Federal Court of Australia
Azurin v Comcare [2026] FCA 1756
File number(s): | ACD 67 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | KENNETT J |
Date of judgment: | 19 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application for referral to the Full Court – whether an interlocutory application to the docket judge is the appropriate method for seeking a referral to the Full Court under s 20(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether the proceeding raises fundamental principles warranting a hearing by the Full Court – whether referral to the Full Court is appropriate in circumstances where the proceeding “raises other issues as well” |
Legislation: | Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) s 175 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 15(1), 18A(1), 20(1) and (1A), Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 5A(1), 5B(1), 14, 16, 19, 29 |
Cases cited: | Luck v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCA 68 Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19; 257 CLR 468 QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; 279 CLR 148 Wuth v Comcare [2022] FCAFC 42; 289 FCR 464 |
Division: | Fair Work Division |
Registry: | Australian Capital Territory |
National Practice Area: | Employment and Industrial Relations |
Number of paragraphs: | 20 |
Date of hearing: | Determined on the papers |
Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr A Anforth AM |
Solicitor for the Applicant: | ACT Law Associates |
Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms S Wright and Mr E Chen |
Solicitor for the Respondent: | McInnes Wilson Lawyers |
ORDERS
ACD 67 of 2026 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | JANE AZURIN Applicant | |
AND: | COMCARE Respondent | |
order made by: | KENNETT J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 19 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 18 September 2026 be dismissed.
2. Costs be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KENNETT J:
1 The applicant appeals from a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal), delivered on 10 July 2026, affirming two decisions by the respondent (Comcare) made on 28 May and 3 October 2024.
2 The applicant filed an interlocutory application on 18 September 2026 seeking an order that “[t]he application in this matter be heard by a Full Court”. The respondent opposes that course. The parties filed written submissions and consented to the interlocutory application being determined on the papers.
3 Section 20(1) and (1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act) provide as follows.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act or any other Act, the original jurisdiction of the Court shall be exercised by a single Judge.
(1A) If the Chief Justice considers that a matter coming before the Court in the original jurisdiction of the Court is of sufficient importance to justify the giving of a direction under this subsection, the Chief Justice may direct that the jurisdiction of the Court in that matter, or a specified part of that matter, shall be exercised by a Full Court.
4 The power to make a direction under s 20(1A) is not vested in the Court per se. It is expressly allocated to the Chief Justice, as the head of jurisdiction, who is responsible for “ensuring the effective, orderly and expeditious discharge of the business of the Court” (s 15(1) of the FCA Act) and for “managing the administrative affairs of the Court” (s 18A(1) of the FCA Act). Deciding how the Court is to be constituted for the purpose of deciding a particular case is an essentially administrative matter which is left to the discretion of the Chief Justice (subject to certain statutory requirements (eg s 20(2) of the FCA Act and s 175 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (the ART Act)) and to the jurisdictional requirement for the Court to be constituted by judges who are not disqualified (see QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; 279 CLR 148 at [26]-[29] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J), [65], [92] (Gordon J), [121], [187]-[189] (Edelman J), [304], [311] (Jagot J))). In practice this function is carried out with extensive support from the Court’s National Operations Registrars and in consultation with National Coordinating Judges in the various National Practice Areas.
5 The order sought by the interlocutory application is therefore not one which the Court in its exercise of judicial power, constituted by a docket judge, could properly make. Faced with a similar application in Luck v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCA 68 at [43] (Luck), Dowling J treated it as an application for him to refer the matter to the Chief Justice and for her Honour to exercise the power under s 20(1A) of the FCA Act. That is a sensible, practical approach to such an application; however, it conceals conceptual problems. An interlocutory application engages the judicial power and calls on the Court to make or refuse to make an order; but there is a degree of incongruity in the Court ordering itself (or the judge who constitutes it) to refer something to the Chief Justice, let alone ordering that a power reposed in the Chief Justice be exercised in a particular way.
6 Dowling J suggested in Luck that an interlocutory application of the present kind might be incompetent (at [43]). In my view, it probably is: even had I been persuaded that the present appeal should go to a Full Court, I would probably have formally dismissed the interlocutory application and conveyed my opinion to the Chief Justice by another method. In my view a request for an application to be heard by a Full Court should be made by a letter to the chambers of the docket judge seeking that the issue be raised with the Chief Justice and explaining why it is considered that a hearing by a Full Court is desirable.
7 In the present case, in 2010 the respondent accepted liability to pay compensation to the applicant under s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the SRC Act) for an “injury” (as defined) deemed to have been suffered on 12 January 2010 (the 2010 condition). “Injury” is relevantly defined in s 5A(1) of the SRC Act as follows.
(1) In this Act:
injury means:
(a) a disease suffered by an employee; or
(b) an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, that is a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment;
…
but does not include a disease, injury or aggravation suffered as a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner in respect of the employee’s employment.
8 “Disease” is defined in s 5B(1) as follows.
(1) In this Act:
disease means:
(a) an ailment suffered by an employee; or
(b) an aggravation of such an ailment;
that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee’s employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee.
9 It will be noted that a “disease” qualifies as an “injury” if it was “contributed to, to a significant degree by the employee’s employment”; whereas an injury “other than a disease” qualifies if it is one “arising out of, or in the course of,” such employment. The type of connection required between the injury and Commonwealth employment depends on whether it is a “disease” or not. The condition that the applicant was recognised as suffering in 2010 was accepted as a “disease”.
10 Compensation was paid to the applicant under ss 16, 19 and 29 of the SRC Act for some time as a result of the decision made in 2010. On 28 February 2024 Comcare advised the applicant of a decision that the 2010 condition was not significantly contributed to by her employment and compensation was therefore not presently payable. The applicant applied for reconsideration of this decision on 30 April 2024; however the decision was affirmed on 28 May 2024. This was the first decision under review.
11 The second decision under review arose from a new claim by the applicant dated 28 March 2024 for a condition described as “chronic pain syndrome”, symptoms of which she said she had first noticed in July 2023. Comcare declined liability in respect of this claim on 5 June 2024. Reconsideration was sought on 6 September 2024, and the decision was affirmed on 3 October 2024.
12 The evidence, the parties’ statements of facts, issues and contentions and their submissions to the Tribunal are not before me, and I will therefore not attempt to describe the course that the proceedings took in the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s reasons summarise a significant body of medical evidence. The Tribunal then records at [129] that, at the end of the second day of hearing, counsel for the applicant requested to make closing submissions in writing at a later date with the benefit of the transcript. Counsel for Comcare wished to make oral submissions immediately after the evidence closed. An agreed position was apparently reached, pursuant to which counsel for Comcare addressed the Tribunal on the final day of the hearing, the applicant filed written submissions six weeks later and Comcare filed written submissions in reply.
13 In her written closing submissions, the applicant raised (apparently for the first time) an argument seeking to re-characterise the 2010 condition as an injury within para (b) of the definition in s 5A(1) of the SRC Act – ie, an injury “other than a disease”. Part of this submission (of which I only have the Tribunal’s summary) was a proposition that “there is no need to engage in a prior characterisation of the condition as being either an injury or a disease.”
14 In its submissions in reply, Comcare complained that the applicant had “recast her entire case” after the evidence had closed. The Tribunal accepted that what the applicant had sought to do involved procedural unfairness, but considered that the need to do something about that unfairness would arise only if it accepted that the 2010 condition was properly characterised as an injury other than a disease (at [180]-[181]). The Tribunal rejected the construction of s 5A of the SRC Act upon which this argument seemed to rely (at [182]-[190]). It also observed that the applicant’s submissions had not attempted to justify the characterisation of the 2010 condition as an injury other than a disease. The point was, the Tribunal said, simply presumed (at [191]).
15 In seeking referral to a Full Court, the applicant submits that the appeal raises “fundamental principles” and there would be a real risk that any decision by a single judge would be the subject of an appeal. The issue that is highlighted in the submissions is the one to which I have adverted above, concerning the distinction between “diseases” and other kinds of “injury”. It is submitted that this involves the correct understanding of Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19; 257 CLR 468 (May) and Wuth v Comcare [2022] FCAFC 42; 289 FCR 464 (Wuth).
16 However, as the applicant’s submissions observe, the appeal “raises other issues as well”. The notice of appeal (which invokes the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) as sources of jurisdiction in addition to describing itself as an “appeal” under the ART Act) sets out 21 questions of law that are said to arise, which are purportedly given content in 15 grounds of appeal. Some of the questions of law and the grounds are expressed at a level of abstraction which I suspect would make them difficult to grapple with, even with the benefit of the complete Tribunal record (which I do not have). The prospect of interlocutory disputes about the questions of law that actually do arise and their proper formulation is significant.
17 As to the asserted issue concerning the understanding of May and Wuth, it is currently very unclear to me how the proposition that there is no necessary dichotomy between a “disease” and an “injury (other than a disease)” finds support in the reasoning in those cases and how that proposition can be reconciled with the statutory text. Accepting that the Court may in due course be persuaded of the correctness of that proposition, it remains somewhat unclear how it assists the applicant in the light of the Tribunal’s observation at [191] referred to above. I am therefore left in some doubt as to whether the outcome of the appeal will turn on this point.
18 For these reasons, it is not appropriate that the appeal should occupy the time of three judges. If there are issues that warrant the attention of a Full Court, it is more efficient for those issues to be identified and distilled in the process of hearing and decision by a single judge and then to proceed by way of a further appeal.
19 I also observe that some complexity attends the relationship between s 20(1A) of the FCA Act and s 175 of the ART Act. Section 175 provides, on its face, for some circumstances where an appeal to this Court “must” be heard by a Full Court and for others where an appeal “may” be heard by a Full Court. The present case does not come into either category; so that, on one reading at least, it cannot be heard by a Full Court. The parties have not addressed this issue in any detail their submissions. Before recommending to the Chief Justice that she should exercise the power in s 20(1A) of the FCA Act, I would need to be satisfied that that power has not been cut down by the enactment of s 175.
20 The interlocutory application will therefore be dismissed. Costs will be reserved.
I certify that the preceding twenty (20) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Kennett. |
Associate:
Dated: 19 November 2026