Federal Court of Australia

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1765

Appeal from:

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1148

File number(s):

SAD 154 of 2025

Judgment of:

O'SULLIVAN J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION — appeal from judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal — where appellant was primary applicant for Business Innovation and Investment (Provisional) (Class EB) (Subclass 188) visa — where family unit of appellant were secondary applicants — where delegate of the Minister refused to grant visas to the appellant and secondary applicants — where Tribunal affirmed decision of the delegate — where appellant did not have an “ownership interest” in one or more “main businesses” under cl 188.225(1) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) — whether primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error in Tribunal’s conclusion the appellant did not have an “ownership interest” in Society — where the proposed amended ground was not advanced before the primary judge — whether appellant permitted to rely upon an amended ground — where appellant put forward no evidence of an ownership interest required under reg 1.11A of the Regulations — where Society was not a “qualifying business” under reg 1.03 of the Regulations — leave to rely on amended ground of appeal refused — whether primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error in Tribunal failing to consider appellant’s control over, and financial benefit derived from, the Society — whether primary judge erred in finding Tribunal did not deny appellant procedural fairness — where appellant on notice that satisfaction of ownership requirement in cl 188.225(1) of Sch 2 to the Regulations was in issue — no denial of procedural fairness — where primary judge found Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under s 338(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to review decision of delegate in respect of secondary applicants who were outside migration zone — where grant of relief in respect of secondary applicants would serve no useful purpose — no appealable error — appeal dismissed with costs

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 134(10), 338(2), 359AA

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs 1.03, 1.11A, Sch 2 – cl 188.225

Haryana Registration and Regulation of Societies Act, 2012, India

Cases cited:

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1

Gomez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 480; (2002) 190 ALR 543

Kilgour v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCAFC 183; (2025) 313 FCR 360

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1148

Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68

SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499

Tohi v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 125; (2021) 285 FCR 187

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588

Division:

General Division

Registry:

South Australia

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

63

Date of hearing:

2 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellant:

The appellant appearing in person with an interpreter

Counsel for the Respondents:

Ms M Pappas

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

SAD 154 of 2025

BETWEEN:

HAMENT KUMAR

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

O'SULLIVAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal is dismissed.

2.    The appellant is to pay the Minister’s costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed in the sum of THREE THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($3,500).

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’SULLIVAN J:

1    The appellant is a citizen of India. On 10 December 2019, he applied for a Business Innovation and Investment (Provisional) (Class EB) (Subclass 188) visa in the Business Innovation stream. The appellant was the primary applicant, with his wife and two children as secondary applicants included in the visa application as members of his family unit.

2    On 26 May 2021, a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) refused to grant the appellant’s visa on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that the appellant had an “ownership interest” in one or more established “main businesses” that had an annual turnover of at least AUD $500,000 for at least two of the four fiscal years immediately prior to the relevant date as required by cl 188.225(1) in Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The delegate found also that the secondary applicants did not satisfy cl 188.311 in Sch 2 to the Regulations because they were not members of the family unit of a person who held a Subclass 188 visa.

3    The appellant and the other applicants applied for a review of the delegate’s decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as it then was). On 8 August 2023, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant visas to the appellant and the secondary applicants and published its reasons for doing so (TR).

4    The appellant and the secondary applicants applied to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. On 24 July 2025, the FCFCoA dismissed the application for judicial review: Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1148 (R).

5    It is from that decision that the appellant, who was the first applicant both before the FCFCoA and the Tribunal, appeals to this Court.

6    There are four grounds of appeal which in summary submit that the primary judge erred:

(1)    in finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision in relation to the meaning of “ownership interest” under reg 1.03 of the Regulations;

(2)    in finding that no procedural unfairness occurred before the Tribunal;

(3)    by not remitting the matter to the Tribunal notwithstanding the finding that the Tribunal erred by affirming the refusal decision for the secondary applicants, who were outside the migration zone; and

(4)    in not finding that the Tribunal failed to consider whether the appellant exercised actual control over the business in question and derived financial benefit, despite the registration of the business under a charitable structure.

7    It is for the reasons which follow that the appeal is dismissed.

The primary judge’s reasons

8    The primary judge set out the appellant’s migration history and that of his family unit: at R [5]-[21]. I do not repeat it.

9    Next, the primary judge considered the Tribunal’s reasons for its decision, noting that the issue before the Tribunal was whether the appellant satisfied cl 188.225 in Sch 2 to the Regulations which deals with applications for a Subclass 188 – Business Innovation and Investment visas. That regulation provides that the appellant (as an applicant) is required to demonstrate that:

(1)    For at least 2 of the 4 fiscal years immediately before the time of invitation to apply for the visa, the applicant had an ownership interest in one or more established main businesses that had an annual turnover of at least AUD500 000 in each of those years.

10    The primary judge noted: at R [25]-[28], that before the Tribunal, the business the appellant relied upon in support of his application for the visa was the Indraprasth Education Society trading as Adi Sankracharya Convent Public School.

11    The primary judge continued by referring to the Tribunal’s consideration of documents provided by the appellant, which included a Memorandum of Association for the Society, which set out its objectives as well as the powers, functions and duties of the Committee established to achieve those objectives.

12    An important issue before the Tribunal was that legislation in India known as the Haryana Registration and Regulation of Societies Act, 2012, under which the Society was registered, provided that no society could be registered unless its Memorandum of Association prohibited the payment of any dividend or distribution of any asset, income or profits to its members or their dependants or legal heirs.

13    Regulation 1.03 of the Regulations defines “qualifying business” as an enterprise that:

(a)    is operated for the purpose of making profit through the provision of goods, services or goods and services (other than the provision of rental property) to the public; and

(b)    is not operated primarily or substantially for the purpose of speculative or passive investment.

14    The primary judge observed: at R [26] that the Tribunal was satisfied on the evidence before it that the Society was set up in accordance with the Societies Act for a charitable purpose and not to generate profit.

15    The primary judge noted that the Tribunal had concluded that given the legislation under which the School operated and the Society’s Memorandum of Association was such that the School did not operate for the purpose of making a profit, it was not a “qualifying business” within the meaning of reg 1.03 of the Regulations.

16    The primary judge also observed that the appellant had acknowledged before the Tribunal that, notwithstanding the appellant’s family had built the school and run it, nonetheless he did not have an ownership interest in the Society that was legally responsible for the School’s operation.

17    The primary judge also noted that because the appellant accepted he did not have an ownership interest in the Society, that the School did not meet the definition of a “main business” of the appellant within the meaning of reg 1.11 of the Regulations.

18    Ultimately, the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application.

Grounds of appeal

19    The appellant was self-represented on the appeal and appeared with the assistance of an interpreter. He advanced four grounds of appeal.

20    In his written submissions, the appellant seeks leave to amend ground one on the basis that the bracketed template words in Form 121 (Notice of Appeal) were left in by mistake such that the ground now sought to be relied upon reads:

The primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision, which misinterpreted “ownership interest” under Regulation 1.03 by disregarding the appellant’s evidence that his family built and funded the School, on the land, and made up its managing committee and treated its income as the family’s.

21    The second part of the bracketed template refers to a failure to apply relevant case law correctly. No case law is identified and a ground in these terms was not advanced at the hearing.

22    Apart from the application for leave to amend ground one in the terms identified, a further issue arises in relation to the proposed amended ground, which is that it was not advanced before the primary judge.

Principles on leave to amend

23    In Metwally v University of Wollongong [1985] HCA 28; (1985) 60 ALR 68 at 71, the High Court said:

It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principles to allow a party, after a case has been decided against [that party], to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, [that party] failed to put during the hearing when [that party] had the opportunity to do so.

(Square brackets provided)

24    “Exceptional circumstances” indicates a discretion to entertain a new ground of appeal if it is expedient and in the interests of justice to do so: Gomez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 480; (2002) 190 ALR 543 at [18] (Hill, O’Loughlin and Tamberlin JJ) and the cases cited therein.

25    In Water Board v Moustakas [1988] HCA 12; (1988) 77 ALR 193 at 196, the High Court also observed that if the facts have been established beyond controversy or the point involves a question of construction of law, “… then a court of appeal may find it expedient and in the interests of justice to entertain the point, but otherwise the rule is strictly applied”: see also Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7-8; VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [44]-[48] (Kiefel J as a member of this Court, Weinberg and Stone JJ); Tohi v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 125; (2021) 285 FCR 187 at [110]-[118] (O’Bryan J, with whom Katzmann J agreed); Kilgour v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCAFC 183; (2025) 313 FCR 360 at [99]-[107] and the cases cited therein; SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499 at [22]-[24] (Lander J).

Ground one

26    One of the issues which goes to whether the Court should grant leave to amend and then to advance the ground on appeal is the merit of the proposed ground: VUAX at [44].

27    The appellant submits that an “ownership interest” includes an interest “indirectly through one or more interposed companies, partnerships or trusts” referring to reg 1.11A of the Regulations. The appellant submits further that the Tribunal had noted the definition of “ownership interest” in s 134(10) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and also referred to reg 1.11A in its reasons: at TR [9]. On that basis, the appellant contended that the appellant’s evidence before the Tribunal raised an indirect beneficial interest.

28    The appellant refers to his evidence before the Tribunal which was in the following terms and was set out by the primary judge: at R [27]:

(a)    his father and grandfather had been involved in providing education and the School was a family business, that his family had built the School and the land was owned by the first applicant and two others (at [TR [21]]);

(b)    until 2012, the School had been owned by the family but in 2013, new legislation was introduced which meant that the legal documentation showed that the Society owned the School, however, it was really his family that did (at [TR [22]]);

(c)    he acknowledged that he could not demonstrate his ownership of the School and that the [Memorandum of Association] stated that any profit earned had to be utilised by the School (at [TR [23]]);

(d)    he has had, and currently has, businesses in Australia which he had some difficulty setting up when he arrived in Australia due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (at [TR [24]]); and

(e)    he did not have any other business that he could nominate or anything else that could be considered to be a “main business” (at [TR [25]]).

(Square brackets provided)

29    The appellant also referred to his evidence that the managing committee of the Society consists entirely of the appellant’s family members, that the School’s “profit and loss is all my family’s” and “in documents” it was a society but, in reality, it was the family’s school.

30    The appellant continues that the Tribunal never applied the beneficial ownership test, only finding that the appellant “does not have an ownership interest in the society that operates the school in a legal sense”: TR [27].

31    In quoting from the Tribunal’s reasons for its decision, the appellant fails to recognise that the Tribunal is there recording the appellant’s acknowledgement that he did not have an ownership interest in the Society. The emphasis is that it is the Society that is the legal operator of the School. The issue of any beneficial ownership in the Society was not the subject of that quote: at TR [27].

32    Next, the appellant submits that the Tribunal did not ask whether the Society held the School, its land or its income indirectly or beneficially for the appellant and his family within the meaning of reg 1.11A of the Regulations, which states:

(1)    Subject to subregulation (4), for Parts 188 and 888 of Schedule 2, ownership by an applicant, or the applicant's spouse or de facto partner, of an asset, an eligible investment or an ownership interest, includes beneficial ownership only if the beneficial ownership is evidenced in accordance with subregulation (2).

(2)    To evidence beneficial ownership of an asset, eligible investment or ownership interest, the applicant must show to the Minister:

(a)    a trust instrument; or

(b)    a contract; or

(c)    any other document capable of being used to enforce the rights of the applicant, or the applicant's spouse or   de   facto   partner, as the case requires, in relation to the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest;

stamped or registered by an appropriate authority under the law of the jurisdiction where the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest is located.

(3)    A document. shown under subregulation (2) does not evidence beneficial ownership, for subregulation (1), for any period earlier than the date of registration or stamping by the appropriate authority.

(4)    Beneficial ownership is not required to be evidenced in accordance with subregulation (2) if the person who has legal ownership of the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest in relation to which the applicant, or the applicant’s spouse or de facto partner, has beneficial ownership:

    (a)    is a dependent child of the applicant; and

    (b)    made a combined application with the applicant; and

(c)    has not reached the age at which, in the jurisdiction where the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest is located, he or she can claim the benefits of ownership of the asset, eligible investment or ownership interest.

33    The Minister submits that the Tribunal correctly identified the definition of an “ownership interest”: at TR [9], that it considered the legal structure under which the School operated, and that the appellant’s evidence before the Tribunal was that he did not have an ownership interest in the School.

34    The Minister submits further that, since the Tribunal had regard to the correct definition of “ownership interest” and had considered the evidence before it in reaching its conclusion that the appellant did not have an ownership interest, this ground, if permitted, amounts to no more than a disagreement.

35    I do not accept the appellant’s submissions and accept the Minister’s submissions for a number of reasons.

36    First, it comes as no surprise that the primary judge did not address the particular point in reg 1.11A of the Regulations in relation to the question of a beneficial interest given that it was not argued before him.

37    Second, the Tribunal dealt with beneficial interest. At TR [9], the Tribunal noted the requirements in reg 1.11A(2) of the Regulations to evidence beneficial ownership an ownership interest. No trust instrument or any other document was provided by the appellant to the Tribunal to evidence beneficial ownership.

38    Third, “ownership interest” is defined in s 134(10) of the Migration Act as an interest in the business as:

…

(a)    a shareholder in a company that carries on the business; or

(b)    a partner in a partnership that carries on the business; or

(c)    the sole proprietor of the business;

including such an interest held indirectly through one or more interposed companies, partnerships or trusts

39    The Tribunal noted: at TR [23] that the appellant “could not demonstrate his ownership of the school, and that members of the committee did not own the school”.

40    Fourth, as I have noted earlier in these reasons, it was an uncontested fact that the Societies Act, to which the Society was subject, provides that profits had to be utilised by the School such that it does not fall within the meaning of “qualifying business” under reg 1.03 of the Regulations because it is not operated for the purpose of making profit. The appellant also acknowledged that the Memorandum of Association stated that any profit had to be utilised by the school.

41    In all the circumstances, there is no merit in the proposed amended ground. The appellant does not have an ownership interest and the School is not a qualifying business.

42    Those facts, combined with (although independent of) the fact that the matter was not advanced before the primary judge, is such that leave to amend ground one in the terms proposed is refused.

43    Ground one, as presently drafted, contends the primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision which misinterpreted the meaning of “ownership interest” in reg 1.03 of the Regulations. It is for the reasons I have set out above, that ground one, in its current form, is not made out.

Ground four

44    Ground four is advanced in conjunction with ground one. It contends that the primary judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal failed to consider whether the appellant exercised actual control over the business and derived financial benefit, despite the registration of the business under a charitable structure.

45    The appellant submits that a “qualifying business”, the definition of which I have set out above, carries with it a test which is directed to the purpose for which the enterprise is operated and that it is a question of fact about how the enterprise actually runs, not only its legal form.

46    The appellant submits that the Tribunal decided the question by reference to the Societies Act and the Memorandum of Association for the Society, rather than the purpose for which the enterprise was operated, and that it made no finding about how the School was operated.

47    The Minister submits that the question of control forms no part of the definition of “ownership interest” and that in reaching the conclusion that the appellant had neither an ownership interest in the School nor an entitlement to any profit from the operation of the School, the Tribunal had regard to the evidence before it such that this ground cannot succeed.

48    I accept that submission. It is clear that to be a “qualifying business” the business must be operated for the purpose of making a profit when it is clear that on the material before the Tribunal that was not the case.

49    The appellant has failed to establish error on the part of the primary judge on this ground such that ground four fails.

Ground two

50    Ground two contends that the Tribunal did not provide procedural fairness to the appellant because it did not provide clear particulars of its concerns under s 359A of the Migration Act.

51    The appellant submits that the issue of whether the School was a “qualifying business” was raised for the first time by the Tribunal, orally, part way through the hearing and was based on the Tribunal’s own research into the Societies Act.

52    The Minister submits that ground two repeats two of the grounds advanced before the primary judge, being the Tribunal’s:

(a)    failure to give the appellant clear particulars; and

(b)    failure to provide an opportunity to the appellant to provide further information in support of the review application before the Tribunal, which were dealt with by the primary judge: at R [63]-[72].

53    I accept the Minister’s submission.

54    The primary judge identified issues that were before the Tribunal by reference to the delegate not being satisfied that the appellant had an “ownership interest” in one or more established “main businesses”, or that the annual turnover of the business met the requirements of cl 188.225(1) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.

55    At R [63]-[65], the primary judge considered cl 188.225 in Sch 2 to the Regulations, noting that the appellant was on notice as to those matters concerning “ownership interest” and “main business” as matters of which the delegate was not satisfied, and that they were the same matters which were considered by the Tribunal.

56    The issue of whether the appellant held an ownership interest, and its importance to the overall analysis, were issues both before the Tribunal and before the primary judge.

57    The appellant has not shown that he was denied procedural fairness such that the appellant has not made out ground two.

Ground three

58    Ground three contends that the Tribunal acted without jurisdiction by affirming the refusal of the secondary applicants’ application for visas. Those applicants formed part of the appellant’s family unit.

59    Unlike the appellant, they were outside the migration zone, such that the decision of the delegate to refuse their applications for a visa was not a reviewable decision: s 338(2) of the Migration Act.

60    The primary judge found error on the part of the Tribunal by concluding that the Tribunal should have determined it had no jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the primary judge concluded that remittal of the matter to the Tribunal would not serve any useful purpose in circumstances where the grant of their visas was dependent upon the appellant being granted a visa. It was for that reason that the primary judge was satisfied that the error would not have changed the outcome for the appellant and that the remittal of the matter to the Tribunal, insofar as it related to the secondary applicants, would serve no useful purpose.

61    The primary judge was clearly correct in reaching that conclusion such that ground three is not made out.

Conclusion

62    It is for these reasons that the appeal must be dismissed.

63    The appellant is to pay the Minister’s costs of and incidental to the appeal fixed in the sum of $3,500.

I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Sullivan.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026