Federal Court of Australia

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1759

Appeal from:

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1166

File number(s):

NSD 1466 of 2025

Judgment of:

O'SULLIVAN J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION — appeal from judgment of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal — where Tribunal affirmed decision of delegate to refuse Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa — where appellants are a family unit — where first appellant did not meet genuine temporary entrant criteria in cl 500.212 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) — where second to fourth appellants unable to satisfy cl 500.311 of Sch 2 to the Regulations — whether primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error where Tribunal mistaken that it did not have copy of first appellant’s visa application and inferred visa application was in similar terms to Statement of Purpose — where primary judge had access to the first appellant’s visa application — where inference correct and nothing turned on absence of visa application — whether Tribunal denied procedural fairness by predetermining application before hearing — where Tribunal advised first appellant that it was unable to make favourable decision on information before it and invited first appellant to attend hearing — where short duration of hearing alone does not establish procedural unfairness — whether Tribunal’s assessment of first appellant’s ties to India and Australia was legally unreasonable — where findings concerning travel history and family ties were open on evidence — whether Tribunal failed to properly apply Ministerial Direction 69 in assessing genuine temporary entrant criteria — where Tribunal had regard to relevant factors including first appellant’s prior studies, course progression and family responsibilities — where weight to be given to relevant considerations a matter for decision-maker — no appealable error — appeal dismissed with cost

Legislation:

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2, cl 500.212, 500.215, 500.311

Cases cited:

BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 159;[2017] FCAFC 61

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1166

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999)197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

62

Date of hearing:

3 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellants:

Appearing in person for the appellants with an interpreter

Counsel for the Respondents:

Ms S Black

Solicitor for the Respondents:

MinterEllison

ORDERS

NSD 1466 of 2025

BETWEEN:

DALVIR KAUR

First Appellant

SATNAM RAM

Second Appellant

SHANAYA RALH (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

O'SULLIVAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal is dismissed.

2.    The first and second appellants are to pay the Minister’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’SULLIVAN J:

1    The appellants are citizens of India and are a family unit. The first and second appellants are the mother and father, respectively, of the third and fourth appellants. The first appellant is the primary applicant for a student visa, with her husband and children as secondary applicants. For convenience, I will refer to the first appellant as the appellant.

2    The appellant arrived in Australia on 28 October 2008 and had completed numerous tertiary courses in the period up to November 2018.

3    On 16 November 2018, the appellant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa in response to which the Department sought further information relating to overseas student health cover for the appellant and her family unit. That application was ultimately refused by a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) on 3 April 2019 on the grounds that the appellant did not satisfy cl 500.215 in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). It followed that the second to fourth appellants did not satisfy cl 500.311 of the Regulations.

4    The appellant lodged an application for a review of the delegate’s decision in respect of the first application and on 1 July 2019 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as it then was) remitted the application to the Minister on the grounds that the appellant had met the requirements of cl 500.215 of the Regulations.

5    On 6 August 2019, the Department sought further information from the appellant, including as to whether the appellant met the genuine temporary entrant criteria required by cl 500.212 of the Regulations. The appellant provided a “Statement of Purpose” in response.

6    On 9 September 2019, a delegate of the Minister again refused the appellant’s application, this time on the grounds that the appellant did not meet the genuine temporary entrant criteria under cl 500.212 of the Regulations in that the delegate did not consider the appellant as a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student. Once again, it followed that the second to fourth appellants did not satisfy cl 500.311 of the Regulations.

7    On 30 September 2019, the appellant filed an application for review of that decision in the Tribunal.

8    On 2 October 2019 and 22 January 2021, the Tribunal invited the appellant to provide it with further material or written arguments for its consideration. The Tribunal also advised the appellant that it was a requirement of a student visa that she be enrolled in a course of study and be a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student. The Tribunal informed the appellant of her duty to have regard to Ministerial Direction 69 in considering whether she is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student and provided the appellant with a copy of that Direction.

9    After the request from the Tribunal on 22 January 2021, the appellant provided the Tribunal with a completed ‘Request for Student Visa Information’ Form on 5 February 2021 and on 22 February 2021, the appellant provided the Tribunal with a supplementary document titled “Statement in addition to student visa information form submitted to AAT”.

10    On 5 March 2021, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant indicating that on the information she had provided to that point, it was unable to make a favourable decision and invited the appellant to attend a hearing by telephone to make oral submissions. In that letter, the Tribunal also provided the appellant with an opportunity to provide further documentary evidence in support of her case, as well as requiring certain information, such as confirmation of current enrolment in a course of study and documents supporting her past studies in Australia. The Tribunal provided a copy of Direction 69 and invited the appellant to provide written submissions addressing the “genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student requirements” in that Direction.

11    The hearing was conducted on 31 March 2021, at which the appellant gave evidence with the assistance of a migration agent. The Tribunal gave oral reasons on the same day, affirming the delegate’s decision. Written reasons for that decision were published on 17 May 2021 (TR).

12    On 29 April 2021, the appellant applied for judicial review in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2). On 23 July 2025, the FCFCoA dismissed the application: Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1166 (R).

13    The appellant now appeals from that judgment.

14    It is for the reasons which follow that the appeal is dismissed.

Primary judge’s decision

15    The primary judge set out the background and migration history of the matter: at R [10]-[32]. There is no challenge to that history, and I do not repeat it.

16    Before the primary judge, the appellants raised six grounds of review which may be summarised as follows:

(1)    The Tribunal denied procedural fairness/failed to exercise its jurisdiction by failing to provide the appellant ample opportunity and time to respond to the matter and queries sought by the Tribunal;

(2)    The Tribunal failed to give proper weight and consideration to earlier documents submitted by the appellant;

(3)    The Tribunal denied procedural fairness on the basis that the Tribunal failed to make proper enquiries and failed to consider the evidence that was before it;

(4)    The Tribunal breached ss 338, 348, 353 and 357A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to review properly the decision that was before it;

(5)    The Tribunal breached s 368 of the Act by failing to provide proper reasons for its decision and findings on the material question of fact on which the decision was made; and

(6)    The Tribunal acted improperly and unreasonably by affirming the decision of the delegate.

17    The primary judge dismissed all six grounds.

Grounds of appeal

18    The appellant advances four grounds of appeal.

19    On the appeal, the appellant appeared on her own behalf and for the family unit with the assistance of an interpreter.

Ground one

20    In ground one, the appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error where the Tribunal failed to properly consider and weigh all relevant evidence before it.

21    Ground one concerns the primary judge’s consideration of an “omission” which related to the fact that the Tribunal did not have specific reference to the appellant’s visa application, which the appellant claims contained her “genuine intentions and circumstances”. The appellant contends that her complete application materials were “essential to properly assess my genuine temporary entrance status under clause 500.212(a).”

22    At R [58], the primary judge referred to TR [24] which recorded that the Tribunal had seen the departmental file, but did not have a copy of the appellant’s visa application. The Tribunal proceeded by inferring that the appellant’s visa application was in similar terms as the appellant’s Statement of Purpose which had been provided to the Tribunal.

23    The primary judge found that the Tribunal was mistaken and that it did, in fact, have the appellant’s visa application. The primary judge compared the two documents and was satisfied that the inference drawn by the Tribunal was correct: R [58]. On that basis, the primary judge was satisfied that nothing turned on the fact that the Tribunal did not have regard to the visa application.

24    The Minister submits that there was no error on the part of the primary judge in that finding.

25    Although the Minister relies on BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 61; (2017) 248 FCR 159 at [93] and [106] (Griffiths, Kerr and Farrell JJ) in support of that submission, it does not seem to me that it advances the matter in the particular circumstances of this case.

26    The appellant did not identify what, if anything, was in the visa application that was not in the Statement of Purpose.

27    Under those circumstances, there was no error on the part of the primary judge in concluding that the appellant’s visa application was in similar terms of the appellant’s Statement of Purpose and that nothing turned on the fact that the Tribunal did not have specific regard to the visa application.

28    The appellant has not made out ground one.

Ground two

29    In ground two, the appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding the Tribunal afforded the appellant procedural fairness when the Tribunal predetermined the appellant’s application before the hearing.

30    The appellant refers to R [42]-[45] where the primary judge finds that the Tribunal afforded procedural fairness to the appellant, particularly providing the appellant with “a reasonable opportunity to give evidence and present arguments, consistent with Division 5 of Part 5 of the Act”.

31    The appellant refers to the letter from the Tribunal dated 5 March 2021 in which it states: “we are unable to make a favourable decision on this information alone” to support her contention that the Tribunal had already determined its decision before the hearing. The appellant also asserts that the hearing duration of approximately 45 minutes was inadequate for any proper consideration of her case.

32    The Minister submits that the primary judge was correct to conclude that procedural fairness was afforded and there is no basis for finding that there was either bias or apprehended bias by the Tribunal. The Minister refers to the Tribunal’s letter and the primary judge’s view that the invitation for the appellant to attend a hearing to make oral submissions reflects the Tribunal’s process of affording natural justice.

33    I accept the Minister’s submission. The letter from the Tribunal provides the appellant with the opportunity to present her case at a hearing – an opportunity the appellant accepted.

34    In relation to the allegation of “insufficient time”, the Minister refers to the primary judge’s observation that without the transcript of the Tribunal hearing, “[t]here is no basis for [the primary judge] to infer undue brevity …”.

35    The fact that a hearing took a relatively short time does not mean there was a lack of procedural fairness. The appellant does not identify what it was that she wanted to advance that she could not on account of any procedural unfairness and relies solely on the duration of the hearing.

36    No error has been demonstrated in the primary judge’s conclusion that there was no basis to infer undue brevity and a consequent lack of procedural fairness on the part of the Tribunal.

37    The appellant has not made out this ground.

Ground three

38    Ground three contends that the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by unreasonableness in its assessment of the appellant’s circumstances in India and Australia.

39    The appellant refers to R [61]-[63] in which the primary judge accepted the Tribunal’s findings as to the appellant’s ties to India and Australia.

40    The primary judge held that without corroborative evidence regarding the twice-weekly phone calls to India, it was open to the Tribunal to reach the conclusion it did: at TR [54] that the Tribunal was unable to accept, at face value, the appellant’s evidence that she is much attached to her family, in circumstances where she had not returned to India to see them since late 2011.

41    Further, in relation to the appellant’s travel history, the primary judge was satisfied that the findings of fact, inferences and conclusions drawn by the Tribunal “through the lens of relative incentive to return to India or remain in Australia” were open on the evidence before the Tribunal.

42    The appellant submits that proper weight and analysis of the evidence was not given to her legitimate reasons for limited travel which include her pregnancy in 2018, the COVID-19 pandemic and her child’s welfare concerns.

43    The Minister submits that in this ground, the appellant is seeking to reagitate ground three of the judicial review before the FCFCoA, whereby the primary judge found that the Tribunal’s reasoning was “not illogical, irrational or unreasonable” as explained by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130] (Crennan and Bell JJ) and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [76] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

44    I accept that submission. Further, the appellant seeks to engage in a merits review which this Court has no power to do.

45    The appellant has not made out ground three.

Ground four

46    Ground four contends that the primary judge erred in finding no jurisdictional error where the Tribunal failed to properly apply Direction 69 in assessing the appellant’s temporary entrant status.

47    The appellant refers to R [102] where the primary judge found that the Tribunal had “regard to the Direction and referred to its factors as a guide when determining whether the applicant satisfied the genuine temporary entrant criterion on a reasonable and balanced basis.”

48    The appellant refers to the factors she says were in her favour which were overlooked, namely: her consistent study progression; completion of multiple qualifications; genuine study intentions; family responsibilities, and the impact of extraordinary circumstances (including her pregnancy and the COVID-19 pandemic).

49    The appellant claims that the Tribunal “focused disproportionately on travel history” without properly balancing all the relevant factors under Direction 69.

50    The Minister submits that there is no appealable error in the primary judge’s reasons in respect of ground four and that although the appellant raised this same issue in an affidavit in support of her judicial review application before the primary judge, she failed to elaborate on the matter.

51    The primary judge found that the Tribunal had regard to the factors in Direction 69 and that the Tribunal expressly addressed the appellant’s circumstances in India and Australia.

52    The Minister submits that in correctly applying Direction 69, the Tribunal considered the appellant’s prior studies, including course progression and her family responsibilities.

53    In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic being a reason to be considered for her non-return to India, the Minister submits that while the Tribunal did not address this factor, there is no evidence that it was in fact raised before the Tribunal for consideration.

54    Further, as to the appellant’s contention that too much weight was factored into her lack of travel to India, the Minister submits that it is for the decision-maker to determine what, if any, weight should be afforded on the facts, and not on judicial review: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 at 41 (Mason J).

55    It is important to keep in mind that the Tribunal was considering a 13-year period when addressing the appellant’s ties to India.

56    The Minister submits that a mere disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision does not of itself establish a jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999)197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].

57    I accept the Minister’s submissions.

58    The primary judge did not err in determining that the Tribunal had regard to Direction 69 when determining the application.

59    It is for those reasons that ground four is not made out.

Conclusion

60    It is for these reasons that the appeal is dismissed.

61    The Minister seeks the first and second appellants to pay their costs as agreed or assessed.

62    There is no reason why such an order should not be made and there will be orders accordingly.

I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Sullivan.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026


SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

NSD 1466 of 2025

Appellants

Fourth Appellant:

MANAV RALH