Federal Court of Australia

Halyday v Commonwealth [2026] FCA 1752

Appeal from:

Halyday v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 330

File number(s):

ACD 41 of 2025

Judgment of:

ABRAHAM J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time and leave to appeal – where application for extension of time and leave to appeal refused

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 24(1D)(b), 31A, 37M

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2)

Public Governance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.01, 35.13

Cases cited:

Bellamy’s Australia Ltd v Basil (2019) 372 ALR 638; [2019] FCAFC 147

Crimmins v Stevedoring Committee [1999] HCA 59; (1999) 200 CLR 1

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Halyday v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 330

Halyday v Commonwealth (No 2) [2026] FCA 1753

Halyday v Department of Home Affairs & Ors [2025] HCASJ 47

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564

Kamruzzaman v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 523

Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133

Perera v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd (t/as Genworth) [2017] NSWCA 9; (2017) 94 NSWLR 83

Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139; (2010) 81 ATR 36

Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Australian Capital Territory

National Practice Area:

Other Federal Jurisdiction

Number of paragraphs:

51

Date of hearing:

30 September 2026

Counsel for the Applicant

The applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the Respondent:

P Clingan

Solicitor for the Respondent:

Maddocks

ORDERS

ACD 41 of 2025

BETWEEN:

SHARYN AMANDA HALYDAY

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

order made by:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.    The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

1    These reasons address an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal (ACD 41/2025) (Appeal Proceeding) from the summary dismissal decision of the primary judge: Halyday v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 330 (ACD 14/2024) (Primary Proceeding or Primary Judgment as appropriate). This application was heard at the same time as an application for summary dismissal or strike out in relation to a further separate but related proceeding filed by the applicant by originating application and associated statement of claim filed on 19 January 2026 (ACD 3/2026) (s 39B Proceeding). The resolution of that application is addressed in separate reasons.

2    The applicant is a litigant in person. She provided lengthy written submissions prior to the hearing and made oral submissions. I am mindful of the difficulties faced by a party representing themselves in this Court when attempting to file appropriate documents and making submissions. I have taken those difficulties into account.

3    For the reasons below, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is dismissed.

Procedural history

4    On 20 March 2024, the applicant filed the Primary Proceeding against the respondent, seeking, inter alia, compensation and the removal of her former partner, N5, from Australia on the basis his visa had been improperly granted or should otherwise be cancelled.

5    On 8 April 2025, the primary judge heard the Commonwealth’s application for summary dismissal of the Primary Proceeding, or in the alternative, that the pleadings be wholly struck out.

6    On the same day, summary judgment was entered in favour of the respondent pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) together with an order for costs: see Halyday v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 330.

7    On 8 May 2025, the applicant commenced the Appeal Proceeding by filing an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from the Primary Judgment, and a draft notice of appeal.

8    On 18 August 2025, the applicant filed an application for a constitutional or other writ together with a supporting affidavit in the High Court of Australia. On 29 September 2025, the respondent made an application to summarily dismiss the High Court application. On 4 December 2025, Steward J summarily dismissed the application as an abuse of process: Halyday v Department of Home Affairs & Ors [2025] HCASJ 47.

9    On 19 January 2026, the applicant commenced the s 39B Proceeding seeking relief and mandamus together with a claim for compensation in respect of the conduct relevant to the respondents’ decision regarding the visa granted to N5. The applicant provided an amended statement of claim to the Court on 27 May 2026 and sought to file an amended notice of appeal in the Appeal Proceeding. They remain unfiled. The s 39B Proceeding is addressed in Halyday v Commonwealth (No 2) [2026] FCA 1753.

10    By orders made 13 July 2026, the Court listed the interlocutory applications in relation to the Appeal Proceeding and the s 39B Proceeding for hearing on 30 September 2026. Timetables were set for the filing of documents in respect to each application. An order was made in relation to each proceeding that, apart from documents filed in accordance with the orders, the applicant may only file further documents with leave of the Court. Although there were requests for leave, it was not granted where documents related to matters outside the scope of the proceedings. However, documents were accepted for filing and could be relied on insofar as they were within the scope of the 13 July 2026 orders.

11    On 17 August 2026, the respondent filed an interlocutory application seeking the originating application and statement of claim in the s 39B Proceeding be summarily dismissed or, in the alternative, struck out or set aside.

Primary Judgment

12    It is appropriate to commence with a consideration of the Primary Judgment in the Appeal Proceeding.

13    That judgment addressed an interlocutory application brought by the respondent to summarily dismiss or strike out the proceedings. I note the Court provided Ms Halyday with pro bono counsel, but he did not appear at the hearing as Ms Halyday had dispensed with his services.

14    The primary judge summarised the proceedings at J[2]-[3]:

[2]    The applicant, Ms Sharyn Halyday, commenced this proceeding on 18 March 2024, filing an originating application (OA), statement of claim (SOC) and concise statement (CS). The central thrust of the case she brings is that the Commonwealth, by reason of its failure to administer migration laws properly, breached a duty of care and is liable in tort for negligence in allowing her former domestic partner, whom she refers to as NS, to obtain a visa to come to Australia, and to retain a visa so as to be able to stay here. She contends that this enabled him to do harm to her and to their child. She seeks damages totalling more than $4.5 million.

[3]    Ms Halyday also makes allegations against a range of other people, some of whom are officers of the Commonwealth, but many of whom are not. None of these people are named, and none of them are parties to this proceeding.

15    The primary judge summarily dismissed the proceedings on the basis that no viable cause of action was disclosed: J[4], [41] and [45].

16    Having described, amongst other things, the deficiencies in the pleadings in the applicant’s case, his Honour summarised the claims at [19]-[21]:

[19]    For the purposes of determining this interlocutory application, I will therefore take Ms Halyday's case at its highest and assume that any relevant factual assertions made can be proven. That then obviates the need to consider in any detail the conduct that NS is said to have engaged in (which is described in general and conclusory terms), or the conduct that others beyond any Commonwealth employees have engaged in (which suffers from similar vices of impression and conclusory expression). It is also unnecessary to delve into the detail of what precisely the Commonwealth, through its employees, knew or had been told about what NS had done.

[20]    Ms Halyday seeks damages for the costs of treatment for trauma (for her and her child), a loss of capacity to earn, and legal costs for proceedings in family law proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia against NS. She also seeks orders that his visa be cancelled, that the Commonwealth provide her child a written apology, that the assets of NS and his immigration sponsors be frozen and that the Commonwealth recover what are described as taxpayer funded monies from his immigration sponsor's assets. Much of the collateral relief beyond damages is most unlikely to be able to be granted.

[21]    On a generous reading, Ms Halyday's primary claim appears to be that the Commonwealth owed both her and her child a duty of care, which it breached in granting NS a visa, failing to revoke it and failing to remove him from Australia, in circumstances where she alleges he caused herself and her child harm. In particular, Ms Halyday's claim seems directed to visas granted to NS in January 2013 and December 2014.

17    The primary judge observed that there was then “a collection of other complaints that are more difficult to understand due to the way they have been described”: J[22]. He described them as follows. First, a number of allegations about unprofessional conduct or worse by various solicitors who had represented her or were otherwise involved in family law proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court, none of whom were party to the proceedings: J[23]. Second, claims of misfeasance in public office by several people who are not party to this proceeding: J[25]. Third, allegations that appear related to passport applications by Ms Halyday for herself and her son: J[26]. Fourth, a claim the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Capital Territory failed to investigate visa fraud, fraud against the Commonwealth and breaches by N5 of orders made in the proceedings before the Federal Circuit and Family Court. His Honour observed that Ms Halyday sought “orders that these alleged crimes be investigated by the Australian Federal Police”: J[27]. Fifth, the applicant sought an order that "it is a breach of Human Rights not to have CCV [coercive control violence] laws criminalized consistently in Federal law in each state and territory of Australia as it is not enforceable at the moment as a working instrument to protect people." His Honour described that in the concise statement “she seeks an order that the Commonwealth criminalise coercive control violence in all States and Territories, relief that no court could ever provide”.

18    His Honour addressed the issue of whether the Commonwealth owed Ms Halyday a duty of care, observing that Ms Halyday was not relying on an established duty, but a novel one. Reference was made to the relevant principles, including as outlined in Crimmins v Stevedoring Committee [1999] HCA 59; (1999) 200 CLR 1 at [93]: J[30]. His Honour concluded that the “incoherence between the duty alleged and the statutory scheme in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is a complete reason to not finding the existence of such a duty”, citing inter alia, Perera v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd (t/as Genworth) [2017] NSWCA 9; (2017) 94 NSWLR 83 at [39]-[60]: J[31]. His Honour explained why that is so in this case at [32]-[37]:

[32]    Properly considered, Ms Halyday’s case does not seem to arise any higher than a correlation of the kind identified by Leeming JA, and in the prior authority his Honour considers. If there is to be a duty of care of the kind she relies upon, it must be found consistent with the statutory framework for making visa decisions in the Migration Act and related regulations.

[33]    The substance of the statutory framework for the granting and revoking of visas has not relevantly changed since the time visas were granted to the applicant’s partner in January 2013 and December 2014. Section 65 requires the relevant Minister or Ministers allocated responsibility for the administration of the Migration Act, mostly via delegates, to grant a visa if satisfied that, among other things, the applicable criteria for that visa are met and the grant is not prevented by s 501.

[34]    Section 501(1) provides that the Minister may refuse a grant of a visa if the visa applicant does not satisfy him that the applicant passes the character test. Section 501(2) provides that the Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if the Minister reasonably suspects that the visa holder does not pass the character test, and the holder does not satisfy the Minister that they do pass the character test. Natural justice principles apply to decisions under both (2) and (3). Section 501(3) empowers the Minister to cancel or revoke a visa, where the Minister reasonably suspects that a person does not pass the character test, and where satisfied that doing so is in the national interest. Natural justice principles are dispensed with for such decisions.

[35]    Failing the character test is defined in s 501(6), and includes persons:

(a) with a substantial criminal record;

(b) who have been convicted of immigration detention offences;

(c) with associations with persons suspected of engaging in criminal conduct;

(d) who are not of good character, having regard to their past and present criminal or general conduct; and

(e) who pose significant risk of particular types of future conduct.

[36]    Section 501(1), (2) and (3) contain no compulsions to take certain action if a visa holder or applicant does not meet the character test. Rather, the powers granted are subject to Ministerial discretion. Implicit in that statutory framework is recognition that there will be cases where a person will not pass the character test, but it will nonetheless be appropriate in the circumstances that they be granted a visa, or that they retain it.

[37]    A duty imposed on the Minister that, on allegations that a person is not of good character raised by a member of the public, a visa not be granted or be revoked, would not cohere to that statutory framework. Moreover, it would be directly inconsistent with the duty to afford natural justice to visa holders and applicants for decisions under s 501(1) and (2).

19    Ms Halyday also attempted to rely on the Public Governance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) (Public Governance Act) as the basis for the duty of care alleged; his Honour observed that it appeared reliance was placed on s 25: J[38]. His Honour concluded at [39]:

There is real difficulty in relying on the Public Governance Act as a basis of the duty alleged, as any duty applies only to officials in the exercise of their duties within a Commonwealth entity. The standard of care is of a reasonable person in the position of the relevant official, and is impacted by the statutory framework that governs their decision-making. The content of that duty would therefore also need to cohere with the statutory framework of the Migration Act, already discussed. Reliance in an action against the Commonwealth on this provision would also require Ms Halyday to establish the legal and factual basis of liability for the Commonwealth for any breach of the duty by officials. None is alleged in the pleadings. It is also doubted whether this provision creates a private right of damages at all. As Perry J pointed out in EOX17 v Commonwealth [2018] FCA 1656 at [44]:

…[a]ny claim relying upon the Public Governance Act depends upon the applicant establishing that this Act is intended, as a matter of statutory construction, to confer a private right of action for damages: O'Connor v S. P. Bray Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 464 at 477-478 (Dixon J); Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 424 (Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ). However no such intention can be discerned from the provisions of the Public Governance Act. Section 23 authorises the Secretary as the relevant accountable authority of the non-corporate Commonwealth entity to enter into arrangements, such as contracts, which may in turn provide for the making of payments to individuals. However, the section has nothing to say in terms of conferring private rights to compensation for breaches of duty. Nor does s 25 or any other provision confer a private right of action: see by analogy Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Frangieh (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 252; (2017) 321 FLR 1 at [672] (Harrison AsJ); Shamir v Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Taxation Office) [2015] FCA 1463 at [11] (Pagone J).

20    The primary judge therefore concluded that there was “no identified cause of action for negligence by the Commonwealth. Accordingly, that aspect of Ms Halyday's proceeding must be summarily dismissed”: J[40].

21    As to the remaining claims, his Honour concluded at J[41]-[44]:

[41]    Ms Halyday also makes allegations and complaints against individuals who are not parties to this proceeding, and for whom the pleading defects identified earlier in these reasons apply. This includes individual but unnamed court staff at the Federal Circuit and Family Court, Solicitor 1, another private solicitor referred to as Solicitor 2, M9, the NSW Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, the Victims Services Commissioner of NSW and two federal ministers. For that reason alone, those aspects of the proceeding must be summarily dismissed.

[42]    In any event, none of those complaints identify, in any proper way, any basis for liability by any of those individuals. For completeness, I should add that this Court has no jurisdiction to order the investigation of crimes by the Australian Federal Police, to order the Commonwealth or State or Territory governments to criminalise coercive control violence, or to make a declaration that it is contrary to human rights in general not to criminalise such conduct. There is no identified proper basis for the Court to order the Commonwealth to make apologies or to alter its records.

[43]    There are many other defects in the allegations made against these individuals, none of which need to be spelt out. The written submissions for the Commonwealth identify many such defects.

[44]    I am therefore satisfied that there should be summary dismissal of the balance of the claims made by Ms Halyday.

22    His Honour concluded that the proceeding was hopeless and bound to fail and, therefore, necessarily, had no reasonable prospect of success: J[45]. He concluded that the central failings could not be remedied by repleading: J[45]. His Honour noted that Ms Halyday had the benefit of assistance from an experienced and capable barrister of some seniority acting pro bono.

Legal principles

23    As the orders from which the applicant seeks to appeal relate to granting summary judgment pursuant to s 31A of the FCA Act, they are interlocutory in nature and leave to appeal is required: ss 24(1D)(b) and 24(1A). An application for leave to appeal must be filed within 14 days of the date of judgment: r 35.13 of the Rules. As this application was filed outside that time, an extension of time to file the application for leave to appeal is also required.

24    The relevant principles are well established. The power to extend time in which to appeal is unfettered; however, the authorities identify a number of matters bearing upon the exercise of the discretion. The matters include the length of the delay, any explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent caused by the delay, and the merits of the substantive application, and the interests of justice more generally: see e.g. Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349; Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] and [17]-[19].

25    The discretion to grant leave to appeal is also an unfettered one, with each case being determined on its merits. Nonetheless the discretion is informed by well-established principles including that generally an applicant must establish: (1) that, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered; and (2) that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397 (Décor Corporation) at 398-400; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564 at [44]; Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 at [26]-[30]. These considerations are “cumulative” and are not satisfied unless each limb is made out: Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139; (2010) 81 ATR 36 at [5].

26    In determining whether to grant leave, the Court must have regard to the statutory command that the power must be exercised in a way that best promotes the overarching purpose in s 37M of the FCA Act, being to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: Bellamy’s Australia Ltd v Basil [2019] FCAFC 147; (2019) 372 ALR 638 at [6].

27    If an appeal has no prospect of success, leave to appeal should be refused: Kamruzzaman v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 523 at [17].

28    I note that there is also an application by Ms Halyday to amend her notice of appeal in the terms of the draft amended notice of appeal dated 31 January 2026.

Appeal grounds

29    The applicant’s original draft notice of appeal lodged on 25 June 2025 provided the following grounds for appeal:

Ground 1: The National Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) Article 3(2)(3), the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986, and the Human Rights Act 2008 s11 (2)(ACT), and the Human Rights Act 2004 (HRA)(ACT) and the ACT Child Safe Standards Scheme makes clear and ensures the concept of child safety is obligatory and not discretionary, requiring Government Departments to be child safe organisations and holds public authorities for respecting these rights.

Ground 2: Pro Bono Barrister's information was incomplete.

Ground 3: The 'Agent' so appointed by the Respondent did not engage with the evidence of safety risks of harm caused, as required to do so pursuant to the Commonwealth Supplier Code of Conduct - particularly when the child's safety was further breached by the visa holder breaching Court Orders and failing to remove the person they identified as an unlawful non-citizen when provided evidence he harmed a child and continued to pose a risk to the child's safety.

30    The applicant sought in her orders that she:

…be allowed to change the pleadings (not the evidence) of the case from Negligence causing harm to unlawful discrimination by the Respondent of the Applicant and her child’s right to safety breaching the Human Rights Act 1986 where upon the Applicant be granted permission to replead pursuant to AHRC Act 1986 Part 11b, 11c (to sue for unlawful discrimination as per Federal Court rules s 46.PO) as conciliation is unlikely and to file an Originating Application (Form 116) of unlawful discrimination pursuant to AHRC Act 1986 r 34.163 or any other form as required by the Federal Court.

(emphasis in original)

31    The proposed draft amended notice of appeal which Ms Halyday sought to rely on, dated 27 May 2026, is as follows:

3.    Pursuant to s4, s501 (1 )(2) (3a) and (6c) and s101-109 REG 2.41 and Migration Ministerial Directions 55 and 99 of the Migration Act with consideration given to the retrospective nature of the Ministerial Direction 110, s499 of the Migration Act 1958 that superseded MD 99 on 7 June 2024. The Ministerial Direction specifically made it mandatory that past actions of visa holders under the strict new rules were to be reviewed and accept family violence conduct as grounds for visa cancelation pursuant to s501. The mandatory zero tolerance Direction was applied retrospectively to cases being processed before the Courts which ACD 14/2024 was up until 8 April 2025. MD 110 ... " decision makers must comply with a direction made under s499. Under the strict new rules our Crown evidence of Federal Circuit Family Court Orders and determination of Departmental Records visa fraud rejected by the Respondent on the 8 January 2024 as in Annexure SAH R2 to ACD 14/2024 and decision not to act and therefore not to cancel and 13 May 2024 decision as in Annexure SAH R1, and SAH R18 in ACD 14/2024 that domestic and family coercive control and federal court orders are not evidence or harm where our family safety was and is the highest priority of the Australian Government 5.2(2) and 5.2(3) Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect .... to forfeit the privilege of staying in Australia.

4    Therefore, S501 is not discretionary where there is judicial considerations and medical evidence and mandatory requirements to consider and cancel the visa of a visa holders who conducts domestic and family coercive control violence as harm and where there is crown evidence as evidence of harm warranting visa cancelation pursuant to MD110 of s499 and s501 Migration Act 1958. At no time did the decision maker apply Ministerial Direction 110 as is so required up until the day the case was heard. Decision was made 8 January 2024 as per stated Annexures to the Federal Court, upheld and the violence identified as not harm in July 2023 and April 2024 and pleaded in 22 January 2025 by the respondent as not evidence to act. This is contrary to the Ministerial Directions 110 Mandatory requirement of June 2024 to retroactively apply, review and cancel N5's visa. Not only did this not happen, but the Respondents also remained defiant of the Mandatory requirements at time of 8 April 2025 Federal Court Appearance almost one year after the legal requirement was assented, making the ACD 14/2024 Decision material and an error in law occurred.

5.    By the Respondents repeatedly ignoring the judicial considerations of WOC225 and making false claims to the court they have conducted fraudulent defence and mislead the Court as s501 and s101-109 are not discretionary where there is judicial evidence and evidence of visa fraud or "bogus or false information when obtaining a visa" and a constitutional duty pursuant to perform 54 Migration Act 1958 "regulate in the national interest the coming into and presence in Australia of non-citizens" - pursuant to MD11 O as there is NOTHING about visa fraud or domestic and family coercive control violence perpetrated by migrants to Australian citizens that is "in the national interest".

6.    The Minister and or the Department were required as the Migration Act states "MUST' review N5's visa on both Character Grounds and Visa fraud. And the Constitution require the Respondents roles be performed pursuant to s4 of the Migration Act where there are court orders and or evidence of bogus or false visa information where the words "MUST' pursuant to Migration Direction 55 and Ministerial Directions 99. The Migration Act Directions that s501 (1 )(2) (3a) and (6c) character grounds must be assessed against Judicial and medical evidence, and s101-109 REG2.41 - a visa "must be assessed against Judicial and medical evidence" and give weight to family court orders and the high risk of ongoing harm and consider the safety and best interests of the child and or the victim and that "Officers must investigate visa fraud s501(6) (c) where the visa was obtained by "bogus or false information".

7.    By fraudulently and repeatedly claiming to the Court as detailed in the attached Affidavit during ACD 14/2024 "there is no evidence, no court orders and no evidence of harm" and the Minister writing to me in October 2025 stating there "are no Court Orders and no evidence of harm" the Respondents mislead the court to determine that s501 was not required to be undertaken following the Federal Circuit Family Court Trial Outcome when advised in March 2023 and led to an error in law by the means of a flawed finding.

8.    The Respondents ongoing hostile refusal of Judicial evidence over the past three years has taken its toll on my health and wellbeing as such that proximity is highly triggering for me and renders me unable to protect or advocate for myself. I can provide any documents or answer any questions you may have, and I ask the Court to make a decision on the papers please.

(emphasis in the original)

32    Therefore, the applicant would require the extension of time to be granted, leave to appeal, and leave to amend the notice of appeal.

Consideration

33    In respect to the extension of time, Ms Halyday’s affidavit of 8 May 2025 accompanying her application in the Appeal Proceeding, at [23] under the heading “Why this application was not filed within time”, stated:

I was unaware of the time frame and have done my best to access legal assistance to draft this response as quickly and correctly as possible.

34    The Commonwealth did not take issue with that explanation. Rather, the Commonwealth opposes the extension of time but does so on the basis that there is no merit in the underlying application. I note the delay was not extensive. I accept Ms Halyday’s explanation. The issue therefore turns on whether there is merit in that application for leave to appeal.

35    As a general observation, the applicant’s written submissions were directed to rearguing or establishing her case, rather than addressing the reasoning of the primary judge.

36    As can be seen from the original grounds recited above, they do not address the basis on which the primary judge granted summary dismissal. None of the grounds in the original notice of appeal are proper grounds of appeal. The first ground makes an assertion about a breach of human rights not argued before the primary judge. In effect the applicant seeks to replead her case. That is not a basis for appeal, which requires identifying error by the primary judge. Ground 2, which is a complaint against the pro bono barrister, is not a proper ground of appeal. The meaning of ground 3 is unclear. These grounds do not demonstrate any merit in an appeal. In fairness to the applicant, she no longer relies on those grounds but seeks to rely on the amended grounds.

37    There appears to have been various versions of the draft amended notice of appeal provided to the Commonwealth. The proposed draft amended notice of appeal recited above is dated 27 May 2026, and was sought to be filed on 23 June 2026. It is currently unfiled. Nonetheless, I have considered this application against those grounds.

38    However, the amended grounds of appeal appear to be phrased more like submissions. In some parts, the applicant argues matters not put to the primary judge. The applicant’s written submissions in support of the applications have the same characteristics. The grounds of appeal and the written submissions mischaracterise the basis of the primary judge’s decision. For example, the applicant’s written submissions assert the primary judge:

…accepted [the Commonwealth’s] false claims that there was ‘no evidence, no decision and therefore no jurisdiction to hear the case’ and failed to find that the resulting administrative process involved a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction and an unlawful, blind fettering of statutory discretion induced by a fraud.

39    That is not an accurate description of the reasons for summary dismissal. I note also that in any event care must be taken with some of Ms Halyday’s factual assertions, as it became apparent at the hearing that there is an issue as to what had been provided to the Commonwealth: see Halyday v Commonwealth (No 2) [2026] FCA 1753 at [57]-[61].

40    The basis of the primary judge’s decision was that it had not been established there was a duty of care owed to Ms Halyday: J[30]-[40]. The applicant did not suggest that the primary judge erred in his characterisation of her claims. Therefore, unless it can be established that his Honour’s conclusion is arguably wrong, there would be no merit in the appeal.

41    That said, from those submissions and what was said orally, Ms Halyday focussed on his Honour’s description that the relevant aspect of the Migration Act, being cancellation of a visa on character grounds under s 501(2), is discretionary. Ms Halyday submitted that the primary judge did not refer to Direction 110 which, Ms Halyday submitted, was mandatory. That is, she submitted this meant N5’s visa must be cancelled. Contrary to Ms Halyday’s submissions, s 501(2) is not “overridden by the mandatory statute of MD110”. Direction 110 does not alter the terms of s 501(2), which are discretionary. That is a complete answer to the applicant’s submission. Bromwich J did not refer to any Direction, because they do not dictate whether the cancellation is mandatory or discretionary; the Migration Act does. The Directions provide guidance to decision makers in their application of certain provisions of the Migration Act. As recited above, the primary judge at [36] concluded:

Section 501(1), (2) and (3) contain no compulsions to take certain action if a visa holder or applicant does not meet the character test. Rather, the powers granted are subject to Ministerial discretion. Implicit in that statutory framework is recognition that there will be cases where a person will not pass the character test, but it will nonetheless be appropriate in the circumstances that they be granted a visa, or that they retain it.

42    Ms Halyday has not established that that is arguably incorrect.

43    Further, Ms Halyday’s submission does not take account of the natural justice principles which apply to the s 501(2) and (3) decision: J[34], [37].

44    In any event, Direction 110 was not in operation at the time that N5's visa was granted, which according to Ms Halyday’s originating application was 2013. It commenced on 21 June 2024, and has already been superseded. The Direction does not have retrospective effect. Further, and as the Commonwealth submitted, even if Direction 110 could be applied, it would require inter alia, for the visa applicant to be given procedural fairness in respect of any decision about it, and could not be dealt with by way of an appeal from the primary judge’s decision.

45    During the hearing Ms Halyday accepted the primary judge was correct that she was not owed a duty of care by the Commonwealth but submitted “they owe their office a duty of care”. That is “the Department of Home Affairs employees and the Minister have a duty to their office, to the employment of their office”. Ms Halyday submitted that is because they must do their job according to the law. However, that does not assist Ms Halyday. It does not establish any error in the primary judge’s conclusion.

46    Ms Halyday submitted that she was unaware of Direction 110, and that she should have pleaded that the duty of care was owed to the Department, and therefore she should have been given an opportunity by the primary judge to replead her case. However, this was not before the primary judge, and there is no error established in his decision based on the material before him, that the pleading could not be cured.

47    The other matters raised in Ms Halyday’s written submission are directed to rearguing the merits of her case and not establishing error in the reasoning of the primary judge. They also raise matters not before the primary judge. The fatal matter, given the nature of Ms Halyday’s claim, related to the duty of care, which is a legal issue.

48    For completeness, I note also that at the hearing of this application, Ms Halyday accepted there was no duty of care owed.

49    As explained above, for leave to appeal to be granted, Ms Halyday must establish that the decision of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered. That has not been established.

50    Accordingly, as there is no merit in the appeal, I refuse the extension of time and leave to appeal the decision of the primary judge.

Conclusion

51    Having considered the proposed draft amended grounds, they should be accepted for filing to formalise the court record. However, as explained above, Ms Halyday has not established that there is sufficient doubt attending the Primary Judgment either on the original grounds of appeal or on the proposed amended draft grounds of appeal. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is dismissed, with costs.

I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Abraham.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026