interest in the Toowong Property, which entitled her to be registered as the owner, on the day of Mr Lane’s appointment; (ii) that equitable interest vested in Mr Lane on the day of his appointment by reason of ss 58 and 132 of the Bankruptcy Act; (iii) in the absence of any defeat of that equitable interest, Mr Lane was entitled to cause the Toowong Property to be registered in the name of “Trustee of the Property of [Ms Thompson], A Bankrupt”, even though this occurred after the date of her discharge from bankruptcy (J [167]). The primary judge repeated that the administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate can continue after her discharge from bankruptcy (J [165]).

(c)    The primary judge repeated that property that was vested in the trustee in bankruptcy does not re-vest in a bankrupt if the administration is ongoing (J [168]-[169], citing Pegler and Daemar). The primary judge repeated that the ongoing administration of Ms Thompson’s estate continued to have a statutory purpose. Her Honour held that, on the evidence, Mr Lane had not derived a benefit or profit in connection with the Toowong Property: his intentions appeared to be to sell it and apply the proceeds of sale for the benefit of the creditors of Ms Thompson whose proof of debts are ruled on and substantiated, as was appropriate (J [173]).

(d)    The primary judge dismissed Ms Thompson’s application in QUD490/2025 for title in the Toowong Property. Her Honour found that none of ss 188, 188A or 188B of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) applied (J [185]-[188]).

(e)    There was power to make an order for vacant possession under s 30(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act (J [190]-[192], citing Coshott v Prentice [2014] FCAFC 88; (2014) 221 FCR 450 at [92]-[94] (the Court)). As trustee, Mr Lane had duties under ss 19(1)(b) and (f) of the Bankruptcy Act to determine whether Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate included property that could be realised to pay a dividend to creditors, and to take appropriate steps to recover property for the benefit of the estate. The primary judge was satisfied that Mr Lane had been unable to obtain vacant possession of the Toowong Property. He was legally entitled in his capacity as trustee to the Toowong Apartment, and was bound by the Bankruptcy Act to realise it for the benefit of the estate (J [193]-[194]).

(f)    The primary judge reached the following conclusions on the appropriate orders:

•    Mr Lane sought an order that Ms Thompson and any other occupants vacate the Toowong apartment, deliver up all keys and give possession, but Mr Lane had not specified a time limit for complying with this order. The primary judge considered it reasonable that Ms Thompson be required to vacate the Toowong Property, deliver up all keys and give possession to Mr Lane within 14 days of the date of her Honour’s orders (J [198]-[199]).

•    The primary judge made the order sought to grant Mr Lane liberty to sell the Toowong Property and any personal property left behind by Ms Thompson and to receive the proceeds of sale. For the avoidance of doubt, and noting Mr Lane’s obligation not to profit from the administration, her Honour added that Mr Lane would receive the net proceeds “into the bankrupt estate of [Ms Thompson]” (J [200]).

B.3    Notice of appeal

14    The Applicant’s notice of appeal contends that the Orders made on 30 October 2026 were made:

a)     in reliance upon error of law;

b)    in absence of law in support thereof;

c)    in absence of exhibited evidence in support thereof;

d)    do not reference the facts, as confirmed in, and exhibited to, the Appellant’s affidavits filed in the three proceedings;

e)    in absence of consideration, or proper consideration, of the exhibited evidence;

f)    confirm bias, or apprehension of bias, or lack of impartiality, by the decision maker, Collier J;

g)    are a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness, including;

i.    because the Application uploaded on 14 July 2026 was not heard, rather dismissed because the decision maker, apparently absent undertaking proper, or any review of the Application, saw “no merit at this stage in the interlocutory application”; and

ii.    the oral Application the Appellant made on 16 July 2026 was refused; and

iii.    consequently, the Appellant was denied sufficient time to properly prepare for the hearing.

15    The notice of appeal then sets out “brief details” of the grounds of appeal in [6]-[87], under the headings:

    “Order 1 dated 30 October 2026” [6]-[25];

    “Appellant was always able to pay valid debts, never insolvent” [26]-[34];

    “Appellant’s bankruptcy ought to have been annulled in 2021” [35]-[52];

    “[R]espondent conflicted prior to being appointed as the Appellant’s trustee” [53]-[59];

    “Legal proceedings commenced against Appellant absent jurisdiction” [60]-[66];

    “Orders 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 dated 30 October 2026” [67];

    “Orders 4, 5, 10, 11, 20 and 21 dated 30 October 2026” [68]-[82];

    “Orders 12 to 19 dated 30 October 2026” [83]-[87].

C.    analysis

C.1    Stay pending appeal - principles

16    The key principles in determining whether to grant a stay pending an appeal are as follows: see Quach v MLC Ltd [2022] FCAFC 202 at [81] (the Court) (numbers added, citations omitted):

(1)    The discretion of the Court in granting a stay ought not be exercised lightly, and only in circumstances where there would be so adverse and serious a consequence that interlocutory intervention should take place notwithstanding that there has not been an opportunity for full consideration of the appeal. Circumstances warranting the grant of a stay have been described as “exceptional”.

(2)    To that extent, the balance of convenience plays an important role in determining whether an order ought be made.

(3)    The Court may be minded to refuse a stay where it is satisfied that there are no serious questions for the determination in the appeal or review. Conversely, the Court may be minded to grant a stay where, on a preliminary assessment of the case, the Court is satisfied that grounds of appeal or review have merit.

(4)    The Court may be minded to grant a stay where it is satisfied that any subsequent appeal or review would be rendered nugatory should a stay be refused.

(5)    Decisions at first instance should not be treated as merely provisional. A successful party in litigation is entitled to the fruits of its judgment, and courts should not be disposed to delay the enforcement of orders. A sufficient basis must be shown to outweigh these considerations.

(6)    The Court will consider whether a stay is warranted in the interests of justice.

C.2    Prejudice to Applicant/effect on the appeal (factors (1)-(2), (4))

17    The first broad issue is whether a failure to grant a stay would cause an adverse and serious consequence to Ms Thompson justifying interlocutory intervention, or would render the appeal nugatory (see factors (1)-(2) and (4) above).

18    Parties’ arguments (prejudice and effect on the appeal): Ms Thompson submits that her appeal will be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted, because the Trustee has announced in an email to her dated 16 November 2026 an intention to remove and dispose of her personal possessions that are on the Toowong Property, and to sell the Toowong Property, in reliance on the orders made by the primary judge. She states (and I accept) that the personal possessions on the Toowong Property include family heirlooms and irreplaceable items.

19    Mr O’Sullivan’s evidence for the Trustee is that it is expected to take a number of weeks to clear out the Toowong Property and conduct any recommended works to prepare the Property for sale. The Trustee accepts that, if a stay is not granted, the Trustee will be entitled under the orders to remove all of Ms Thompson’s possessions on the Toowong Property and sell the Toowong Property. The Trustee submits that, although the sale of the Toowong Property is significant, it is less so in this case because:

    Ms Thompson’s sequestration took place over 6 years ago;

    although Ms Thompson was discharged from bankruptcy, the Toowong Property does not “re-vest” in her;

    The Trustee has on numerous occasions between 25 March 2024 and 4 March 2026 demanded possession of the Toowong Property and invited Ms Thompson to remove her possessions;

    The Applicant has brought several applications to restrain the sale of the property, which have been dismissed; and

    The appeal has no prospects of success.

20    Consequences to Ms Thompson will not be remediable: The Trustee’s submissions do not deny that a failure to grant a stay is likely to lead to consequences that could not be undone, if Ms Thompson’s appeal were successful. In the meantime, it is likely that Ms Thompson’s personal possessions on the Toowong Property will be disposed of, and (depending on when an appeal could be heard) there is a distinct possibility that the Toowong Property will be sold before the Full Court rules on the appeal. The sale of the Toowong Property would seem to render this appeal largely academic: although the proceedings before the primary judge raised a large number of issues, Ms Thompson’s primary objective is to recover ownership of the Toowong Property.

21    This factor strongly favours granting a stay, because the purpose of a stay is to protect the right to an appeal: Frigger v Trenfield (Application for Stay Pending Appeal) [2021] FCA 1605 at [10] (Colvin J). The Court would not lightly allow the possibility that an appeal could be rendered nugatory.

22    At the same time, this factor by itself does not mean that Ms Thompson is entitled to a stay: there must be shown to be some risk of an event occurring that may jeopardise the subject matter of the appeal and there must be merit in the appeal: Frigger at [10]. However, the serious consequences of not granting a stay reduces the necessary level of merit required to justify granting a stay: as with the grant of an interlocutory injunction, these two considerations (serious question to be tried, balance of convenience) involve related inquiries, and each should not be considered in isolation from the other: as to which, see, in relation to interlocutory injunctions, Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 at [67] (the Court).

C.3    Whether serious question to be tried (factor (3))

23    The second broad issue is whether the arguments in Ms Thompson’s notice of appeal raise any serious questions for determination (factor (3) above). The Trustee’s principal argument resisting the stay is that the appeal does not raise any serious questions for determination.

24    Approach to assessing merits: In assessing merits, the Court on a stay application is not conducting an appeal, so the Court does not undertake a full review of the proposed arguments raised by an appeal. Quach indicates that the Court undertakes a “preliminary assessment”, similar to an assessment of merits in deciding whether to grant an extension of time. Given the serious consequences of not granting a stay in this case, the Court would need to be confident that the appeal does not raise any serious questions, or (to put the matter another way) that the appeal is not “genuine and based on reasonable grounds”: Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (No 2) [2010] FCA 1212; (2010) 88 IPR 633 at [15] (point 5) (Jagot J).

25    What this means in practice is that, in the case of factual arguments, I will not undertake a review of the underlying factual matter before the primary judge, which was extensive. Instead, the question is whether the factual findings made by the primary judge are capable of being supported by the evidence referred to, or whether there is an arguable error. There are two important points.

    First, there is no error in preferring the evidence of one witness over the evidence of another witness. The primary judge had the advantage of seeing both Mr Lane and Ms Thompson, and reviewing the documents as a whole in the light of their oral evidence. Some of her Honour’s findings are expressly influenced by demeanour (for example, that Mr Lane remained composed in answering questions in cross-examination: J [148]); however, her Honour’s assessment of the witnesses would underpin all of her use of oral evidence.

    Second, in cases not affected by delay (like this one), the mere failure to refer to evidence does not mean that the evidence was overlooked: see Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 17; [2004] FCAFC 189 at [72] (the Court).

26    For example, Ms Thompson complained at the hearing that the primary judge did not refer to the large volume of documentation provided by Ms Thompson which showed (she said) that she had requested the Trustee to provide information, which he had not provided. The primary judge considered this point at J [129]-[131]: her Honour refers to Mr Lane’s evidence that Ms Thompson had sent hundreds of emails to Mr Lane’s office and his legal representatives, and that these requests were broad-ranging and repetitive. Her Honour refers to Mr Lane’s evidence that he considered that Ms Thompson already had access to all relevant information, and refers to Ms Thompson’s submission that one of her affidavits shows requests for documents that were not answered. With this particular example, I consider that Ms Thompson would face considerable difficulties in persuading a Full Court on appeal that the primary judge failed to consider the evidence provided by Ms Thompson.

27    With legal arguments, the issue is whether Ms Thompson’s arguments raise any arguable question of law. As will appear, Ms Thompson seeks to re-agitate points that have been decided against her in previous proceedings, particularly in Thompson v Lane FC. Ms Thompson contends that those previous decisions are all incorrect, and that the Court should not perpetuate this miscarriage of justice. However, as a predictive matter for the purposes of a stay application, Ms Thompson has extremely limited prospects of success in persuading a Full Court to re-visit issues that have been decided in earlier proceedings: see Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 88; (2017) 252 FCR 267 at [13] (the Court). The Courts place high importance on the finality of judicial decisions: as to which, see D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 223 CLR 1 at [34] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ); Queensland v Mr Stradford (a pseudonym) [2025] HCA 3; (2025) 99 ALJR 396 at [2], [109]-[110] (Gageler CJ, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ).

28    Three key points: Underlying Ms Thompson’s appeal grounds are three key points that bear on her prospects on appeal of succeeding in having the title in the Toowong Property returned to her. For the following reasons, Ms Thompson does not have any reasonable prospect of succeeding on any of these three points.

29    No valid debts? First, Ms Thompson contended on a number of occasions at the hearing that there were “no valid debts”, meaning that she should never have been made bankrupt (or at least that her bankruptcy should have been annulled).

30    This issue was decided against Ms Thompson by Logan J in Thompson v Lane (2022). Logan J found (at [37]-[38]) that the trustee in bankruptcy had received proofs of debts totalling around $1.3m. His Honour also refused to annul the bankruptcy, in part because he found (at [84]-[85]) that Ms Thompson was not solvent when the debtor’s petition was presented, and was not solvent at the time of the hearing.

31    The Full Court in Thompson v Lane FC dismissed an appeal, which confirmed that Ms Thompson’s bankruptcy was not annulled. Charlesworth J referred (at [32]) with apparent approval to the finding of Logan J that the Trustee had received proofs of debt totalling around $1.3m. Downes J (at [73]) stated that Mr Lane had received proofs of debt totalling $1.146m, as well as two further costs orders made by the Federal Circuit Court.

32    Ms Thompson contends that the Full Court decision is in error, and that the Court should not perpetuate this “fraud upon the Court”. However, as a predictive matter for the purposes of this stay application, Ms Thompson has extremely limited prospects of succeeding on that point on appeal. The overwhelming likelihood is that the Full Court in this appeal will treat the issue as concluded by Thompson v Lane FC: see [29] above. Accordingly, the grounds discussed in [26]-[52] of the notice of appeal have no reasonable prospects of success.

33    Toowong Property revested in Ms Thompson in 2023? Second, Ms Thompson contends that the Toowong Property should have revested in her when she was discharged from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023. She observes that the trustee only became the registered owner of the Property in February 2024, some nine months after she was discharged from bankruptcy.

34    The key point underlying this argument is the primary judge’s conclusion that property vested in a trustee during a bankruptcy continues to be vested in the trustee after discharge of the bankrupt from bankruptcy if the administration of the bankrupt estate is otherwise ongoing: J [72]. That conclusion is supported by the cases cited by Her Honour; namely, Pegler at 266-267; Daemar at 182-183; and Pekar at [44] (points (3)-(4)), in turn citing Pekar v Holden (Trustee) [2019] FCA 442 at [70] (Moshinsky J). There are extremely limited prospects of Ms Thompson persuading a Full Court that this principle is in error.

35    Once that point is accepted, then there is no incongruity in the vesting occurring as a matter of law on the appointment of Mr Lane, even if the formal step of registration did not occur until some later point (for the reasons explained by the primary judge at J [162]).

36    No continuing administration? Third, Ms Thompson contends that there is no continuing administration of her estate, and that the Bankruptcy Act does not confer indefinite authority on a trustee to deal with a bankrupt’s property.

37    The primary judge considered the affidavit and oral evidence of Mr Lane (at J [79]-[81]), and concluded that there was a continuing statutory purpose for the ongoing administration of Ms Thompson’s bankrupt estate (J [85]-[87]). I cannot identify any arguable error in her Honour’s reasons: I accept the Trustee’s submission that the primary judge applied settled principles, and Ms Thompson does not identify any authority which contradicts this position. The decision of Judge Barlow does not affect the position, for the reasons given by the primary judge at J [90]-[95]. In any event, the Queensland Court of Appeal has since allowed an appeal against the decision of Judge Barlow, and held that the relevant cause of action remained vested in the Trustee: Robinson Locke Litigation Lawyers Pty Ltd v Thompson [2026] QCA 170. Accordingly, there is no reasonable prospect of success with the grounds discussed at [6]-[25] of the notice of appeal, to the extent they raise any point different from the first point considered above.

38    Other arguments: Ms Thompson contends that she was denied procedural fairness, because the primary judge refused Ms Thompson’s application for an adjournment, and the hearing proceeded on 16 July 2026: see [15] above, point (g)(ii)-(iii). The key issue for procedural fairness purposes is whether Ms Thompson was given a reasonable opportunity to present her case; she was not required to be given every opportunity: see Wyman on behalf of the Bidjara People v State of Queensland [2015] FCAFC 108 at [43]-[44] (the Court). Further, in deciding whether to grant an adjournment, the primary judge was required to consider not just whether Ms Thompson had had a reasonable opportunity to prepare her case, but also the interests of the Trustee and the broader interests in the administration of justice, as reflected in ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): see Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 at [42] (the Court); Wyman at [46]. Accordingly, Ms Thompson’s personal view that she required more time to prepare for the hearing (particularly, cross-examination of Mr Lane) does not determine whether, objectively speaking, there was a breach of procedural fairness.

39    I accept the Trustee’s submission that Ms Thompson was given a reasonable opportunity to present her case given that:

(a)    the proceeding was listed for hearing pursuant to orders made 2 March 2026 (meaning that Ms Thompson had over 4 months to prepare for the hearing);

(b)    the Trustee’s affidavit evidence relied on at hearing was filed and served on 2 April 2026;

(c)    the Trustee’s submissions were filed and served on 21 June 2026;

(d)    Ms Thompson had decided that she was going to cross-examine Mr Lane by 2 March 2026 (see J [82]).

40    Another aspect of the procedural fairness argument is that the primary judge dismissed Ms Thompson’s interlocutory application uploaded on 14 July 2026 without a hearing: see [15] above, point (g)(i). As noted below, the primary judge found that this interlocutory application sought either to relitigate issues already determined by the Court, or to duplicate relief which was already the subject of existing proceedings in the Court that were due to go to trial the next month: see [48](6) below. I do not see any arguable error in that characterisation of the interlocutory application, or in the consequent dismissal of that application without a further hearing.

41    In any event, these procedural fairness arguments go only to the process before the primary judge, and do not suggest any error in the outcome reached by her Honour. However, the application for a stay is concerned with whether there was any error in making the orders granting possession in the Toowong Property to the Trustee.

42    Trustee conflicted? Next, Ms Thompson contends that the Trustee was conflicted from accepting the appointment (notice of appeal [53]-[59]). The Trustee says, correctly, that this argument was not raised before the primary judge, which means that Ms Thompson would require leave to raise this argument on appeal. The Full Court is not likely to grant leave, if for no other reason than because this matter could have been addressed by evidence from the Trustee if it had been raised before the primary judge. Further, Downes J set out the circumstances of Mr Lane’s appointment, without criticism, in Thompson v Lane FC at [90]-[93]. In these circumstances, these arguments have no reasonable prospects of success.

43    Allegations against third party lawyers: Ms Thompson in [60]-[66] of the notice of appeal raises allegations against Grace Lawyers and Londy Lawyers, in respect of proceedings brought against Ms Thompson by the body corporate. As the Trustee observes, these lawyers are not parties to the proceeding, and did not participate in the hearing. Further, the question of the costs orders obtained by the body corporate against Ms Thompson in Queensland proceedings was considered fully by Logan J in Thompson v Lane 2022 at [62]ff, who stated that these arguments could have been raised in the State proceedings, and that he was not satisfied that there was any reason to go behind the judgment debts (at [66], [77]). On appeal, Downes J (with Charlesworth J agreeing on this point) held that there was no error in the decision by the primary judge not to go behind the costs orders: Thompson v Lane FC at [150]. These arguments have no reasonable prospects of success.

44    Costs arguments: Ms Thompson in [68]-[82] of the notice of appeal seeks to set aside the orders as to costs. Issues as to costs do not affect whether the orders made for possession of the Toowong Property should have been made. In any event, the primary judge made the usual order as to costs, which is that costs were awarded against the unsuccessful party: Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; (2019) 265 CLR 164 at [25] (the Court).

45    In conclusion, I consider that the arguments raised in Ms Thompson’s notice of appeal do not raise a serious question to be determined, and have no reasonable prospects of success.

C.4    Interests of justice (factors (5)-(6))

46    The final factor is the broader interests of justice, which considers the interests of both parties and the interests in the administration of justice more broadly. The Trustee is correct that a first instance decision is not provisional; however, this factor has less force when (as here) the absence of a stay could well have the effect of rendering an appeal nugatory.

47    Litigation history: Of more significance is that Ms Thompson has already brought a significant volume of litigation arising out of this bankruptcy, and this appeal seeks to re-agitate some issues that have previously been determined against her (particularly as to whether there were any valid debts, and whether the bankruptcy should be annulled). The following outlines the previous decisions of this Court concerning this bankruptcy starting with Thompson v Lane 2022, and the issues determined in those decisions.

(1)    Thompson v Lane 2022 (February 2022): Logan J refused an application for annulment of the bankruptcy. Logan J found that the Trustee had received proof of debts from Ms Thompson’s creditors totally approximately $1.3m: at [37]-[38].

(2)    Thompson v Lane FC (March 2023): The Full Court dismissed an appeal from Logan J, and confirmed that the bankruptcy should not be annulled.

(3)    Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 (Thompson (No 1)) October 2024): Collier J dismissed interim applications that Mr Lane cease acting as the trustee of Ms Thompson’s estate; or that Mr Lane provide “full and frank details” of specified matters. In the course of dealing with the removal application, Collier J held that there was not a serious question to be tried on whether the Trustee had failed to provide information to Ms Thompson, or whether he had breached his duties as trustee: Thompson (No 1) at [46]. Her Honour held that there was no material to suggest, even at a prima facie level, that there had been any wrongdoing in respect of the payment of monies; and that there was no serious question to be tried on whether the Trustee had breached s 19 of the Bankruptcy Act: Thompson (No 1) at [55], [59]. Collier J stated in this context that the proceedings were not a means through which Ms Thompson could re-litigate her loss before Logan J: Thompson (No 1) at [65].

(4)    Thompson v Lane (leave to appeal) (August 2025): Vandongen J dismissed an application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal against Thompson (No 1). His Honour found that none of Ms Thompson’s arguments was reasonably arguable: Thompson v Lane (leave to appeal) at [88].

(5)    Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86 (February 2026): Collier J dismissed an application that she recuse herself from hearing and determining QUD447/2023, QUD176/2024 and QUD 490/2025, and that she set aside Thompson (No 1). One of the claimed bases for setting aside Thompson (No 1) was that Ms Thompson claimed that she was never insolvent, and that she was never liable for debts of $1.3m: see Thompson v Lane (No 2) at [22]. Her Honour held that there was no basis for her to set aside Thompson v Lane (No 1), and noted that Ms Thompson had applied for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal, which had been rejected: Thompson v Lane (No 2) at [40]-[42].

(6)    Thompson v Lane (No 3) (June 2026): Collier J dismissed an interlocutory application which sought (among other things) interim relief that the decision in Thompson v Lane (No 1) be set aside; that the hearing of QUD447/2023, QUD176/2024 and QUD490/2025 be delisted until the set aside application was determined by another judge; and other final relief including that Mr Lane is to cease to act as trustee of Ms Thompson’s estate in bankruptcy, and Mr Lane is to transfer the title in the Toowong Property back to Ms Thompson: Thompson v Lane (No 3) at [5]-[6]. After conducting a case management hearing on 17 June 2026, Collier J dismissed the application forthwith without any further hearing. Her Honour held that the application sought either to relitigate issues already determined by the Court, or duplicate relief which was already the subject of existing proceedings in the Court that were due to go to trial the next month: Thompson v Lane (No 3) at [16], [27].

48    These circumstances bear on whether it is in the interests of justice to grant a stay. As already explained, I accept that a failure to grant a stay in this case could well render the proposed appeal nugatory. That is a very serious matter. On the other hand, the grounds of the proposed appeal do not raise any serious question to be tried, and in key respects seek to re-litigate issues that have already been determined against Ms Thompson, particularly in Thompson v Lane FC. Again, I appreciate that Ms Thompson contends that the decisions of Logan J and the Full Court were based on incorrect information, and that the Court should not perpetuate this miscarriage of justice and fraud upon the Court. However, arguments along those lines were rejected in Thompson v Lane (No 1), and leave to appeal was refused in Thompson v Lane (leave to appeal), on the basis that these arguments were without merit. I accept the Trustee’s submissions that the interests of Ms Thompson’s creditors are also a relevant matter in assessing the interests of justice.

49    Conclusion: Taking these matters together, the lack of any apparent merit in Ms Thompson’s arguments, and the fact that key aspects of those arguments repeat arguments already rejected in this Court, mean that it is not in the interests of justice to grant a stay, even though I accept that not granting a stay could render the appeal academic, if the Toowong Property is sold before that appeal is heard and determined.

50    It is also a concern that Ms Thompson’s personal possessions may well be disposed of in the absence of a stay. I would not necessarily consider the period since the orders of the primary judge (from 30 October to 9 November) as being ample opportunity for Ms Thompson to pack up her personal possessions, as submitted by the Trustee. However, as I understand it, she had access to the Toowong Property up until around March 2025: see J [61], fourth last dot point. Mr Lane was appointed trustee on 1 July 2020, and title in the Toowong Property vested in him from that date under ss 58 and 132 of the Bankruptcy Act. The Trustee states in his submissions that he has been demanding that Ms Thompson vacate the Toowong Property since March 2024 (after the Trustee became the registered owner). Ms Thompson submitted at the hearing that she should not be required to clear out “her home”; however, on the position found by Thompson v Lane FC, she has been bankrupt since July 2020, and the Toowong Property has not been her home as a matter of law since that date. When viewed in that light, the prejudice to Ms Thompson is less stark than it might first appear. In any event, prejudice to Ms Thompson is not the only relevant factor, and is outweighed in this case by other factors, as explained above.

D.    conclusion

51    For these reasons, the application for a stay is dismissed.

52    I accept the Trustee’s submission that the costs of this application should be paid on a solicitor-client basis out of the bankrupt estate of Ms Thompson, and paid in priority under s 109 of the Bankruptcy Act.

I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hill.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026