Federal Court of Australia

Thomson v InQuisient Inc [2026] FCA 1766

File number:

NSD 1124 of 2026

Judgment of:

STEWART J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – anti-anti-suit injunction – whether the Court is a “clearly inappropriate” forum for the determination of the dispute – where the connecting factors generally point to Australia – whether the applicants are parties to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of Virginia, USA – whether non-parties can be held to the clause – privity of contract – where there is a real risk that the applicants will not be able to pursue their ACL claims in the foreign court and could therefore be deprived of a legitimate juridical advantage – whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law) ss 18, 21

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.32(2)

Cases cited:

Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1996] HCA 39; 188 CLR 418

Bolin Technology Co Ltd v BirdDog Technology Ltd [2024] FCA 129

Bolin Technology Co Ltd v BirdDog Technology Ltd [2024] FCA 286

Breen v Williams [1996] HCA 57; 186 CLR 71

Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 3; 188 CLR 501

Commonwealth v Walsh [1980] HCA 45; 147 CLR 61

Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF v Insurance Australia Ltd [2024] FCA 1193

CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1997] HCA 33; 189 CLR 345

Global Partners Fund Ltd v Babcock & Brown Ltd (in liq) [2010] NSWCA 196; 79 ACSR 383

HNOE Ltd v Angus & Julia Stone Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 271

Home Ice Cream Pty Ltd v McNabb Technologies LLC (No 2) [2018] FCA 1093

Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56; 178 CLR 408

Karpik v Carnival plc (The Ruby Princess) (Stay Application) [2021] FCA 1082; 157 ACSR 1

Karpik v Carnival plc [2023] HCA 39; 280 CLR 640

Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd [1962] AC 446 (HL)

New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1974] AC 154 (PC)

Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd (The New York Star) (1980) 144 CLR 300 (PC)

Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 44; 165 CLR 107

Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55; 171 CLR 538

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Commercial and Corporations

Sub-area:

Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance

Number of paragraphs:

71

Date of hearing:

17 November 2026

Counsel for the Applicants:

A J McInerney SC and L P Cavell

Solicitor for the Applicants:

Garland Hawthorn Brahe

Counsel for the Respondents:

M Baroni

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Mills Oakley

ORDERS

NSD 1124 of 2026

BETWEEN:

MICHAEL THOMSON

First Applicant

EBCOM PTY LTD

Second Applicant

AND:

INQUISIENT INC

First Respondent

SCOTT DIXON SMITH

Second Respondent

order made by:

STEWART J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Upon the applicants’ continuing usual undertaking as to damages, order 3 of the orders made on 9 October 2026 be extended until the final determination of this proceeding (including the exhaustion of any rights of appeal) or further order.

2.    The respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the interlocutory application dated 9 October 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STEWART J:

Introduction

1    The applicants apply for the extension of an anti-anti-suit injunction that I previously granted against the respondents on an interim basis restraining them from taking further steps against the applicants in a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, United States of America.

2    In this Court, the applicants are Michael Thomson and Ebcom Pty Ltd (Ebcom), an Australian incorporated company of which Mr Thomson is the sole director and, indirectly through another company, the sole shareholder. The respondents are InQuisient Inc (InQuisient), a Delaware registered corporation, and Scott Smith, the chief executive officer of InQuisient.

3    In the Virginia court, the original petitioner was InQuisient. Later, leave was sought to add Mr Smith as a second petitioner. It is not clear from the evidence whether leave has yet been granted, but I will assume in what follows that Mr Smith is also a petitioner. The respondents to the petition are Mr Thomson, Ebcom, Eastern Bridge Ltd (Eastern Bridge) and Bengoal Pty Ltd (Bengoal). Eastern Bridge is a Malaysian company of which Mr Thomson is the managing director and Ebcom is the sole shareholder. Bengoal is an Australian incorporated company of which Mr Thomson is the sole director and shareholder. Relevantly, it is common ground that Mr Thomson owns and controls Ebcom, Eastern Bridge and Bengoal and Mr Smith owns or controls InQuisient.

The proceeding in this Court

4    The principal proceeding in this Court was commenced by the filing of an originating application and statement of claim on 25 June 2026. Those documents were served on Mr Smith on 10 July 2026 and on InQuisient on about 20 July 2026.

5    The statement of claim is very lengthy. In summary, it pleads that in about March 2021, Mr Smith asked Mr Thomson, a former Macquarie employee, to secure an investment bank as InQuisient’s financial adviser on a sale of its business. It is said that Mr Smith agreed to pay Mr Thomson, or his nominee, the same fees as Macquarie. From about September 2021, the arrangement is said to have extended to any judgment or settlement of InQuisient’s patent litigation against a competitor, ServiceNow Inc, in Delaware. The discussions between Mr Thomson and Mr Smith which are said to have led to the oral agreement and the variations to it are alleged to have taken place in Sydney where both Mr Thomson and Mr Smith live.

6    The statement of claim alleges that after two years’ work by Mr Thomson with Macquarie and Deutsche Bank, Macquarie was appointed on 8 May 2023 for both the sale and the litigation. It is said that Mr Smith repeatedly promised that InQuisient’s counsel would document the agreement with Mr Thomson, but that was not done.

7    The statement of claim alleges that Eastern Bridge was Mr Thomson’s initial nominee in March 2021, but that in December 2022 Mr Thomson informed Mr Smith that Ebcom “would replace Eastern Bridge and Bengoal as his nominee with respect to payment for consultancy services”. There is no allegation as to when or how Bengoal became Mr Thomson’s nominee.

8    On those facts, the applicants plead four causes of action. First, they plead breach of an oral contract against InQuisient. The relief sought is specific performance and equitable compensation or liquidated damages calculated with reference to Macquarie’s fees. Second, they plead misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law based on unfounded representations about future payment. Third, in reliance on s 21 of the ACL, they plead unconscionable conduct against Mr Smith and InQuisient in exploiting Mr Thomson’s trust and weaker position. Fourth, and alternatively, they plead a quantum meruit based on a reasonable fee assessment by reference to market rates and Macquarie’s fees.

9    The proceeding came before me for first case management hearing on 9 October 2026 at which the applicants applied for an interim anti-anti-suit injunction. As the respondents had not had an opportunity to put on any evidence or otherwise prepare for the application, I dealt with it effectively on an ex parte basis and, on the applicants’ usual undertaking as to damages, I restrained the respondents from taking any further steps in the Virginia proceeding to restrain or seek to restrain the hearing of the applicants’ claim for interlocutory relief in this proceeding, or any other aspect of this proceeding. I then programmed the interlocutory application for hearing on an opposed basis about five weeks later.

The Virginia proceeding

10    The Virginia proceeding was commenced on 15 September 2026 by the filing of a “Petition for Injunctive Relief and Emergency Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction”. The application for an amendment to the petition (referred to above at [3]) which added, or at least sought to add, Mr Smith as a petitioner, was filed on 6 October 2026. The petition was purportedly served on the respondents to the petition by sending it by email, without consent, to the Australian solicitor acting for Mr Thomson and Ebcom on 8 October 2026.

11    By the amended petition, the petitioners seek an order compelling the respondents to the petition (ie the applicants in the proceeding before me) to dismiss with prejudice the proceeding in this Court, a temporary injunction prohibiting the respondents to the petition from taking any further action in this proceeding and a permanent injunction restraining them from bringing further claims in this Court.

12    The petition relies on two practically identical agreements concluded between InQuisient and Eastern Bridge, and between InQuisient and Bengoal, both dated 20 April 2021. The agreements are styled “Mutual Non-Disclosure Strategic Partner Agreement”. Clause 17 of the agreements, titled “Governing Law and Jurisdiction”, is relevantly in the following terms:

This Agreement shall be subject to and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The parties agree that jurisdiction and venue for any matters raised or controversies arising out of this Agreement shall be exclusively in the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia located in Fairfax County, Virginia and/or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia located in Alexandria, Virginia (and the appellate courts therefrom).

13    The petition asserts, without particulars: “It was understood between the Parties that EBCOM would be covered by the terms of the Agreement, as Eastern Bridge is the sole shareholder of EBCOM.” It can be noted that that factual statement as to the shareholding reverses the true position, but nothing turns on that for present purposes.

14    The petition quotes from the statement of claim in the proceeding in this Court that “On or before 19 April 2021 Thomson and [InQuisient] made a concluded and binding agreement for Thomson to provide consultancy services to [InQuisient]”, and asserts that “the matter is subject to, and must be heard in, the Commonwealth of Virginia”.

15    I was informed at the hearing of the interlocutory application that the Virginia proceeding is not listed for hearing, and that it will not be listed so long as the interim injunction that I made on 9 October 2026 remains in place.

The case for the anti-anti-suit injunction

16    The applicants rely, in essence, on the following contentions in support of the relief that they seek.

17    First, the applicants say that Mr Thomson and Ebcom are not parties to the non-disclosure agreements and are therefore not bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause in those agreements. They submit that there is no proper basis upon which the anti-suit injunction is sought against them in Virginia, and that this Court should protect its own process by restraining the respondents from pursuing the anti-suit relief in Virginia.

18    Second, the applicants say that the controversy sought to be litigated in the proceeding in this Court does not come within the subject matter of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in that it is not one of “any matters raised or controversies arising out of” the non-disclosure agreements.

19    Third, the applicants say that there is at least a real risk that if they are confined to bringing their claims in Virginia they will lose the benefit of their ACL claims. They say that that is a strong discretionary factor in favour of the relief they seek.

20    Fourth, the applicants say that to the extent that the respondents contend that the statement of claim in this Court discloses confidential information in breach of the non-disclosure agreements, any such breaches are not breaches by Mr Thomson or Ebcom. They also say that the relevant information is already in the public domain in Australia and in Virginia by reason of the statement of claim being publicly available and no suppression orders having been sought or granted.

The case against the anti-anti-suit injunction

21    The respondents submit that the fact that the applicants are not parties to the non-disclosure agreements “is not compelling in circumstances where they are ‘not strangers’ to those agreements”. They rely on Global Partners Fund Ltd v Babcock & Brown Ltd (in liq) [2010] NSWCA 196; 79 ACSR 383 (Global Partners v Babcock), to which I will return.

22    The respondents say that the subject matter of the proceeding in this Court is within the subject matter of the exclusive jurisdiction clause with the result that the applicants are constrained by that clause to litigate their claims in Virginia.

23    The respondents say that it “should not be taken as an axiom” that the ACL claims could not be litigated in Virginia. They also say that there have to be strong reasons showing why a matter should not be heard in the forum chosen by the parties before a court will decline to enforce an exclusive jurisdiction clause.

24    The respondents say that the balance of convenience warrants the refusal of the injunction.

The principles governing anti-anti-suit relief

25    The established principles that apply to anti-suit injunctions apply also to anti-anti-suit injunctions, perhaps with minor modification: Credit Suisse Virtuoso SICAV-SIF v Insurance Australia Ltd [2024] FCA 1193 at [37] per Moshinsky J.

26    In CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1997] HCA 33; 189 CLR 345 (CSR v Cigna) at 391-392 it was identified that there are two bases on which an Australian court might by anti-suit injunction prevent a party subject to its jurisdiction commencing or continuing a suit in a foreign forum. One basis is if the foreign proceeding interferes with or has a tendency to interfere with a proceeding pending in the Australian court. Thus, an anti-suit injunction may be granted when it is necessary for the protection of the court’s own proceedings or processes.

27    The other basis, which is quite apart from the inherent (or implied) power of a court to protect its own processes, is that a court may in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction make orders in restraint of unconscionable conduct or the unconscientious exercise of legal rights. Thus, if the bringing of legal proceedings involves unconscionable conduct or the unconscientious exercise of a legal right, an injunction may be granted by a court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to restrain those proceedings no matter where they are brought.

28    The applicants rely on the first of those bases in seeking anti-anti-suit relief. They submit that the Virginia proceeding has the tendency to interfere with the proceeding in this Court because there is a real risk that the Virginia court will grant orders preventing the applicants from pursuing the proceeding in this Court. In the case of anti-anti-suit relief, it is axiomatic that the foreign proceeding in which anti-suit relief is or may be sought has the tendency to interfere with a proceeding in this Court. As the anti-anti-suit jurisdiction is clearly enlivened, attention must now turn to the basis on which that relief might be granted.

29    The principles governing the exercise of a court’s power to grant an anti-suit injunction in respect of foreign proceedings are identified in CSR v Cigna at 396-398. First, the court must be satisfied that it is not a clearly inappropriate forum in the sense discussed in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55; 171 CLR 538.

30    Second, the court must consider whether the applicant for the anti-suit injunction should first be required to seek a stay in the foreign court. In the context of anti-anti-suit relief, the question is whether the applicants should first be required to oppose the anti-suit relief in the foreign forum.

31    Third, if the court is not a clearly inappropriate forum and it is not considered expedient or desirable to require the applicants first to oppose the anti-suit relief in the foreign proceeding, the court must proceed in accordance with the practice which ordinarily applies with respect to interlocutory relief. That is to say, it must determine whether there is a serious issue to be tried and, if so, whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of an interlocutory injunction. Additionally, the power to grant injunctions in restraint of foreign proceedings should be exercised with caution.

Consideration

32    The respondents do not submit that this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum independently of their reliance on the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the non-disclosure agreements. That is not surprising given the close connection that the dispute has with Australia. The relevant discussions over several years between Mr Thomson and Mr Smith which are said to have resulted in an oral agreement and then variations of that agreement are said to have taken place in Sydney. The discussions and agreements concerned the involvement of an Australian bank, Macquarie. Both Mr Thomson and Mr Smith live in Sydney and Ebcom is incorporated in Australia with its registered office in Sydney.

33    That turns attention to the exclusive jurisdiction clause. If indeed the applicants are bound by the clause, then they would have to establish strong countervailing reasons to avoid being held to the jurisdiction that they agreed to: Akai Pty Ltd v The People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1996] HCA 39; 188 CLR 418 at 428-429 and 445; Karpik v Carnival plc [2023] HCA 39; 280 CLR 640 at [66].

The parties to the non-disclosure agreements

34    Neither Mr Thomson nor Ebcom is a named party to the non-disclosure agreements. Mr Thomson signed the agreements for each of Eastern Bridge and Bengoal, but he did so in his capacity as director. There is nothing in the manner or terms of his signature to bind him personally to the agreements. The respondents instead rely on the following features in submitting that Mr Thomson and Ebcom became bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause, or can be held to it, in the same way that the non-parties in Global Partners v Babcock were able to have the benefit of such a clause.

35    First, the respondents point to the recitals which state, in each case, that the agreement “is made for the purposes of facilitating discussions regarding engaging in a strategic partnership, which may lead to possible future M&A activity”. They refer to the definition in the agreements of “Project” which “means the negotiation of, and work under or pursuant to, a contract, agreement or other business arrangement by and between InQuisient and Eastern Bridge”.

36    Second, they refer to the terms of cl 3 which include that a party receiving confidential information under the agreement (referred to as the “Receiving Party”) does so “for itself and it [sic] affiliates” and undertakes to the other party not to disclose the information save under the terms of the agreement.

37    Third, the respondents refer to cl 4.1, which creates exceptions to the non-disclosure undertaking in cl 3. The exceptions include in relation to confidential information which becomes generally available to the public “other than as a result of a disclosure directly or indirectly by the Receiving Party or its officers, directors, employees, professional advisers, representatives, agents, or Third Parties in violation of this Agreement” or which becomes available to the Receiving Party on a non-confidential basis from a source other than the other party (referred to as the “Disclosing Party”) or its officers, directors, etc. (Although “Third Party” is capitalised in the agreements, it is not defined.)

38    Fourth, the respondents rely on the fact of the three corporations, namely Ebcom, Eastern Bridge and Bengoal, all being commonly owned and controlled by Mr Thomson.

39    Given the respondents’ heavy reliance on it, it is necessary to identify what was decided in Global Partners v Babcock. The case concerned a partnership agreement which contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts in respect of “any disputes which may arise out of or in connection with this Agreement” (at [22]). The applicant was the managing general partner of the partnership and, obviously, a party to the partnership agreement. It claimed that the respondents breached tortious or fiduciary obligations that they owed to investors in the partnership. The respondents were all members of the same group of companies, the Babcock and Brown Group. The first respondent was the primary holding company and the fourth respondent was the only respondent that was a member of the partnership and thus party to the exclusive jurisdiction clause. The primary judge had made interlocutory orders which had the effect of requiring the claims against the respondents to be determined in England.

40    There were proceedings in England in which the respondent parties sought negative declarations as to their liability to the applicant on the claims brought in the NSW proceeding. It was accepted by the applicant that the proceedings in England involved the same issues that were sought to be agitated in NSW.

41    Chief Justice Spigelman, with whom Giles and Tobias JJA agreed, identified that there are overwhelming commercial and policy considerations to support the proposition that only one court should determine the whole of the dispute between the parties, and that the issue before the court was which court that should be (at [18]).

42    Importantly, the respondents that were not parties to the partnership agreement were nevertheless included in the definition of “Babcock and Brown Group” in the agreement which envisaged that they would, as such, be involved in making decisions with respect to the partnership’s investments (at [28]). They were also given rights to certain fees under the agreement (at [29]), and they were “associates” of the managing partner and, therefore, “Indemnified Persons” within the meaning of the partnership agreement (at [32]). That meant that they were each entitled to the benefit of certain provisions of the agreement including in relation to “Exculpation”, “Indemnity” and “Continuing Effect” (at [32]).

43    The relevant issue in the case for present purposes is the issue referred to as “party scope”, ie whether the relevant non-parties to the exclusive jurisdiction clause could claim the benefit of it.

44    His Honour noted that some English authorities have interpreted an exclusive jurisdiction clause to bind a party with respect to proceedings against a non-party and others have interpreted exclusive jurisdiction clauses as applying only to proceedings between the parties to the clause (at [71]). His Honour proceeded on the basis that each contract must be interpreted in its context (at [72]).

45    It was explained that the respondents who were not parties to the partnership agreement had no contractual rights with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction clause (at [73]). However, the respondent that was a party to the agreement was held to have such rights which it was entitled to assert both with respect to the claims against it and with respect to the closely related, indeed, relevantly identical, claims against the other respondents (at [73]). It was held that those non-parties to the agreement were entitled to approach the court, in their own right, to request that the court exercise its discretion to grant the stay (at [73]). That was because of their involvement in the affairs of the partnership, as envisaged by the agreement itself, and the rights conferred upon them as indemnified persons under the agreement (at [73]). Although not being parties to the agreement, those respondents were “not strangers” to it (at [74]) and they could not be categorised as members of “an undifferentiated group of ‘non parties’” (at [78]).

46    It was further reasoned that each of the respondents that was not a party to the agreement was entitled to the benefit of the indemnity provisions in the agreement which they intended to rely on as a contractual defence to the applicant’s claims (at [77]). It was held that in a context where the contract confers rights on identified non-parties, the choice of law and exclusive jurisdiction clauses should be construed as binding the parties with respect to proceedings in which such an indemnity may arise (at [79]).

47    On the strength of that reasoning, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and maintained the stay of the proceeding in NSW in favour of the proceeding in England.

48    From that synopsis, it is immediately to be observed that the present case is substantially different. First, Mr Thomson and Ebcom have no rights under the non-disclosure agreements. Second, they do not intend to rely on the non-disclosure agreements. Third, no matters raised or controversies arising out of the non-disclosure agreements are sought to be litigated against Mr Thomson and Ebcom. Indeed, no such claim is made even against Eastern Bridge or Bengoal – the Virginia proceeding, in which the respondents to that proceeding are sought to be restrained from proceeding in Australia, is not in aid of any independent claim in Virginia; Mr Smith and InQuisient do not seek any relief in relation to any alleged breach of the non-disclosure agreements other than the anti-suit relief, and they do not seek any negative declaratory relief in respect of the liability that they are alleged to have to Mr Thomson and Ebcom in the Australian proceeding. Fourth, there is no party to the non-disclosure agreements that seeks to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause in aid of its associated non-parties.

49    The respondents submit that Mr Thomson and Ebcom, by virtue of being “affiliates” of Eastern Bridge and Bengoal, and Mr Thomson as an officer or director of Eastern Bridge and Bengoal, have obligations under the non-disclosure agreements. “Affiliates” is not defined in the non-disclosure agreements. I accept that it could include Mr Thomson as a director of one of the parties to the agreement and Ebcom as being under common ownership, in particular given the involvement of Mr Thomson and Ebcom in the same “project” that is the subject of the agreements. Nevertheless, it is trite that a non-party to an agreement cannot take the benefit of rights nor be subject to obligations under the agreement without its assent. The doctrine of privity of contract makes that clear: see generally Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 44; 165 CLR 107 per Brennan J at 128-141, Deane J at 141-143, Dawson J at 155-162 and Gaudron J at 173-174.

50    Unlike in Global Partners v Babcock, there is no benefit under the agreements to which it is said that the non-parties are entitled. Also, and critically, the non-parties do not intend to claim any benefit under the agreements and in that way cannot be said to have adopted or ratified any part of the agreement that might be said to have been entered into for their benefit: cf Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd [1962] AC 446 (HL) at 474 per Lord Reid; New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd (The Eurymedon) [1974] AC 154 (PC) at 166 per Lord Wilberforce; Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v Salmond & Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd (The New York Star) (1980) 144 CLR 300 (PC) at 304-305.

51    There is simply no basis on which Mr Thomson and Ebcom can be held to the exclusive jurisdiction clause. The underlying premise of the respondents’ case accordingly fails.

52    In light of that conclusion, it is not necessary to consider whether the controversy that is the subject of the proceeding in this Court is within the subject matter scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clauses.

The ACL claims

53    If the applicants were not able to advance their ACL claims in a proceeding in Virginia, that would be a strong discretionary factor in favour of the anti-anti-suit relief that they seek. Unlike in many other cases that have come before Australian courts in which it has been relevant whether particular claims or causes of action would be able to be pursued in foreign proceedings, neither side of the case before me has adduced any evidence as to whether a court in Virginia would apply Australian law and, in particular, whether such a court would apply the ACL in determining the applicants’ claims.

54    A similar scenario of absence of evidence arose in Bolin Technology Co Ltd v BirdDog Technology Ltd [2024] FCA 129 in which, with reference to prior cases in this Court where the point had been litigated, I found on an urgent ex parte hearing that there was at least a substantial risk that the United States District Court would not apply the ACL. See Home Ice Cream Pty Ltd v McNabb Technologies LLC (No 2) [2018] FCA 1093 at [5] per Greenwood ACJ and Karpik v Carnival plc (The Ruby Princess) (Stay Application) [2021] FCA 1082; 157 ACSR 1 at [291]-[328]. That reasoning was subsequently approved when the matter was determined on an opposed basis: Bolin Technology Co Ltd v BirdDog Technology Ltd [2024] FCA 286 at [100] per Anderson J.

55    I am satisfied that there is a similar risk in the present case that if the applicants were forced to pursue their claims in Virginia, the mandatory norms of commercial dealing as prescribed by the ACL that would be applied by an Australian court would not be applied to the dealings that are pleaded to have occurred in Australia. There is then a real risk (on the hypothesis that I decline to extend the anti-anti-suit injunction) that if the Virginia court made orders to restrain this proceeding, the applicants would be deprived of a legitimate juridical advantage. That is a significant factor weighing in favour of the anti-anti-suit relief that the applicants seek.

The balance of convenience

56    The respondents submit that the balance of convenience does not favour the continuation of the anti-anti-suit relief because of the disproportionate prejudice that it will visit on them. In particular, they submit that the pursuit of the claims in this Court by Mr Thomson and Ebcom amounts to a breach of confidence by their use in the statement of claim of confidential information that is subject to the non-disclosure agreements. I am obviously not called upon on this interlocutory proceeding to determine whether the identified information in the statement of claim is indeed subject to obligations of confidence, but for present purposes I accept that the respondents’ contention that it is so subject raises a serious issue to be tried.

57    I have already found that Mr Thomson and Ebcom are not parties to or bound by the non-disclosure agreements, so they cannot be in breach of those agreements. I understand, however, that the respondents contend that there is information in the statement of claim which is nevertheless subject to obligations of confidence under the agreements and that Mr Thomson and Ebcom, having received that information with knowledge of those obligations, are bound in equity to maintain the confidence. That would presumably be in reliance on the trend of authority regarding the accountability in equity of third parties for breaches of confidence: Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56; 178 CLR 408 at 459-460 per Gaudron J; Breen v Williams [1996] HCA 57; 186 CLR 71 at 129 per Gummow J; Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 3; 188 CLR 501 at 537 per Gaudron J and 567 per Gummow J.

58    The principal weakness in the respondents’ contention in reliance on breach of confidence as an incident of the balance of convenience is that the statement of claim is (and for about six weeks has been) publicly available so it can no longer be regarded as confidential: Commonwealth v Walsh [1980] HCA 45; 147 CLR 61 at 62 per Mason J. After the first case management hearing on 9 October 2026, the statement of claim became available for inspection by third parties as of right in the absence of any order to the contrary: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 2.32(2). No application was made by the respondents to restrict access to the statement of claim, and no application has been foreshadowed. If indeed there is confidential information in the statement of claim which is disclosed in breach of a confidence under the non-disclosure agreements, that is a matter that, if not too late to remedy, can be remedied by appropriate suppression orders. The continuation of the proceeding in this Court does not cause any relevant prejudice in relation to confidentiality. To put the matter differently, preservation or protection of the confidence does not require that the applicants be restrained from pursuing the proceeding in this Court. Moreover, in the absence of suppression orders in this Court, even such a restraint would not protect the statement of claim from continuing to be publicly available to third parties.

59    The applicants also rely on the statement of claim having been disclosed in the Virginia proceeding as an annexure to the petition and to the amended petition. However, there is no evidence before me on what the rules are in that court about third-party access to documents. I am therefore not in a position to find that the confidence in any confidential information in the statement of claim has been lost through the filing of the petitions in Virginia.

60    There is a further consideration that detracts from the respondents’ reliance on the statement of claim containing confidential information in breach of the non-disclosure agreements in contending that the balance of convenience favours refusing the anti-anti-suit relief sought by the applicants (thereby allowing the respondents to proceed with their anti-suit petition in Virginia). It is that the respondents make no claim in that petition that the applicants’ proceeding here amounts to a breach of confidence. That is to say, the petition in Virginia is not brought in protection of any confidence, but only to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

61    The next aspect of prejudice that the respondents identify is the prejudice of having to litigate here rather than where, they say, the parties have agreed to litigate, ie Virginia. In light of my findings with regard to the applicants not being bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause, that submission must fail.

62    In my assessment, the balance of convenience strongly favours the granting of anti-anti-suit relief restraining the respondents from pursuing their anti-suit petition against the applicants in Virginia. Of course, no relief should be granted here which would impinge on the respondents’ ability to pursue relief against Eastern Bridge and Bengoal in Virginia in reliance on any matters raised or controversies arising out of the non-disclosure agreements; it is only Mr Thomson and Ebcom who should be protected by the anti-anti-suit relief.

63    As found at [55] above, if Mr Thomson and Ebcom are restrained in Virginia from continuing the proceeding in this Court, there is a real risk that they will not be able to pursue their ACL claims in a proceeding in Virginia. That is significant prejudice. Also, Mr Thomson and Ebcom have chosen to litigate in Australia, which they are entitled to do in circumstances where they are not to be held to the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the non-disclosure agreements. It would be significantly prejudicial to them if they were restricted to litigating their claims in Virginia, particularly when those claims arise from dealings in Australia and one of the respondents resides in Australia.

64    As noted at [32] above, there is no sense in which this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum for the litigation of the applicants’ claims. It is also relevant that the Virginia proceeding is not a competing proceeding in the relevant sense. That is to say, there is no risk that there will be conflicting findings of fact or conflicting outcomes in Virginia because there is no parallel substantive proceeding in Virginia and none is contemplated. As mentioned, the anti-suit petition in Virginia is not advanced in protection of any substantive overlapping proceeding there. Nor is there any existing or contemplated proceeding in Virginia against Eastern Bridge and Bengoal (which are bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clauses) that might make this Court a clearly inappropriate forum for the determination of related and overlapping claims by Mr Thomson and Ebcom: cf HNOE Ltd v Angus & Julia Stone Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 271 at [112] per Bell CJ.

Other matters

65    The respondents do not contend that the applicants should have to oppose the anti-suit relief in Virginia and thus have the forum dispute determined there rather than in the interlocutory application before me. I nevertheless hold that the applicants should not be required to do that. The anti-suit petition in Virginia inherently has the tendency to interfere with the proceeding in this Court, including because there is no indication, and there can be no certainty, as to how long it will take to be resolved and in the meantime progress in the proceeding here would run the risk of being wasted.

66    The respondents also rightly do not contend that there is no serious issue to be tried in the applicants’ substantive proceeding in this Court.

Disposition

67    In summary, if the respondents are permitted to pursue their anti-suit petition against Mr Thomson and Ebcom in Virginia, and they are successful, that will have the effect of interfering with Mr Thomson and Ebcom’s proceeding in this Court. That enlivens this Court’s jurisdiction to grant anti-anti-suit relief against the respondents.

68    In considering whether such relief should be granted, it would count very heavily against Mr Thomson and Ebcom if they were parties to the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the non-disclosure agreements or if they could on some other basis be held to those clauses. However, I have found that they are not parties and they cannot be held to those clauses. In the circumstances, there is no basis upon which this Court would grant a stay of this proceeding thereby restricting the applicants to pursuing their claims, if at all, in Virginia. Equally, there is no basis upon which the petition for anti-suit relief against Mr Thomson and Ebcom is justifiable from the perspective of this Court.

69    Thus, the pursuit of anti-suit relief by the respondents against Mr Thomson and Ebcom in Virginia is an unjustified interference in the processes of the Court. That is a strong basis to grant the anti-anti-suit relief that has been sought.

70    Moreover, for the reasons given above, if Mr Thomson and Ebcom were only able to pursue their claims in Virginia they would face the real risk of being prejudiced by not being able to pursue their ACL claims. The balance of convenience favours the extension of the anti-anti-suit relief that I granted on 9 October 2026.

71    The costs should follow the result.

I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stewart.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026