Federal Court of Australia
Halyday v Commonwealth (No 2) [2026] FCA 1753
File number(s): | ACD 3 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | ABRAHAM J |
Date of judgment: | 20 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for summary dismissal or alternatively strike out of pleadings - s 39B Judiciary Act application – where proceedings re-litigate proceedings – same factual matrix – similar relief – where no real prospects of success – application for summary dismissal granted |
Legislation: | Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 8.03, 16.02, 16.21, 26.01 |
Cases cited: | Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1994] FCA 636; (1994) 217 ALR 226 Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11; (1990) 169 CLR 279 Clayton v Bant [2020] FCA 44; (2020) 272 CLR 1 Halyday v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 330 Halyday v Department of Home Affairs & Ors [2025] HCASJ 47 Halyday v Commonwealth [2026] FCA 1752 Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; (2009) 178 FCR 401 Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [2020] FCA 1629 Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 4) [2011] FCA 1126; (2011) 203 FCR 293 Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 Thomson v STX Pan Ocean Co Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 15 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Australian Capital Territory |
National Practice Area: | Other Federal Jurisdiction |
Number of paragraphs: | 61 |
Date of hearing: | 30 September 2026 |
Solicitor for the Applicant: | the Applicant appeared in person |
Counsel for the Respondents: | P Clingan |
Solicitor for the Respondents: | Maddocks |
ORDERS
ACD 3 of 2026 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | SHARYN AMANDA HALYDAY Applicant | |
AND: | COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS First Respondent MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, CYBER SECURITY, AND THE ARTS Second Respondent | |
order made by: | ABRAHAM J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 20 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The respondents’ application for summary dismissal is granted.
2. Summary judgment of the proceeding be entered in favour of the respondents, pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
3. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
1 These reasons address the respondents’ application to summarily dismiss or strike out the proceeding commenced by the applicant by originating application and statement of claim filed on 19 January 2026 in ACD 3/2026 (s 39B Proceeding). This application was heard at the same time as the applicant’s application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the primary judge to summarily dismiss separate but factually related proceedings brought by the applicant: Halyday v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 330 (Primary Proceeding or Primary Judgment as appropriate) (ACD 14/2024). The applicant’s application in relation to her appeal from the Primary Proceedings was determined before this application, and these reasons are to be read together with the reasons dismissing her application for an extension of time and leave to appeal: Halyday v Commonwealth [2026] FCA 1752 (ACD 41/2025) (Appeal Proceeding).
2 As recorded in that judgment, the applicant is a litigant in person. She provided lengthy written submissions prior to the hearing and made oral submissions. I am mindful of the difficulties faced by a party representing themselves in this Court when attempting to file appropriate documents and making submissions. I have taken those difficulties into account.
3 For the reasons below, the proceedings are summarily dismissed.
Procedural history
4 On 20 March 2024, the applicant filed the Primary Proceeding against the respondents, seeking, inter alia, compensation and the removal of her former partner, N5, from Australia on the basis his visa had been improperly granted or should otherwise be cancelled.
5 On 8 April 2025, the primary judge heard the Commonwealth’s application for summary dismissal of the Primary Proceeding, or in the alternative, that the pleadings be wholly struck out.
6 On the same day, summary judgment was entered in favour of the respondents pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) together with an order for costs: see Halyday v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 330.
7 On 28 May 2025, the applicant commenced the Appeal Proceeding by filing an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from the Primary Judgment, and a draft notice of appeal.
8 On 18 August 2025, the applicant filed an application for a constitutional or other writ together with a supporting affidavit in the High Court of Australia. On 29 September 2025, the respondents made an application to summarily dismiss the High Court application. On 4 December 2025, Steward J summarily dismissed the application as an abuse of process: Halyday v Department of Home Affairs & Ors [2025] HCASJ 47.
9 On 19 January 2026, the applicant commenced the s 39B Proceeding seeking relief and mandamus together with a claim for compensation in respect of the conduct relevant to the respondents’ decision regarding the visa granted to N5. The applicant provided an amended statement of claim to the Court on 27 May 2026 and sought to file an amended notice of appeal in the Appeal Proceeding. They remain unfiled.
10 By orders made 13 July 2026, the Court listed the interlocutory applications in relation to the Appeal Proceeding and the s 39B Proceeding for hearing on 30 September 2026. Timetables were set for the filing of documents in respect to each application. An order was made in relation to each proceeding that, apart from documents filed in accordance with the orders, the applicant may only file further documents with leave of the Court. Although there were requests for leave, it was not granted where documents related to matters outside the scope of the proceedings. These included an interlocutory application dated 21 August 2026 (referred to in [12] below). However, documents were accepted for filing and could be relied on insofar as they were within the scope of the 13 July 2026 orders.
11 On 17 August 2026, the respondents filed an interlocutory application seeking the originating application and statement of claim in the s 39B Proceeding be summarily dismissed or, in the alternative, struck out or set aside.
12 For completeness I note that one of the interlocutory applications referred to above, dated 21 August 2026, sought an order the “respondents submission [in this proceeding] and interlocking order dated 17 August 2026 be struck out in entirety as an abuse of process and failure to address withholding judicial considerations from a statutory decision maker”. There is no basis for such an order.
Legal principles
Summary dismissal
13 The power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 (Spencer) at [60] and see [24], although it does not require that the proceedings be seen as “frivolous”, “untenable” or “groundless”: Spencer at [24], [53]-[60]. The critical question is whether the moving party has persuaded the court that the opposing party has no reasonable prospect of success: Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 4) [2011] FCA 1126; (2011) 203 FCR 293 (Polar Aviation) at [17].
14 The meaning of “reasonable prospect of success” in this provision was considered in Spencer, with the plurality, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ observing at [59]-[60]:
[59] In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like "clearly", "manifestly" or "obviously") as "frivolous", "untenable", "groundless" or "faulty". But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power given by s 31A. Nor can the content of the word "reasonable", in the phrase "no reasonable prospect", be sufficiently, let alone completely, illuminated by drawing some contrast with what would be a "frivolous", "untenable", "groundless" or "faulty" claim.
[60] Rather, full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is "no reasonable prospect" of success…
15 The inquiry required under s 31A is “not an enquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail”: Spencer at [52].
16 The assessment of whether a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success necessitates the making of value judgments in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and argument, with the result that the provision vests a discretion in the court: Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; (2009) 178 FCR 401 at [28].
17 Rule 26.01 provides for circumstances in which a party can make an application to the Court for summary judgment, which relevantly includes where the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding: r 26.01(a); where proceedings are vexatious or an abuse of process: r 26.01(b); and where no reasonable cause of action is disclosed: r 26.01(c).
Strike out
18 The relevant principles applicable to the determination of an application to strike out pleadings are well established and are unnecessary to repeat in detail. Given the submissions advanced by the respondents, it suffices for present purposes to recall the following. A strike out application is directed to the sufficiency of the pleadings or equivalent documentation, as opposed to the underlying prospects of success of the proceedings: Spencer at [23]. The main purpose of a pleading is to give notice to the other party of the case it has to meet: Thomson v STX Pan Ocean Co Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 15 (Thomson) at [13]. Pleadings are not an end in themselves, instead they are a means to the ultimate attainment of justice between the parties to litigation: Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11; (1990) 169 CLR 279 at 293. For the purposes of r 16.21(1)(e), a “reasonable cause of action” is one that has some chance of success having regard to the allegations pleaded: Polar Aviation at [42]-[43]; Chandrasekaran v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [2020] FCA 1629 (Chandrasekaran) at [108]-[111]. A cause of action cannot be struck out merely on the basis that it appears to be weak: Chandrasekaran at [108]; Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1994] FCA 636; (1994) 217 ALR 226 at 236.
Submissions
19 The respondents seek summary dismissal for two reasons.
20 First, the proceeding seeks to relitigate the Primary Proceeding which was summarily dismissed in the Primary Judgment, as is relates to the same factual matrix and seek similar relief on the same or substantially the same grounds and, as such, has no reasonable prospect of success and should therefore be summarily dismissed on the grounds of res judicata, cause of action estoppel or Anshun estoppel. Second, to the extent that the s 39B Proceeding gives rise to a new legal issue or cause of action, it should be summarily dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success, based on either mandamus, or any cause of action giving rise to compensation.
21 Dealing first with res judicata, the respondents submitted that a single factual matrix generated the controversy the subject of the Primary Proceeding which now forms the basis of the s 39B Proceeding, which would mean the applicant would be required to lead the same evidence in the s 39B Proceeding.
22 The respondents also submitted any claim by the applicant for mandamus (either that the respondents are compelled to revisit N5’s visa decision, or failed to make a decision required by statute) relies on the same factual premises identified above, being: (1) the N5 visa decision, including the grant of a visa to N5 in 2014, and any allegation that the respondents were obliged to cancel the visa after 2014; (2) the various allegations made by the applicant about N5's character and domestic coercive control and/or abuse by N5; and (3) the asserted outcome of Federal Circuit and Family Court proceedings which the applicant contends have been breached by N5 and the respondents (where the reasons provided by the Court for the orders made in that proceeding are not available to this Court or the respondents, and the manner in which the respondents are alleged to have breached them is unclear). It was submitted that factual premises pleaded in the s 39B Proceeding were the subject of the cause of action pleaded in the Primary Proceeding in respect of which the Federal Court ordered summary dismissal.
23 The respondents also submitted the applicant seeks broadly the same relief in the s 39B Proceeding as sought in the Primary Proceeding.
24 The respondents submitted that though the pleadings in the s 39B Proceeding are not in the same form as those the subject of the Primary Proceeding, the gist of the relief sought, the grounds and factual matrix that constitute the proceedings are the same, and that the applicant now merely seeks to prosecute her original application, raising the same issues, in a slightly expanded form. The respondents submitted that, were the s 39B Proceeding permitted to proceed, the Court would be required to revisit the same issues dealt with by the primary judge in the Primary Judgment, which may result in inconsistent judgments. For example, a finding that the applicant should succeed in her application for mandamus in this proceeding would require me to find contrary to the primary judge in the Primary Judgment.
25 Second, the respondents submitted that, in relation to the application for mandamus:
(1) the applicant does not have standing to bring an application for judicial review as she is not the visa applicant;
(2) mandamus is only available where a government official is obligated to make a decision but fails to make it – here the decision was made in 2014; and
(3) the applicant failed to follow the proper path for the review of migration decisions and, in any event, has no right to seek review as she is not the applicant of that visa.
26 For these reasons, the respondents submit that the applicant’s claim for mandamus or other claims for relief have no prospects of success, and the proceedings should therefore be summarily dismissed.
27 Third, the respondents contend the s 39B Proceeding does not specifically plead a cause of action connected to a basis to pay damages but that, taken at its highest:
(1) the respondents breached a statutory duty in relation to N5’s visa decision;
(2) in the alternative, the respondents engaged in misfeasance in relation to N5’s visa decision or in seeking summary dismissal of the Original Proceedings;
(3) the respondents was negligent in relation to N5’s visa decision;
(4) the respondents were under some duty or obligation to apply and enforce Federal Circuit and Family Court orders, or somehow take a purported breach of such orders into account in applying a character test to an existing visa holder.
28 Leaving aside res judicata, the respondents submitted the matters dealt with above do not articulate a justiciable cause of action, and the proceedings should therefore be dismissed.
29 The applicant opposed the application. The applicant did not address the respondents submissions about relitigating the issues decided in the Primary Proceeding. Rather, while Ms Halyday’s written submissions addressed both proceedings it focused on the Appeal Proceeding. That said, in her submission she advances the basis of her case. Indeed, Ms Halyday in her written submissions acknowledged the proceedings were in effect the same: “I originally combined the S39B [proceeding] and the Appeal [proceeding] because they were overlapping and ask the same question”.
Other proceedings
30 Given the basis of the Commonwealth’s application, it is appropriate to first refer to the other proceedings filed by Ms Halyday.
31 As referred to above, this application was heard at the same time as the Appeal Proceeding. I refused the application. The reasons of the primary judge in the Primary Proceeding are summarised in Halyday v Commonwealth [2026] FCA 1752 at [13]-[23] and are unnecessary to repeat in their entirety as the judgments are to be read together. However, for ease of reference, it is helpful to recite the critical aspect which addressed the duty of care the applicant alleged the Commonwealth owed her. His Honour rejected the submission, explaining at [32]-[37]:
[32] Properly considered, Ms Halyday’s case does not seem to arise any higher than a correlation of the kind identified by Leeming JA, and in the prior authority his Honour considers. If there is to be a duty of care of the kind she relies upon, it must be found consistent with the statutory framework for making visa decisions in the Migration Act and related regulations.
[33] The substance of the statutory framework for the granting and revoking of visas has not relevantly changed since the time visas were granted to the applicant’s partner in January 2013 and December 2014. Section 65 requires the relevant Minister or Ministers allocated responsibility for the administration of the Migration Act, mostly via delegates, to grant a visa if satisfied that, among other things, the applicable criteria for that visa are met and the grant is not prevented by s 501.
[34] Section 501(1) provides that the Minister may refuse a grant of a visa if the visa applicant does not satisfy him that the applicant passes the character test. Section 501(2) provides that the Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if the Minister reasonably suspects that the visa holder does not pass the character test, and the holder does not satisfy the Minister that they do pass the character test. Natural justice principles apply to decisions under both (2) and (3). Section 501(3) empowers the Minister to cancel or revoke a visa, where the Minister reasonably suspects that a person does not pass the character test, and where satisfied that doing so is in the national interest. Natural justice principles are dispensed with for such decisions.
[35] Failing the character test is defined in s 501(6), and includes persons:
(a) with a substantial criminal record;
(b) who have been convicted of immigration detention offences;
(c) with associations with persons suspected of engaging in criminal conduct;
(d) who are not of good character, having regard to their past and present criminal or general conduct; and
(e) who pose significant risk of particular types of future conduct.
[36] Section 501(1), (2) and (3) contain no compulsions to take certain action if a visa holder or applicant does not meet the character test. Rather, the powers granted are subject to Ministerial discretion. Implicit in that statutory framework is recognition that there will be cases where a person will not pass the character test, but it will nonetheless be appropriate in the circumstances that they be granted a visa, or that they retain it.
[37] A duty imposed on the Minister that, on allegations that a person is not of good character raised by a member of the public, a visa not be granted or be revoked, would not cohere to that statutory framework. Moreover, it would be directly inconsistent with the duty to afford natural justice to visa holders and applicants for decisions under s 501(1) and (2).
32 The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from that decision was extant at the time the s 39B Proceeding was filed.
33 Prior to filing the s 39B Proceeding, as apparent from the procedural history above, Ms Halyday filed proceedings in the High Court in which she sought to invoke its original jurisdiction by an application for a constitutional writ, which had been dismissed. I note that Steward J observed at [10]-[11]:
[10] By proposed orders 1-4 and 7, the plaintiff in effect seeks to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court to agitate claims which, as the defendants correctly submit, were largely "already considered and rejected by the Federal Court" and in doing so "circumvent the process by which judgments of the Federal Court can be challenged".
[11] While the plaintiff does not expressly seek an order that Bromwich J's summary judgment in the Federal Court proceeding be set aside, she now seeks to relitigate in this Court claims which are substantially duplicative to those which his Honour already considered and summarily dismissed. For those claims to succeed, the appropriate remedy was to be sought, not by invoking this Court's original jurisdiction, but by way of an appeal from Bromwich J's summary judgment – which here lies to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, and only upon the grant of leave to appeal
34 The application was dismissed as an abuse of process because it was attempting to circumvent the appeal process in this Court. Nonetheless, as those paragraphs recognise, what was filed in the High Court, albeit in some respects using different language, was in fact seeking to relitigate the issues dealt with in the Primary Proceeding.
Consideration
35 The many documents that have been filed, or sought to be filed by Ms Halyday in this and the Primary Proceeding are difficult to navigate and, at times, difficult to understand. The pleadings involve high level general and conclusory assertions. In the Primary Proceeding the primary judge noted that the pleaded conduct N5 is said to have engaged in is described by the applicant in general and conclusory terms, and that conduct engaged in by individuals other than a Commonwealth employee suffers from similar vices of imprecision and conclusory expression: J[19]. That said, I have considered the documents which have been filed, and those sought to be filed (but not yet accepted for filing) insofar as they relate to the issues to be determined in these proceedings.
36 The pleadings in the s 39B Proceeding bear all the hallmarks of those before the primary judge in the Primary Proceeding, as described in Halyday v Commonwealth [2026] FCA 1752 at [6]-[12]. They do not comply with the pleading requirements of this Court: see e.g. rr 8.03, 16.02. It would not be possible for the proceeding to continue in its current form given the defects in the pleadings.
37 The relief sought by Ms Halyday, as set out in the originating application is as follows:
1. I seek a writ of Mandamus to compel the Department of Home Affairs and the Minister for Home Affairs to perform legally required Constitutional and Migration Act duties of office that they failed to do as described in the attached Statement of Claim.
2. Order that the Respondents accept that Federal Circuit Family Court Orders and determination of Trial of WOC225/2019 exist and that those documents are Judicial Evidence of domestic and family coercive control harm inflicted by NS to the child and me.
3. A Declaration under s39b(1A) that the Court issue a formal statement clarifying the legal duties of the Respondents against the legislation detailed in the Statement of Claim where consideration is given to the Federal Circuit Family Court Order and not for publication decision of obtaining a Visa in 2014 by fraudulent means (as in visa fraud), evidence of NS fail test of good character, failure by the visa holder NS, to uphold his visa requirements, evidence of NS inflicting harm to the child and I and evidence that the Orders detail the perpetrator, NS, poses a very high risk to continue his domestic and family coercive control and that domestic and family coercive control is harm.
4. An Order that the Respondents remedy my child and my injuries as the Court deem appropriate.
5. The Respondents ongoing hostility and refusal of Judicial and medical evidence during the past three years and their lying to the courts that no evidence exists or that they had not made a decision to cancel or not cancel N5's visa when in fact they had, has taken its toll on the already existing decade of trauma and abuse we endured at the hands of N5.
…
38 In the statement of claim (and the amended statement of claim), the relief is identified as follows:
29. The Respondents perform their Constitutional duty to manage in the national interest and the Migration Act legally required actions as set out below with knowledge of
- Federal Circuit Family Court Orders woe 225/2019,
- Judge Boyle's determination that he lied in order to access a visa determined on subpoena evidence of 2014 from the Department of Immigration,
- and our medical evidence, and include:
Section 501 (Character Test) against the mandatory provision s501 Migration Act 1958 Direction number 55 Character Grounds: and Ministerial Direction M99, particularly Ministerial Direction sections 7, 8 and 9 which include Migration Act Directions that both s501 (1 )(2)(3a) and (6c) character grounds must be assessed against Judicial and medical evidence" and give weight to coercive control violence family court orders and the high risk of ongoing harm and consider the safety and best interests of the child and the victims.
Section 101-109 (Visa Fraud) s101-109 REG2.41 as detailed in the Migration Direction 55 of investigate reports of visa fraud pursuant to s501 (6) (c) where the visa was obtained by "bogus or false information" as detailed by Judge Boyle upon subpoena evidence to the woe 225/2019 Federal Circuit Family Court Trial.
30. Award damages for the thirteen years of injuries we sustained, the impact to our lives and the ongoing trauma. I did include a cost breakdown in the ACD 14/2024 case, but I defer to the Court on this occasion and ask that they award my child, and I damages that they think is appropriate.
39 The Commonwealth submitted that the asserted premises in respect of the s 39B Proceeding appear to be the following:
14.2.1 [the applicant] contends that the visa granted to N5 (granted in 2014) was improperly granted or alternatively that it ought be / have been cancelled by the Respondent (NS Visa Decisions), and therefore seeks that N5's visa be cancelled and that he be removed from Australia on the basis of orders made by the Family Circuit Court and / or allegations made by the Applicant about the character of N5 and/ or fraud;
14.2.2 [the applicant] makes allegations which appear to relate to the manner in which the Respondent handled her claim for compensation in the Original Proceedings; and
14.2.3 [the applicant] seeks that the Respondent 'remedy' her and her child's injuries alleged to arise from N5's domestic and family coercive control alleged to have caused a decade of trauma and abuse.
40 I agree with that submission.
41 I am satisfied the proceeding should be summarily dismissed.
42 First, I accept the Commonwealth’s submission that this proceeding seeks to reagitate the proceeding before the primary judge in the Primary Proceeding, which was summarily dismissed and from which leave to appeal has been refused in the Appeal Proceeding.
43 Ms Halyday pleads, inter alia:
The Respondent is in breach of its legal responsibility to us by failing to apply s501 despite judicial findings of domestic and family controlling coercive violence…
44 That is, the Commonwealth owed the applicant a duty of care which was breached.
45 The effect of these proceedings is that Ms Halyday seeks orders that N5’s visa is cancelled. It is alleged the Commonwealth failed to comply with its duty by granting N5 a visa and failed to revoke it and remove him from Australia in circumstances where she alleges N5 caused her and her child harm. That is the manner in which the primary judge described the case before him: Primary Judgment at [21]. It is also an apt description of these proceedings. That is the same factual premise underlying this proceeding.
46 The primary judge there determined that no duty of care was owed to the applicant. That the exercise of s 501(2) is discretionary: see [33] above.
47 Additionally, the factual assertions are to the same effect, albeit Ms Halyday appears to have extended the allegations to include the Commonwealth’s conduct of the Primary Proceeding. For example, the Commonwealth made a legal error in its decision-making process by failing to act upon relevant considerations pursuant to its “Constitutional and Migration Act responsibilities”; made false representations in the Primary Proceedings proceeding about the existence of evidence and false representations relating to N5's visa; ignored medical evidence and said during the Primary Proceeding that there was no evidence and no harm; failed to investigate visa fraud; failed to consider evidence presented in the Federal Circuit and Family Court proceedings; repeatedly refused to act to cancel the visa when the applicant provided them with evidence to do so; and they should pay damages to remedy the damage to the applicant and her child (who is not a party to the proceedings). Ms Halyday also alleged malfeasance in public office, and alleged the Commonwealth acted fraudulently and dishonestly, breaching the various offence provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Again, such claims were made in the Primary Proceeding. Further, as the Commonwealth submitted, in the Primary Proceeding “questions of whether the circumstances which were alleged to be relevant to the N5 Visa Decisions were capable of judicial review and the justiciability of either the mandamus application or any cause of action for damage or harm allegedly arising from the N5 Visa Decisions were in dispute”. They were the subject of submission, as apparent from the transcript of the oral hearing in that proceeding.
48 There is, as submitted by the Commonwealth, a “single factual matrix [that] has generated the controversy that was the subject of the [Primary] Proceeding[] and which now forms the basis of the [s] 39B Proceeding[]”. The applicant did not suggest otherwise. It means that the same evidence would need to be relied on by the applicant in this proceeding as would have been relied on in the Primary Proceeding. The same evidence would need to be led by the applicant in respect of both claims. Indeed, as referred to above at [29], Ms Halyday acknowledged the proceedings are in effect the same; they overlap and ask the same question.
49 I accept the Commonwealth has established that “the gist of the relief sought, the grounds and the factual matrix in both causes is the same”. Accordingly, the applicant is prevented from relitigating the issues in the Primary Proceeding based on the principles of res judicata or finality: see e.g. the description in Clayton v Bant [2020] HCA 44; (2020) 272 CLR 1 at [65]-[70]. Ms Halyday appears to have commenced the s 39B Proceeding on an erroneous understanding of the consequence of the High Court’s refusal to grant her application for a constitutional or other writ, submitting that:
…the High Court…just said, “We’re not going to look at this…Take it back to the Federal Court.” They didn’t look at the evidence. They didn’t say you can’t relitigate. You can’t – they didn’t make a decision on the evidence, on the Minister’s letters, nothing. They just said, “No, take it back,” and so that’s what I’ve done…
50 Second, and in any event, an action in mandamus is only available where a government official is obliged to make a decision but fails to do so and, as found in the Primary Proceeding, “s 501(1), (2) and (3) contain no compulsions to take certain action if a visa holder or applicant does not meet the character test”. Nor is there a duty imposed to do so on third party requests. I note this is also in a context where the import of Ms Halyday’s case is that the Commonwealth is obliged to accept the material provided, and it is mandatory that they cancel the visa. Neither proposition has any foundation. That is, there is no reasonable prospect of success. That is so even leaving aside the issue that Ms Halyday has no apparent standing to bring an application.
51 Third, and in any event, the claim for damages is not based on any pleaded cause of action. Mandamus proceedings do not provide a basis. Further, insofar as Ms Halyday makes allegations in the statement of claim against non-parties (e.g. the police, her pro bono barrister), they do not disclose a reasonable cause of action.
52 Fourth, and in any event, the orders or relief sought cannot be made by this Court. The first order, when read in the context of the body of the statement of claim, seeks an order compelling the Commonwealth to cancel N5’s visa. That being the import of the order sought is reflected in the statement of claim, which pleads that the Commonwealth failed to cancel N5’s visa in light of information provided by the applicant, and that the Commonwealth “ignored their responsibilities under the Migration Act to cancel N5's visa, detain and deport him back to England”. The Court has no power to compel such an outcome. Nor does the Court have any power to order the Commonwealth to accept the evidence of the findings of the Federal Circuit and Family Court as evidence of “Judicial Evidence of domestic and family coercive control harm inflicted by N5 to the child and [Ms Halyday]”, which is sought by order 2.
53 Ms Halyday has already sought to file an amended statement of claim on which she seeks to rely. It has not yet been accepted for filing. Despite that, I have considered the amended pleadings. The principal difference between it and the statement of claim is Ms Halyday’s reliance on Direction 110. For the reasons given in the Appeal Proceeding, Direction 110 does not have the effect contended for by the applicant. It does not render cancellation under s 501(2) and (3) mandatory. Nor does it operate retrospectively. The reasons I have given above in respect of why the proceedings should be summarily dismissed apply equally to the draft amended statement of claim. I note that the amended statement of claim does not amend the relief sought (see [36] above). The orders sought in the originating application have not changed. Ms Halyday’s submissions do not assist in clarifying her case. They also involve high level general and conclusory assertions. They include, inter alia, reliance on provisions of the Migration Act which do not have the meaning contended for. To take one example: the applicant submits the Department was obliged to put her Family Court material to the Minister as it is mandated by s 501G(2). However, s 501G relates to notification to the person the subject of the visa, of refusal to grant a visa, cancellation of their visa or a decision not to revoke a decision to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.
54 In my view, given the above, there is no basis on which Ms Halyday could replead so as to establish a reasonable cause of action. It follows that the proceedings should be summarily dismissed.
55 In that context, for completeness, I make a further observation.
56 Throughout the statement of claim (and the amended statement of claim) Ms Halyday alleges that the Commonwealth is lying and has made false representations to the Court about the existence of evidence relating to N5’s visa, and that there is no evidence of her claims. The pleadings contend that the respondents have breached “Part 7.3, Part 10.1 and Part 134.1 and 134.2 Criminal Code (Cth) with Fraud and dishonest conduct”. The amended statement of claim includes that the respondent has conducted “Misfeasance in Public office” (an allegation also in the Primary Proceeding). The pleadings in respect to these claims suffer the flaws described above at [35]-[36]. These are serious allegations, denied by the Commonwealth. Care needs to be taken with Ms Halyday’s descriptions of what occurred, and her pleadings and assertions that the Commonwealth refused the existence of evidence. I note that in the appeal judgment, I observed that grounds of appeal and written submissions relied on by Ms Halyday mischaracterised the reasons of the primary judge: see Halyday v Commonwealth [2026] FCA 1752 at [38]-[39].
57 To provide two examples. First, Ms Halyday, in written submissions, relied on an email of January 2024 in support of her case, alleging, inter alia, “8 January 2024: They stated in an email that they "reviewed the record and no evidence existed," using a deliberately emptied file to halt the case”. Although in quotation marks, the email does not use those words. I assume the passage in quotes is said by Ms Halyday to be the import of the letter. However, that description mischaracterises the email. Rather, the email describes that the Commonwealth did “not have access to the judgment by Justice Boyle, and has no knowledge of what the case related to or what findings were made by the Federal Court, apart from the referencing you have previously provided”. I note also there is no basis pleaded for the allegation the Commonwealth used a “deliberately emptied file”. Second, the submission by Ms Halyday also included in relation to the documents filed on 17 August 2026, that “[t]hey filed direct lies to the Federal Court claiming they "never had any orders," despite the certified lower court record proving they possessed them for years”. The affidavit of Ms Byrne of that date states:
In respect of any decision by Justice Boyle, the Applicant has provided a copy of orders made in the FCFC to the Respondent. However, the reasons for that decision are not available to the Respondent and the Respondent does not know the reasons given for the orders made.
58 During the hearing Ms Halyday also made the same submission. However, it is now apparent from Ms Halyday’s response to a question by the Court during the hearing that she had deliberately not filed the Federal Circuit and Family Court material in this Court, but rather she had given it to her pro bono barrister and she assumed he would have filed it. Ms Halyday in writing submitted that:
…and the entire bundle including sealed Orders and determination and Trial solicitors communications of the paragraphs relating to visa fraud determination upon subpoena evidence (from the Department admitted into evidence during the Family Court Tria)l being provided to the pro bono barrister in 2024 during the active ACD 14/2024 case now on Appeal – they still claim there is no evidence and no evidence existed. They constructed a deceptive falsehood and repeated it to the Minister and the Court.
59 However, it would not be expected in the circumstances that a pro bono barrister would provide the documents to the Commonwealth, or file them in Court. I note also that Ms Halyday terminated his services. The material in relation to the Federal Circuit and Family Court is suppressed, including the judgment. Nothing in any of the lengthy affidavits filed by Ms Halyday contains the Federal Circuit and Family Court material because, as described above, Ms Halyday deliberately did not include it. In those circumstances it is not surprising that the Commonwealth would not have the material. I note the orders from the Family Court are described in submissions as custody orders. Not surprisingly, the orders are just that, and do not state the basis for the orders or the underlying reasons (a copy of the orders is attached to an unfiled affidavit dated 22 June 2026). In light of Ms Halyday’s explanation at the hearing as to the basis on which she understood the Commonwealth to be in possession of the material, there may well be a discord between the applicant’s understanding and the documents actually in the Commonwealth’s possession.
60 Generally, it cannot be said that material was not considered by someone if the material itself had not been provided to them.
Conclusion
61 The respondent’s application for summary dismissal of the s 39B Proceeding is granted. The proceedings are dismissed, with costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Abraham. |
Associate:
Dated: 20 November 2026