Federal Court of Australia

Ngo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1758

Review of:

Ngo and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2025] ARTA 286

File number(s):

VID 537 of 2025

Judgment of:

ANDERSON J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – judicial review of decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) to affirm the decision of the delegate not to revoke the cancellation of the applicant’s Class WC (Subclass 030) Bridging C Visa (Visa) pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) – whether ART erred in not properly considering the applicant’s argument regarding parole as a protective factor in relation to the applicant’s risk of harm and recidivism under Ministerial Direction no. 110 – whether ART had a duty to inquire into the status of parole before handing down decision – whether ART erred in consideration of expert evidence as to risk of recidivism – whether ART erred in not properly considering evidence as to the best interests of children as required under Ministerial Direction no. 110 – whether errors material – writs of certiorari and mandamus issue.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501(3A), 501CA(4))

Cases cited:

Chava v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 313

Hatewar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] HCA 45

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; 280 CLR 321

Masson v Parsons [2019] HCA 21; 266 CLR 554

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZRTF [2013] FCA 1377

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 83 ALJR 1123

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; 275 CLR 582

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

63

Date of hearing:

13 October 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr L Boccabella

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Warlows Legal

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr V Murano

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Clayton Utz

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs.

ORDERS

VID 537 of 2025

BETWEEN:

THE AN NGO

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Second Respondent dated 31 March 2025.

2.    A writ of mandamus issue directing the Second Respondent to determine the Applicant’s application for review according to law.

3.    The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANDERSON J:

Introduction

1    By amended application filed on 24 February 2026, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 31 March 2025. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of the first respondent (Minister), by his delegate, not to revoke the cancellation of the applicant’s Class WC (Subclass 030) Bridging C Visa (Visa) pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).

2    Although the amended application contains three grounds, in his written submissions dated 21 September 2026, the applicant only addresses grounds 1 and 2. By email dated 21 September 2026, the applicant’s solicitors confirmed that ground 3 is no longer pressed.

3    For the reasons set out below, the application will be allowed with costs.

Background

4    On 8 November 2023, the applicant was convicted of:

(1)    “TRAFFICK DRUG OF DEPENDENCE COMM QTY” and sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment; and

(2)    “KNOWINGLY DEAL/CONCEAL PROCEEDS OF CRIME” and sentenced to four months’ imprisonment, with two months of that sentence to be cumulative with the former sentence.

5    On 15 December 2023, the Visa was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act (Cancellation).

6    On 10 January 2024, the applicant lodged a request for revocation of the Cancellation.

7    On 8 January 2025, the applicant was: (1) notified that a delegate of the Minister had decided not to revoke the Cancellation; and (2) provided written reasons.

8    On 14 January 2025, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the decision not to revoke the Cancellation.

9    On 18 and 19 March 2025, the Tribunal conducted a hearing of the applicant’s review application. The applicant was represented by a solicitor advocate.

10    On 31 March 2025, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to revoke the Cancellation (Decision) and delivered written reasons (Reasons).

11    The Tribunal noted at [11]–[12] of the Reasons that the Tribunal must comply with “Direction no. 110 — Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA”, being a ministerial direction made under s 499(1) of the Act (by s 499(2A), a person or body must comply with a direction under subsection (1)). The purpose of Direction no. 110 (see para 5.1(4)) is to “guide decision-makers in performing functions or exercising powers” under ss 501 and 501CA of the Act.

12    Direction no. 110 sets out the following “primary considerations” in para 8 and goes on to set out how the decision-maker is to consider each of them:

(1)    protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;

(2)    whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence;

(3)    the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia;

(4)    the best interests of minor children in Australia; and

(5)    expectations of the Australian community.

13    Direction no. 110 then says that “other considerations” must also be taken into account, where relevant, including (but not limited to):

(1)    legal consequences of the decision;

(2)    extent of impediments if removed; and

(3)    impact on Australian business interests.

14    The Tribunal considered each of the primary and other considerations before determining that on balance the factors did not favour revocation of the Cancellation.

The alleged errors

15    By ground 1, the applicant alleges the Decision is affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that the Tribunal misunderstood relevant facts and materials and committed the type of error identified in Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; 275 CLR 582 at [24], [25] and [27] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Steward JJ). In short, the majority there held that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations made to them by the applicant and that the decision-maker’s engagement with the representations “must occur within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness”. This ground has two limbs.

16    By ground 2, the applicant submits that the Tribunal erred because it failed to appreciate that the applicant had become the “psychological parent” of his wife’s two younger children and, as a result, failed to properly assess the best interests of the child in accordance with Direction no. 110.

17    I will address each limb in the order that they were addressed by the applicant in written and oral submissions, turning first to ground 1(b), then to ground 1(a) and then ground 2.

The parties’ submissions

Ground 1(b)

18    By ground 1(b) the applicant alleges that the Tribunal proceeded on an incorrect basis that the Adult Parole Board has the power to release the applicant into the community. The applicant alleges that the Tribunal erred because it (a) misunderstood the applicant’s case that parole would have a beneficial effect on him; and (b) failed to make inquiries about whether he had been granted parole after the Tribunal hearing was concluded.

19    The applicant submits that the Tribunal was not aware that the Adult Parole Board had granted the applicant parole on 25 March 2025, six calendar days before the Tribunal made the Decision.

20    The applicant submits that the Tribunal misunderstood the parole issue, which was obvious from material before the Tribunal and indicated that the applicant’s grant of parole was pending. The Tribunal had before it the Parole Suitability Assessment (PSA) dated 3 December 2024 which recommended parole and a letter dated 4 December 2024 which stated that the Adult Parole Board would likely consider the applicant’s parole application at a meeting within the next four weeks, subject to the number of other cases listed for consideration.

21    The applicant submits that the parole issue was raised during cross-examination of the expert consultant psychologist, Mr Tim Watson-Munro, by the Minister’s legal representative. The applicant submits that the parole issue was also raised in final submissions by the applicant’s legal representative.

22    The applicant submits that the Tribunal was dismissive about parole and stated in its Reasons at [43]:

… During closing submissions, Ms [sic] John advanced for the first time that the Applicant would be subject to parole conditions if released, requiring him to comply with reporting and other obligations. This is not referred to in the Applicant’s SFIC and there is no corroboration about what if any conditions the Applicant might be subjected to if released on parole. Custodial officers noted between 18 November 2024 and 9 February 2025 that the Applicant’s parole status is uncertain. The first report said his ‘parole is linked to his immigration status’ and the Applicant preferred to ‘serve his parole time in immigration detention’. Another custodial record dated December 2024 recommends that a condition of parole is that the Applicant reside at a Detention Centre rather than in the community.

23    The applicant submits that the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant’s case that parole would have a beneficial effect on the applicant. The applicant submits that this error was compounded by the fact that the Tribunal did not inquire into the status of any final parole order before making the Decision.

24    The Minister submits that when [43] of the Reasons is read fairly and in context, it is apparent that there is no error as alleged by the applicant. The Minister submits that the Tribunal, in substance, found that it did not need to consider “the nature of any conditions” of parole as a protective factor which would decrease the applicant’s risk of reoffending in the community, because the applicant had not, in fact, been granted parole.

25    In summary, the Minister submits that the consideration by the Tribunal of the parole issue was to the following effect. The relevance of the PSA recommended condition was that if the Tribunal revoked the Cancellation of the Visa, parole would be unlikely to be granted, as the applicant would then be a lawful non-citizen and unable to reside at an immigration detention centre – ie, a condition for the granting of parole would not be satisfied. In those circumstances, there would be no parole and no conditions on parole serving any protective purpose.

26    In relation to whether there was a requirement for the Tribunal to inquire as to the applicant’s parole status after the hearing, the Minister submits that no error of the type contemplated in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 83 ALJR 1123 at [25] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) arises for the following reasons:

(a)    as the applicant was represented before the Tribunal and the applicant’s representative raised the issue of parole at the hearing, the making of such an inquiry “was not obvious”. Rather, the granting of parole was a matter for the applicant to bring to the Tribunal’s attention;

(b)    there was no “vulnerability, incapacity, or infirmity in [the applicant] or his circumstances which might have made some proactivity on the part of the Tribunal necessary”: Chava v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 313 at [80] (Mortimer J, as her Honour then was);

(c)    parole was not critical to the Decision, in the sense of being at least “decisive of, or crucially important to an anterior issue which provides ‘a sufficient link’ to the outcome of the review”: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZRTF [2013] FCA 1377 at [40] (Katzmann J); and

(d)    there was nothing on the record to indicate that any inquiry would have yielded a useful result and while the applicant’s legal representative made submissions about parole conditions at the hearing on 19 March 2025, the applicant provided no evidence that parole had been granted.

Ground 1(a)

27    By ground 1(a) the applicant submits the Tribunal misunderstood the relevant facts and materials, being the evidence of Mr Watson-Munro, that the risk of recidivism was “low” (with some qualification) and that a custodial risk assessment (utilising the LSI/R:SV methodology) found his risk of recidivism “low” on all scores.

28    The applicant submits that the Tribunal failed to grapple with, understand or properly evaluate the evidence on the risk of recidivism before the Tribunal and, in particular, the oral evidence of Mr Watson-Munro, which found that the applicant’s “risk of re-offending is low”.

29    The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred in concluding at Reasons [51] that the applicant’s risk was “moderate”.

30    The Minister submits that there is no error in the Tribunal’s findings at Reasons [51] as they conformed with Direction no. 110 and were sound and open, based on probative evidence.

Ground 2

31    By this ground, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal erred because it failed to appreciate that the applicant had become the “psychological parent” of his wife’s two younger children and, as a result, failed to properly assess the best interests of minor children in accordance with Direction no. 110.

32    The applicant submits that the Tribunal, at Reasons [81], stated, “[t]here is no expert evidence about the effects of continued separation on the children” when in fact there was expert evidence from Mr Watson-Munro, including as follows (with the names of the children and the applicant’s wife removed):

Just a few questions regarding the children. You spoke with the mother of the children, []?---That is correct.

In your expert opinion, what do you think is the likely impact of the separation from the stepfather and the children?---Well, according to the mother, the children enjoy a very close bond with their stepfather. As I understand it, they are unaware that he is in custody. But they view him, according to her, very much as a father figure. I think if they were permanently separated, that would represent a period of trauma and adjustment for them.

How severely it would impact especially on the younger child, [], and the other child, []? She is, I think, eight years old, and [] is 14 years old. The overall combined effect on each child as you have read the letters of [] as well. In your expert opinion, what is the overall impact on the children?---Well, I’ve not examined the children. I’m reliant upon the history provided by the mother. But clearly, we’re talking about children that are in their adolescent years. My understanding is that prior to his incarceration, Mr Ngo was actively involved in their lives. In terms of specifics – a good question – there can often be a multiplier effect in families, meaning that if one person was affected, that effect impacts upon other family members. So it would be a cumulative impact on all of them.

(Emphasis added by the applicant).

33    The applicant submits that the Tribunal failed to “grapple” with this evidence.

34    Pursuant to para 8 of Direction no. 110, “the best interests of minor children in Australia” is a primary consideration. Paragraph 8.4(4) lists factors (a)–(h) which must be taken into consideration, where relevant, by the decision-maker in determining the best interests of minor children.

35    The applicant relies upon Masson v Parsons [2019] HCA 21; 266 CLR 554 where the plurality acknowledged the concept of a “psychological” parent, saying at [29]:

… In In Re G (Children), Baroness Hale of Richmond observed in relation to comparable English legislation that, according to English contemporary conceptions of parenthood, “[t]here are at least three ways in which a person may be or become a natural parent of a child” depending on the circumstances of the particular case: genetically, gestationally and psychologically. That may also be true of the ordinary, accepted English meaning of “parent” in this country, although it is unnecessary to reach a concluded view on that issue. The significance of her Ladyship's analysis for present purposes, however, is that, just as the question of parentage under the legislation with which she was concerned was one of fact and degree to be determined by applying contemporary conceptions of parenthood to the relevant circumstances …

36    The applicant submits that the Tribunal was required to “grapple” with the material advanced by the applicant in support of the claim that he was a “psychological” parent.

37    The Minister submits that the Tribunal did not err or misapply Direction no. 110. The Minister accepts that the Tribunal was required to apply para 8.4(1) of Direction no. 110 in respect of the applicant’s three stepchildren in Australia but submits that the Tribunal did not err or misapply Direction no. 110 by stating at Reasons [81] that “[t]here is no expert evidence about the effects of continued separation on the children”. That was so, in the Minister’s submission, because the evidence of the clinical psychologist, Mr Watson-Munro, did not comprise “expert evidence”.

Consideration

38    There are two questions for determination: has an error occurred; and, if so, was that error material: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; 280 CLR 321 at [9].

39    I will, therefore, first consider whether the Tribunal committed an error or errors. I will then turn to consider whether any error was jurisdictional, noting as Beech-Jones J said in LPDT at [41] (in dissent but generally in agreement regarding the principles):

However, even if there were multiple errors or “breach[es]” of the kind described by their Honours, an assessment of materiality is not to be undertaken by reference to each such breach separately without regard to the others. The object of the inquiry is to determine whether the decision was one involving jurisdictional error, ie, was there “a failure to comply with one or more statutory preconditions or conditions to [such] an extent [that it] results in a decision which has been made in fact lacking [the] characteristics necessary for it to be given force and effect by the statute pursuant to which the decision-maker purported to make it” (emphasis added)? In assessing materiality, multiple failures to comply with a precondition or condition, or failures to comply with different preconditions or conditions, are not to be considered without regard to each other.

40    Therefore, I will consider the question of the materiality of any error(s) together.

Did the Tribunal err?

Ground 1(b)

41    It is useful to first understand the relevance of the issue of parole to the Decision. As I have said, the Tribunal was considering the exercise of the power under s 501CA(4) of the Act (revocation of the Cancellation of the Visa). As the applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months, he does not pass the character test, meaning the only basis for revocation is whether there is “another reason” why the Cancellation should be revoked (s 501CA(4)(b)(ii)).

42    One of the primary considerations under Direction no. 110 is the protection of the Australian community. Under para 8.1(2)(b) of Direction no. 110, in considering the protection of the Australian community, a decision-maker should give consideration to “the risk to the Australian community, should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct”. The applicant’s representative before the Tribunal submitted in closing that a protective factor (that is, a factor tending against the applicant committing further offences) was that the applicant would be granted parole and would then be subject to parole conditions. The applicant’s argument was as follows:

Senior Member, the applicant will be opined [sic] upon release subject to the federal conditions. Which means he has to report to the parole authority regularly and as Dr Watson-Munro said that the supervision will greatly benefit.

…

[T]he risk to the Australian community is mitigated beyond his offending in a very serious way. He has demonstrated with these serious efforts and his willingness to take the help and when we put the parole conditions in perspective that he will be subject to parole conditions. That are very protective factors.

43    Mr Watson-Munro also said in cross-examination by the Minister’s representative that:

My view about people who have served time in custody and are released on parole, they fare better when they have supervision, accountability, and somebody that they can work through their issues with. Clearly, with this man, there will be adjustment issues in terms of the community and so on. I’m not saying, however, that if he doesn’t have treatment or supervision that he will inevitably reoffend. But I think the chances of him reoffending will be significantly reduced with that type of structure in place.

44    There is some incongruity between the error in ground 1(b) as framed in the application and in the submissions but in substance the applicant seems to argue that the Tribunal erred by either misunderstanding the applicant’s argument on parole or that its reasons on that issue were illogical, and also that the Tribunal erred by not inquiring into the status of the applicant’s parole.

45    The Tribunal had evidence before it which indicated that the applicant’s grant of parole was pending. The PSA had recommended a grant of parole. The evidence was that parole was under active consideration by the Adult Parole Board. There was no evidence before the Tribunal as to the actual conditions of parole that the applicant would be subject to because the applicant had not been granted parole. It is convenient, therefore, to first consider whether the Tribunal needed to inquire into the applicant’s parole status.

46    For the reasons advanced by the Minister, which I have set out in [26] of these reasons, there was no duty or obligation (or any other such requirement) for the Tribunal to inquire into the status of the applicant’s parole after the hearing and before handing down the Decision.

47    I now turn to consider the Tribunal’s consideration of the possibility that the applicant would be granted parole. The Tribunal appears to approach this issue on the understanding that the PSA parole recommendation was that the applicant be released into immigration detention (rather than into the community). That approach does not engage with the fact that, because the applicant’s Visa had been cancelled and he was therefore an unlawful non-citizen, he could only be released into immigration detention unless the Cancellation was revoked.

48    However, ultimately there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in not including the potential of the applicant being granted parole in its evaluation of the applicant’s risk to the Australian community should he commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct. The Tribunal “should also give consideration to” that risk under para 8.1(2)(b) of Direction no. 110 as part of its consideration of the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community. Paragraph 8.1.2 of Direction no. 110 then sets out how the Tribunal should consider the applicant’s risk to the Australian community should he commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct, which is as follows:

(1)    In considering the need to protect the Australian community (including individuals, groups or institutions) from harm, decision-makers should have regard to the Government's view that the Australian community's tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. Some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable.

(2)    In assessing the risk that may be posed by the non-citizen to the Australian community, decision-makers must have regard to, cumulatively:

a)    the nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct; and

b)    the likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account:

i.    information and evidence on the risk of the non-citizen re-offending; and

ii.    evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since their most recent offence (noting that decisions should not be delayed in order for rehabilitative courses to be undertaken).

c)    where consideration is being given to whether to refuse to grant a visa to the non-citizen — whether the risk of harm may be affected by the duration and purpose of the non-citizen's intended stay, the type of visa being applied for, and whether there are strong or compassionate reasons for granting a short stay visa.

49    The Tribunal was required to take into account only those considerations that were mandatory: Hatewar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] HCA 45 at [50] (Jagot J). There was no requirement for the Tribunal to include the speculative future possibility of the applicant being granted parole (and the specific conditions which may be attached to such a grant) or to give that possibility any (or any particular) weight. Ground 1(b) is not made out.

Ground 1(a)

50    As to ground 1(a), a consideration of Reasons at [41], [50] and [51] reveals that the Tribunal misunderstood or failed to properly evaluate the issue of risk.

51    The custodial risk assessment found the applicant’s risk of recidivism was “low”, with each assessment factor in the methodology used rated at “low”. Mr Watson-Munro gave evidence that the applicant’s risk of reoffending was “trending from Medium to Low”.
Mr Watson-Munro did give evidence that he “would be comfortable in saying that his risk of reoffending is low” if the applicant received psychological treatment. However, he later responded to a question from the Tribunal that he “would hold [his] statement as stated in the report, that he’s trending from moderate to low”, because of “new information” and recognising that the structures which could help the applicant were “yet to be tested”.

52    At Reasons [50], the Tribunal stated that it preferred Mr Watson-Munro’s assessment of the risk of reoffending to that of the custodial records; the Tribunal found the custodial risk assessment was “inconsistent with a Parole Suitability Report in February 2024, which gave entirely different risk/need ratings”: Reasons at [41]. The applicant submits that without any reasoned explanation the Tribunal then concluded at [51] that the applicant’s risk was “moderate”, saying:

The Applicant constitutes a moderate risk of reoffending and causing harm to the community. When the serious nature of his crime is coupled with a moderate recidivism risk, which could cause significant harm to the community, this primary consideration weighs substantially against revocation.

53    The error is in the Tribunal’s finding of a “moderate recidivism risk”. The Tribunal referred to and considered the following in relation to recidivism:

(a)    the applicant’s character and ability to remain law-abiding as “tested in the community” while on bail awaiting sentencing;

(b)    the custodial risk assessment which rated the applicant as a “Low” risk of recidivism, with every assessment factor rated as “Low”; and

(c)    the report from Mr Watson-Munro which assessed the applicant’s risk of recidivism as “trending from Medium to Low”.

54    The Tribunal’s consideration of the risk of recidivism at [50] is as follows:

In terms of recidivism risk, the Tribunal prefers Mr Watson-Munro’s assessment to the custodial records. This is because of significant differences in the assessment of risk / need factors in the custodial records. The Tribunal accepts Mr Watson-Munro’s reference to the Applicant’s compliance with bail conditions for an approximately two-year period in 2022 and 2023. A period of conditional liberty, however, is a contextually different situation to complete freedom in the community. The Applicant would continue to have significant financial obligations if released yet displays a limited understanding about this. His rehabilitation, including in better managing financial stress and the CBT recommended by Mr Watson-Munro, is yet to be undertaken. His plans for doing so are general at best and he has declined to meaningfully advance this while in custody. In terms of protective factors, the Applicant’s ‘more serious’ relationship with Ms AA is relatively short-lived and reflects a continuing lack of candour. Moreover, this relationship and past employment did not prevent him committing serious crimes, including with Ms AA’s best friend purportedly without her knowledge. Ms AA’s intention to remain best friends with the Applicant’s co-offender only adds to the Tribunal’s concerns.

55    As is apparent from the above, there is a gap in the reasoning. The Tribunal discloses no basis for accepting Mr Watson-Munro’s expert opinion but then concluding at [51] as to a different, higher risk of recidivism. While it is true that the Tribunal refers to other matters such as the applicant’s financial obligations, his relationship and rehabilitation, it is not at all clear how those factors impact on the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s risk of recidivism or its acceptance of Mr Watson-Munro’s evidence. The Tribunal therefore erred as its reasoning is illogical.

Ground 2

56    I am not persuaded that the Tribunal, in considering the best interests of minor children, at Reasons [78]–[82] failed to adequately consider that the applicant was the “psychological” parent of the children.

57    As I understand it, the applicant’s submission is that, in substance, the applicant contended before the Tribunal that he was a “psychological” parent and that the Tribunal erred by not grappling with this contention. It is true that the Tribunal does not expressly refer to or deal with the applicant being a “psychological” parent. However, the Tribunal proceeds on the basis that he is the stepfather to his wife’s children and has played a parental role, although the Tribunal does analyse the nature and duration of his relationship with his stepchildren (as required under para 8.4(4)(a) of Direction no. 110). That is clear as the Tribunal repeatedly uses the terms “stepfather”, “stepson” and “stepchildren”. Therefore, it is not clear to me what bearing the concept of a “psychological” parent would or could have had on the Tribunal’s reasons and the applicant did not make any submissions explaining what effect it could have had on the Tribunal’s reasoning.

58    However, a consideration of Reasons [80]–[82] demonstrates that the Tribunal failed to grapple with the substance of Mr Watson-Munro’s evidence of which is set out at [32] of these reasons. Furthermore, the Tribunal incorrectly found at [81] “there is no expert evidence about the effects of continued separation on the children”. There was evidence to that effect in the expert opinion expressed by Mr Watson-Munro.

59    By not considering Mr Watson-Munro’s evidence the Tribunal failed to properly consider “the likely effect that any separation from the non-citizen would have on the child, taking into account the child’s or non-citizen's ability to maintain contact in other ways” as it was required to under para 8.4(4)(d) of Direction no. 110.

Did the Tribunal commit jurisdictional error?

60    The Decision the Tribunal made was that there was no other reason to revoke the Cancellation. The Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion was that “the primary consideration Protection of the Australian community, which is generally given greater weight than the other primary considerations, coupled with Expectations of the Australian community, considerably outweigh the combined weight given to the countervailing primary and other considerations”: Reasons [115].

61    An error will be material if the decision that was in fact made could, not would, “realistically” have been different had there been no error. “Realistically” means the possibility is not fanciful or improbable; the materiality threshold, for which the applicant bears the onus, is not demanding or onerous: LPDT at [14]. As the majority said in LPDT at [16]:

In sum, unless there is identified a basis on which it can be affirmatively concluded that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the error not been made, once an applicant establishes that there has been an error and demonstrates that there exists a realistic possibility that the outcome of the decision could have been different had that error not been made, the threshold of materiality will have been met (and curial relief will be justified subject to any issue of utility or discretion).

62    The two errors which I have found the Tribunal made compel the finding that the evaluative conclusion reached by the Tribunal in the exercise of the discretion under s 501CA(4) could have been different if there had been no error. This is because each of the errors “contributed to the evaluative and discretionary decision which the Tribunal made” because each of the errors “bore on the Tribunal’s assessment” of the mandatory considerations under Direction no. 110: LPDT at [35]. In that regard, I refer to the following statement by the majority at [36] of LPDT:

It would involve improper speculation to attempt to discern how the Tribunal would have reasoned if it had not departed from the required process of reasoning in these respects. It follows that there is a possibility, not fanciful or improbable, that the decision that was made in fact could have been different if the error had not occurred. The threshold of materiality was met. None of the facts before the Court provided a basis to consider that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the error not been made. The error was jurisdictional. The curial relief sought by the appellant should be granted.

Disposition

63    The application will be allowed. The Minister will pay the applicant’s costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anderson.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026