Federal Court of Australia

CJY21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1764

Application for leave to appeal from:

CJY21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1113

File number(s):

VID 992 of 2025

Judgment of:

ANDERSON J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time – application for leave to appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court dismissing an application for review of a decision of a Registrar to summarily dismiss the applicant’s application for judicial review because the application had no reasonable prospects of success – insufficient explanation for delay – insufficient merits of proposed appeal – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 256(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 494C

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (repealed) rr 13.13(a), 21.01

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.31(2)

Cases cited:

AIX20 v Director-General of Security [2025] FCAFC 38

BJM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCA 786

BLD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1400

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344

MZZYV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 957

SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; 135 ALD 17

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579

WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

48

Date of hearing:

16 November 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

The Applicant appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Ms K Petrovski of Sparke Helmore

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 992 of 2025

BETWEEN:

CJY21

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.    The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent on a lump sum basis, as agreed, or as fixed by a Registrar of the Court.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANDERSON J:

Introduction

1    By application filed on 5 August 2025, the applicant seeks an extension of time and leave to appeal from the orders and judgment of the primary judge delivered and published on 17 July 2025 as CJY21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1113 (primary judgment).

2    The primary judge dismissed the applicant’s application for review of a Registrar’s decision, pursuant to s 256(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth). The Registrar’s decision, dated 12 June 202, summarily dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review, pursuant to r 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (repealed on 1 September 2025) (FCFCOA Rules), because the application had no reasonable prospects of success. The applicant had sought judicial review of a decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 30 June 2021.

3    A decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia made by a Registrar (pursuant to r 21.01 of the FCFCOA Rules) is interlocutory in nature and therefore requires the Court’s leave to appeal: s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Further, pursuant to r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), any application for leave to appeal was required to be made within 14 days from the date of the primary judge’s orders, namely by 31 July 2025. The application was not filed until 5 August 2025 and was therefore filed five days outside the time limit prescribed by r 35.13 of the Rules. The applicant therefore also requires an extension of time to seek leave to appeal.

4    For the reasons that follow, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is refused.

Background

5    On 15 April 2019, the applicant, a citizen of India, arrived in Australia on a Visitor visa. On 10 October 2019, the applicant applied for a Protection (Subclass 866) visa (Visa). The applicant claimed that his wife and her family belonged to a higher, more influential caste, his wife’s family opposed their marriage, and her parents had political connections and threatened to kill him.

6    On 8 December 2020, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the Visa. The delegate concluded that the applicant’s claims were not credible, having regard to the lack of substantiating details and inconsistencies in the information provided. The delegate’s notification letter and decision record were sent to the applicant’s email address as recorded on the visa application.

7    On 27 May 2021, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision.

8    On 28 May 2021, the Tribunal sent the applicant a letter inviting him to comment on the validity of the application for review. The letter indicated that the application was not valid, as it was not lodged within the relevant time limit of 28 days, and invited the applicant to comment in writing by 11 June 2021.

9    On 11 June 2021, the applicant responded stating that he understood that he had not lodged his application for review within time; however, he had missed the notification, checked his email now and then, and did not receive any call from the Department or letter to his address.

10    On 30 June 2021, the Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction in the matter.

Tribunal decision

11    The Tribunal noted that as the applicant was not in immigration detention on the day he was notified of the delegate’s decision, the application had to be made within 28 days pursuant to reg 4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations).

12    The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant was notified of the delegate’s decision on 8 December 2020 in accordance with the statutory requirements in s 494C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The prescribed period to apply for review ended on 4 January 2021.

13    The Tribunal had regard to the applicant’s email explaining that he only checked his email now and then and missed the decision notification, but found that it did not have discretion regarding the specified timeframe for lodging an application.

14    The Tribunal found that as the application was not received until 27 May 2021, it was not made within the statutorily prescribed time limit and therefore the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to conduct the review.

Proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

15    By application filed in the (then) Federal Circuit Court (now the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia) on 22 July 2021, the applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The application advanced three grounds of review, which appeared in the application as follows:

1.    I was denied the natural justice.

2.    The Tribunal breached section 424A(1) of the Act in failing to provide me to

comment of information specific to my claims.

3.    The Tribunal failed to provide me with an opportunity to appear before it, and

thus failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of section 425(1)

16    On 1 April 2025, the Minister filed an amended response seeking summary dismissal of the application for review.

17    On 12 June 2025, the parties appeared at a hearing of the Minister’s application for summary dismissal before Judicial Registrar Munro. The judicial review application was dismissed pursuant to r 13.13(a) of the FCFCOA Rules on the basis that it had no reasonable prospects of success.

18    On 19 June 2025, the applicant filed an application to review the Registrar’s decision.

19    On 17 July 2025, the primary judge dismissed the application for review of the Registrar’s decision.

20    The primary judge held that the application for judicial review had no prospects of success because the applicant failed to file his application for merits review within the time prescribed by reg 4.31(2) of the Regulations. Therefore, the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to undertake a merits review, nor did it have discretion to extend the time period for the filing of such an application.

21    Further, the primary judge accepted the Minister’s submission that in circumstances where the applicant did not raise a ground that challenged the notification letter’s compliance with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act, there was no error in the Tribunal determining it had no jurisdiction. The notification letter was emailed to the applicant and stated the time the applicant had to apply to the Tribunal for review. The applicant was taken to have received the notification at the end of the day on 8 December 2020.

22    With respect to the applicant’s grounds of review individually, while not strictly necessary to consider them given the finding as to jurisdiction, the primary judge held that they had no prospects of success, because:

(a)    ground one was not sufficiently particularised; and

(b)    grounds two and three were misconceived as the Tribunal’s procedural fairness obligations had no application where the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to conduct the review and, in any event, common law procedural fairness was accorded to the applicant.

Application for an extension of time and leave to appeal

23    As noted, the applicant requires both an extension of time and leave to file an appeal from the primary judgment.

24    The applicant did not file any submissions and his affidavit in support of his application said relevantly that:

The Hon. Judge dismissed my application on 17 Jul 2025. I was not represented by any solicitor or barrister and dismissed my case on motion date. I was not aware of the time limit of the appeal.

25    The affidavit does not otherwise explain the reason for the delay in the filing of the application for leave to appeal. The applicant made brief oral submissions, with the assistance of an interpreter.

26    The decision to grant an extension of time to appeal is discretionary. A determination as to whether an applicant should be given an extension of time to appeal from a judgment of a court is one which is to be made “recognising the importance of finality in respect of judicial decisions and the important role that the observance of time limits has in maintaining the finality of judicial determinations”: BJM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCA 786 at [37] (Colvin J).

27    There are no mandatory relevant considerations for the making of an order extending time (save for the interests of the administration of justice): Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579 at [12] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ) and see [39] (Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ). However, the factors typically taken into account when considering whether an extension of time should be granted include the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, any prejudice a respondent or third party might suffer because of the delay, and the merits of the proposed application: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344 at 348–349 (Wilcox J), referred to with approval in Tu’uta Katoa at [13].

28    In considering the merits of the underlying application, the Court “is not required to go into too great a detail, but is to ‘assess the merits in a fairly rough and ready way’”: BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33(e)] (Yates, Wheelahan and O’Bryan JJ) and the cases there cited, and see Tu’uta Katoa at [17] (it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a “reasonably impressionistic level”). An order extending time will not be made if the proposed appeal has no reasonable prospects of success; that is, where the case is devoid of merit, is hopeless, or is unarguable: BQQ15 at [33(e)]. The applicant bears the onus of persuading the Court that in all the circumstances an extension should be granted.

29    The power to grant leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision is also discretionary. The principles concerning a grant of leave are well settled. The applicant must satisfy the Court of two matters (as set out in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–400 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ), see also AIX20 v Director-General of Security [2025] FCAFC 38 at [13] (Murphy, Bromwich and Shariff JJ)), namely:

(a)    whether in all the circumstances the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered; and

(b)    whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong.

30    If the proposed appeal is doomed to fail, or if there is no arguable ground of appeal, then the application for leave to appeal should not be granted.

Delay and prejudice

31    A delay of five days is minor. However, the time limits prescribed by the Rules are “not mere aspirational guidelines” and “once that period expires without any appeal being lodged the parties are entitled to assume that the litigation is at an end and that they may move on with their affairs as defined by the judgment at first instance. The court should not readily disturb that established state of affairs”: BLD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1400 at [3] (Derrington J).

32    The applicant alleges that he did not file his application within time as he was not aware of the time limit to appeal the primary judge’s decision. Ignorance of the timeframes in which to file an appeal is generally not, without more, an adequate explanation for the delay in filing with the Court: SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; 135 ALD 17 at [38] (Foster J); MZZYV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 957 at [25] (Moshinsky J). It was the applicant’s responsibility to ascertain his review rights and the applicable time limits.

33    During the hearing I asked the interpreter to ask the applicant to explain why his application was not filed within time. The applicant submitted that the reason for the delay was that he needed to obtain certain documents from India; that the relevant authorities had informed him he needed to provide a copy of his passport to obtain those documents; but that he had lost his passport. The applicant said he had applied for a new passport.

34    I accept the Minister’s submission that this explanation does not relate to a delay in filing the application in this Court and, further, that in any event it is not a sufficient explanation for the delay. This is particularly so in circumstances where the issue in this Court is whether the court below erred in finding that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in determining that it had no jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s application for merits review.

35    No specific prejudice would be caused to the Minister if the application were granted, beyond the public interest in the finalisation of administrative decisions. However, the Minister has a legitimate interest in the timely resolution of visa applications and related litigation: WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 at [40]–[42] (Derrington J). Further, the absence of prejudice alone is not a sufficient reason to grant an extension of time: Hunter Valley Developments at 349.

Merits of the proposed substantive appeal

36    The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal will be refused because the proposed substantive appeal is futile and without merit. The proposed substantive appeal contains three grounds which were not raised before the primary judge (although I accept that the substance of the grounds is similar).

37    Proposed ground one alleges that the primary judge failed to consider that the Tribunal acted in a manifestly unreasonable way in dealing with his protection claims. This ground is advanced on the misconceived basis that the Tribunal made findings in relation to the applicant’s claims for the Visa. The Tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the applicant’s application for merits review: it did not (and necessarily could not) consider the merits of the applicant’s claims for protection. This ground cannot succeed.

38    Proposed ground two asserts that the primary judge dismissed the application without considering the legal and factual errors contained in the Tribunal’s decision, specifically that the Tribunal failed to consider claims or component integers thereof that were raised by the material before it.

39    Proposed ground three asserts that the primary judge failed to find the Tribunal acted unreasonably or irrationally by overlooking relevant material.

40    Proposed grounds two and three are insufficiently particularised to be meaningful and should be dismissed on this basis alone: WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612 at [60] (Judge Lucev); upheld in WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969 (Siopis J).

41    In any event, the Tribunal’s finding that it had no jurisdiction was the only finding open to it on the material before it. On 8 December 2020, the delegate’s notification letter and decision record were sent to the applicant’s email address contained in the visa application. In accordance with s 494C(5) of the Act, the applicant was taken to have received the delegate’s decision at the end of that day. The applicant then had 28 days to apply to the Tribunal for review, including the day he was deemed to have received the decision. Accordingly, the last day for the applicant to apply for review was 4 January 2021. The applicant did not apply for merits review until 27 May 2021. The Tribunal was correct to find it had no jurisdiction. Irrespective of any compassionate or compelling circumstances which caused the applicant to apply for review outside of the prescribed period, the Tribunal simply had no power or discretion to extend time.

42    Further, the applicant did not contend either in this Court or below that the delegate’s refusal notification letter did not comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii). The delegate’s notification letter was emailed to the applicant. It was clear in stating the time that the applicant had to apply to the Tribunal and that he was taken to have received the letter at the end of the day it was transmitted, under the heading “Review Rights” on page 2.

43    The applicant made the following oral submissions:

(a)    there are ongoing cases in India against Sikhs, his family has been attacked in India, and there has also “been firing on [his] house”;

(b)    he has been told (by an unidentified person) that if he returns to India his life will be at risk and his family will be at risk; and

(c)    his sister has married but has also been attacked, which affected her family as well; the applicant added that “she’s back home now”.

44    These submissions relate to the merits of the refusal of the applicant’s application for the Visa. They are not relevant to the proposed grounds of appeal and do not otherwise comment on or seek to demonstrate error in the primary judgment.

45    The proposed appeal is without merit.

Materiality and futility

46    Even if the applicant could establish some error in the primary judge’s decision, any error would not be material, and it would be futile to remit the matter. This is in circumstances where, for the reasons set out above, the only decision open to the Tribunal was to find that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. The applicant did not, and cannot, meet the prescribed time limits in reg 4.31(2) of the Regulations, which cannot be extended. If the matter were ultimately remitted to the Tribunal, it would be bound to again find that it does not have jurisdiction.

47    The primary judge’s decision to dismiss the application for review of a Registrar’s decision is not attended by sufficient doubt or error. Nor is there any jurisdictional error apparent in the Tribunal’s decision. In those circumstances, there is no substantial injustice in refusing leave to appeal.

DISPOSITION

48    The applicant has not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, and the proposed grounds of appeal have no reasonable prospects of success. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is dismissed with costs. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent on a lump sum basis, as agreed, or as fixed by a Registrar of the Court.

I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anderson.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026