Federal Court of Australia

Dassault Systemes SolidWorks Corporation v Inspired Living Developments Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1763

File number(s):

NSD 1791 of 2024

Judgment of:

MOORE J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

COPYRIGHT – applicant alleges that respondent infringed copyright in its software programs – application for summary judgment in light of settlement deed – whether appropriate

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where the parties entered into a settlement deed for the resolution of the proceedings – where the settlement deed provided that the first respondent would file a submitting notice and the applicant would seek summary judgment – whether a justiciable matter exists – appropriateness of determining summary judgment application

Legislation:

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)

Cases cited:

EEU20 v Meat Industry Employees’ Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (Trustee) (No 2) [2020] FCA 1536

Touhey v Salini Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 55

Trust Co of Australia Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (No P2) (1995) 36 NSWLR 654

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Intellectual Property

Sub-area:

Copyright and Industrial Designs

Number of paragraphs:

61

Date of last submission/s:

2 September 2025

Date of hearing:

5 August 2025

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr S J Hallahan

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Harris & Company

Counsel for the Respondents:

The Respondents did not appear

Counsel for the Contradictor:

Ms J E McKenzie

ORDERS

NSD 1791 of 2024

BETWEEN:

DASSAULT SYSTEMES SOLIDWORKS CORPORATION

Applicant

AND:

INSPIRED LIVING DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD ATF JD FAMILY TRUST T/AS POLYLINE INDUSTRIES (ABN 43 513 063 722)

First Respondent

JUSTIN REED

Second Respondent

order made by:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    There be no order as to costs.

3.    There be liberty to apply in relation to the issue of costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOORE J:

Introduction

1    The issue for present determination has arisen in unusual circumstances, and concerns the effect of a settlement deed on a proceeding.

2    The proceeding involves a claim for copyright infringement. The Statement of Claim alleges in summary that:

(a)    The applicant (Dassault) is a US corporation which manufactures, markets and supplies computer programs, including programs known as the SOLIDWORKS Programs.

(b)    Copyright subsists in the SOLIDWORKS Programs and Dassault owns that copyright.

(c)    The first respondent, Inspired Living Developments Pty Ltd being the corporate trustee for the JD Family Trust trading as Polyline Industries (Polyline) has reproduced the SOLIDWORKS Programs on various identified computers from November 2019 to June 2024, by reproducing those programs onto the hard disk drive of those computers and then making multiple reproductions on those computers from the hard disk drive to the RAM.

(d)    The reproductions were substantial reproductions in a material form.

(e)    The second respondent (Mr Reed) has authorised the reproductions.

3    Dassault asserts an entitlement to additional damages, and seeks various other remedies.

4    On 10 June 2025, there was a mediation conducted by a Registrar of the Court, which resulted in a settlement. Following the mediation, on 17 June 2025, my chambers received an email from the applicant’s solicitors (which was sent with the consent of the respondents’ solicitor) which included the following:

As requested, we attach proposed consent orders agreed between the parties which reflect an in-principle settlement between the parties reached at the mediation on 10 June 2025.

Consistent with their obligations, the parties have each negotiated in good faith, and the in-principle settlement would involve substantial concessions by both sides. The Respondents’ primary concession is that the First Respondent would file a submitting notice, clearing a path for the Applicant to obtain summary judgment, should the Court determine that to be appropriate. However, given the First Respondent’s financial circumstances and certain events which are due to occur later this year, the respondents’ agreement to the in-principle settlement is subject to the Court being in a position to finalise the proceedings before 30 September 2025.

In the event that the Court is able to hear and determine the matter and finalise the proceedings before 30 September 2025, the parties consent to the proposed orders. If the Court is not in a position to do so, the parties will need to confer further and adopt a different course.

5    The proposed Short Minutes of Order enclosed with that email included the following:

The Court notes, by consent, that:

1.    Within seven days of the date of these orders and subject to paragraph 2 below:

(a)    the First Respondent intends to file and serve a Form 29: Submitting Notice;

(b)    the Applicant intends to file and serve a Form 48: Notice of Discontinuance with the consent of the First Respondent and the Second Respondent discontinuing the proceedings as against the Second Respondent with no order as to costs;

(c)    the Applicant intends to file and serve an interlocutory application seeking summary judgment against the First Respondent.

2.    The steps envisaged by paragraph 1 above assume, consistently with an in-principle settlement reached between the parties at the mediation on 10 June 2025, that by no later than 30 September 2025, the Court will be in a position to:

(a)    deliver summary judgment and make final orders in the proceedings; and

(b)    conclude the proceedings in all respects, such that the status of the proceedings will be listed as “closed” on the Commonwealth Courts Portal.

The Court orders, by consent, that:

3.    The matter be listed for summary judgment with an estimate of ½ day at a time convenient to the Court and the parties in the period between 7 July 2025 and 5 September 2025.

4.    At least 7 days before the hearing of the application for summary judgment, the Applicant file and serve a written outline of submissions in support of the application for summary judgment.

5.    Liberty to apply on 3 days’ notice.

6    It is inappropriate for the Court to be presented with proposed orders reflecting a private resolution of a matter that depends upon the Court giving some commitment to give priority to the matter over other matters in the docket and agreeing to render judgment by a specified date.

7    The parties subsequently removed the time limitation. However, the position remained that the parties had reached some form of settlement, but the Court was being asked to hear an application for summary judgment. In those circumstances, I was concerned to ascertain more details as to the settlement.

8    In particular, I was concerned to ascertain whether the present situation was one in which Dassault had in effect settled its dispute with the respondents but did not wish to be deprived of the benefit of an adjudication by the Court as to whether the respondents’ conduct infringed its SOLIDWORKS Programs, which adjudication might be of benefit to Dassault in dealing with other potential infringers. I was concerned about whether that was appropriate, and whether there was a proper matter before the Court, i.e. whether there was any ongoing controversy between the parties that needed to be quelled. As matters have transpired, that concern was justified.

9    Following a case management hearing on 25 June 2025, orders were made in preparation for a hearing on 5 August 2025. Given that the respondents, as a result of the settlement, were no longer taking any active part in the proceedings, I requested that Dassault arrange for a contradictor to appear at that hearing. Dassault, quite properly, consented to this course, and arranged for Ms McKenzie to appear as a contradictor (the Contradictor). The Contradictor has provided very useful submissions and has adopted a constructive and helpful role.

10    Prior to the hearing on 5 August 2025, my chambers sent an email to the parties foreshadowing that at the hearing on 5 August 2025, the Court might wish to hear from the parties on the question of the settlement and the terms of that settlement. A copy of a Deed of Settlement dated 27 June 2025 (Deed) was subsequently provided by email to my chambers. The Deed was admitted into evidence at the hearing on 5 August 2025 and was the subject of submissions at that hearing, and written submissions since the hearing.

11    The Contradictor submits, in summary, that:

(a)    as a result of the Deed, there is no longer a justiciable controversy before the Court; and

(b)    the application for summary judgment should not be entertained for other reasons in any event, and if entertained should fail.

12    Given the issues that were raised by the Deed and by the Contradictor, I determined that I would first consider the question of whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for summary judgment, or whether the Court should decline to hear that application on other grounds.

The application for summary judgment

13    The application for summary judgment is not a simple one, in that numerous issues fall to be addressed. Merely by way of example:

(a)    In relation to subsistence and ownership of copyright, Dassault relies upon the effect of various statutory presumptions. It would be necessary to consider the operation of these presumptions, including in light of the filing of a submitting notice.

(b)    In relation to infringement, there are factual issues as to whether copies of the SOLIDWORKS Programs were present on various computers, whether those computers were under the control and possession of Polyline, and whether certain programs were used in the relevant time period.

(c)    In that regard, Dassault relies upon an anti-piracy measure known as the “Phone Home System” which is present in the SOLIDWORKS Programs, and relies upon a description of how that works to identify copies of the software which are not licensed. As identified by the Contradictor, the evidence as to how the Phone Home System operates includes some assertions at a relatively high level: e.g. that for the Phone Home System to work, “it is necessary that a material reproduction” of the SOLIDWORKS Programs be made onto the hard drives of relevant machines. As the Contradictor notes, a relevant “cracked” version (i.e. one that has been tampered with to allow access to the SOLIDWORKS Program without payment of the licence fee) that triggers the operation of the Phone Home System may be something less than a complete reproduction, but the extent of the reproduction required for the Phone Home System to operate is not disclosed or analysed against what might be a reproduction of a substantial part for the purposes of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). That is not to suggest that the applicant would necessarily have any difficulty in establishing these matters, but is merely to note that this is a relevant factual issue.

(d)    Further, insofar as Dassault is relying upon the SOLIDWORKS Programs being “used” on a computer, it is apparent that Dassault is relying upon a reproduction in RAM of that computer. It would be necessary for the Court to consider relevant issues associated with that contention.

(e)    There are issues associated with who was using and controlling various machines, including issues associated with the use of a particular IP address. Dassault relies upon authorisation by Polyline. It would be necessary to consider these factual issues, including the basis on which it was said that Polyline had authorised the conduct in question.

(f)    In relation to damages:

(i)    for machines 2, 6, 10, 11 and 12 (on which the relevant SOLIDWORDS Program was run five or fewer times), Dassault seeks damages “at large”, and seeks the figure of $5,000 per machine;

(ii)    for machines 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 (which are said to be machines on which the relevant SOLIDWORKS Program was run more than five times), Dassault seeks compensatory damages based on the user principle, and provides various schedules with calculations performed in different ways; and

(iii)    Dassault also seeks an award of additional damages. Dassault seeks findings that the contraventions were flagrant and benefitted Polyline, in that the SOLIDWORKS Programs were used in the design and manufacture of products sold by Polyline. Dassault also says that there is a need for specific and general deterrence, including because a licence-fee based award of compensatory damages provides a potential infringer with a rational basis for infringing, in the sense that if the infringer gets away with the infringement then the cost is zero, and if the infringer is caught the cost is merely the licence fee that the infringer would have had to pay anyway.

14    The present case is not one where there is some distinct legal issue to be determined. Rather, Dassault’s application for summary judgment raises a range of factual and legal issues (including mixed questions of fact and law), some of which may prove to be complicated. Dassault’s estimate of a half day hearing appears to be overly optimistic. Certainly, the preparation of a judgment would be a very time-consuming exercise.

The Deed

15    The Deed was formally executed by the parties by way of executed counterparts and is dated 27 June 2025. I summarise the key relevant provisions below.

16    In the Deed, Dassault is referred to as “DSSW” and Mr Reed is referred to as “Reed”. The recitals are as follows:

A.    DSSW is the owner of the copyright in the DSSW Programs.

B.    By correspondence dated 28 May 2024, 9 July 2024 and 16 July 2024 from DSSW’s solicitors, DSSW:-

(i)    alleged Polyline and Reed had infringed DSSW’s copyright in SOLIDWORKS, one of the DSSW Programs (Alleged Infringement); and

(ii)    claimed damages from Polyline and Reed in respect of the Alleged Infringement (Demand).

C.    On 11 December 2024, DSSW commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against Polyline and Reed in respect of the Alleged Infringement (Proceeding No. NSD 1791/2024) (Proceedings).

D.    The parties have agreed to settle all matters in connection with the Demand, the Alleged Infringement and the Proceedings on the terms set out in this Deed.

17    Clause 1.1 contains various definitions. Relevant definitions include the following:

(a)    “Judgment” is defined as “the final judgment and orders for the Proceedings.” In other words, it refers to something that has not yet occurred. It is otherwise very general in its terms, and would include a judgment and order dismissing the proceedings.

(b)    “DSSW Program” is defined as “any computer program developed, distributed or licensed by DSSW, including but not limited to SOLIDWORKS.”

18    Clause 2 provides for a release. It relevantly provides as follows:

2.    RELEASE

2.1    Release from DSSW

In consideration of Polyline and Reed entering into this Deed and subject to the performance of their obligations in clause 3, clause 4 and clause 5 of this Deed, DSSW absolutely and irrevocably releases and forever discharges Polyline, its agents, contractors and employees and Reed in respect of all Claims which DSSW now has or at any time had, or but for this Deed may have had arising out of or in connection with the Alleged Infringement, the Demand and the Proceedings prior to the date of this Deed (Released Matters).

2.2     Mutual Release

In support of the release in clause 2.1 above, unless there is a breach/default by either party in fulfilling its obligations and/or undertakings herein provided, each party covenants with the other party not to claim, sue or take any action against the other party in respect of the Released Matters.

19    Clause 3 provides for the payment of a specified sum. This amount is said to be confidential, and I accept that this is so. I accept that disclosure of the amount could have a detrimental effect on Dassault’s flexibility to deal with potential infringers in future and could cause commercial harm to Dassault. The clause (with redactions applied) relevantly provides:

(a)    In consideration of DSSW entering into this Deed, Polyline and Reed will pay to DSSW damages in the sum of $[redacted, being the total amount] in the following instalments:

(i)    $[redacted] within 30 days from the date of the Judgment; and

(ii)    [redacted] further monthly instalments of $[redacted] are due on the same date of each month thereafter…

…

(c)    In this clause 3, time is of the essence and Polyline and/or Reed’s failure to make payment of any instalment by the date specified will be a material breach of the Deed.

…

20    Thus clause 3 provides that one aspect of the bargain recorded in the Deed is the agreement to pay damages in a specified amount. However, it also provides for payment by instalments and that the first instalment is not payable until after the occurrence of an event that has not yet happened, i.e. the giving of the Judgment.

21    Clause 4 sets out certain undertakings. These are not expressed to be conditional upon anything else occurring. Clause 4 provides as follows:

4.    UNDERTAKINGS

4.1    Undertaking not to Infringe

Polyline and Reed each undertake to DSSW not to:-

(a)    breach the terms of a licence agreement supplied to it with or in respect of any DSSW Program;

(b)    reproduce or authorise the reproduction of the whole or a substantial part of DSSW Programs, otherwise than in accordance with a valid licence acquired in respect of that computer program.

4.2    Undertaking to Purchase and Delete

(a)    Polyline and Reed each undertake to DSSW that, within 60 days from the date of this Deed, Polyline and/or Reed will purchase the necessary licenses for any DSSW Program and provide to DSSW the proof of purchase and evidence of deletion of any unlicensed DSSW Program in the control and possession of Polyline and/or Reed.

(b)    In this clause 4.2, time is of the essence and Polyline and/or Reed's failure to comply with the obligations of this clause 4.2 will be a material breach of the Deed.

22    Clause 5 sets out what is to occur in the proceeding. It provides as follows:

5.    PROCEEDINGS

(a)    In accordance with the Orders:-

(i)    Polyline will lodge a submitting notice of appearance at or as soon as practicable after the date of this Deed;

(ii)    DSSW will file (and Reed will consent to) a Notice of Discontinuance against Reed with no order as to costs as soon as practicable after Polyline's submitting notice of appearance is filed; and

(iii)    DSSW will request that the proceedings be listed for a summary judgment application as soon as practicable on the basis of the evidence already filed in the proceedings and the confidential affidavits of Nejib Ben Daali affirmed 4 February 2025 and Mohamad Idly Ali affirmed 30 May 2025.

(b)    If Polyline complies with its obligations under clause 3 and 4.2 above, DSSW agrees not to enforce any judgment in the Proceedings (including as to costs) it obtains beyond the terms in clause 3 and clause 4.2. For the avoidance of doubt, if Polyline does not so comply, DSSW is at liberty to enforce any judgment in the Proceedings (including as to costs) against Polyline.

23    Consistently with clause 5, and importantly for present purposes, on 1 July 2025 a submitting notice was filed by Polyline, and on 3 July 2025 a notice of discontinuance was filed by Dassault in respect of its claim against Mr Reed.

24    Clause 6 is a key clause. It provides as follows (emphasis added):

6.     PLEA IN BAR

6.1    The release referred to in clause 2.1 operates from the date of this Deed and continues to operate provided:-

(a)    the unlicensed DSSW Programs have been deleted pursuant to clause 4.2 above; and

(b)    the sum of $[redacted] has been paid in full by Polyline and/or Reed.

6.2    Subject to the terms of the release in clause 2.1 and clause 6.1 above, each party acknowledges that the other party is entitled to enforce this Deed directly and may plead this Deed in bar to any claim or proceeding by the other party in respect of the Released Matters.

25    On its face, clause 6.1 purports to provide that the release set out in clause 2.1 operates with immediate effect, and continues to operate provided that certain things have been done: i.e. is subject to a condition subsequent.

26    Before turning to consider the debate as to the construction of clause 6.1, I observe that the structure of the Deed, and the contemplated contractual mechanism of settling the proceedings but also cooperating in the bringing of an application for summary judgment, is not a structure that should be emulated. In my view, it is inappropriate. No doubt, having gone to the trouble of bringing proceedings, Dassault would like the precedent value of a judgment of the Court as to whether the conduct of Polyline warranted summary judgment, notwithstanding its settlement of the proceedings. However, to enter into a settlement deed that facilitates the non-opposition to that application by contractually obliging Polyline to file a submitting appearance, whilst otherwise resolving the matter by virtue of the other terms of the Deed, is to engage in an artificial exercise whereby the Court is sought to be co-opted into writing a judgment about a matter that has settled. This involves a misuse of the procedures of the Court.

27    In any event, there is a threshold question as to whether there is a matter, in the constitutional sense, in light of the terms of the Deed.

Is there a matter?

28    There was a debate before me as to the proper construction of the Deed, and clause 6.1 in particular.

29    Dassault points to clause 2.1, where the release of claims against Polyline and Mr Reed is expressed to be “subject to the performance of their obligations in clause 3, clause 4 and clause 5 of this Deed”. Dassault says that these obligations arise at different times. In that regard, Dassault notes that:

(a)    clause 3 provides for the payment of damages by way of instalments on a timetable which commences to run once “Judgment” is given (which has not yet happened);

(b)    clause 4, which deals with undertakings, contains an undertaking that, within 60 days of the date of the Deed, Polyline and Mr Reed will purchase the necessary licences for any DSSW Program, and will provide DSSW with the proof of purchase and “evidence of deletion of any unlicensed DSSW Programs”; and

(c)    clause 5 provides that, in accordance with the Court’s orders of 25 June 2025, Polyline will lodge a submitting appearance, Dassault will file a notice of discontinuance against Mr Reed, and Dassault will request that the proceedings be listed for a summary judgment application as soon as practicable. I note that the orders of 25 June 2025 do not require any of these things to occur, but rather merely note that the parties intend to do these things within 7 days.

30    Dassault notes that these obligations arise at different times and that there is nothing in clause 2.1 which states that the releases arise immediately from the date of the Deed. Dassault submits that the fact that the Deed is expressed to be “subject to the performance of the obligations” referred to above means that the release will not arise until each of the time limited obligations has been complied with.

31    Dassault made detailed submissions on the proper construction of clause 6.1 in its supplementary written submissions dated 12 August 2025 at paragraphs [25]–[36]. In light of the importance of this issue, it is appropriate to set out these submissions in full, as follows (emphasis in original):

25.    Clause 6.1 provides a mechanism by which the Respondents can obtain the benefit of a release earlier than they would if they used all of the time provided for compliance with the obligations referred to [above]. In this respect, clause 6.1 provides that “[t]he release referred to in clause 2.1 operates from the date of this Deed and continues to operate provided that: (a) the unlicensed [Dassault] Programs have been deleted pursuant to clause 4.2 above; and (b) the sum of $[redacted] has been paid in full by Polyline and/or Reed”.

26.     That is, clause 6.1 provides that the release will operate from the date of the Deed provided that: (a) the deletion of unlicensed DSSW Programs occurs by the date of the Deed (rather than within the 60 days allowed to the Respondents under clause 4.2); and (b) the total amount referred to in clause 3(a) is paid by the date of the Deed (rather than according to the payment schedule identified in clause 3(a)(i) and (ii)).

27.     The Applicant accepts that clause 6.1 is open to a construction which provides that the release operates from the date of the Deed (i.e. an immediate release) and will continue to operate provided that the conditions referred to in 6.1(a) and (b) are fulfilled.

28.     In this respect, clause 6.1 is ambiguous. That is because it can be read:

(a)     in a manner where the word “provided” attaches to the phrase “operates from the data [sic] of this Deed” and the phrase “and continues to operate” (i.e. “…operates from the date of this Deed, and continues to operate, provided…); or

(b)     in a manner where the word “provided” only attaches to the phrase “and continues to operate” (i.e. “…operates from the date of this Deed, and continues to operate provided…).

29.     In these circumstances, the Applicant respectfully submits that the Court’s task in construing the Deed is not to determine which construction is the more obvious, linguistically natural, or grammatically correct interpretation of the words used. Rather, in accordance with the principles referred to in Part B2 above, the Court’s task is to determine which construction is consistent with the intention of the parties, as determined objectively having regard to the whole of the Deed, the purpose of the transaction, and the context in which it was agreed.

30.     The Applicant submits that it is clear that the parties did not intend the release provided by clause 2.1 to operate immediately (unless the conditions referred to in clause 6.1(a) and (b) had been complied with), because the parties agreed that, following execution of the Deed:

(a)     the First Respondent would file a submitting notice (clause 5(a)(i));

(b)     the Applicant would file a notice of discontinuance with respect to the Second Respondent (clause 5(a)(ii));

(c)     the Applicant would seek to have the matter determined by way of summary judgment (clause 5(a)(iii));

(d)     the time for the First Respondent to begin to make payments in accordance with clause 3(a) would not begin until after final judgment and orders in the proceeding (clause 3(a)(i)); and (e) the Applicant would be at liberty to enforce any judgment in the proceedings against the First Respondent if the First Respondent fails to comply with its obligations under clauses 3 and 4.2 (clause 5(b)); and

(e)    the Applicant would be at liberty to enforce any judgment in the proceedings against the First Respondent if the First Respondent fails to comply with its obligations under clauses 3 and 4.2 (clause 5(b)).

31.     In circumstances where an immediate release from liability would prevent the Court from hearing and determining the summary judgment application referred to in clause 5(a)(iii), and from delivering the final judgment and orders which marked the commencement of the time for the First Respondent to begin making payments under clause 3(a), and would mean that there would be no judgment which could be enforced as referred to in clause 5(b), the Applicant submits that the Court would not prefer the construction referred to in paragraph 28(b) above (which entails an immediate release) when the construction referred to in paragraph 28(a) above is open (which entails a release only after the necessary payment and deletion of unlicenced software has occurred, which payment may not occur until after Judgment).

32.     Moreover, the Applicant submits that the Court would not prefer the construction referred to in paragraph 28(b) above in circumstances where the consequences of that construction could be described as capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust (and that is so “even though the construction adopted is not the most obvious, or the most grammatically accurate” (see paragraph 12 above)).

33.     For example, if the Deed were to be construed such that the release from liability operates from the date of the Deed, and the Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to give final judgment and orders in the proceeding, then the result would be that the time for the Respondents to make the payments referred to in clause 3(a) would never arise (see clause 3(a)(i) and the definition of “Judgment” in clause 1.1). The result of that would be that the condition for the release in clause 2.1 of compliance with (inter alia) the obligations in clause 3, and the condition for the continued operation of the release in clause 6.1(b), could not be satisfied and there would be no release from liability.

34.     The practical effect of construing the Deed so that the release from liability operates from the date of the Deed (notwithstanding that the conditions in 6.1(a) and (b) have not been satisfied) is that it would be impossible for the final judgment and orders referred to in clause 3(a)(i) and clause 5(b) to issue, and the agreement between the parties would be frustrated due to that impossibility. In those circumstances, there would be no release, the Applicant would have to consider re-joining the Second Respondent to the proceedings, the First Respondent may decide to seek leave to withdraw its submitting notice, and the proceeding would proceed to a final hearing. However, if some other result were possible, it is plain that any outcome through which the Respondents obtain the benefit of a release but the Applicant does not obtain the judgment referred to in clause 5(b) (or, at least, the opportunity to obtain that judgment) would fall within the realm of the capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust.

35.     However, it is unnecessary for this matter to proceed down that inconvenient path that is not wanted by any of the parties to the proceedings or the Deed, given that the objective of the agreement set out in the Deed (and the intent of the parties in making that agreement) can be achieved by construing the Deed such that the release from liability does not operate until each of the obligations referred to in paragraphs 22(a), 22(b), and 22(c) above has been complied with. For the reasons set out above, that construction is open based upon the words of the Deed and is consistent with the principles of construction referred to in Part B2 above.

36.     Accordingly, given that the release from liability provided by the Deed will not operate until each of the obligations referred to in paragraphs 22(a), 22(b), and 22(c) above has been complied with (which has not yet occurred), there is “some immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of the Court” in this proceeding, and it is a “matter” which the Court has jurisdiction to determine.

32    I do not consider that the Deed should be construed in the manner suggested by Dassault. In particular, I do not consider that clause 6.1 should be read as a confined release that operates from the date of the Deed only in the limited circumstances that the unlicensed programs are deleted by the date of the Deed and the total amount payable by Polyline is paid by the date of the Deed. This is so for various reasons.

33    First, the opening words of clause 6.1 (“The release referred to in clause 2.1 operates from the date of this Deed and continues to operate provided:- ”) are clear enough, and inconsistent with Dassault’s suggested construction. They suggest, in accordance with their ordinary meaning, that the release operates from the date of the Deed subject to conditions subsequent. In particular, the use of the words “continues to operate” underscores that the conditions are conditions subsequent. The words “continues to operate” would be superfluous on Dassault’s construction. The clause does not commence with the words: “The release referred to in clause 2.1 operates from the date of this Deed if:- ”. Although Dassault submits that the Court’s task “is not to determine which construction is the more obvious, linguistically natural, or grammatically correct interpretation of the words used”, those matters are relevant to a proper interpretation of the clause.

34    I note that there is a suggestion in the last part of the sentence in paragraph [31] of Dassault’s written submissions, set out above, that on Dassault’s construction the release operates from whenever the conditions are satisfied. I do not accept this construction. Clause 6.1 commences with the words “The release referred to in clause 2.1 operates from the date of this Deed…”. Those words cannot sensibly be construed as meaning that the release operates from whenever the conditions happen to be satisfied, which could either be prior to the date of the Deed or at some later time. That is simply not what the words say. I therefore consider that there are only two available constructions. One is that the release operates from the date of the Deed if (and only if) the conditions are satisfied by then, and the other is that the release operates from the date of the Deed but is subject to conditions subsequent.

35    Secondly, it would be commercially nonsensical for Polyline to pay in full before the Deed commenced. Further, it is apparent that the parties contemplated that payments would be made by instalments and that the payments would not commence until after Judgment. That is the very point made in paragraph [30(d)] of Dassault’s written submissions set out above.

36    Thirdly, the reference in clause 6.1(a) to the unlicensed programs having been deleted is expressed as:

the unlicensed DSSW Programs have been deleted pursuant to clause 4.2 above

37    However, the obligation in clause 4.2 is an undertaking to take steps “within 60 days from the date of this Deed”. It is apparent that the reference to clause 4.2 in clause 6.1 includes this timeframe, and should not be read as confining the application of clause 6.1 to a situation in which steps have taken place prior to the date of the Deed. If the latter had been intended, different language would have been used.

38    Fourthly, Dassault quite properly accepted that clause 6.1 is open to a construction which provides that the release operates from the date of the Deed (i.e. an immediate release) and will continue to operate provided that the conditions referred to in clause 6.1(a) and (b) are fulfilled.

39    Fifthly, clause 6.2 must be considered. This provides that:

6.2    Subject to the terms of the release in clause 2.1 and clause 6.1 above, each party acknowledges that the other party is entitled to enforce this Deed directly and may plead this Deed in bar to any claim or proceeding by the other party in respect of the Released Matters.

40    It would be odd to say the least if the clause dealing with a plea in bar only operated in the limited circumstance of clause 6.1 operating because of a payment in full and deletion of programs prior to the date of the Deed, but would not operate in any other circumstance. That is not a sensible construction. Rather, it is apparent that clause 6.2 was intended to operate generally, because both clause 2.1 and 6.1 would be applicable generally.

41    Sixthly, I do not accept that all of the consequences described as “capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust” would follow from giving clause 6.1 its ordinary meaning, or that any of them bear that description. In that regard:

(a)    contrary to paragraphs [31] and [33] of Dassault’s submissions, an immediate release would not prevent the commencement of the time for making payments under clause 3(a). The orders that are made in this judgment constitute “the final judgment and orders for the Proceedings” in accordance with the definition of “Judgment” in the Deed, and therefore will trigger the time for making payment;

(b)    although I accept that the more natural construction of clause 6.1 would prevent a summary judgment application from proceeding, that does not give the Deed any capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust application. On the contrary, the Deed has a sensible commercial operation typical of a settlement deed, with the payment by Polyline of a sum of money, mutual releases, an undertaking not to infringe, and a requirement to destroy unlicensed copies and purchase licences for future uses of the SOLIDWORKS Programs. As set out below, I would not have entertained the application for summary judgment in any event, even if clause 6.1 operates in the way suggested by Dassault, and therefore that aspect does not contribute to any finding of commercial unreasonableness. More generally, the quest to have the Court expend its time and resources on hearing summary judgment applications when the matter has settled is an inappropriate use of public resources. Dassault, in settling the form of the Deed, has proceeded on an unwarranted assumption as to what the Court would entertain. That assumption does not compel or persuade the Court to adopt a strained construction of clause 6.1.

42    Therefore, clause 6.1 operates as an immediate release of the claims in the proceeding. Thereafter, Dassault’s rights against Polyline are rights to enforce the terms of the Deed.

43    Dassault appears to accept that the consequence of this construction is that there is no longer any justiciable matter. Indeed, Dassault relies upon that consequence (a lack of jurisdiction) in paragraph [33] of its written submissions in support of the contention that such an effect would be capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust. That concession by Dassault is rightly made. Once the cause of action is released, the legal controversy which was the subject matter of the proceeding has ceased to exist. The Court has no jurisdiction to hear that underlying controversy and the proceeding must be dismissed.

Deed of Variation

44    In apparent recognition of the potential consequence of the form of the Deed, following the hearing, Dassault apparently persuaded Polyline and Mr Reed to execute a “Deed of Variation” dated 18 August 2025 which amends the Deed (Deed of Variation). Without disclosing the amount, I note that the amount payable by Polyline has been reduced.

45    The Deed of Variation was emailed to my chambers on 18 August 2025, under a covering email that stated that the amendment “clarifies” the position and “confirms that the release operates after (i.e. “upon”) satisfaction of the two conditions identified in clause 6.1 have been fulfilled”. My chambers sent an email indicating that the Deed of Variation would be treated as being in evidence, and set a timetable for further submissions about the effect of the Deed of Variation. I treat the Deed of Variation as having been tendered on the present application.

46    Consistently with the timetable, amended written submissions dated 21 August 2025 were filed by Dassault. The Contradictor also filed supplementary submissions dated 28 August 2025 that dealt with the Deed as amended by the Deed of Variation, and responded to Dassault’s submissions of 21 August 2025. Dassault filed further written submissions in reply dated 2 September 2025.

47    Pursuant to the Deed of Variation, the opening words of clause 6.1 have been amended as follows:

The release referred to in clause 2.1 operates upon satisfaction of the following by Polyline and/or Reed:- from the date of this Deed and continues to operate provided

48    I can deal with the effect of the Deed of Variation in brief terms. There is no occasion to consider whether the amended form of the Deed which results from the Deed of Variation would have had the same consequences as the original Deed. The Deed in its original form operated to release the claims the subject of the proceeding. It did so on 27 June 2025. From that point onwards, there was no matter before the Court. The parties cannot, by agreement, confer jurisdiction on the Court which the Court does not have and cannot re-enliven a cause of action that has been released. The Deed of Variation does not even purport to do that: it merely amends the terms of a limited number of clauses in the original Deed. The Deed of Variation certainly does not operate to somehow reinstate the causes of action that were released on 27 June 2025. The Deed of Variation does not alter the position that there is no matter before me and the proceedings must be dismissed.

The application for summary judgment

49    If I had not reached the conclusion that the present proceeding does not involve a matter, I would nevertheless have declined to embark upon a hearing of the application for summary judgment.

50    The proceeding against Mr Reed has been discontinued. Polyline has filed a submitting notice. In those circumstances, there is no occasion to undertake an assessment of whether the test for a summary judgment has been satisfied: i.e. whether Polyline has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding. Polyline is not defending the proceeding. Polyline is submitting to any order that the Court may make. The effect of the filing of the submitting notice is to remove any active contradiction by Polyline. There is no reason thereafter for the Court to consider whether Polyline’s defence has any real prospect of success. As observed in Trust Co of Australia Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (No P2) (1995) 36 NSWLR 654 (Young J) at p 660, a submitting appearance removes the need for a summary judgment application or a trial.

51    Rather, the analysis is a different one. The Court may grant the relief sought if satisfied it is appropriate to do so: EEU20 v Meat Industry Employees' Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (Trustee) (No 2) [2020] FCA 1536 (Mortimer J) at [12]–[14]; Touhey v Salini Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 55 (Banks-Smith J) (Touhey) at [29].

52    It follows that I would not have heard or granted an application for summary judgment, and the contractual provisions of the Deed that assume that such an application would be made (and would be granted) would not operate as intended. In that respect, the Deed is misconceived.

53    The further issue that would then arise (assuming that there was still a matter) is whether Dassault is entitled to relief on its originating application in light of the filing by Polyline of its submitting notice. I observe that such an application is not provided for in the Deed and appears inconsistent with the terms of the Deed.

54    The current status of the proceeding against Polyline, brought about by the filing of the submitting notice by Polyline, is entirely artificial. Polyline has not filed a submitting appearance because it does not wish to contest the claims. Rather, Polyline has filed a submitting notice because it was contractually obliged to do so pursuant to clause 5(a)(i) of the Deed, which otherwise settled the proceedings.

55    Even a consideration of the issues raised by Dassault in circumstances of a submitting notice would be complicated by the similar issues that would arise on an application for summary judgment as set out earlier. Dassault appears to underestimate the complexity of that task. It is frankly inappropriate for the Court to expend significant further time and effort in considering issues that may involve a considerable degree of complexity in the particular circumstances of the present case. Courts are not available for parties to obtain rulings merely because it is commercially convenient, or a useful precedent. As observed in Scott v Steritech Pty Ltd [2025] FCAFC 110 (Banks-Smith, Meagher and Kennett JJ) at [26], Courts are organs of government and not commercial arbitrators whose services can be obtained whenever parties want them. I would not have granted the relief sought, and would have dismissed the proceedings in light of the settlement. To continue to agitate the claims notwithstanding the settlement amounts to an abuse of process.

56    Further, it would in any event not be appropriate to make any declaration. The present case does not involve some distinct legal issue, but rather involves complicated factual questions, including as to what conclusions or inferences could be drawn from the operation of Dassault’s copyright protection methods. The submissions of the Contradictor, at paragraphs [38]–[52], raise a number of issues in this regard. I would not make declarations about complex and potentially contestable factual matters, and mixed questions of fact and law, in the circumstances of the present case. It does not serve the interests of justice to do so. As between the parties, Polyline is not submitting because it no longer wishes to contest the claim, but because it has entered into a settlement deed that obliges it to do so. The claims of Dassault will not have been the subject of proper testing on the merits. Nor is it an appropriate case to record the Court’s disapproval of infringing conduct for the purposes of consideration by third parties. There will be no proper hearing on the merits of potentially complex issues. The making of a declaration of infringement could be positively misleading in those circumstances and would not serve the requisite purpose.

57    The applicant relies upon the making of a declaration in Touhey. However, that case involved circumstances quite different from the present and is distinguishable. In that case, there was a legal issue of general importance, rather than a complex series of factual questions. Further, although the respondent had filed a submitting appearance, it had in correspondence expressed its opposition to the declaration sought by the applicant, as well as articulating the basis of that opposition. The arguments on the central legal issue were therefore joined to a considerable extent. There was also no settlement.

58    It would likewise not be appropriate to make any award of additional damages. By reference to the language of s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), I could not be satisfied that it is proper to order additional damages in the circumstances of the present case. As a result of the Deed, and the filing by Polyline of a submitting notice pursuant to the obligation in clause 5(a)(i) of the Deed, there will be no proper consideration on the merits of:

(a)    whether Polyline has infringed copyright;

(b)    whether that infringement was flagrant;

(c)    the extent of any flagrancy;

(d)    the conduct of Polyline after the acts constituting the infringement (assuming there was infringement); or

(e)    any benefit to Polyline from the conduct.

59    Moreover, there will be no established need for specific or general deterrence, having regard to the artificiality of the circumstances following the entry into the Deed. Indeed, an award of additional damages could be misleading.

60    That is not to suggest that an award of additional damages would never be appropriate on an application for summary judgment or an application for relief in light of a submitting appearance. However, it would clearly be inappropriate in the circumstances of the present case.

Conclusion

61    The proceedings must be dismissed. In light of the Deed, there would appear to be no reason to make any order for costs, and I will order that there be no order as to costs. In doing so, I assume that the costs of the Contradictor have already been met. However, in case my assumption is incorrect, or there is some other issue that would bear upon costs that has not been drawn to my attention, I will order that there be liberty to apply in relation to costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Moore.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026