Federal Court of Australia

Nathan v Burness (Trustee) [2026] FCA 1776

Application for leave to appeal from:

Nathan v Burness (Trustee), in the matter of Nathan [2026] FCA 672

File number(s):

NSD 1073 of 2026

Judgment of:

THAWLEY J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from orders for security for costs – where proposed grounds of appeal have no real prospects of success – where the primary judge could not be said to have erred in finding that the respondents remained trustees of the applicant’s bankrupt estate and that it was appropriate for them to participate in the proceeding to which the applicant had joined them, with the consequence that they had a future costs exposure – where the primary judge could not be said to have erred in deciding the security for costs application on the papers, rather than in open Court – where no substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused – held: application for leave to appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 31, 54, 149 and 153B

Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 (Cth)

Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act (No 4) 1992 (Cth)

Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth) reg 53

Cases cited:

Capital Finance Aust Pty Ltd v Nathan [2008] FMCA 1363

Commissioner of Taxation v Patrix Prestige Pty Ltd [2024] FCAFC 148; 306 FCR 56

Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397

Marlton Group Pty Ltd v Villawood Management Pty Ltd [2026] FCAFC 147

Nathan v Burness (No 2) [2011] FCA 289

Nathan v Burness (Trustee), in the matter of Nathan [2026] FCA 672

Ziegler v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCAFC 168; 313 FCR 574

Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Bill (No 4) 1992 (Cth)

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Commercial and Corporations

Sub-area:

General and Personal Insolvency

Number of paragraphs:

34

Date of hearing:

18 November 2026

Counsel for the applicant:

The applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the respondents:

Mr L Freckelton

Solicitor for the respondents:

Strongman & Crouch

ORDERS

NSD 1073 of 2026

BETWEEN:

KAILAI NATHAN

Applicant

AND:

PAUL BURNESS AND MORGAN LANE AS TRUSTEES OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF KAILAI NATHAN

Respondents

order made by:

THAWLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for leave to appeal dated 21 June 2026 is dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THAWLEY J:

Introduction

1    Mr Kailai Nathan brought an application in this Court seeking an annulment of his bankruptcy under s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). There are two unusual aspects to that application.

2    First, Mr Nathan was made bankrupt more than 17 years ago: Capital Finance Aust Pty Ltd v Nathan [2008] FMCA 1363. He has not been discharged from bankruptcy because he has never filed a statement of affairs in accordance with s 54 of the Bankruptcy Act with the consequence that the time in s 149(1) never started to run, although the administration of his bankrupt estate has been finalised.

3    Second, Mr Nathan has already applied for an order annulling his bankruptcy under s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act some 16 years ago, in 2010. That application was dismissed with costs in 2011: Nathan v Burness (No 2) [2011] FCA 289. Mr Nathan has neither appealed from that decision nor paid the costs he was ordered to pay.

4    Mr Nathan joined the trustees of his bankrupt estate as respondents to his more recent annulment application. In light of the unusual history outlined above, the trustees sought an order for security for costs. The parties consented to that application being determined on the papers. On 29 May 2026, the primary judge ordered that Mr Nathan provide security for costs in the amount of $32,000 on or before 26 June 2026: Nathan v Burness (Trustee), in the matter of Nathan [2026] FCA 672 (J). His Honour also ordered that the proceeding be dismissed if security was not provided in accordance with the orders.

5    By an application lodged on 21 June 2026, Mr Nathan applied for an extension of time and leave to appeal from the primary judge’s orders. An order was made on 13 August 2026, extending the time by which Mr Nathan could seek leave to appeal to 21 June 2026.

6    The sole proposed ground in Mr Nathan’s application for leave to appeal from the orders of the primary judge is as follows:

His Honour erred in law in the exercise of the discretion to order security without identifying any respondent with a legal interest requiring future protection. Once his Honour found that the administration had been finalised, the respondents ceased to be trustees and had no future costs exposure.

7    By his written submissions dated 27 August 2026, Mr Nathan also challenged the primary judge’s orders on the basis that his Honour determined the application for security for costs on the papers in contravention of s 31(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act: AS at [5] to [9], [14] to [15]. Section 31(1)(c) provides:

31 Exercise of jurisdiction

(1)    In exercising jurisdiction under this Act, the Court shall hear and determine the following matters in open Court:

…

(c)    proceedings in connection with the consideration of an annulment of a bankruptcy under section 153B …

8    At the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, it seemed (although it was not entirely clear) that Mr Nathan contended that:

(a)    the primary judge should have determined the security for costs application in open Court, notwithstanding the parties’ consent to it being determined on the papers; and

(b)    the primary judge (or the Court) could not make an order for security for costs with associated orders the effect of which could bring the proceeding to an end without the Court hearing his s 153B application.

9    Also, Mr Nathan contended that the primary judge erred in finding at J[34] that there were “additional factors” beyond Mr Nathan’s impecuniosity which warranted the making of an order for security for costs. He submitted that there was no evidence for such a finding.

10    The respondent trustees did not object to Mr Nathan raising these further issues.

11    For leave to appeal to be granted, it is necessary for Mr Nathan to show that the two limbs in Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398–9 are satisfied: (a) that the primary judge’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the appellate court; and (b) that, supposing the decision to be wrong, substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. Those limbs are cumulative and must be weighed together – see: Marlton Group Pty Ltd v Villawood Management Pty Ltd [2026] FCAFC 147 at [30].

12    For the reasons that follow, none of the grounds raised by Mr Nathan have sufficient merit when assessed and weighed together with any injustice which would flow if, supposing the primary judge’s decision to be wrong, leave to appeal were refused. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Insufficient doubt to warrant granting leave

The respondents’ future costs exposure

13    Mr Nathan’s primary contention was that the administration of his bankrupt estate has been finalised with the consequence that the respondents ceased to be trustees of his bankrupt estate. They were therefore not proper parties to the annulment proceeding and would not be liable to incur costs defending the proceeding: J[28]; AS at [11], [27].

14    That contention is incorrect. As the primary judge explained, Mr Nathan has never been discharged from bankruptcy because he has never filed a statement of affairs in accordance with s 54 of the Bankruptcy Act, meaning the time in s 149(1) never started to run: J[1]. The respondents remained and remain in office as trustees of his bankrupt estate.

15    At the hearing, Mr Nathan relied on reg 53 of the Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth), read together with the heading to Division 3 of Part 8 of the regulations. The heading states: “Registered trustee ceasing to be trustee of an estate”. Regulation 53 relevantly provides:

53 Notice of finalisation of administration

(1)    If the trustee of a regulated debtor’s estate (other than the Official Trustee) finalises the administration of the debtor’s estate, the trustee must:

(a)    give the Official Receiver written notice of the finalisation; and

(b)    do so within 5 business days after the day of the finalisation. …

16    Regulation 53 does not provide that a trustee ceases to hold office when the administration is finalised. It requires a trustee, upon finalising the administration, to give notice of that fact to the Official Receiver. The heading to Division 3 of Part 8 does not alter that conclusion. Although a heading may assist in construing the provisions to which it relates, headings are generally descriptive or introductory rather than operative and cannot confer an effect that the operative provisions, construed in context (which includes the heading), do not have: Commissioner of Taxation v Patrix Prestige Pty Ltd [2024] FCAFC 148; 306 FCR 56 at [19]; Ziegler v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCAFC 168; 313 FCR 574 at [46].

17    The primary judge’s conclusion that the respondents would have a costs exposure in the annulment application to which Mr Nathan had joined them as parties is not arguably wrong or attended by any doubt.

Determination of the application for security for costs on the papers

18    Although the language of s 31(1)(c) is broad, it is clear from the legislative history that it is directed to the hearing of a substantive application for an annulment by the Court under s 153B where a person ought not to have been made bankrupt. It is not directed to the hearing of interlocutory applications or procedural matters in a proceeding seeking relief under s 153B.

19    The Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) introduced annulments of bankruptcies by operation of law, that is, without any application to the Court. Section 31(1)(c) was amended by the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act (No 4) 1992 (Cth) to address this change. Paragraph (c) before the change was as follows:

(c)    applications for an order of discharge or annulment of a bankruptcy …

20    Paragraph (c) after the change was as follows:

(c)    proceedings in connection with the consideration of an annulment of a bankruptcy under section 153B …

21    The Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Bill (No 4) 1992 (Cth) explained at p 7:

Jurisdiction of the Court

In addition to the early discharge regime mentioned above, the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 provided for bankruptcies to be annulled by operation of law where the bankrupt’s debts have been paid in full or where creditors accept a composition or scheme of arrangement, and for the removal of the ability of creditors to seek leave of the Court to enter an objection to the discharge of a bankrupt. However, the Court’s discretion to annul a bankruptcy where the Court is satisfied that the bankruptcy ought not to have been made was retained.

The amendments to section 31 will require the Court to hear proceedings relating to the annulment of a bankruptcy where it ought not to have been made, and remove the requirement to hear objections in open court, as the court no longer has specific jurisdiction to deal with such a matter.

22    The purpose of the change to s 31(1)(c) was to make it clear that the paragraph was only applicable to annulment applications under s 153B. Parliament should not be taken to have intended that all interlocutory applications and case management issues in a s 153B proceeding be heard in open Court.

23    One would not lightly take Parliament to have intended, for example, to prohibit procedural hearings otherwise than in open Court or to require an application to set aside a subpoena in a s 153B proceeding to be determined in open Court rather than “in open Court or in Chambers” as permitted by s 31(2).

24    An application for security for costs made in a proceeding seeking an annulment under s 153B is not prevented by s 31(1)(c) from being determined on the papers. There is little merit in the argument that the primary judge erred in determining the application for security for costs on the papers, a course to which Mr Nathan consented: J[3].

Section 31(1)(c) did not prevent the security for costs order being made

25    Section 31(1)(c) does not prevent the Court from making security for costs orders which could result in the proceeding being dismissed without a hearing of the substantive application for annulment in open Court.

26    The requirement in s 31(1) that “the Court shall hear and determine the following matters in open Court” operates only to specify the mode of hearing of the substantive application for annulment, not to require a hearing of such an application such that the proceeding cannot be brought to an end by, for example, non-compliance with an order to provide security for costs.

27    This argument has little weight in favour of granting leave to appeal.

Evidence for finding there were “additional factors”

28    Mr Nathan submitted that there was no evidentiary basis for the “additional factor” referred to by the primary judge in his Honour’s reasoning at [33] and [34], being the 2011 costs order which Mr Nathan has never paid.

29    As the respondents submitted, that matter was directly addressed in the affidavit of Mr Burness of 20 March 2026 at [8] and [15].

30    This ground could not arguably succeed.

No substantial injustice if leave were refused

31    Mr Nathan would not face substantial injustice if leave were refused.

32    First, and leaving aside the lack of arguable error, Mr Nathan could have pursued the annulment proceeding if he wished. All that occurred is that he first had to provide security for costs. Mr Nathan has frustrated the ability of the respondents to determine whether or not he could satisfy any costs order made against him, and of the Court to determine whether any order for security for costs would stultify the proceeding, because he has, over many years, failed to disclose any substantial information about his financial affairs: J[26].

33    Secondly, Mr Nathan has already had an annulment application determined by the Court: Nathan v Burness (No 2) [2011] FCA 289. There is a relation between the grounds now advanced by Mr Nathan for annulment and the grounds advanced in 2010 – see: J[21].

Conclusion

34    Mr Nathan’s application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Thawley.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026