Federal Court of Australia

Barnden (Trustee), in the matter of Ross (Bankrupt) v Macedo (No 5) [2026] FCA 1762

File number:

NSD 1694 of 2024

Judgment of:

MARKOVIC J

Date of judgment:

19 November 2026

Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – interlocutory application by trustee in bankruptcy for sale of real property before final determination of competing claims to property – balance of convenience – no evidence of current or historical value of property – asserted financial benefit of immediate sale not established – mortgagee undertaking to meet rates, insurance premiums and other necessary outgoings pending final determination – application dismissed

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23

Cases cited:

Barnden (Trustee), in the matter of Ross (Bankrupt) v Macedo (No 4) [2026] FCA 818

Palk v Mortgage Services Funding Plc [1993] Ch 311

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Commercial and Corporations

Sub-area:

Corporations and Corporate Insolvency

Number of paragraphs:

25

Date of last submission:

14 November 2026

Date of hearing:

16 November 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr A J Greinke

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Chamberlains Law Firm

Counsel for the Respondents:

Mr A L Oakes

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Mars Legal

ORDERS

NSD 1694 of 2024

IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF RAYMOND ROSS

BETWEEN:

ANDREW BARNDEN IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF RAYMOND ROSS

Applicant

AND:

DEIRDRE ANN MACEDO

First Respondent

CHRISTOPHER ROSS

Second Respondent

CIGA PROPERTY FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 634 449 899)

Third Respondent

order made by:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 November 2026

THE COURT NOTES:

1.    The undertaking given by the third respondent to the Court that pending final determination of this proceeding, it will meet all council and water rates, insurance premiums, land tax and other reasonably necessary outgoings payable in relation to the property situated at 46 Northcote Street, Naremburn, New South Wales.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

2.    The interim application filed by the applicant on 3 August 2026 is dismissed.

3.    The applicant is to pay the third respondent’s costs of the interim application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

1    By interim application filed on 3 August 2026, Andrew Barnden in his capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Raymond Ross, seeks an order for sale of the property situated at 46 Northcote Street, Naremburn, New South Wales (Naremburn Property).

2    The background to this proceeding is set out in Barnden (Trustee), in the matter of Ross (Bankrupt) v Macedo (No 4) [2026] FCA 818 at [9] to [46]. It is not necessary to repeat it here save to note that:

(1)    Deirdre Ann Macedo is the registered proprietor of the Naremburn Property; and

(2)    in the proceeding the Trustee claims that Ms Macedo holds the Naremburn Property on trust for Raymond Ross (the bankrupt) or, in the alternative, that the transfer of the property to her is void under s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), that registered mortgage AV117889, which is now in favour of the third respondent, CIGA Finance Pty Ltd, secures no debt or, alternatively, is void against him, and that CIGA is not entitled to exercise any power of sale.

3    In Macedo (No 4) I was satisfied that the Trustee had made out a prima facie case for the relief sought: at [84] and [91]. The effect of my findings in Macedo (No 4) was that freezing orders first made in relation to the Naremburn Property as against CIGA on 16 January 2026 remain in place. They were varied only to permit the completion of a contract for sale of the Naremburn Property entered into by CIGA with Ninth Night Productions Pty Limited as purchaser. However, as that sale did not complete, further orders were made to reflect that fact.

4    The Trustee seeks orders for sale of the Naremburn Property for the following reasons.

5    First, Ms Macedo says that she holds her interest in the Naremburn Property as trustee and she does not live there. CIGA’s interest in the Naremburn Property is as mortgagee and its claim is to money. No caveat or other dealing has been lodged by any other person claiming an interest in the Naremburn Property and no other party asserts a right to occupy the Naremburn Property or wishes to retain it.

6    Secondly, the Naremburn Property is not currently occupied and, after the previous occupants left, it was vandalised.

7    Thirdly, outgoings continue to accrue on the Naremburn Property including land tax, council rates, and water and sewerage charges. The Trustee is also concerned that if the Naremburn Property is vacant and uninsured, or insured subject to vacancy conditions, the estate is exposed to a risk of further vandalism, uninsured losses or occupation by squatters.

8    Fourthly, the sale of the Naremburn Property would allow its value to be crystallised and for the remaining fund to be invested and earn a return. The Trustee says that would give the parties certainty in circumstances where there is presently no certainty that the value of the Naremburn Property will increase between now and the final determination of the proceeding.

9    CIGA opposes the application. It says that the sale of the Naremburn Property should await the final determination of this proceeding. It relies on evidence given by Mr MacMahon, CIGA’s director, and Rohan Alexander, a licenced real estate agent. Mr MacMahon speculates that current volatility in the real estate market is likely to settle within 12 months while Mr Alexander gives evidence that he presently advises clients who are not required to sell, to wait 12 months before listing their properties.

10    Neither the Trustee nor CIGA tendered any evidence about the current (or historical) value of the Naremburn Property. In other words, besides speculation, there was no evidence from which I could determine whether, or to what extent, the value of the Naremburn Property had been affected by any market volatility. Nor was there a sufficient evidentiary basis for me to conclude that market conditions would materially improve within 12 months. I would therefore place little weight on the evidence of those matters that was before me.

11    Having considered the parties’ respective positions, I am not satisfied that I should make the orders enabling the Trustee to sell the Naremburn Property. My reasons follow.

12    It was not in dispute that s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) empowers the Court to make the orders for sale sought by the Trustee. As CIGA submits, the Trustee’s application in substance seeks a mandatory injunction dispossessing CIGA, compelling discharge of CIGA’s registered mortgage and giving control of the sale to the Trustee (subject to the entitlements given to CIGA under the proposed orders to be involved in the process) before the Trustee’s claim to final relief is determined.

13    It was also not in dispute that on this application the question to be considered is where the balance of convenience lies in relation to the Trustee’s proposal to sell the Naremburn Property.

14    The Trustee relied on the decision in Palk v Mortgage Services Funding Plc [1993] Ch 311. That case concerned an application by the registered proprietors and mortgagors of a property, Mr and Mrs Palk, for an order for sale pursuant to s 91(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (UK). The mortgagee, Mortgage Services Funding Plc, successfully opposed the application at first instance. Although Mortgage Services sought possession, it did not wish to put the property on the market but intended to lease it and to sell when the property market improved. At 334 Sir Donald Nicholls V.C. (with whom Butler-Sloss LJ and Sir Michael Kerr agreed) observed that in order for “a postponement of sale to be worthwhile, housing prices would have to rise faster than the rate of interest payable under the mortgage after deducting the amount of the rent obtainable from the proposed letting”.

15    At 339, in exercising the court’s discretion, Nicholls V.C. said that “[i]f Mortgage Services wishes to chance its arm, and run the risk involved in waiting to see what happens to house prices, it should be free to do so” but as a matter of fairness “it ought not to be able to saddle Mrs. Palk with that risk and a rising debt against her wishes” and that “she should not be at risk of being worse off than she is now”. At 340 his Honour set out why, in his view, the sale should be directed: first, there would be a substantial income shortfall between the rent collected by Mortgage Services and the interest that would be saved if the house was sold and the amount owing reduced by the proceeds of sale; secondly, the only prospect of recoupment of the shortfall lay in the hope that there would be a substantial rise in house prices generally; thirdly, the likelihood of Mrs Palk suffering increased loss if Mortgage Services’ plan proceeded was so high as to make the plan oppressive to her; and fourthly, directing a sale would not preclude the mortgagee from having the opportunity to wait and see what happens to house prices. The mortgagee could buy the property where the sale was directed by the court (as opposed to being a sale by a mortgagee in exercise of its own power of sale).

16    The Trustee sought to draw an analogy between the circumstances facing the court in Palk and this case. True it is that interest continues to accrue on the loan from CIGA secured over the Naremburn Property at the rate of 48% p.a. However, unlike the position facing Mr and Mrs Palk, a sale of the Naremburn Property would not reduce the amount owing to CIGA, such that the quantum of interest payable on the loan would reduce. Here, the entitlement to the Naremburn Property, and therefore to any proceeds of sale, remains in dispute. Under the Trustee’s proposal, if the property was to be sold, the net proceeds would not be applied in reduction of the amount CIGA claims is owing to it but would be held in an interest-bearing account pending final determination of the proceeding. In the meantime, interest would continue to accrue on the full amount owing to CIGA.

17    The Trustee next submits that the real benefit to the parties, both of whom ultimately seek the proceeds of sale as opposed to the Naremburn Property in specie, is that there is certainty of the return on the moneys invested. That is, if the Naremburn Property is sold and funds invested, they will earn interest at the prevailing rate (again, about which there was no evidence before me). On the other hand, if the Naremburn Property is not sold, there is no guarantee that it will sell for a higher price after final determination of the proceeding than the price at which it would presently sell. In the absence of any evidence of the current value of the Naremburn Property and the likely return on investment of the funds, it is not possible for me to assess the benefit for which the Trustee contends.

18    That then leaves the question of the continuing charges on the Naremburn Property. It is true that they continue to accrue. The current position seems to be that CIGA paid the outstanding land tax for 2025, has paid the council and water rates and maintains insurance over the Naremburn Property. In addition, CIGA has installed security cameras in the property and Mr MacMahon’s son periodically visits the Naremburn Property to check on it. As the evidence as to whether CIGA was prepared to continue to meet those expenses was equivocal, in the course of argument, I inquired of counsel appearing for CIGA whether it would proffer an undertaking to the Court to the effect that it would continue to meet council and water rates, insurance premiums and other necessary outgoings on the Naremburn Property pending final determination of the proceeding. Counsel for CIGA informed the Court that he was instructed that it would.

19    That undertaking addresses the Trustee’s concern about these charges and other expenses related to the Naremburn Property. CIGA is prepared to bear those costs in order to maintain the status quo.

20    As to the condition of the Naremburn Property, as set out at [6] above, the property was vandalised after the previous occupants left. There was, however, no evidence from which I could assess the likelihood or likely extent of further vandalism. Counsel for CIGA indicated that the protection of the Naremburn Property was a matter that could be discussed and hopefully solved by agreement between the parties.

21    As I have already observed, the evidence does not permit a finding that a sale now would realise less than a sale after the final determination of the proceeding, in say, 12 months’ time. However, any risk of that occurring may lead to diminished recovery by CIGA should the Trustee be unsuccessful in the proceeding. In the absence of a compelling reason to sell the Naremburn Property now, I accept that CIGA should not have that risk imposed on it, even if it is only speculative.

22    Further, in the normal course, a sale of a property such as the Naremburn Property would await final determination of the dispute surrounding it. The Trustee has not offered any compelling reason why that course should not be adopted in the present case.

23    CIGA also raised a question about the adequacy of the Trustee’s undertaking as to damages given in relation to the freezing orders should I be minded to accede to the Trustee’s application for sale. Given my conclusion that the application for sale should be dismissed, it is unnecessary to address that question.

conclusion

24    Upon CIGA giving an undertaking in the form described at [18] above, I will dismiss the Trustee’s interim application. As the Trustee has been unsuccessful, he should pay CIGA’s costs of that application.

25    I will make orders accordingly.

I certify that the preceding twenty-five (25) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Markovic.

Associate:

Dated:    19 November 2026