Federal Court of Australia

Paumolevuka v Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia [2026] FCA 1767

Review of:

Orders made by FCFCOA judge on 16 November 2026

File number(s):

VID 1371 of 2026

Judgment of:

HILL J

Date of judgment:

18 November 2026

Date of publication of reasons:

19 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – urgent application for judicial review of a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) – where Applicant has limited English and requested an interpreter, but no interpreter appeared at an urgent hearing – primary judge went on to refuse the application – whether a breach of procedural fairness by the primary judge – held no jurisdictional error in the circumstances, given the urgency of the proceeding and the fact that the application was bound to fail for a legal reason

Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cls 050.212(3), 050.223

Cases cited:

Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1991) 25 NSWLR 75

Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80

Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507; (1999) 92 FCR 6

Ross v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 666

Schoonwinkel v Inspec Group Pty Ltd [2023] QCA 173

Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; (2015) 229 FCR 301

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142; (2013) 219 FCR 212

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

47

Date of hearing:

18 November 2026

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Mr L McLean, McLean Legal

Counsel for the First Respondent:

The First Respondent did not appear

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

Mr B McGlade

Solicitor for the Second Respondent:

Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

VID 1371 of 2026

BETWEEN:

SIONE TUPOU PAUMOLEVUKA

Applicant

AND:

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent

order made by:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The originating application filed in this proceeding on 16 November 2026 be dismissed.

2.    The Applicant pay the Second Respondent’s costs of the application to be taxed if not agreed.

3.    Order 1 of the Orders of the Court made on 16 November 2026 be discharged.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HILL J:

introduction

1    This is an urgent application for judicial review of a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) (FCFCOA). On 16 November 2026, the primary judge dismissed an urgent application for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal, and associated interlocutory relief to restrain the Applicant’s removal from Australia. In September 2026, the Tribunal affirmed a decision not to grant the Applicant a Bridging E (Class WE) visa. This application was referred to me as general duty judge.

2    The Applicant contends that he was denied procedural fairness before the primary judge, because he did not have a legal representative, and he was not provided with a Tongan interpreter (contrary to the request in his originating application in the FCFCOA). That argument raises three issues:

(a)    Whether the Applicant has established that he does not speak sufficient English to have participated in a meaningful way before the primary judge;

(b)    Whether the absence of an interpreter in the circumstances meant that the Applicant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to participate in that hearing;

(c)    Whether any breach of procedural fairness was material, given that the Tribunal found that the Applicant did not meet either of the two essential visa criteria, and the Applicant’s originating application in the FCFCOA challenged only one of the findings.

3    On 18 November 2026, I made orders dismissing the application, with costs. These are the reasons for those orders. I find that the Applicant’s English was of a standard that he was at a material disadvantage (in the absence of an interpreter or a lawyer) in presenting his case before the primary judge (issue (a)). However, in the circumstances of the case, it was not a jurisdictional error to proceed without an interpreter, given the urgency of the proceeding and the fact that the application was bound to fail for a legal reason (issue (b)-(c)).

4    Materials: The Applicant has filed in this Court an affidavit of Mr Luke McLean, the Applicant’s lawyer, dated 16 November 2026 (which was unsworn at the date of the hearing); and an affidavit of the Applicant affirmed on 17 November 2026. In addition, I have had regard to the application for an extension of time filed in the FCFCOA, and an affidavit of Mr McLean dated 15 November 2026 filed in the FCFCOA, which attaches the Tribunal’s decision.

5    The Respondent (Minister) relies on an affidavit of Mr Samuel Woods, a solicitor, affirmed on 18 November 2026. Both sides have filed written submissions.

background

6    The following background is taken principally from the Tribunal’s reasons for decision.

7    Arrival in Australia (2014): The Applicant first came to Australia in May 2014 on a temporary visa that expired in November 2014. He remained an unlawful non-citizen until October 2022 (Tribunal reasons (ART) [27]). The most recent visa held by the Applicant was a bridging visa granted on 8 November 2022, which expired in December 2022 (ART [37]).

8    Application for class WE Bridging visa (Aug 2026): The Applicant was taken into immigration detention on 15 August 2026, after Queensland Police found during a random breathalyser test that he did not have a valid visa (ART [40]). On 20 August 2026, the Applicant applied for a class WE Bridging visa. That application was refused on 25 August 2026 (ART [2]-[3]).

9    Visa criteria: The Applicant was applying for a subclass 050 visa, set out in Part 050 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Relevantly, the Applicant was required to satisfy two criteria (see ART [2]):

    The first criterion was in cl 050.212(3), which provided that an applicant satisfies that subclause if:

(a)     …

(b)     the Minister is satisfied that the applicant will apply, in Australia, within a period allowed by the Minister for the purpose, for a substantive visa of a kind that can be granted if the applicant is in Australia.

    The second criterion was in cl 050.223, which required that:

The Minister is satisfied that, if a bridging visa is granted to the applicant, the applicant will abide by the conditions (if any) imposed on it.

10    Tribunal affirms refusal decision (Sep 2026): On 16 September 2026, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse to grant the Applicant a class WE Bridging visa. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Tongan and English languages (ART [3]).

11    Substantive visa application (cl 050.212(3)): The Tribunal considered first whether it was satisfied under cl 050.212(3)(b) that the Applicant will apply in Australia for a substantive visa of a kind that can be granted if the applicant is in Australia.

    The Applicant mentioned in his bridging visa application that his youngest child should not move back to Tonga as Tonga does not have the facilities to treat her medical condition (ART [12]). He stated at the hearing that, if he was granted a bridging visa, he would seek a medical visa to stay in Australia, although he had not applied as yet (ART [13]).

    The Tribunal then considered at ART [15]-[19] the different forms of medical visas that were available, and concluded that the Applicant did not meet the criteria for any of those visas (for example, because his daughter did not hold a subclass 602 Medical Treatment Visa or other medical treatment visa).

    The Tribunal stated (ART [20], emphasis added):

In summary then, as well as the Applicant not having made a valid application for a substantive visa as at the date of the application for the Bridging Visa, standing in the shoes of the Minister for the purposes of subclause 050.212(3)(b), I cannot be satisfied that the Applicant would apply, in Australia, for the purpose of a substantive visa because the evidence is as at the date of his application for the Bridging Visa, that a Medical Treatment visa could not be granted to him.

12    Whether Applicant will abide by conditions (cl 050.223): The Tribunal then considered whether it was satisfied under cl 050.223 that the Applicant will abide by any conditions imposed on the bridging visa. This required the Tribunal to consider which conditions, if any, should be imposed, and then whether it is satisfied that the Applicant would abide by those conditions (ART [23]).

    On the first matter (conditions of the bridging visa), the Tribunal found that the bridging visa would be subject to a mandatory no work condition, and may be subject to other discretionary conditions (ART [24]).

    The second matter was to consider whether the Applicant would abide by those conditions, having regard to matters including the Applicant’s immigration history and whether there were mitigating circumstances for any breach of migration laws (ART [23]). The Tribunal considered the Applicant’s immigration history at ART [27]-[43], summarised the delegate’s decision at ART [44]-[58], and summarised the Applicant’s evidence in the Tribunal (ART [59]-[102]).

    The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s history of complying with Australian migration requirements was poor (ART [104]). The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant and his wife have a daughter who requires medical assistance (ART [110]). For the Applicant to pay for these medical expenses will impose an incentive on him to obtain paid work, in breach of the conditions of the bridging visa (ART [112]). The Tribunal stated that, overall, given the Applicant’s demonstrated non-compliance with immigration requirements and bail requirements, the Tribunal was concerned that the Applicant would not comply with the requirement not to work, given the natural incentive for him to want to support his family (ART [114]). The Tribunal stated in conclusion (ART [115], emphasis added):

On the evidence before it, I am not satisfied that the Applicant will abide by conditions imposed on the visa if granted. Therefore, the Applicant does not meet cl 050.223. Having said that, that finding is in a real sense secondary to the finding I have made above, that the Applicant does not comply with subclause 050.212(3) in that the Applicant has not made a valid application for a substantive visa or that he would apply, in Australia, within a specified period, for a substantive visa of a kind that can be granted to him if he was in Australia. That is because of the reasons I have set out above on why the Applicant is not in a position to apply for a medical visa.

13    FCFCOA originating application (15 Nov 2026): On 15 November 2026, the Applicant lodged an originating application in the FCFCOA, seeking an extension of time to apply for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. Mr McLean sent an email to the FCFCOA registry at around 1.54pm on 15 November stating that the Applicant was advised orally that he was intended to be removed to Tonga on Monday 16 November 2026 at 7pm.

14    Grounds for extension of time: The FCFCOA originating application set out the following grounds for applying for an extension of time:

1.     The applicant was unaware that he could seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision until he obtained legal advice on 7 November 2026.

2.     The applicant was being assisted by his cousin to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, and was of the belief that an application was filed on 10 November 2026, however this wasn’t the case.

3.     The applicant has limited English language ability.

15    Ground of application for review: The FCFCOA originating application contained one ground of review: that the Tribunal misconstrued and/or misapplied cl 050.212(3)(b) of Sch 2 to the Regulations. The particulars to this ground state:

a.     Clause 050.212(3)(b) required the Tribunal to determine whether it was satisfied that the Applicant would apply, within a period allowed for that purpose, for a substantive visa of a kind that could be granted if the Applicant was in Australia.

b.     The Applicant gave evidence that, if granted a Bridging E (subclass 050) visa, he would apply for a Medical Treatment visa: at T[13], [92] and [99]-[100].

c.     Rather than determining whether it was satisfied that the Applicant would make such an application, the Tribunal undertook its own assessment of whether the Applicant would satisfy the criteria for grant of a Medical Treatment (subclass 602) visa: at T[15]-[19].

d.     The Tribunal concluded at [20] of its reasons that it could not be satisfied that the Applicant would apply for a substantive visa “because the evidence is … that a Medical Treatment visa could not be granted to him.”

e.     In doing so, the Tribunal impermissibly conflated the question whether the Applicant would apply for a substantive visa of the relevant kind with the separate question of whether that substantive visa application would ultimately satisfy the criteria for grant.

f.     The Tribunal thereby asked itself the wrong question and misconstrued the statutory task required by cl 050.212(3)(b).

16    The Applicant indicated on the originating application that he required a Tongan interpreter.

17    FCFCOA application dismissed (16 Nov 2026): On 16 November 2026, the primary judge held a hearing and made orders dismissing the application for an extension of time, and refused to grant an interlocutory injunction. The Applicant attended this hearing by video link from the Brisbane Immigration Transit Accommodation facility. It is common ground that a Tongan interpreter did not appear. The primary judge has not provided written reasons, and no transcript is available. Mr Woods gives evidence in his affidavit about what occurred at this hearing.

18    Judicial review sought of FCFCOA decision (16 Nov 2026): Later on 16 November 2026, the Applicant filed an application in this Court for judicial review of the FCFCOA’s decision under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), supported by a concise statement of the same date. The concise statement claims that “[t]he decision of the FCFCOA to refuse the applicant’s application for an extension of time and dismiss the proceeding was affected by jurisdictional error because the applicant was denied procedural fairness.”. The particulars of that claim are as follows:

(a)     The applicant required a Tongan interpreter in order adequately to understand and participate in the hearing.

(b)     The FCFCOA was on notice that the applicant required a Tongan interpreter and had advised the applicant that a Tongan interpreter would be present at the hearing.

(c)     The applicant appeared without legal representation and without the assistance of an interpreter.

(d)     Notwithstanding the absence of an interpreter, the FCFCOA proceeded to hear and determine the applicant's application.

(e)     In those circumstances, the applicant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to understand the proceedings and present his case.

19    Interim injunction granted (16 Nov 2026): Late on 16 November 2026, I granted an interim injunction restraining the Minister from removing the Applicant from Australia until the hearing of the application on 18 November 2026, or further order.

20    Hearing (18 Nov 2026): The application was heard on 18 November 2026. The Respondent’s counsel, the Applicant and a Tongan interpreter attended by video link. I made orders at the end of that hearing.

analysis

Issue is whether primary judge’s decision contains jurisdictional error

21    The Applicant correctly recognises that there is no appeal to this Court from a decision of the FCFCOA refusing to grant an extension of time. However, the Applicant may still seek judicial review of such a decision under s 39B of the Judiciary Act. Accordingly, to succeed, the Applicant must establish that the primary judge’s decision contains jurisdictional error. A breach of procedural fairness, if established, would be a jurisdictional error.

Procedural fairness and the provision of interpreters

22    General principles: It is common ground that the primary judge was required to afford the Applicant procedural fairness. In general terms, that requires giving the Applicant a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and make submissions: Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; (2015) 229 FCR 301 at [37]-[38] (the Court).

23    The absence of an interpreter can affect whether a litigant has been provided procedural fairness. In Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507; (1999) 92 FCR 6 at [18], Kenny J stated that, in criminal trials, the trial judge must, as part of their duty to provide a fair trial, see that an accused receives the assistance of a competent interpreter, if the accused is not sufficiently proficient in English to understand the proceedings or to make themselves understood. Her Honour then stated that, “[f]or similar reasons, there may be a need for the services of an interpreter in a civil proceeding”: Perera at [19], citing Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1991) 25 NSWLR 75 and Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414.

    In Adamopoulos at 77, Kirby P stated that the mere fact that a person can sufficiently speak the English language to perform mundane or social tasks or even business obligations at the person's own pace does not necessarily mean that he or she is able to cope with the added stresses imposed by appearing as a witness in a court of law. His Honour observed that the reasons for offering a person assistance were more powerful if the person must present the case without the help of a lawyer. However, Kirby P stated (at 78) that a discretion must always be reserved to the trial judge to balance the inconvenience occasioned by a late application for an interpreter; the possibility that the application has been made for extraneous or ulterior purposes; and an assessment that in the particular case an interpreter is not needed for the issues involved.

    Mahoney JA stated that a person does not have a “right” to an interpreter, but the court must ensure that a trial proceeds in a way that is acceptably fair. Whether there is relevant unfairness will depend on all the circumstances, and it is necessary to consider the interests of both parties. It was generally for the trial judge to decide whether, in the circumstances, the party seeking an interpreter would without one suffer such disadvantages as would result in unacceptable unfairness “in the context of the time and the trial”: Adamopoulos at 81.

24    The Minister also cites Schoonwinkel v Inspec Group Pty Ltd [2023] QCA 173 at [22], where Bond JA quoted Kirby P stating that a trial judge has a “wide discretion”. However, the full passage cited by Bond JA is that the content of the matters considered in exercising the wide discretion has changed. In any event, the appellant in Schoonwinkel spoke and understood English perfectly well: Schoonwinkel at [23].

25    In SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142; (2013) 219 FCR 212 at [9], Allsop CJ stated that a “hearing” requires that there be a substantially effective mechanism of communicating oral and written information from and to the person. His Honour stated that an interpretation must be so inadequate as effectively to deny the fact of any hearing: SZRMQ at [11]. Although those remarks were made in the context of asserted interpretation errors in Tribunal proceedings, they can be adapted to court proceedings.

26    FCFCOA practice direction: Consistently with these principles, the FCFCOA has published a practice direction FCFCOA Practice Direction: Working with interpreters (PD-INTERP) (updated 1 April 2026).

    Paragraph 4 states that FCFCOA proceedings are conducted in English, but that the FCFCOA accommodates the language needs of parties and witnesses with limited English proficiency in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness: [4.1]-[4.2]. In any proceedings, if the FCFCOA is satisfied that a party cannot understand and speak English sufficiently to enable the party to understand and participate in the proceedings, the Court must permit that party to engage the services of an interpreter who meets the standards and requirements imposed by this Practice Direction, if the interpreter is to be engaged by that party to communicate with the Court (but for no other purpose): [4.4].

    Paragraph 5 states that, if a party has difficulty with English or otherwise requires an interpreter, it is the responsibility of that party or their legal representative to arrange for an interpreter for that party and any witness in that party's case who requires an interpreter: at [5.1]. If a party requires an interpreter, the FCFCOA “may arrange and fund an interpreter for that party” if (relevantly) the party is self-represented in a proceeding under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): [5.2](b).

A.    What is the state of the Applicant’s English?

27    The first issue is whether the Applicant has established that he does not speak sufficient English to have participated in a meaningful way before the primary judge.

28    Applicant’s evidence: The Applicant’s affidavit filed in this Court contains the following evidence:

(a)    The Applicant’s first language is Tongan. He can speak and understand some English, but his English is limited. The Applicant finds it harder to understand English when people are speaking quickly or when legal and complicated matters are being discussed: at [1]-[2].

(b)    The Applicant advised his lawyer that he needed a Tongan interpreter when he filed his application in the FCFCOA. Before the hearing on 16 November 2026, the Applicant understood that a Tongan interpreter would be provided for him at the hearing. He attended the hearing without a lawyer. There was no Tongan interpreter at the hearing: at [5]-[6].

(c)    The Applicant tried to follow the hearing in English. During the hearing, he could not clearly understand what the Minister’s lawyer was saying, or what he was arguing about the Applicant’s case. The Applicant also could not clearly understand what the Judge was saying or what the Judge and the Minister’s lawyer were discussing. The Applicant understood some words and parts of what was being said, but he could not work out what they were talking about or what was happening with his case: at [7]-[9].

(d)    Because the Applicant did not understand what was being said, he did not understand what he needed to respond to or what he should say about his case. When the hearing finished, the Applicant did not understand what had happened. He was confused and did not understand that the Judge had dismissed his application. The Applicant first understood that his application had been dismissed when his lawyer Mr McLean rang him after the hearing: at [10]-[12].

29    Minister’s argument: The Minister contends that the Applicant’s evidence only goes to his subjective understanding, whereas procedural fairness is concerned with what the Court knew or ought reasonably to have known, citing Ross v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 666 at [65] (Downes J). The Minister contends that there was not anything in the objective circumstances that would have caused the primary judge to perceive that the hearing could not proceed in an acceptably fair way: the Applicant had been in Australia for more than 12 years, and little occurred during the hearing to make it apparent that the Applicant was operating under a material disadvantage. Mr Woods gives evidence about what occurred at the hearing before the primary judge, and states that, on his observation, the Applicant appeared to have a reasonable grasp of English, and the Court asked the Minister’s counsel to speak slowly.

30    Conclusions – Applicant was at a material disadvantage: I do not see any reason to discount the Applicant’s evidence that he subjectively did not understand what was occurring before the primary judge. I would give little weight to Mr Woods’ observation of the Applicant, because it is common knowledge that a person who does not understand a language (and particularly in an unfamiliar setting like a court) may have difficulty in expressing that they are not understanding. Accordingly, procedural fairness concerns are not addressed simply by asking a person whose language facility is in question to inform the Court if they do not understand something. The FCFCOA practice note states (at [5.4]) that, in determining whether a person requires an interpreter, legal practitioners should apply a four-part test to test actual comprehension. Mr Woods’ evidence does not suggest any process like this was followed.

31    On the evidence, I would conclude that the Applicant was at a material disadvantage in his ability to understand the proceedings before the primary judge, and to present arguments. I would also conclude that the primary judge was reasonably on notice of this disadvantage: the Applicant requested an interpreter, it was apparent from the Tribunal decision that he had participated in the Tribunal with the assistance of an interpreter, and part of his explanation for requiring an extension of time was that the Applicant had “limited English language ability”. It was open to the primary judge to explore the extent of the Applicant’s English abilities, but the FCFCOA’s practice note sets out a quite different process than the one which was followed.

B.    Was there a denial of procedural fairness?

32    The second issue is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the absence of an interpreter meant that the Applicant was denied procedural fairness. Although I have concluded that the Applicant was at a material disadvantage and that this ought reasonably to have been known to the primary judge, that does not conclude the question of whether there was a breach of procedural fairness. As noted, there is no right to an interpreter, and the question is whether, in the circumstances, the absence of an interpreter meant that the Applicant suffered such disadvantages as resulted in unacceptable unfairness in the context of the time and the trial: Adamopoulos at 81 (Mahoney JA).

33    Relevant circumstances: The Applicant contends that the relevant circumstances were as follows:

(a)    The applicant had informed the FCFCOA in his originating application that he required a Tongan interpreter;

(b)    The FCFCOA had been informed that he would appear without legal representation;

(c)    The FCFCOA’s notice of listing on 16 November 2026 sent before the hearing stated that a “Tongan interpreter will be present at this hearing”;

(d)    No interpreter attended; and

(e)    The primary judge nevertheless proceeded to hear and finally determine the application.

34    On the other hand, as the Minister submits, the Applicant filed an urgent application for an injunction on a Sunday when he was due to depart from Brisbane to Sydney on the Monday afternoon. The hearing before the primary judge concluded around 1.15pm. The Minister contends that it is doubtful whether the hearing could have reasonably accommodated obtaining an interpreter within the constraints of the case, observing that a hearing takes much longer when an interpreter is required.

35    The Minister’s last point cannot be accepted in its unqualified form: the FCFCOA indicated that it would provide an interpreter and, if an interpreter had been available, it is doubtful that the Minister could insist on the matter being cut short to enable the Applicant to be put on a booked flight from Brisbane to Sydney, if the hearing was still going. A Court’s obligation is to provide an acceptably fair hearing to both parties. At the same time, the Court considers the interests of both parties (not just the party requesting an interpreter) when deciding how to proceed: see Adamopoulos at 81 (Mahoney JA). It is highly relevant that the Court was dealing with an urgent application that had significant time pressures.

36    Another relevant part of the circumstances is the merits of the application, which is considered next.

C.    Was any denial of procedural fairness material?

37    The third and crucial issue is materiality. The Minister contends that, even if there was a breach of procedural fairness, this error was not material. The Minister contends that the application to the FCFCOA was bound to fail, because:

(1)    the Applicant had to meet both cl 050.212(3) and cl 050.223;

(2)    the Tribunal found that the Applicant did not meet either of those requirements;

(3)    the Applicant’s FCFCOA originating application only challenged the Tribunal’s finding as to cl 050.212(3), and did not challenge the finding as to cl 050.223.

38    Accordingly, the Minister contends, the Tribunal’s findings on cl 050.223 provide an independent basis for upholding the Tribunal’s decision, even if the Applicant were correct on his arguments about cl 050.212(3). Mr Woods’ evidence is that this is the basis on which the primary judge determined the application.

39    Applicant’s arguments: The Applicant contends that the two visa criteria were not considered by the Tribunal in isolation. The Applicant’s case under cl 050.212(3) was that, if released on a bridging visa, he intended to make a substantive application for a medical treatment visa. The Applicant submits that the Tribunal’s acceptance or rejection of that proposed course was capable of bearing upon the expected purpose and duration of the bridging visa and, in turn, the prospective assessment under cl 050.223 of whether the Applicant would comply with its conditions. The Applicant observes that the Tribunal stated that its conclusions on cl 050.223 were “in a real sense secondary” to its conclusions on cl 050.212(3) (ART [115]).

40    Conclusion – the two findings were legally separate: The Applicant’s arguments cannot be accepted. He is plainly correct that, once it is established that a party has been deprived of an opportunity to present evidence or make submissions on an issue that required consideration, generally nothing more is required to establish that the error is material: Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 at [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ). However, implicit in this reference to an “issue that required consideration” is that the issue is one on which evidence or submissions could have made a difference.

41    Here, cl 050.223 required the Tribunal to assess whether the Applicant would comply with the conditions of the bridging visa (not any visa that he might apply for). For that reason, the cl 050.223 criterion is legally separate from the cl 050.212(3) criterion. The Tribunal found that the bridging visa would be subject to a mandatory “no work” requirement (ART [24], referring to cl 050.611B).

42    The Applicant contends that, if the Tribunal had correctly understood that the Applicant would apply for a medical treatment visa, then that could have affected the time that the Applicant would be on the bridging visa, which in turn could have affected the risk that the Applicant would seek work, in breach of the no work condition. But, as the Minister submits, the entire analysis of the Tribunal in ART [13]-[19] was considering the possibility of the Applicant applying for a medical treatment visa; no other visa was being considered. The bridging visa would need to remain in force until any substantive visa was granted, and on the Tribunal’s analysis, the Applicant could not be granted a medical treatment visa. Accordingly, even if the Tribunal had asked itself whether the Applicant would apply for a visa for the purposes of cl 050.212(3), the relevant question for cl 050.223 is the period for which the Applicant would remain on the bridging visa; that is, until a substantive visa were granted. The claimed error in interpreting cl 050.212(3) could not have affected the Tribunal’s analysis under cl 050.223.

43    Although the Tribunal described its conclusions on cl 050.223 as “secondary”, that only goes to the relative weight of the two conclusions: it was still necessary for the Applicant to satisfy both criteria, and the Tribunal’s reasons on each were legally separate. Contrary to the Applicant’s arguments, I am affirmatively satisfied that that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the Applicant been afforded a fair hearing (assuming for these purposes there was a breach of procedural fairness): cf LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 at [16] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ). It is true that the legal arguments on an extension of time are usually assessed at an impressionistic level; however, there is no jurisdictional error by the primary judge reaching a state of satisfaction that the Applicant’s proceeding was bound to fail: this was apparent on the face of the Tribunal’s reasons and the originating application in the FCFCOA.

44    I also accept that procedural fairness is of course concerned with securing a fair hearing, not a fair outcome: see SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [25] (the Court). And particularly in court proceedings, there is great normative force in requiring that disputes be determined only in accordance with processes that meet minimum fairness requirements. Accordingly, the Court would only find that a breach of procedural fairness is not material in the clearest of circumstances: a lack of merit in an application does not by itself permit an unfair hearing. But procedural fairness takes account of all the circumstances, which here included that the FCFCOA was dealing with an urgent application under considerable time pressure, when the application as brought was bound to fail for legal reasons. It is also relevant that the Tribunal’s decision was handed down in September 2026, but the application for judicial review not made until a day or two before the proposed removal of the Applicant in November 2026: considerations of urgency might have different significance if they were entirely the creation of the Minister.

45    For these reasons, I found that the primary judge’s decision does not contain jurisdictional error, even though I was satisfied that the absence of an interpreter meant that the Applicant was at a material disadvantage in presenting his case in the FCFCOA.

conclusion

46    The application for judicial review of the primary judge’s decision was therefore dismissed. The Applicant accepted that there was no reason to depart from the usual position as to costs.

47    The Applicant sought to have the interim injunction restraining his removal from Australia continued until 48 hours after written reasons were provided, to enable the Applicant to consider whether to appeal from my decision. I did not grant that application: although this proceeding is not in form an appeal, the Applicant has now had two chances to persuade a judge that he should not be removed. I have endeavoured, however, to provide written reasons as promptly as possible.

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hill.

Associate:

Dated:    19 November 2026