Federal Court of Australia

Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1761

Appeal from:

Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1894

File number(s):

SAD 279 of 2025

Judgment of:

O'SULLIVAN J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION — appeal from judgment of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal — where Tribunal affirmed decision of delegate to refuse Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa — where appellant does not satisfy criterion in cl 500.217 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) — where appellant provided academic transcript from Indian university in support of visa application — where issuing university advised Department that academic transcript was bogus — where Tribunal faced with conflicting evidence and preferred evidence of Department — whether primary judge erred in failing to find that Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in preferring Department's evidence — where grounds of appeal amounted to no more than a disagreement with merits of Tribunal's decision and primary judge's conclusions — no appealable error identified — appeal dismissed with costs

Legislation:

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl 4020, 500.2, 500.217

Cases cited:

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1894

Division:

General Division

Registry:

South Australia

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

41

Date of hearing:

3 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellant:

Appearing in person with an interpreter

Counsel for the Respondents:

Ms M Pappas

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

SAD 279 of 2025

BETWEEN:

DAXISH ARVINDKUMAR PATEL

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

O'SULLIVAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 november 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal is dismissed.

2.    The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of THREE THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($3,500).

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’SULLIVAN J:

1    The appellant is a citizen of India and arrived in Australia in November 2018 on his initial student visa for the purpose of studying a Master of Professional Accounting. After completing one semester, the appellant enrolled in a Master of Business of Information System, successfully completing “nearly three semesters” at which time his initial student visa was due to expire.

2    On 21 July 2020, the appellant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa in which he provided academic transcripts from Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj University in Kampur, India.

3    The Department of Home Affairs contacted the University for the purpose of verifying the appellant’s academic transcript. Those inquiries indicated that the academic transcript relating to the appellant’s Bachelor of Commerce degree from the University was a “bogus” document. On 29 June 2021, the Department notified the appellant that he had 28 days to comment on the Department’s information that the academic transcript provided by the appellant was bogus.

4    On 12 August 2021, a delegate refused to grant the appellant a visa on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that the appellant met the “Public Interest Criteria” in cl 500.217 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). That was because the delegate considered the appellant gave, or caused to be given, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to his application for the visa. The delegate stated that the appellant provided bogus academic transcripts from the University in support of his initial visa application.

5    The appellant sought review of the delegate’s decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as it then was). The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the Department and on 21 December 2021 affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse the appellant’s visa. The Tribunal subsequently published reasons for its decision on 4 January 2022.

6    The appellant applied to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The primary judge dismissed the application on 19 November 2025: Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1894 (R).

7    The appellant now appeals against that judgment on four grounds.

8    It is for the reasons which follow that the appeal is dismissed.

The primary judge’s reasons

9    The primary judge set out the history of the matter and summarised the Tribunal’s decision: at R [3]-[20]. I do not repeat that history.

10    Before the primary judge, the appellant raised one ground of review which was set out: at R [21]. It is a prolix ground which, in essence, contends the Department was wrong to conclude that the appellant’s academic transcript from the University was bogus.

11    The appellant continued to oppose the delegate’s view that his supporting documents were bogus and that he did complete the studies in India, contending that the universities in India are not as electronically organised as in Australia and retrieving information had to be done manually, opening the possibility for human error or ineffective processes. The appellant contends that the Tribunal did not consider that he had worked as an accountant and had also completed a Master of Business Information Systems in Australia.

12    The primary judge reviewed the Tribunal’s reasons for its decision (TR), noting that the Tribunal considered the appellant’s submissions and found: at TR [15], that the Tribunal was faced with two sets of conflicting evidence:

(1)    The documents the appellant said were accurate records of his study and academic performance; and

(2)    Evidence that the issuing body had advised the Department that the documents provided by the appellant were bogus.

13    The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review.

Grounds of appeal

14    The appellant was self-represented on the appeal and appeared with the assistance of an interpreter. The appellant appeals from the primary judge’s decision on four grounds. He seeks two orders:

1.    An order that decision of tribunal to be quashed.

2.    An order for tribunal to reconsider my case.

Ground one

15    Ground one repeats TR [15], stating that the Tribunal was faced with two sets of conflicting evidence regarding the academic transcripts, and that the Tribunal found the Department’s evidence more convincing. As I have noted, the essence of this prolix ground is that the Tribunal was wrong to prefer the Department’s evidence over that of the appellant and the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in doing so.

16    Regulation 500.2 of the Regulations sets out the primary criteria for the grant of a subclass 500 student visa. Regulation 500.217 provides that one of the primary criteria is that the applicant satisfies public interest criteria 4001, 4002, 4003, 4004, 4010, 4013, 4014, 4020 and 4021.

17    Schedule 4 to the Regulations sets out the public interest criteria and related provisions.

18    Regulation 4020(1) provides that in order to meet the public interest criteria:

(1)    There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal during the review of a Part 5-reviewable decision, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:

(a)    the application for the visa; or

(b)    a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.

(emphasis added)

19    The primary judge held: at R [31]-[32], that the Tribunal’s reasons, when read fairly and as a whole, reveal that the Tribunal took the appellant’s evidence into account but did not consider that it was sufficient to overcome the delegate’s decision that the appellant’s academic transcript was bogus.

20    There is nothing to identify any error on the part of the primary judge in reaching that conclusion and the appellant’s submissions amount to no more than a disagreement with the primary judge’s conclusion.

21    The appellant has not made out ground one.

Ground two

22    Ground two is identical to the single ground of judicial review advanced before the primary judge which was to the effect that the Department was wrong to conclude that the appellant’s academic transcript was bogus.

23    There is nothing identifying error on the part of the primary judge and again that submission amounts to no more than a disagreement with the primary judge’s conclusion.

24    The appellant has not made out ground two.

Ground three

25    There are two parts to this ground.

26    First, the appellant refers to R [29], where the primary judge references a partial transcript of the Tribunal hearing in support of his finding that the Tribunal considered the appellant’s submissions dated 12 December 2025 as to his study history for his Master of Commerce degree at the University of South Australia and work as an accountant.

27    The partial transcript shows the Tribunal Member informing the appellant of the information he has before him and what he will base his decision on, in addition to affording the appellant an opportunity to make further oral submissions. This conversation included the Tribunal Member acknowledging the appellant’s recent submission that he would not have been able to study at a Masters level if he had not done a Bachelor’s degree, and asking him if he has now completed his studies in Australia – to which the appellant replied, “Yes, I finished my Masters and I’m doing my Cookery, Commercial Cookery”.

28    The appellant submits that the primary judge erred in that while the Tribunal Member did ask a question, it failed to afford sufficient weight to the appellant’s response, and thus committed jurisdictional error.

29    Second, the appellant refers to R [30] where the primary judge repeats TR [15]. In that paragraph, the Tribunal Member states he is faced with two sets of conflicting evidence, that being the academic transcript and documents the appellant says are accurate and genuine, and the Department’s evidence claiming they are bogus after contacting the issuing bodies. The Tribunal found the Department’s evidence to be more convincing and concluded the documents were bogus.

30    The appellant submits that the Tribunal did not indicate on what basis it considered the Department’s evidence to be more convincing and thus made a jurisdictional error.

31    The primary judge considered that submission referring to well-known authorities on the task of a court considering an judicial review, the concept of unreasonableness, and the weight to be afforded to evidence by the Tribunal as part of its fact finding function: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17]; Minister for Immigration v Li [2013] HCA 18 at [28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [11]; NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10].

32    The Minister submits that the weight to be given to the evidence was a matter for the Tribunal as part of its fact-finding function and the reasoning was not illogical or irrational, and the Tribunal’s finding was open on the materials.

33    Nothing has been put before the Court by the appellant in relation to either part of this ground which demonstrates that the primary judge erred in his consideration of the Tribunal’s reasons and erred in not finding jurisdictional error as contended for in this ground.

34    The Minister’s submission should be accepted on the basis of the authorities to which the primary judge referred, such that this ground fails.

Ground four

35    The appellant refers to R [31], where the primary judge said that the information provided by the appellant to the Tribunal, including that he completed a Master’s degree in Australia and has worked as an accountant, was not sufficient to overcome the delegate’s ultimate conclusion.

36    The appellant disagrees with the Tribunal Member’s decision stating that this ultimately means that his “Bachelor degree is non genuine” and asks rhetorically how he was able to work as an accountant without such a degree. He says according to the Tribunal, “I am a 12th Grade pass student who has worked as an accountant and finished Australian Masters degree”. He states the Tribunal should have asked “immigration to review the report, recheck or reinvestigate it as given the situation this goes against common sense and clearly seems that there is something wrong in report”.

37    The Minister submits that when reading the Tribunal’s reasons for its decision as a whole, the appellant was afforded numerous opportunities to provide further supporting documentation, or verify the existing documents. The Minister submits the Tribunal was not obliged to go into further details and was entitled to prefer the Department’s evidence. The Minister submits that this ground does not identify any error made on the part of the primary judge.

38    The Minister’s submission should be accepted. In reviewing the Tribunal’s decision, the primary judge does not consider the merits of the Tribunal’s decision, but rules on its lawfulness by reference to the complaints made about it: Djokovic at [17].

39    The appellant has not made out ground four.

Conclusion

40    It is for these reasons that the appeal is dismissed.

41    There is no reason why the appellant should not pay the Minister’s costs and there will be orders accordingly.

I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Sullivan.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026