Federal Court of Australia
Price, in the matter of Leed Steel Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2026] FCA 1773
File number: | VID 1192 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | BEACH J |
Date of judgment: | 19 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | CORPORATIONS — insolvency — corporate trustee — application pursuant to s 57 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to appoint the liquidators of the company as joint and several receivers and managers of trust property — company now holding as a bare trustee — orders made |
Legislation: | Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 420, 433, 491, 556 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 57(1) |
Cases cited: | Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AGM Markets Pty Ltd (2018) 129 ACSR 335 Cremin; Re Brimson Pty Ltd (in liq) (2019) 136 ACSR 649 National Australia Bank Ltd v Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386 Sapphire (SA) Pty Ltd v Ewens Glen Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 714 University of Western Australia v Gray (No 6) [2006] FCA 1825 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Victoria |
National Practice Area: | Commercial and Corporations |
Sub-area: | Corporations and Corporate Insolvency |
Number of paragraphs: | 25 |
Date of last submissions: | 18 November 2026 |
Date of hearing: | Determined on the papers |
Counsel for the Plaintiffs: | Mr M K B Waters |
Solicitors for the Plaintiffs: | Harwood Andrews |
ORDERS
VID 1192 of 2026 | ||
IN THE MATTER OF LEED STEEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 143 926 943 | ||
GARTH O’CONNOR PRICE AND LAURENCE FITZGERALD IN THEIR CAPACITY AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF LEED STEEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 143 926 943 First Plaintiff LEED STEEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 143 926 943 Second Plaintiff | ||
order made by: | BEACH J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 19 novEMber 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The liquidators of the second plaintiff (the company) are justified and acting reasonably in proceeding upon the basis that all assets and liabilities of the Leed Steel Unit Trust (the Trust) are assets held, and liabilities incurred, by the company in its capacity as trustee of the Trust.
2. Pursuant to s 57(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the liquidators be appointed as receivers and managers nunc pro tunc over the business and assets of the Trust.
3. The requirements that would otherwise be imposed upon the liquidators acting as such receivers and managers to give security and file a guarantee pursuant to rules 14.21 and 14.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) be dispensed with.
4. The liquidators have in respect of the assets of the Trust the powers that a receiver has in respect of the business and property of a company under s 420 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (other than the powers in s 420(2)(s), (t), (u) and (w)) as if the reference in that section to the corporation were a reference to the Trust.
5. The costs, expenses and remuneration of the liquidators both as liquidators and receivers and managers (including the costs of this application) be paid from the assets of the Trust to be calculated in accordance with the schedule of charge-out rates as set out in annexure GO-23 to the affidavit of Garth O’Connor–Price affirmed on 5 October 2026.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BEACH J:
1 The joint and several liquidators of Leed Steel Pty Ltd (in liquidation) seek orders for their appointment as receivers and managers of the assets and liabilities of the Leed Steel Unit Trust (the Trust), and that such orders be made nunc pro tunc so as in effect to retrospectively authorise any dealing with the assets of the Trust prior to my determination of this application.
2 On 21 May 2026, the liquidators were appointed as joint and several liquidators of the company by way of a creditors’ voluntary liquidation pursuant to s 491 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). At that time, Old Bull and Box Holdings Pty Ltd was the sole shareholder of the company and the sole unitholder of the Trust.
3 It would seem from the evidence before me that the company conducted its business solely in its capacity as trustee of the Trust. The financial report for the year ending 30 June 2024 was prepared in the name of Leed Steel Pty Ltd ATF Leed Steel Unit Trust. Further, the company maintained a separate Trust ABN through which trading activities were conducted. Moreover, the company’s own ABN was never registered for GST. Further, all invoices for receivables issued by the company in the liquidators’ possession reference the Trust ABN and name the company in its capacity as trustee of the Trust. Further, creditors’ proofs of debt and invoices lodged in support of the same have referred either to the Trust ABN or to the company’s trading name. Further, assets financed through Westpac Banking Corporation were financed in the company’s capacity as trustee and by reference to the Trust ABN. And generally speaking, the books and records that have been reviewed by the liquidators show that the business was conducted solely in the company’s capacity as trustee of the Trust.
4 The applicable trust deed provides that the company was disqualified from holding office as the trustee if it went into liquidation. It follows that on the appointment of the liquidators and by operation of this ipso facto clause, the company became a bare trustee of the Trust’s assets without the power to sell or otherwise deal with them. And it would seem that there have been no steps taken to appoint a replacement trustee of the Trust. I should also note that the trust deed entitles the trustee to be indemnified from the assets comprising the trust fund.
Some relevant principles
5 Despite being only a bare trustee, the company retains a right of indemnity out of the Trust’s assets to pay the Trust’s creditors including the costs and remuneration of an external administrator of the former trustee. The right of indemnity gives rise to an equitable lien over the trust fund. But it is limited to the assets required to meet the Trust’s debts, and does not extend to meeting the claims of creditors generally. Moreover, the insolvency of the corporate trustee does not change the nature of this interest. I should also note that a trustee’s right of indemnity falls within the broad definition of “property” of the company as used in inter–alia s 556 of the Act. Further, a former trustee’s proprietary interest in the assets of a trust does not of itself confer a power of sale. An order of the Court or the appointment of a receiver over the assets of the trust is required.
6 It is well established that a liquidator can be appointed as a receiver of trust property to secure the trustee’s right of indemnity out of trust assets. And it is the more common course for a liquidator of the former corporate trustee to apply to be appointed a receiver for the purposes of selling the trust assets and distributing the proceeds among trust creditors.
7 In Cremin; Re Brimson Pty Ltd (in liq) (2019) 136 ACSR 649, Moshinsky J observed (at [49] and [50]):
…It is now settled that the liquidator of an insolvent (former) corporate trustee cannot sell the trust’s property without order of the Court, or by appointment of a receiver over the trust assets … The rationale for this position is that, on a proper understanding, the trust assets are not the “property of the company”, but are instead trust property in which the corporate trustee has a proprietary interest by way of lien or charge to secure its right of exoneration: see [Jones (Liquidator) v Matrix Partners Pty Ltd, in the matter of Killarnee Civil & Concrete Contractors Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCAFC 40; 260 FCR 310; 124 ACSR 568] at [89]. …
The courts are generally willing, upon an appropriate application, to make orders permitting the liquidator of a (former) corporate trustee to sell trust assets. In situations where the property of the trust will be exhausted following its sale and subsequent distribution to creditors, it may be appropriate merely to give the liquidator a power of sale … The more common course is, however, for the liquidator of the insolvent (former) corporate trustee to apply to be appointed a receiver for the purpose of selling the trust assets and distributing the proceeds among trust creditors …
8 Further, orders appointing a liquidator as a receiver can also be made nunc pro tunc to in effect retrospectively authorise dealings with trust assets that have already occurred.
9 Now s 57 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides that:
(1) The Court may, at any stage of a proceeding on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks fit, appoint a receiver by interlocutory order in any case in which it appears to the Court to be just or convenient to do so.
(2) A receiver of any property appointed by the Court may, without the previous leave of the Court, be sued in respect of an act or transaction done or entered into by him or her in carrying on the business connected with the property.
(3) When in any cause pending in the Court a receiver appointed by the Court is in possession of property, the receiver shall manage and deal with the property according to the requirements of the laws of the State or Territory in which the property is situated, in the same manner as that in which the owner or possessor of the property would be bound to do if in possession of the property.
10 In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AGM Markets Pty Ltd (2018) 129 ACSR 335, I had cause to make the following observations at [100] and [101].
11 The condition on the grant of the statutory power under s 57 is expressed in broad terms, being where it is “just or convenient so to do”. It may be noted that the statutory power does not countenance a limitation on the exercise of the power or an implicit fetter based upon phraseology such as: “the appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, to be exercised with utmost care and caution and only where the court is satisfied there is imminent danger of loss if it is not exercised” or the power “should be exercised only after great scrutiny and in extraordinary circumstances”. That is not the phraseology of that statutory power and nor is any such limitation consistent with the authority of this Court. The applicable position is that stated by French J in University of Western Australia v Gray (No 6) [2006] FCA 1825 at [71] where he stated:
The power of the Court to appoint a receiver is statutory. It has its origins, however, as an equitable remedy. An order in the nature of an equitable remedy can be made under s 23 of the Act. The class of circumstances in which such power may be exercised is not closed. Nor are the purposes for which a receiver may be appointed and the powers and conditions attaching to such an appointment. There may be many circumstances of considerable diversity which would warrant such an order and it is important that the discretion not be unnecessarily confined by any particular line of cases to which it has been applied.
12 Now in relation to judicial receivership, one purpose of such a receivership may be to facilitate a quasi-administration of the affairs of a corporate defendant who is in financial difficulties. There is precedent in an appropriate case to support such a purpose, particularly in Victoria. Judicial receivership for such a purpose was ordered in relation to the Massey-Ferguson Group (1980), Qintex Australia Ltd (1989), TEA (1983), International Harvester Australia Ltd (1982) and the Cooperative Farmers and Graziers Direct Meat Supply Ltd (1975). Receivership for conservation can be an appropriate purpose. But it should be stressed that a judicial receivership is not for a plaintiff, as for the witch in Hansel and Gretel, to “cage the defendant and fatten him up so he will make better eating, or at least to prevent him from wasting away” (National Australia Bank Ltd v Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386 at 553). But of course in the context now before me I am dealing with a different scenario that is more standard.
13 Let me note two other matters.
14 First, the liquidators seek that their appointment as receivers and managers be made without the requirement to give security. Such a course was adopted in Cremin and Sapphire (SA) Pty Ltd v Ewens Glen Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 714 at [4] per Besanko J where joint and several liquidators were not required to provide security upon their appointment as receivers and managers given they were already subject to obligations under the Act. The same considerations apply here. The liquidators are registered liquidators and subject to ASIC oversight. Further, the cost of security would reduce the funds available to creditors.
15 Second, where an insolvent trustee company has only acted as trustee of the relevant trust, and did not trade on its own account, the costs and expenses of the liquidator’s general liquidation work is included in the trustee’s right of indemnity, in addition to the work directed toward trust property, as the general liquidation work is consequential upon the company’s activities as trustee. So, the whole of the liquidation costs ought to be paid from the assets of the trust.
Analysis
16 Now given that the liquidators’ evidence establishes that the company carried on business solely in its capacity as trustee of the Trust, I will direct that the liquidators are justified and acting reasonably in proceeding on that basis.
17 Section 90-15(1) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) confers power on me to make “such orders as [I think] fit in relation to the external administration of a company”. The “[e]xamples of orders that may be made”, set out in s 90-15(3), which include “determining any question arising in the external administration of the company”, demonstrate that the power is broad and is at least as extensive as the powers formerly available under ss 479(3) and 511 of the Act.
18 In my view the liquidators are justified and acting reasonably in proceeding on the basis that they can deal with, hold, apply and/or distribute trust assets pursuant to the receivership that I have ordered and under other applicable parts of the regime under Part 5 of the Act.
19 Further, as I have indicated, by virtue of the ipso facto clause in the trust deed, the company and by extension the liquidators no longer have the power to realise or deal with the assets of the Trust or to rely on the right of indemnity without orders from me.
20 So, to allow the company and the Trust to be wound down in an orderly fashion and for the liquidators to comply with their statutory duties, I will make the orders sought to enable the liquidators to deal with the assets of the Trust.
21 Further, it is just and convenient to appoint the liquidators as receivers and managers of the Trust’s assets without security. They have detailed knowledge of the company’s affairs and the Trust structure, they have already taken steps to preserve the assets of the Trust and the appointment of different persons would cause unnecessary expense and delay.
22 Further, the orders should be made nunc pro tunc so as in effect to retrospectively authorise any dealings that the liquidators may have had with the assets of the Trust prior to my orders.
23 Further, the liquidators should have their expenses and remuneration both as liquidators and as receivers and managers including the costs of this application, which should be paid from the assets of the Trust in accordance with the priority specified in s 556(1).
24 Finally, the application has been made on notice to the relevant creditors of the company and the beneficiaries of the Trust. There is no opposition to the application.
25 In summary, I will make the orders sought.
I certify that the preceding twenty-five (25) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Beach. |
Associate:
Dated: 19 November 2026