Federal Court of Australia

DJI20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1755

Appeal from:

DJI20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 958

File number(s):

NSD 1478 of 2025

Judgment of:

KENNETT J

Date of judgment:

19 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – where the appellant’s Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa was refused by a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) – where the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) affirmed the Minister’s decision – where the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissed the application for judicial review of the decision – whether the AAT made an error of fact – whether there was a denial of procedural fairness before and during the hearing before the AAT – whether the AAT member was biased – whether the AAT failed to provide a competent interpreter – where the primary judge found no jurisdictional error – whether the grounds of appeal identify any error on the part of the primary judge

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa)

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

29

Date of hearing:

16 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellant:

The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Finn Ryan of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1478 of 2025

BETWEEN:

DJI20

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

KENNETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 NOVEMBER 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal be dismissed.

2.    The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KENNETT J:

Background and Tribunal decision

1    The appellant is a national of the Peoples Republic of China who first arrived in Australia in 2015. On 8 April 2016 he applied for a protection visa. He made detailed written claims, the key points of which were that:

(a)    he had fought the authorities over insufficient compensation when his parents’ house and land were appropriated, leading to him being injured by military weapons and detained; and

(b)    his and his family’s health were affected by the construction of a nuclear power station in his village.

2    A delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) refused to grant the visa on 19 January 2017. On 15 February 2017 the appellant applied for review of the delegate’s decision in the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).

3    The Tribunal conducted a hearing by telephone on 4 June 2020, at which the appellant gave evidence and presented argument with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. The Tribunal handed down a decision, affirming the decision of the delegate, on 25 June 2020 (the Tribunal Decision).

4    The Tribunal observed that the appellant’s evidence on important aspects of his claims had “continued to change” and formed the view that he was not recalling actual events but fabricating evidence. Given its credibility findings ([27]–[29] of the Tribunal Decision), the Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s core protection claims, including that the appellant’s parents’ house was expropriated, that thousands of people in China gathered in response or that people were arrested. The Tribunal also did not accept that a nuclear reactor was constructed in front of the appellant’s house, that his health was endangered as a result, or that the Chinese military was called and attacked villagers. The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was attacked, injured or detained. The Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claim that he appealed the expropriation of his parents’ land, petitioned the government or fled China as a result. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim that the Chinese government would exact revenge on him upon his return to China ([28] of the Tribunal Decision).

5    The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant held opinions that gave rise to a real chance that he would be persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion should he return to China in the foreseeable future ([29] of the Tribunal Decision).

6    The Tribunal therefore found that the appellant did not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) ([30] of the Tribunal Decision). The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the appellant held opinions such that there was a real risk of significant harm ([31] of the Tribunal Decision). Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant met the criteria for a protection visa set out in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act) ([31]-[32] of the Tribunal Decision).

Proceeding in the Court below

7    On 17 July 2020 the appellant filed an application for review of the Tribunal Decision in the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The grounds of review advanced in his application were as follows.

1.    AAT made some mistakes because it has no knowledge of the traditions and cultures in my country. The land belongs to my parents but I considered it as mine too. This is our value that the land belongs to our whole family and I will fight for my family at all costs. We placed high value on our family land and it is not separated from each other even if the land is under my parents name.

2.    My parents still live in the house and the land was taken by the government. It was not contraditory as the land and the house are separated.

3.    The whole interview is arranged with hasty without proper procedures. The telephone interpreting was terrible and didn’t interprete all things I said. I said I didn’t understand the definition of persecution; the interpreter showed very impatient and was reluctant to explain to me. AAT was also very impatient and too informal to conduct. The whole process is inaccurate and unfair. There was no real communication, no trust but prejudgements and prejudice. I can only feel the indifference and a lot of misunderstandings during the whole telephone interview. I should be given another chance with more fairness and justice.

(Original grammar and spelling.)

8    The application for review came on for hearing on 15 May 2025, by which time the Court had become the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Division 2 (the FCFCOA). The appellant appeared in person and a solicitor appeared for the Minister. The judgment of the primary judge was delivered on 30 July 2025. Her Honour rejected each of the grounds of review.

Ground 1

9    The primary judge recorded the appellant’s oral submission in relation to this ground as follows (at [48]).

The applicant was invited at the hearing of this Court to provide particulars in relation to this ground. He submitted that the Tribunal did not understand his culture. He said that the Tribunal found that as the land was in his parents’ names, it was ‘not his’. He said that according to his culture, the land was ‘essentially mine’ (Tp 7.29-44).

10    The Minister submitted in response that the appellant was essentially alleging an error of fact.

11    The primary judge understood the substance of the appellant’s argument to be that the Tribunal had misunderstood his culture in reasoning that, because his parents owned the house, he would not have fought for compensation. Her Honour concluded that it was open to the Tribunal to consider that the appellant’s parents owned the house but that this was not the basis for its adverse findings about the appellant’s credibility. The Tribunal had not reasoned in the manner alleged in ground 1 (at [50]-[55]).

Ground 2

12    The primary judge recorded the appellant’s submission as follows (at [57]).

At the hearing, the applicant said that the Tribunal ‘skipped content’ in his answers, by moving on to other questions (Tp 8.24-34). He said that they did not understand that the land and house were separated.

13    The Minister submitted that (contrary to the factual assertion in ground 2) there was no reference before the Tribunal to the house having been retained.

14    The primary judge referred at [60] to statements (including in the appellant’s visa application) and evidence given to the Tribunal (noted [2] of the Tribunal Decision) in which:

(a)    he said a nuclear power station was constructed in front of his “house”;

(b)    he said “[a]ll the land we were living on ground were taken by the government”;

(c)    he provided only one address in answer to a question where he had lived from 1990 to 2015 (implying that his house had not been confiscated);

(d)    he referred to a hope that he “could used [sic] my hands to rebuild my home”; and

(e)    in response to a question by the Tribunal, he said that the house was not demolished but the land was taken.

15    Her Honour then observed that the Tribunal’s findings had been based on “contradictions” in his evidence and “changing” evidence about issues including where the appellant had lived. These findings were considered to be open to the Tribunal (at [62]-[64]).

Ground 3

16    The appellant’s submissions on this ground were summarised as follows (at [68]).

The applicant made further submissions at the hearing. He said that the Tribunal hearing was ‘hasty’ and that it is difficult to gain trust in a telephone hearing (Tp 9.10-23). He contended that the Tribunal Member did not believe him. He said that tribunal members must conduct ‘countless hearings’ in a day, and that he was pre-judged, and the Member was impatient and did not give serious consideration to the matter (Tp 9.25-39). He also submitted that the interpreter did not understand what he was saying (Tp 10.1-13).

17    The primary judge understood this submission to involve allegations of bias and lack of procedural fairness (at [69]). Her Honour’s reasons record that she asked the appellant if he could point to an evidentiary foundation for these allegations and invited him to apply for leave to adduce additional evidence (in the form of a transcript or audio recordings) (at [70]). The appellant said that he did not wish to make such an application (at [73]).

18    As to bias, the primary judge was not satisfied that the material before the Court (which consisted of the documents before the Tribunal and the Tribunal’s reasons) demonstrated actual bias on the part of the Tribunal or any basis on which a fair-minded observer might reasonably apprehend that the presiding member might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the issues (at [75]-[78], [83]-[84]).

19    As to procedural fairness, the record indicated that the Tribunal had complied with the requirements in Part 7 of the Act (at [79]), including inviting the appellant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments. That invitation noted that the Tribunal was not holding in-person hearings in order to help slow the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Her Honour referred at [81] to passages in the Tribunal Decision which noted that:

(a)    the presiding member had “specifically asked” the appellant if there was anything else he wanted to say, and he said that there was not;

(b)    the appellant confirmed that he had said everything he wanted to say; and

(c)    the presiding member’s observations were that the hearing flowed in an unobstructed manner and the appellant had an ample opportunity to submit all the evidence that he wished the Tribunal to consider.

20    On the basis of this material, the primary judge concluded at [82] that the Tribunal had given the appellant a “fair opportunity before and during the hearing to provide all the evidence and arguments…that he wanted the Tribunal to consider”.

21    As to interpreter error, the primary judge accepted that a failure to provide a competent interpreter to assist a non-English speaking applicant may constitute a ground for review (at [85]). However, proper evidence of interpreter error must be adduced and the appellant bore the onus in that regard (at [86]). The primary judge concluded there was no evidence capable of establishing that the interpreting during the Tribunal hearing was deficient (at [87]).

Additional issue raised at the hearing

22    The primary judge noted that the appellant also claimed that the Tribunal had not considered the influence the nuclear reactor would have on his health (at [89]). However, accepting the submission of the Minister, her Honour concluded that the Tribunal had expressly not accepted that a reactor was constructed in the appellant’s village or would have an adverse impact on his health (at [90]-[91]). To the extent that the appellant was challenging that finding, he was inviting impermissible merits review (at [92]).

The appeal

23    The grounds set out in the notice of appeal are as follows.

1.    The Judge didn’t correct the mistakes made by the Tribunal.

2.    The Judge didn’t apply the law correctly.

3.    The Judge failed to consider the issues of bias and procedural unfairness according to law.

24    The Minister filed written submissions on 19 October 2026 in accordance with directions made by a Registrar. The appellant was required to file written submissions by 2 November 2026. He did not file submissions or respond to any communications from the Court, except to return a signed copy of the litigant in person acknowledgement form.

25    The appellant did appear at the hearing of the appeal on 16 November 2026. He represented himself with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. When invited to explain why the primary judge was wrong, he did not make any submissions other than to say that the issues were all in the papers and were essentially the same as in the FCFCOA.

26    The first and second grounds of appeal give no indication at all of the nature of any alleged error by the primary judge. It is not the task of the Court in an appeal to attempt to give content to vague assertions of this kind, or to construct a case on behalf of an appellant. They must be rejected.

27    I add, however, that I see no reason to doubt the correctness of the judgment of the primary judge. Grounds 1 and 2 of the application before her Honour essentially alleged factual errors by the Tribunal and did not seek to demonstrate that the relevant findings were not supported by any probative material. Ground 3 asserted procedural failures that could not be made out on the evidence before her Honour; the appellant was made aware of this during the hearing but did not seek an opportunity to remedy the lack of an evidentiary foundation.

28    The third ground of appeal is somewhat more specific but, again, gives no real indication of the nature of the alleged error. The appellant made no attempt to explain that error by way of submissions. No error is apparent from the terms of the primary judge’s reasons on the issues of bias and procedural fairness.

29    The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding twenty-nine (29) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Kennett.

Associate:

Dated:    19 November 2026