Federal Court of Australia
Kavanagh v Atlassian Pty Ltd (Confidentiality and Non-Publication Application) [2026] FCA 1774
File number: | NSD 1752 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | PERRY J |
Date of judgment: | 20 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for a non-publication order pursuant to ss 37AF(1) and 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and confidentiality order under r 2.32(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011(Cth) – principles of open justice – circumstances where a non-publication order is not necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice – application granted in part for a strictly limited time and otherwise dismissed |
Legislation: | Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 17, 37AA, 37AE, 37AF, 37AF(1), 37AG, 37AG(1)(a), 37AG(2), 37AH(2)(d), 37AI, 37AI(1), 37AI(2), 37AJ Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 2.32(2), 2.32(3)(a), 28.02 |
Cases cited: | Berryman v NextDC Limited [2026] FCA 1065 EOF25 v Talbot [2025] FCA 1091 Falco v Zscaler Australia Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 22 Johnson v H&M Hennes & Mauritz Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 834 Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Confidentiality Applications) [2024] FCA 954 Forrest v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2026] FCAFC 69 Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 Kavanagh v Atlassian Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1509 Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2023] FCAFC 22; 296 FCR 272 Neve v LVMH Perfume & Cosmetics Group Pty Ltd (Suppression Order) [2026] FCA 108 Ogawa (formerly Ms PD) v President of the Australian Human Rights Commission (Pseudonym) [2022] FCAFC 160; 294 FCR 221 Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] FCA 629 Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2) [2024] FCA 818 Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863 Ritter v Savills (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] FCA 1169 Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2024] FCA 1210 The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; (2020) 275 FCR 377 |
Division: | Fair Work Division |
Registry: | New South Wales |
National Practice Area: | Employment and Industrial Relations |
Number of paragraphs: | 46 |
Date of hearing: | 18 November 2026 |
Counsel for the Applicant: | The applicant appeared in person. |
Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr B. Rauf |
Solicitor for the Respondents | K&L Gates |
ORDERS
NSD 1752 of 2026 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | ALAN KAVANAGH Applicant | |
AND: | ATLASSIAN PTY LTD First Respondent TALAL TAYYAB Second Respondent FELIX FERRIS Third Respondent | |
order made by: | PERRY J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 20 november 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The interim confidentiality and non-publication orders made by Kennett J on 2 October 2026 under s 37AI of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act) and as extended by Stellios J on 8 and 13 October 2026, cease as from the time of the making of these orders.
2. Until 11:59pm on 24 November 2026, pursuant to s 37AF of the Act and on the ground in s 37AG(1)(a) of the Act that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following documents filed in this Court be ordered confidential for the purposes of r 2.32(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and their publication (except to the parties’ legal representatives) be prohibited:
(a) Applicant’s Interlocutory Application filed on 18 September 2026;
(b) Applicant’s Concise Statement;
(c) Applicant’s Affidavit affirmed on 17 September 2026;
(d) Respondent’s Interlocutory Application filed on 1 October 2026;
(e) Affidavit of Talal Tayyib affirmed on 1 October 2026; and
(f) Affidavit of Yvette Salem affirmed on 1 October 2026 with the exception of paragraphs 1 to 5 and 44 to 49 inclusive;.
(g) Affidavit of Alan Kavanagh affirmed on 6 October 2026;
(h) Affidavit of Alan Kavanagh affirmed on 7 November 2026;
(i) Supplementary Affidavit of Alan Kavanagh affirmed on 7 November 2026; and
(j) Applicant's Second Interlocutory Application filed on 6 November 2026.
3. The respondents’ interlocutory application filed on 1 October 2026 and as amended on 11 November 2026, is otherwise be dismissed.
4. Save with leave of the Court, no party is to use generative artificial intelligence to produce text in any document filed with the Court, including submissions and affidavits.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
5. At the case management hearing on 11 November 2026 and the hearing of the respondents’ interlocutory application on 18 November 2026, the applicant indicated that it was his intention to engage legal representatives to act for him in the proceeding. At those hearings, Justice Perry emphasised the desirability of the applicant following this course at the earliest opportunity.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRY J:
[1] | |
[4] | |
[14] | |
[29] | |
[29] | |
[31] | |
[33] | |
5 USE OF GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN SUBMISSIONS | [45] |
1. INTRODUCTION
1 The applicant, Mr Alan Kavanagh, is employed as a senior software engineer by the first respondent, Atlassian Pty Ltd. The second and third respondents are also employees of Atlassian. Mr Kavanagh alleges that the respondents have contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in various respects.
2 By an amended interlocutory application dated 11 November 2026, the respondents seek orders pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) (the s 37AF application) that all of the documents filed to date, save for the original and amended IA themselves, be ordered confidential for the purposes of r 2.32(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and their publication, save to the parties’ legal representatives, be prohibited. The applicant seeks those orders on the basis that they are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice: s 37AG(1)(a). The respondents rely upon the affidavit of Yvette Salem, Senior Director of Employment Law with the first respondent, affirmed on 1 October 2026 in support of the orders under s 37AF.
3 For the reasons that follow, the s 37AF application must be dismissed and the interim non-publication orders made by the duty judges pursuant to s 37AI of the FCA Act made on 2 and 8 October 2026 and extended until further order on 13 October 2026, lifted.
2. BACKGROUND
4 The procedural background up to the orders made by Stellios J as duty judge given on 13 October 2026 is set out in his Honour’s reasons in Kavanagh v Atlassian Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1509 (Kavanagh (No. 1)) and need not be repeated here.
5 Suffice it to say that on 2 October 2026, Kennett J, as then duty judge, made interim non-publication and confidentiality orders under s 37AI of the FCA Act over all of the documents then filed in the proceedings, pending the outcome of an application foreshadowed by the respondents for final confidentiality and non-publication orders under s 37AF(1). These orders were extended on 8 October 2026 until further order of the Court by Stellios J (also as duty judge) with the exclusion of the respondents’ s 37AF application itself. In addition, three further documents which had been filed in the meantime were made subject also to interim confidentiality and non-publication orders.
6 In his judgment given on 13 October 2026 extending the interim orders, Stellios J first referred to cases in which orders had been made pursuant to s 37AF in relation to the entirety of filed documents pending negotiation, namely:
(1) Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] FCA 629 (Raper J) (Patterson (No 1)), where the orders were intended to operate for a few days until exhaustion of the mediation process;
(2) Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2024] FCA 1210 (Perram J) where the mediation was scheduled to take place within two to six weeks of the orders (at [4]);
(3) Neve v LVMH Perfume & Cosmetics Group Pty Ltd (Suppression Order) [2026] FCA 108 (Perram J) where the orders were specified to endure until the earlier of a specified date six weeks hence or 7 days after termination of the mediation process; and
(4) Falco v Zscaler Australia Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 22 (Bromwich J) where the mediation was to occur within two months of the orders being made, with the confidentiality and non-publication orders extending until the later of 7 days after the mediation had been terminated, or a specified date just over 3 months from the orders having been made. The effect of those orders was that, if the mediation process terminated within, for example, one month of the making of those orders, the confidentiality order would still be in place for another two months.
(The Patterson line of authorities.)
7 Stellios J considered that the early stage of the proceedings meant that there was no opportunity yet for the parties to seek an order for mediation. Thus, in his view, orders tethered to the date of mediation would be premature, while orders setting a fixed date for expiry would be “largely inutile until the proceeding has sufficiently progressed to have some meaningful estimation of a timetable for mediation”.
8 Justice Stellios also accepted that when determining the necessity of preventing prejudice to the proper administration of justice, account may be taken of the fact that a lack of access to the Court file may enhance the parties prospects of a negotiated settlement and there is a significant public interest in proceedings settling, especially at an early stage, citing Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2) [2024] FCA 818 at [17] and [18] (Raper J).
9 On the other hand, Stellios J acknowledged reservations expressed in this Court about including entire documents within the scope of a non-publication order without further particularisation: Johnson v H&M Hennes & Mauritz Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 834 at [11]–[12] (Lee J); Berryman v NextDC Limited [2026] FCA 1065 at [19] (Lee J); Forrest v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2026] FCAFC 69 at [68] (Lee J, Abraham and Vandongen JJ agreeing at [260]). His Honour also expressed difficulties with the respondents’ submission that, given the “embryonic stage of the proceeding”, it would not be efficient on an urgent interlocutory application for the parties of the Court “to rake through the various documents to distil the passages that should be redacted”.
10 Ultimately, in the circumstances at the time, Stellios J did not consider that the s 37AF(1) application was “ripe for consideration”. In his Honour’s view, the application “would benefit from further progression of the proceeding in its case management, at least to a position where orders have been made for mediation, if not further orders in relation to the pleadings, and further attention by the respondents to the particularity of the orders sought” (Kavanagh (No. 1) at [32]). On the other hand, his Honour considered that “the failure to make orders under s 37AF may have a detrimental impact on the parties’ desire to mediate the dispute”. The “practical solution” to this dilemma accepted by his Honour was to extend the s 37AI interim orders (Kavanagh (No. 1) at [33]) and orders were made accordingly as set out above.
11 Following the matter being allocated to me as docket judge, I held a case management hearing on 11 November 2026. At the case management hearing, the respondents sought orders:
(1) setting a timetable for the filing of pleadings to be completed by 19 February 2027;
(2) for the s 37AF application to be listed for hearing on a date after 19 February 2027; and
(3) for the matter to be referred to mediation before a Registrar under r 28.02 of the Rules after determination of the s 37AF application.
12 However, I was concerned that these orders did not accord with the obligation on the Court to determine an application under s 37AF “as a matter of urgency” where an interim order is made under s 37AI(1) of the FCA Act: see s 37AI(2). Accordingly, bearing in mind that Mr Kavanagh is unrepresented and opposes the non-publication orders, I set the s 37AF application down for hearing a week later on 18 November 2026 and gave leave to the respondents to file an amended s 37AF application.
13 At the same time, I ordered that the parties attend a confidential conciliation before a Registrar of this Court. I note that the confidential conciliation has since been listed for 24 November 2026. The intended scope of this conference is limited, in that it is directed towards the resolution of issues arising out of the applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 6 November 2026, the various undertakings provided by the first respondent, and the practicalities of managing the applicant’s performance while these proceedings remain on foot. Timetabling orders were also made for the filing of pleadings.
3. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
14 The starting point is s 17 of the FCA Act providing that, save where that Act or another law of the Commonwealth authorises, “the jurisdiction of the Court shall be exercised in open court”. This reflects the fundamental common law rule that, with limited exceptions, the administration of justice must occur in open court: Ogawa (formerly Ms PD) v President of the Australian Human Rights Commission (Pseudonym) [2022] FCAFC 160; 294 FCR 221 at [23] (the Court).
15 As to the rationale underlying open justice, the Full Court explained in Ogawa at [26] that:
One reason for the common law’s insistence that justice be administered in public, transparently, in open court, that is reflected in ss 17(1) and 37AE of the Federal Court Act, is the importance of the common law right of any person to make fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings: Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 at 450A–B per Lord Diplock; [John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465] at 477A, 481C–E. As McHugh JA said (5 NSWLR 481E–F):
Without the publication of the reports of court proceedings, the public would be ignorant of the workings of the courts whose proceedings would inevitably become the subject of the rumours, misunderstandings, exaggerations and falsehoods which are so often associated with secret decision making. The publication of fair and accurate reports of court proceedings is therefore vital to the proper working of an open and democratic society and to the maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice. It is a right which can only be taken away by words of plain intendment.
(emphasis added)
16 Similarly, the Full Court in Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2023] FCAFC 22; 296 FCR 272 at [84] explained that:
Open justice facilitates public scrutiny of the way in which courts decide cases and enables the public to understand how the justice system works and why decisions are taken. Counsel for The Age referred to Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd (No 23) [2019] VSC 417; 58 VR 611 at [63], in which Elliott J stated (citations omitted):
The rationale of the principle of open justice is to expose court proceedings, and the evidence in court proceedings, to “public and professional scrutiny”. Such scrutiny informs the public as to how judicial power is exercised, and on what evidential basis. Relatedly, it helps ensure courts are held accountable, and so guards against the possibility of the misuse of judicial power. As a result, it aids in maintaining public confidence in the integrity and independence of the courts.
17 Part VAA of the FCA Act (ss 37AA to 37AL) creates a strict regime by which “Suppression and non-publication orders” may be made.
18 First, in line with the importance accorded to the principle of open justice, s 37AE provides that “the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice” in deciding whether to make such an order (emphasis added). As Jagot J observed in Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863 at [83] (and cited by the Full Court in Lee also at [83]):
The [FCA Act] is clear – a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice: s 37AE. The fact that this is “a” not “the” primary objective of the administration of justice reflects the fact that there are other primary objectives, including those in s 37M of the Court Act to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.
19 Secondly, the power to make a suppression or non-publication order is found in s 37AF of the FCA Act which provides:
(1) The Court may, by making a suppression order or non-publication order on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:
(a) information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court; or
(b) information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is:
(i) information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or
(ii) information obtained by the process of discovery; or
(iii) information produced under a subpoena; or
(iv) information lodged with or filed in the Court.
(2) The Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1).
20 A “non-publication” order is defined in s 37AA to mean “an order that prohibits or restricts the publication of information (but that does not otherwise prohibit or restrict the disclosure of information)”. It is therefore to be distinguished from a “suppression order” which is defined in s 37AA to mean “an order that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of information (by publication or otherwise)”. It is an order of the former kind which is sought here.
21 Thirdly, among other persons, news publishers are entitled to appear and be heard by the Court on an application for a suppression or non-publication order: FCA Act s 37AH(2)(d). In the present case, while some news publishers had made non-party access requests and were advised of the hearing of the s 37AF application, none sought to appear.
22 Fourthly, if the Court makes a suppression or non-publication order, s 37AG(2) requires the Court to specify the ground or grounds for doing so. The grounds on which the Court may make a suppression order or non-publication order are also set out in s 37AG, which provides that:
(1) The Court may make a suppression order or non-publication order on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice;
(b) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security;
(c) the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person;
(d) the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in a criminal proceeding involving an offence of a sexual nature (including an act of indecency).
23 Furthermore, in deciding the period for which a suppression or non-publication order is to endure, s 37AJ provides that “the Court is to ensure that the order operates for no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is made”.
24 In addition, while r 2.32(2) of the Rules provides that non-parties may, after the first directions hearing, inspect certain filed documents, this does not apply to a document which the Court has ordered be confidential by virtue of r 2.32(3)(a).
25 Importantly, it is for the applicant to persuade the Court that the non-publication order is necessary in the relevant sense. As, for example, Colvin J in Ritter v Savills (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] FCA 1169 emphasised at [7]–[8], the word “necessary’ to describe the criterion to be met for making a suppression order is a strong word” and is measured by reference to the fact that the exercise of judicial power is fundamentally one which should take place openly such that it can be subjected to public scrutiny. It follows that the onus on the respondents in the context of an application for an order under s 37AE is a heavy one (as Wigney J emphasised in EOF25 v Talbot [2025] FCA 1091 at [16]) and stands in contrast to an interim suppression or non-publication order under s 37AI which may be decided “without determining the merits of the application”.
26 The principles relating to the provision of a suppression or non-publication order are well-established and summarised in Ogawa at [27]–[29] as follows:
Considerations of embarrassment, convenience or personal sensitivity to the publication of personal and often very private circumstances given in evidence or revealed in the course of a proceeding in open court, of themselves, cannot justify or support the exercise of any inherent or implied power of a court to suppress or prohibit the publication of those matters. None of the grounds in s 37AG(1) for a statutory suppression or non-publication order refers to such a basis other than, perhaps, the ground in s 37AG(1)(d) (which, however, only applies in a criminal proceeding). The reason that considerations of embarrassment, convenience or personal sensitivity are not relevant to a Court’s inherent and statutory powers to derogate from the principle of open justice is that the principle is a fundamental condition for the exercise of every court’s jurisdiction, subject to any common law or statutory exception. As French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ said in [Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; 240 CLR 651] at [31] in respect of an analogue of s 37AF (and see too: R v Tait (1979) 46 FLR 386 at 404 per Brennan, Deane and Gallop JJ and The Food Improvers Pty Ltd v BGR Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) (2006) 155 FCR 216 at 220–223 [18]–[29] per Rares J):
It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order under s 50 appears to the Federal Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some “balancing exercise”, the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics.
(footnote omitted)
Thus, at common law, subject to very limited exceptions, a court has power to make an order derogating from the law’s insistence that it exercise its jurisdiction in open court in accordance with the principle of open justice only where the public disclosure of evidence or other matter, or the identity of a party to, or a person involved in, a proceeding would frustrate the administration of justice. In [Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417] at 437–8, Viscount Haldane LC instanced that exceptions to this principle include the wardship and lunacy jurisdictions as well as the protection of trade secrets and confidential information.
27 Nor is there any element of discretion in determining whether or not to make a non-publication or suppression order once the Court is satisfied that one of the grounds in s 37AG applies. As the Full Court (Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ) explained in The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; (2020) 275 FCR 377 at [9]:
The question whether an order is necessary will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. Once the court is satisfied that an order is necessary, it would be an error not to make it: Hogan at [33]. There is no exercise of discretion or balancing exercise involved: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430 at [21].
(Emphasis added.)
28 Finally, French CJ in Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at [21]–[22] usefully gives a number of examples of the kinds of circumstances that may properly found the making of a suppression order as follows:
It has long been accepted at common law that the application of the open justice principle may be limited in the exercise of a superior court’s inherent jurisdiction or an inferior court’s implied powers. This may be done where it is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. In a proceeding involving a secret technical process, a public hearing of evidence of the secret process could “cause an entire destruction of the whole matter in dispute”. Similar considerations inform restrictions on the disclosure in open court of evidence in an action for injunctive relief against an anticipated breach of confidence. In the prosecution of a blackmailer, the name of the blackmailer’s victim, called as a prosecution witness, may be suppressed because of the “keen public interest in getting blackmailers convicted and sentenced” and the difficulties that may be encountered in getting complainants to come forward “unless they are given this kind of protection”. So too, in particular circumstances, may the name of a police informant or the identity of an undercover police officer. The categories of case are not closed, although they will not lightly be extended. Where “exceptional and compelling considerations going to national security” require that the confidentiality of certain materials be preserved, a departure from the ordinary open justice principle may be justified. The character of the proceedings and the nature of the function conferred upon the court may also qualify the application of the open-court principle. The jurisdiction of courts in relation to wards of the state and mentally ill people was historically an exception to the general rule that proceedings should be held in public because the jurisdiction exercised in such cases was “parental and administrative, and the disposal of controverted questions … an incident only in the jurisdiction”. Proceedings not “in the ordinary course of litigation”, such as applications for leave to appeal, can also be determined without a public hearing.
It is a common law corollary of the open-court principle that, absent any restriction ordered by the court, anybody may publish a fair and accurate report of the proceedings, including the names of the parties and witnesses, and the evidence, testimonial, documentary or physical, that has been given in the proceedings.
(Footnotes omitted.)
4. DISPOSITION OF THE S 37AF APPLICATION
4.1 The scope of the non-publication orders sought
29 The s 37AF application seeks a non-publication order in the following terms:
1. Until 14 days after the mediation process is terminated or further order of the Court, pursuant to s 37AF(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act) and on the ground in s 37AG(1)(a) of the Act that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following documents filed in this Court be ordered confidential for the purposes of r 2.32(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and their publication (except to the parties’ legal representatives) be prohibited:
(a) Originating Application under the Fair Work Act 2009 Alleging Discrimination filed on 18 September 2026;
(b) Applicant’s Interlocutory Application filed on 18 September 2026;
(c) Applicant’s Concise Statement;
(d) Applicant’s Affidavit affirmed on 17 September 2026;
(e) Respondent’s Interlocutory Application filed on 1 October 2026;
(f) Affidavit of Talal Tayyib affirmed on 1 October 2026; and
(g) Affidavit of Yvette Salem affirmed on 1 October 2026.
(h) Affidavit of Alan Kavanagh affirmed on 6 October 2026;
(i) Affidavit of Alan Kavanagh affirmed on 7 November 2026;
(j) Supplementary Affidavit of Alan Kavanagh affirmed on 7 November 2026; and
(k) Applicant's Second Interlocutory Application filed on 6 November 2026.
2. Until 14 days after the termination of the mediation process, where further material not listed in order 1 is to be filed in this proceeding (including the statement of claim of the Applicant, the Defences of the respondents, and any Reply by the Applicant):
(a) the parties must confer before the filing of that material to determine whether such material should be the subject of order 1; and
(b) either party may apply to the Court on an urgent basis for orders 1 to be extended to such material.
30 Proposed order 2 is based upon orders made by Perram J in Saw which his Honour explained as follows:
…Seven’s interlocutory application also seeks suppression and non-publication orders over the defence and any reply. As these documents have not yet been filed, it is not appropriate at this stage to make an order in respect of them. Prior to the filing of these documents, the parties should confer to determine if these documents should, for the reasons stated herein, also be subject to suppression and non-publication orders. Either party may apply to the Court for such orders on an urgent basis.
4.2 The respondents’ submissions in support of the orders
31 The totality of the evidence on the basis of which the s 37AF application is made are set out at [44]–[49] of the Salem affidavit, namely that:
44. I understand that the Court has received a request by a non-party for access to Court documents for the following documents:
(a) Originating Application under the Fair Work Act 2009 Alleging Discrimination
(b) Interlocutory Application
(c) Concise Statement
(d) Affidavit of Alan Gerard Kavanagh on 17 September 2026.
(collectively, the Documents)
45. The Respondents are concerned about the disclosure and publication of the Documents and other documents which will be filed in this proceeding (namely my affidavit and the Affidavit of Talal Tayyib).
46. The documents refer to, and name, various persons in relation to the Applicant Claims and the employment of the Applicant.
47. I am concerned that the disclosure of the details of the Applicant Claims, including the names of the other employees of the First Respondent, and the names of those employees of the First Respondent named before the filing of the First Respondent's responses, will materially impact on any resolution which may otherwise be reached in relation to the Applicant Claims, including at any court-ordered or other mediation process. An important requirement for the Respondents in relation to any resolution will be confidentiality as to the Applicant Claims and the employment of the Applicant.
48. It is for this reason that the Respondents seek suppression and non-publication orders until a specified time after any mediation has occurred (assuming that there is not any settlement).
49. The Respondents have also not yet had the opportunity to file a Response, and have not been able to defend their positions or provide a response to the Applicant Claims.
32 The key points made by the respondents in support of the non-publication orders can be summarised as follows:
(1) It could be vitally important to the prospects of the parties achieving a negotiated settlement in the context of a Court ordered mediation that the documents in question remain subject to non-publication orders and are confidential in the sense of not being accessible on the court file to non-parties.
(2) It would involve too expensive and time-consuming a task to require the respondents to “trawl” though all of the documents which have been filed in order to further particularise the passages in the documents which should be the subject of the non-publication orders.
(3) The decisions relied upon by Stellios J (Patterson, Saw, Neve and Falco) are clear authority for the proposition that suppression or non-publication orders may be made in similar circumstances in order to enhance the prospects of the parties achieving a mediated or negotiated outcome. These decisions have acknowledged the significant public interest in the settlement of proceedings, especially at an early stage.
(4) In this case, there is a heightened need for the non-publication and confidentiality orders to be made given that there is an ongoing employment relationship between Mr Kavanagh and his employer, and given the number of employees against whom Mr Kavanagh has made allegations, including his direct line manager who is currently working with Mr Kavanagh on his performance improvement programme. As to the latter, it would be particularly undesirable if there were a “raging debate” in the media about a performance improvement plan which is currently in the process of being implemented.
(5) The respondents have not yet filed their defence in response to the allegations by Mr Kavanagh. Furthermore, while Mr Kavanagh’s affidavits have been read in support of his interlocutory application before Justice Stellios, they have not yet been read on his substantive application for relief and contain material which is likely to be inadmissible because it contains unfounded assertions and material in the nature of submissions and the like.
4.3 The s 37AF application must be refused
33 In my view, the respondents’ application for the s 37AF orders should be refused save that I consider that an order should be made until 11:59pm on Tuesday 24 November 2026. This is because the confidential conference before a Registrar of this Court is to be held on that date at 1:15pm and is to consider, among other things, the practicalities of managing Mr Kavanagh’s performance while these proceedings remain on foot. I accept that publication of the documents prior to that confidential conference may well undermine those negotiations but have limited the non-publication order such that it expires on the day that the confidential conference is to be held and therefore is in place for no longer than is required to meet the purpose of the order. A limited order of this kind is necessary in my view to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice for the purposes of s 37AG of the FCA Act.
34 My reasons otherwise for refusing the non-publication and confidentiality orders sought by the respondent are as follows.
35 First, counsel for the respondents confirmed at the hearing that they press for a non-publication order over the entirety of the documents filed to date in the proceedings, with the exception of the s 37AE original and amended applications and certain parts of the Salem affidavit, namely:
(1) paragraphs 44 to 49 setting out the basis on which the s 37AE application is made (quoted above); and
(2) paragraphs 1 to 5 which are purely formal.
36 In Kavanagh (No. 1), Stellios J observed that counsel for the respondents appeared to accept that:
more calibrated or particularised orders could be proposed in time. However, it was submitted that, because of the embryonic stage of the proceeding, the claimed deficiencies in the pleaded case, and the compressed timetable for the hearing of the s 37AF(1) application, it would not be efficient on an interlocutory application of some urgency for the parties or the Court to rake through the various documents to distil the passages that should be redacted. It was submitted that, in the circumstances, it was necessary to make orders covering the entirety of the documents.
(Emphasis added.)
Despite expressing some reservations with this position (at [31]), Stellios J accepted that submission in the context of an urgent duty matter and his interim orders under s 37AI were expressed to apply to the entirety of the documents in question.
37 However, during the hearing of the application before me, the respondents maintained essentially the same objection to “rak[ing] through the various documents” on the ground that to determine what should be redacted in the context of the application under s 37AF(1) would be a very large and inefficient task given the volume of documents filed by the applicant. I do not accept that submission. As the authorities to which I have referred make clear, considerations of convenience and efficiency alone are not sufficient to enliven the power in s 37AF; nor does the Court engage in any discretionary or balancing exercise in determining whether, and the extent to which, any suppression or non-publication order should be made. A suppression or non-publication order should be no broader in scope than “is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. Accordingly, as therefore Lee J said in Forrest at [68], (Abraham and Vandongen JJ agreeing at [260]):
Any such order should go no further than suppressing that part of the information or that part of the evidence that is necessary and be formulated with ‘sufficient particularity to ensure’ that the order is limited to achieving the purpose for which the order is made...
38 Moreover, it has been approximately six weeks since the interim orders were made and the parties were given a period of one week’s notice of the hearing of the s 37AF application, together with the opportunity for the respondent to file an amended s 37AF application. It is not unreasonable therefore to have expected that the respondents could have been in a position to provide proposed redactions to the relevant documents over material they wish to protect, including the names of certain employees contained therein. Instead, the respondents have sought an order effectively over the entirety of the documents filed to date. The breadth of the non-publication orders sought is thus plainly not justified. It included material which was plainly unexceptional. As Lee J observed in Farrell v Super Retail Group Limited (Confidentiality Applications) [2024] FCA 954 at [5]:
The widespread practice of seeking inappropriate, or inappropriately broad, confidentiality and suppression orders remains the case notwithstanding this phenomenon is inconsistent with principle and has been deprecated by Full Courts (and judges in the original jurisdiction) who have repeatedly sought to remind the profession of the express statutory limits on the making or such orders; the demanding nature of the statutory test involved; and the “very heavy” onus that needs to discharged in order to obtain such an order…
(Citations omitted.)
39 Secondly, the brief evidence as to the importance of the non-publication and confidentiality orders to the possibility of a successfully mediated outcome did not rise above bald assertion. There is nothing exceptional in the material which has been filed. It is not a case where the very nature of the allegations made can be said to give rise to a perception that the prospect of settlement at a mediation would be destroyed or materially diminished if the allegations made in the documents were made public: cf Berryman at [19]–[20] (Lee J). Indeed, if the orders were held to be justified in this case on the grounds that disclosure might jeopardise the possibility of mediated or negotiated settlement and create difficulties because of an ongoing employment relationship, it is difficult to see why similar orders should not be made in many, if not most, other employment disputes.
40 This highlights a difficulty, respectfully, with the Patterson line of authority, on the one hand, and longstanding authority as to the significance of open justice and the exceptional nature of orders permitting a departure from the principle of open justice, on the other hand. Furthermore, there is a risk that the Patterson line of authority might also be relied upon to suggest, contrary to authority, that the Court may engage in an exercise of balancing open justice with the public interest in the settlement of proceedings in determining whether a suppression or non-publication order should be made. I note, against this, that Lee J in Johnson and Berryman at [19]–[20] sought to explain these decisions in the manner indicated above at [40].
41 However, it is not necessary for me to reach a concluded view with respect to these concerns; nor would it be desirable for me to do so where I have not heard any argument on the question. Suffice it to say that in the circumstances of this case, the respondents’ evidence fell well short of meeting the heavy onus imposed by s 37AF of the FCA.
42 In this regard, I understood the respondents to rely upon observations of Perram J in Saw at [14] that “keeping the details of … allegations out of the news” is something that a party might be able to offer in settlement negotiations and, “there is a risk that that bargaining chip will be off the table” once allegations are made public and invite me to draw an inference to that effect. However, his Honour may well have had compelling evidence to support a finding to that effect in Saw. There is no such evidence in the present case and as a general proposition, this cannot suffice to establish an exceptional case for departing from the principle of open justice.
43 Thirdly, even though the respondents have not yet filed their defence and there is therefore no response to Mr Kavanagh’s allegations in his pleadings, there is nothing unusual about this situation. The respondents have the opportunity to respond to the allegations in accordance with the rules of procedural fairness and provision is made for this in the timetabling orders made to date. With respect to material said to be inadmissible in the body of Mr Kavanagh’s affidavits read in support of his interlocutory application, I assume that it was not objected to at the time it was sought to be read because of the urgency of the matter. However, there is no apparent reason why the respondents could not subsequently have identified any such material and explained why that material should not be disclosed on the ground in s 37AG(1)(a).
44 Fourthly, it was proposed that the non-publication and confidentiality orders would endure until the completion of mediation which was not to occur until the close of pleadings. Even if (as suggested in arguendo) the orders required mediation prior to the filing of any reply by Mr Kavanagh, that would shorten the time for which the orders were to endure merely by two weeks. As Mr Kavanagh pointed out in submissions, if the orders sought were made, it would mean that the file would essentially have been suppressed from 2 October 2026 until mid to late February or early March 2027. As such, the orders are sought for a significantly longer period than in any of the authorities to which I was taken in the Patterson line of authorities. In this regard, it will be recalled that in Patterson itself, the orders were intended to operate for only a few days pending exhaustion of the mediation process.
5. USE OF GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN SUBMISSIONS
45 Finally, I note that there were clear indications that Mr Kavanagh, who is unrepresented, had used generative AI to produce at least part of his submissions in opposition to the s 37EF application. In particular, while some authorities were cited correctly in support of certain propositions put by Mr Kavanagh, other citations and pinpoint references did not support the propositions for which they were cited, did not exist, or contained other errors. Further, the language was at times odd, perhaps reflective of jurisprudence from a different jurisdiction.
46 I raised these issues with Mr Kavanagh at the start of the hearing, and he appeared to accept that he had used generative AI at least in part, to produce part of the submissions and prepare. While this is understandable in the context of an unrepresented litigant, it is unhelpful and can result in a significant wastage of time and resources for the other parties and the Court. In the circumstances, I consider that it is appropriate to make an order that no party is to use Generative AI to produce text without leave of the Court.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Perry. |
Associate:
Dated: 20 November 2026