Federal Court of Australia

FFT19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 1760

Review of:

Decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal delivered by Member N. McGowan on 27 November 2019

File number(s):

VID 1443 of 2025

Judgment of:

ANDERSON J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review a decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant a protection visa – where Tribunal determined that notice of the refusal was given to the applicant and applicant out of time to seek review – where applicant does not dispute validity of notification – where applicant says not aware of notification, in fact – where applicant called the Department and spoke on the telephone to an unidentified person – where applicant claims that officer of the Department was required to inform him that his visa had been refused – where applicant claims that duty in s 66 of the Migration Act was not exhausted – where applicant claims that in the circumstances the Minister, by his delegate or agent, was required to renotify the applicant of the decision to refuse his visa – consideration of duty in s 66 to notify visa applicant of decision – where applicant claims that procedural fairness denied – consideration of whether telephone call was an act amenable to judicial review – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 33

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 412, 494B, 494C

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) rr 2.16(3), 4.31

Cases cited:

BIF23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 201; 301 FCR 229

BIF23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 44; 282 CLR 253

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1292; 134 FCR 308

Davis v Commonwealth [1988] HCA 63; 166 CLR 79

Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 213; 288 FCR 23

Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 10; 279 CLR 1

DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64; 270 FCR 492

H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 126; FCAFC 18; 118 FCR 153

Jabbour v Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs [2019] FCA 452; 269 FCR 438

Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] HCA 50; 224 CLR 44

Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550

Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; 242 CLR 573

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Manaf [2009] FCA 963; 111 ALD 437

Minister for the Arts, Heritage and Environment v
Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274

Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCA 1; 257 CLR 42

Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 31; 246 CLR 636

R v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; 241 CLR 252

Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 327; 128 FCR 469

Zhang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 151; 161 FCR 419

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

48

Date of hearing:

11 November 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr M Guo and Dr G Clough

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Asylum Seeker Resource Centre

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr N Wood SC and Mr J Barrington

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1443 of 2025

BETWEEN:

FFT19

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application be dismissed.

2.    The Applicant will pay the First Respondent’s costs of the application on a lump sum basis to be agreed or as assessed by a Registrar of the Court.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANDERSON J:

INTRODUCTION

1    The applicant applied for a protection visa on 19 December 2016. On 24 June 2019, a delegate of the Minister decided to refuse the application.

2    Section 66(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides that, “when the Minister grants or refuses to grant a visa, he or she is to notify the applicant of the decision in the prescribed way”. The relevant part of r 2.16(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) prescribes that the Minister must notify an applicant of a decision to refuse to grant a visa by one of the methods specified in s 494B of the Act. Section 494B(4) provides, relevantly, that the Minister may give a document to a person by dispatching it by prepaid post.

3    On the same day that the delegate refused the application (24 June 2019), the delegate sent a notification of the refusal to the applicant by post (Notification Letter). The applicant’s evidence is that he never received the Notification Letter. However, pursuant to s 494C(4) of the Act, the applicant was deemed to have received the notification on 3 July 2019. On the basis of that deemed date of receipt, the applicant was required to lodge any application for review by 31 July 2019 (as pursuant to the then s 412 of the Act and r 4.31 of the Regulations the applicant had 28 days from the notification of the decision to lodge an application for review).

4    Before the expiry of the review period, on 30 July 2019, a Department officer phoned the applicant and left a voice message to the effect that the visa he then held had lapsed. Later that day, the applicant called the Department back. The call was answered by an unidentified officer (Officer) who told the applicant that they were not able to give him further information and directed him to attend an appointment on 6 August 2019 (Telephone Conversation). It was at this appointment, after the expiration of the review period, that the applicant learned of the visa refusal. The applicant asked for a copy of the Notification Letter but was told that the Department officer could not give him a copy.

5    After further requests by the applicant, a copy of the Notification Letter was emailed to him on 8 August 2019. The applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (now the Administrative Review Tribunal, which I will refer to as the Tribunal in these reasons) for merits review that same day, attaching screenshots explaining that he had only just received the Notification Letter. On 27 November 2019, the Tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction in the matter because the application for review was made out of time.

6    By a further amended application, the applicant seeks relief on two grounds:

(a)    ground one: on the proper construction of s 66 of the Act, the Minister became obliged to renotify the applicant of the refusal decision when, by reason of the Telephone Conversation, the Minister by his delegate, servant or agent (being the Officer) “became aware or ought to have reasonably become aware” that the applicant was unaware of that decision but there was still time (one day) for the applicant to apply for review of the decision; and

(b)    ground two: the Minister, by the Officer:

(i)    was either actually or constructively aware that a decision had been made in respect of the applicant’s visa application and that the time for the applicant to seek merits review was running; and

(ii)    became aware or ought to have reasonably become aware that the applicant was unaware of that decision and therefore denied the applicant procedural fairness by failing to inform the applicant of those matters.

Ground one

Applicant’s submissions

7    The applicant’s first ground of review concerns the proper construction and operation of s 66 of the Act. The applicant’s argument is that s 66 required the Minister (by his delegate or agent) to renotify the applicant of the refusal of his visa application as a result of the Telephone Conversation, in the circumstances where:

(a)    in the course of the Telephone Conversation the Officer became aware or ought reasonably to have become aware that the applicant did not know that a decision had been made;

(b)    contrary to the applicant’s misapprehension, the Officer knew or constructively knew that a decision had been made; and

(c)    the time in which to seek merits review was still running at the time of the communication.

8    The applicant submits that ground one raises two issues. The first is whether the Minister may, under s 66, renotify an applicant of a decision. The second is whether, on its proper construction, s 66 required the Minister, in the circumstances of this case, to renotify the applicant of the relevant decision.

9    The applicant does not contend that s 66 confers a power to withdraw or invalidate a previously issued legally effective notification. The applicant submits that s 66 allows the Minister to issue a further, legally effective notification, without affecting the validity of the previously issued notification. The applicant submits that this is an interpretation of s 66 that the Full Court has endorsed: H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 126; FCAFC 18; 118 FCR 153 at [9] (Lee, Carr and Finkelstein JJ). The applicant also relies upon the decision of Sundberg J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Manaf [2009] FCA 963; 111 ALD 437 (primarily for the proposition that Manaf does not affect the authority of H).

10    The applicant submits that the proper construction of s 66 requires consideration of the text of the provision, construed in its context, and in light of its object and purpose. Subsection 66(1) specifies only that the Minister “is to notify” the applicant of a decision. Subsection 66(2) provides a detailed list of matters that such notification must include, because the purpose of the provision is “to ensure that the legislative scheme in relation to rights of review of decisions operates fairly”, and that an applicant be given enough information to pursue the right to review, in the context of the scheme, “in which time limits are strict and in which there exists no power, discretionary or otherwise, to enlarge them”: Chan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1292; 134 FCR 308 at [45] (Gray J). See also DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64; 270 FCR 492 at [51] (Perram J, Farrell J agreeing at [67]).

11    The applicant submits that such a purpose supports a construction of s 66 that requires the Minister, in the rare circumstances of the present case, where the Minister is, or ought to have been, aware of the risk of the legislative scheme operating unfairly and where the Minister is in a position to remedy the situation, to issue a further notification to an applicant about the relevant decision.

12    The applicant submits that his construction of s 66 is further supported by s 33 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). Section 33 provides that where “an Act confers a power or function or imposes a duty, then the power may be exercised and the function or duty must be performed from time to time as occasion requires”. The applicant submits that s 66(1) of the Act confers a duty on the Minister to notify the applicant of a decision. Section 33 suggests that the duty to notify must be performed “from time to time as occasion requires”.

13    The applicant submits that the Act does not demonstrate a “contrary intention”, to the effect that s 33 should not apply in this way. The applicant also submits that the possibility of multiple notifications would not undermine a need for “administrative certainty”. Ascertaining whether an application for review has been made within the period prescribed, being “a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of the decision”, would remain a question of fact to be determined by the Tribunal. Whether a visa applicant has been notified of a decision once or twice would not affect this.

14    The applicant further submits that s 494C of the Act provides for circumstances in which a person is deemed to have received a document but that this does not provide a basis for any finding of a “contrary intention”. The applicant submits that s 494C deems when a document is received, not whether multiple notifications can be sent. The deeming provisions would still operate to ensure the requisite “certainty” in relation to delivery of documents constituting a notification, whether that notification is the first or subsequent notification. The applicant further submits that s 494C is not an absolute provision in that first, it contemplates circumstances in which the deeming provision will not operate and secondly, the Tribunal is already required to engage in fact-finding about the circumstances of the notification, (that is, even without accepting the applicant’s construction of s 66).

15    The applicant also submits that his proposed construction is further supported by the principle of legality. Principles of natural justice can only be excluded from the operation of a statutory provision by “plain words of necessary intendment”: Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; 241 CLR 252 at [14]–[15] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). The applicant submits that there are no such words or intendment in s 66, such that it cannot be said that the duty of the Minister to “notify” an applicant of a decision is not intended to be required to be re-exercised where the Minister becomes aware, in the manner that occurred in this case, that the initial notification has been ineffective.

16    The applicant submits that s 66 can and should be construed so as to have required the Minister, in the circumstances of this case, to re-exercise the power conferred by s 66.

17    The applicant submits that the proper performance of the duty “to notify” the applicant of the decision to refuse his visa on the facts of this case required the Minister to perform that duty for a second time.

Consideration

18    I do not accept the applicant’s submissions for the reasons that follow.

19    Section 66(1) imposes a single duty upon the Minister. It requires the Minister to notify the applicant of a refusal decision in a prescribed way. In this case, there is no dispute that that duty was complied with. A delegate of the Minister notified the applicant in a “legally effective” way by dispatching the letter on 24 June 2019.

20    I accept the Minister’s submission that there is no basis in the text of the Act upon which a duty or indeed a power to “renotify” the applicant can be derived. Once the applicant has been notified of the decision in a prescribed way, then no further occasion can arise for the performance of that singular duty and no statutory purpose is served by “renotifying” that which has already been notified. The occasion for the performance of the duty has already arisen (the making of the refusal decision), and the duty has already been performed.

21    I also do not accept the applicant’s contention that his construction of s 66 is supported by s 33 of the Interpretation Act. I accept the Minister’s submission that the Act manifests a contrary intention to the application of s 33(1) of the Interpretation Act. A contrary intention arises from a prescriptive timing regime within the Act. Section 412(1)(b) of the Act (as it then stood) required an application for review of a Part 7-reviewable decision to be given to the Tribunal within the period prescribed, being a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of the decision under s 66. Section 494C of the Act deemed the notification to have been received when it was given by one of the methods specified in s 494B of the Act. These periods then inform the removal duties within the Act, and thus the period of permissible detention.

22    That the “prescriptive timing regime” within the Act discloses a contrary intention for the purposes of the Interpretation Act was the holding of Sundberg J in Manaf (see, in particular [48]). Manaf was subsequently applied and approved by the Full Court in BIF23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 201; 301 FCR 229 (Markovic and Anderson JJ, Derrington J agreeing with the majority at [141]) (in the analogous context of notifications under s 501CA(3) of the Act, noting this was overturned in BIF23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 44; 282 CLR 253 but in relation to a separate issue).

23    The applicant sought to rely on H as supporting the contention that s 66(1) can give rise to a duty to renotify. Sundberg J conveniently summarised the issue in H as follows in Manaf at [49]:

There notification had first been sent to the appellant’s agent and was later handed to the appellant in person. Notification to the agent gave the appellant more time in which to lodge his application for review. The Refugee Review Tribunal dismissed the application on the ground that it was out of time. The primary judge dismissed an appeal from that decision. The appellant’s appeal was upheld by the Full Court. The court agreed with the tribunal’s decision so far as it concerned personal notification, but said that the tribunal had overlooked the notification to the agent.

24    The Full Court found as follows in H at [9]:

[T]here are two alternative bases for concluding that the application for review was within time. The first is that the notification to the migration agent was the only relevant notification of the decision, so that the application for review could be lodged at any time before 14 November. This approach assumes that once the Minister first notified the appellant of the decision, that exhausted the Minister’s obligation under s 66. If that be correct, any further “notifications” (for example, by personally serving the appellant with a copy of the decision), would not be notifications under the statute and would have no legal consequence. The second basis for holding the application to be within time assumes that the second notification cannot be ignored, and that it brought into operation a second timetable within which the appellant could file a notice of review. In that event the appellant has been given two inconsistent timetables within which to make application for review and, in the absence of any statutory basis for giving one priority over the other, the appellant was entitled to choose the timetable that best suited him. That is what occurred in this case, albeit the appellant did not know he was making a choice.

25    Subsequently, the Full Court in Zhang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 151; 161 FCR 419 (Finn, Kenny and Greenwood JJ) said as follows at [25], in respect of H:

It is unnecessary to express any view in this appeal on the correctness or otherwise of the second of the two bases mentioned in H and in particular whether there can be two operative and effective notifications made. In the circumstances of this matter two methods of notification were not utilised giving rise to “inconsistent timetables”. Even if it was the case that the failed attempt to email the appellant on 2 March 2006 was intended to be a notification under reg 2.55, that form of notification was knowingly abandoned and the pre-paid post method alone was relied upon. The course taken by the migration agent over a month later to obtain an email from the delegate cannot meaningfully be described as involving continuation of the process of notification by email begun on 2 March 2006. There was by then no such process to continue. Notification had long since been effected …

(Emphasis added.)

26    In Manaf, the Minister had sent a valid notification to the applicant that their visa application had been refused. After the time of deemed receipt, the applicant provided a notification of change of address. The Minister then attempted to send a second notification to the new address – but that letter was sent to a non-existent address in error. The court below had found that in those circumstances the applicant had not been notified of the visa refusal. Sundberg J found that the first notification was valid and was unaffected by the second purported notification. Sundberg J considered both H and Zhang in Manaf and said as follows at [51] in respect of the two bases considered in the excerpt from H above:

In my view the Full Court in H was not endorsing both alternative bases. Only one can be the correct approach. An assumption is part of each of them. I understand the court to have said that on whichever of the two bases argued was the correct one, the application for review was within time. It was thus unnecessary to decide which was the true view. For the reasons I have given, the first basis is to be preferred. That would appear to have been the opinion of the court in Zhang.

27    I do not accept the applicant’s submissions in respect of H and Manaf. First, I accept as the Minister submitted and as Sundberg J found in Manaf that the Full Court in H did not decide which of the two bases identified was correct. It therefore does not stand for the proposition that there may be two valid notifications which create two separate timelines for review. Second, I do not accept, as the applicant contends, that Manaf is not directly relevant to this decision as it relates to an argument that s 66 allows the Minister, by issuing a renotification, to “invalidate or cancel the legal effect of an earlier performance of a duty”. Sundberg J found that once the valid notification had occurred, time began to run and specifically found (at [48]) that “[t]he prescriptive timing regime that runs through the Act is inconsistent with the notion that, as the minister put it, ‘you can reset the clock as often as you like by just sending a new letter’”. That is directly inconsistent with the applicant’s argument before me that s 66 can give rise to a duty to renotify. I find that H is not of assistance to the case before me. I accept that neither Zhang nor Manaf directly considered or decided whether the Minister can be subject to a duty to renotify a visa applicant, but I do find that Manaf supports the contention that there can only be one notification under s 66(1), and that Zhang is consistent with that proposition.

28    I also do not accept the applicant’s submissions that the “purpose” of s 66(2) of the Act as expressed in Chan “to ensure that the legislative scheme in relation to rights of review of decisions operates fairly” extends to s 66(1). Subsection 66(2) is directed towards the requirements of a valid notification. As Perram J said in DFQ17 at [51] (Farrell J agreeing at [67]) in relation to Gray J’s statement of the purpose of s 66(2) in Chan, “[i]n a sense, that observation mirrors Allsop J’s concern that s 66(2) is [to] be interpreted so that what is conveyed by the notification is complete information” (referring to Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 327; 128 FCR 469). Justice Gray’s comments on the purpose of s 66(2) should not be divorced from the context of his Honour’s decision – whether a notification of a decision was valid. That is quite a different proposition to the issue in this case. More importantly, even accepting that the legislative purpose is “to ensure that the legislative scheme in relation to rights of review of decisions operates fairly” does not aid the applicant. Section 66(1) must be read in the context of the Act as a whole, in particular s 494C which deems receipt of notifications. The applicant’s asserted purpose is not useful in answering the question in this case and is apt to distract from the clear terms of the statutory scheme as to how decisions are to be notified (by the methods in s 494B), when notifications are received (by the deemed receipt provisions in s 494C), when review rights are available and when they expire (by reference to when a person is deemed to have received notification). The statutory purpose is to be ascertained objectively noting that “[t]he purpose of a statute is not something which exists outside the statute”: Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] HCA 10; 242 CLR 573 at [43]–[44] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). I accept the Minister’s submission that the applicant’s case that a duty to “renotify” arises when it becomes apparent that an applicant has not “in fact” received a notice, is irreconcilable with the clear terms of the Act.

29    I also reject the applicant’s contention that the principle of legality supports the applicant’s construction of s 66. The applicant enjoys no right or interest to be notified of a refusal decision independent of the scheme of the Act, which provides for the making of a notification of a refusal decision, the terms of which are clear.

30    I also reject the applicant’s submission that procedural fairness bears on the construction of any provision in the notification scheme, with the result that the Act required that the applicant be “renotified” of that which he had already been notified of under the Act. The principles of procedural fairness have no application in the present context.

31    For these reasons ground one must be rejected.

Ground two

Applicant’s submissions

32    The applicant’s second ground of review is that the Minister denied the applicant procedural fairness when, by his delegate or agent (being, the Officer), he spoke to the applicant during the Telephone Conversation, in the following circumstances:

(a)    the Telephone Conversation, while initiated by the applicant, was in response to a call from an officer of the Department and was in that sense initiated by the Department;

(b)    during that conversation the applicant said that he was still awaiting an outcome on his visa application. As a consequence, the Officer either became aware, or at the very least should reasonably have become aware, that the applicant did not know that a decision had been made to refuse his visa application; and

(c)    at the time of the conversation the time period within which the applicant was entitled to apply for merits review had not yet expired and the Officer was either aware of this, or at least ought to have been, or was constructively aware.

33    The applicant submits that in the above circumstances, he was denied procedural fairness when the Minister’s delegate or agent failed to notify him that a decision had been made in relation to his visa application.

34    The applicant submits that the Minister breached a duty of procedural fairness that attached to the exercise of a non-statutory executive power, being the power to make the telephone call on 30 July 2019. The applicant argues that this exercise of non-statutory executive power attracted requirements of procedural fairness, and that procedural fairness, in the circumstances of this case, required the Minister to either:

(a)    bring to the applicant’s attention the fact that a refusal decision had been made;

(b)    not misleadingly fail to correct a communicated assumption that the Officer must have known to be wrong; or

(c)    both, because on these facts one is the corollary of the other.

35    The applicant notes as a preliminary matter that the Minister argues that there is no right to seek judicial review of the exercise of such a non-statutory executive power on procedural fairness grounds. The applicant submits that this submission of the Minister should not be accepted for the following reasons.

36    First, the applicant submits that it is well established, including by High Court authority, that an exercise of non-statutory executive power, depending on the nature of the power at issue and the circumstances of its exercise, may be reviewed by a court: Minister for the Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274 at 277 (Bowen CJ, and see Sheppard J at 280 and Wilcox J at 303–4). See also R v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170 at 220–1 (Mason J); Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] HCA 50; 224 CLR 44 at [69] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

37    The applicant submits that powers with the ability to affect individuals’ rights and interests and which are not otherwise rendered non-justiciable by their subject matter, are powers that can be judicially reviewed: Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 213; 288 FCR 23 at [168] (Mortimer J) and see [245] (Charlesworth J) (noting this was overturned in Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 10; 279 CLR 1 but in relation to a separate issue), see also Jabbour v Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs [2019] FCA 452; 269 FCR 438 at [91]–[92] (Robertson J).

38    Second, the applicant submits that the exact grounds on which such a non-statutory exercise of power can be reviewed “depends on the nature and subject matter of the challenged exercise of executive power”: Davis at [29] (Kenny J). Whether a given exercise of non-statutory executive power can be reviewed on procedural fairness grounds therefore requires examination of the specific power in issue. The applicant submits that an exercise of power may be reviewed on procedural fairness grounds where it is “apt to affect adversely” an applicant’s interests specifically (rather than the interests of members of the public generally) and includes where such “interests” are not limited to strict legal rights: Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 31; 246 CLR 636 at [66]–[69] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). See also Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550 at 616–17 (Brennan J).

39    The applicant submits that the exercise of power in this case involved a telephone call to a visa applicant who had review rights in respect of a decision, which were extant but soon to expire at the time of the telephone call, and of which the applicant should have been, but was not, aware. The applicant submits that the Minister’s action in not bringing those matters to the applicant’s attention, upon becoming aware of the applicant’s misapprehension and while otherwise discussing with him matters relating to his visa status, affected the applicant’s rights and interests because it further encouraged his misapprehension that a decision had not been made. Further, this induced the applicant’s failure to appreciate that he then had legal rights to seek review of the decision, and to act upon those rights. The applicant submits that those were expressly defined legal rights. In those circumstances, it is apparent, in the applicant’s submission, that the exercise of power is one that can and should be subject to judicial review, including for an alleged denial of procedural fairness.

40    On the basis that this exercise of non-statutory executive power can be reviewed on procedural fairness grounds, the applicant submits that there is nothing in the statutory scheme that suggests that the Minister was not required to afford procedural fairness in the exercise of this power.

Consideration

41    The applicant, in the circumstances of this case, was not denied procedural fairness for the reasons that follow.

42    First, I do not accept that the Officer, by answering a telephone call from the applicant and having a brief conversation with him, was exercising a non-statutory power that was constrained by a duty to afford procedural fairness to the applicant.

43    In Davis v Commonwealth [1988] HCA 63; 166 CLR 79 at 108, Brennan J explained a tripartite classification of executive power as (a) statutory power or capacity; (b) a prerogative power; and (c) a capacity which is neither statutory nor prerogative.

44    In Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCA 1; 257 CLR 42 at [135], Gageler J (as his Honour then was) said:

An act done in the execution of a prerogative executive power is an act which is capable of interfering with legal rights of others. An act done in the execution of a non-prerogative executive capacity, in contrast, involves nothing more than the utilisation of a bare capacity or permission, which can also be described as ability to act or as a “faculty”. Such effects as the act might have on legal rights or juridical relations result not from the act being uniquely that of the Executive Government but from the application to the act of the same substantive law as would be applicable in respect of the act had it been done by any other actor.

45    In the present case, the Officer in answering the telephone call and having a brief conversation with the applicant did not affect any legally recognised rights or interests of the applicant. The Officer was not exercising a “power” that was limited or constrained by a duty of procedural fairness or unreasonableness. The Officer’s act is therefore not amenable to judicial review.

46    Secondly, the applicant’s submission is framed as a duty of procedural fairness in the exercise of non-statutory power. In reality, the applicant is seeking to derive a duty of an officer of the Commonwealth to advise the applicant about his rights under the Act. There is no such duty imposed by the Act. Nor can such a duty be derived from outside the Act, including by the notion of non-statutory duty of procedural fairness in the exercise of a “power” to have a conversation.

47    For the reasons given, ground two must be rejected.

DISPOSITION

48    The application will be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anderson.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026