Federal Court of Australia
Alka v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1751
Appeal from: | Alka v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1347 |
File number: | VID 1414 of 2024 |
Judgment of: | MOSHINSKY J |
Date of judgment: | 20 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) – medical treatment visa – where the Tribunal held that the appellant did not satisfy the objective criteria for the visa – where the primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review on the basis that no jurisdictional error was shown in the decision of the Tribunal – appeal dismissed |
Legislation: | Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 362B(1A) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2, 3 |
Cases cited: | DNK17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 975 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Victoria |
National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |
Number of paragraphs: | 28 |
Date of hearing: | 11 November 2026 |
Counsel for the Appellant: | The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter |
Solicitor for the First Respondent: | Ms C Oppel of Australian Government Solicitor |
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: | The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs |
ORDERS
VID 1414 of 2024 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | ALKA Appellant | |
AND: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP First Respondent ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent | |
order made by: | MOSHINSKY J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 20 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be determined on a lump sum basis.
4. Within 21 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
5. In the absence of any agreement:
(a) within a further 14 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);
(b) within a further 14 days, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS); and
(c) in the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MOSHINSKY J:
Introduction
1 The appellant, who is a citizen of India, appeals from a judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) (the Circuit Court). The Circuit Court dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Delegate) to refuse the appellant a Medical Treatment (Visitor) (Class UB) (Subclass 602) visa (the Visa).
2 Briefly, the chronology of key events is as follows:
(a) In November 2006, the appellant arrived in Australia on a student visa.
(b) On 30 December 2009, the student visa expired.
(c) On 10 April 2017, the appellant applied for the Visa.
(d) On 13 April 2017, the Delegate refused the Visa on the basis that the appellant did not satisfy criterion 3001 in Sch 3 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), which in the appellant’s case required that the application was validly made within 28 days after the last substantive visa held by the appellant ceased.
(e) The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s decision.
(f) On 9 October 2018, the Tribunal emailed the appellant to invite her to attend a hearing on 1 November 2018.
(g) On 1 November 2018, the hearing before the Tribunal took place, but the appellant did not appear. The Tribunal decided to proceed with determining the application on its merits (see s 362B(1A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)). The Tribunal decided to affirm the decision of the Delegate not to grant the appellant the Visa.
(h) The appellant applied to the Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
(i) On 30 October 2024, a hearing before the Circuit Court took place. The appellant appeared for herself (i.e. she was not legally represented) with the assistance of an interpreter in the English and Punjabi languages.
(j) On 12 December 2024, the Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review.
3 The appellant appeals to this Court from the judgment of the Circuit Court.
4 The appellant is not legally represented. She appeared at the hearing with the assistance of an interpreter in the English and Punjabi languages. Although assisted by an interpreter, the appellant made oral submissions herself, in English. The statements made by the Court and by the solicitor for the first respondent (the Minister) were interpreted by the interpreter.
5 For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the appeal should be dismissed.
The Tribunal’s reasons
6 The Tribunal noted at [2] that the criteria for the grant of the Visa were set out in Part 602 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations. The Tribunal noted at [3] that the Delegate had found that the appellant did not satisfy the requirements of clause 602.213(5) as the appellant did not satisfy criterion 3001 of Sch 3, which in the appellant’s case required that the application was validly made within 28 days after the last substantive visa held by the appellant ceased.
7 At [9] of the Tribunal’s reasons, the Tribunal referred to clause 602.212 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations. The Tribunal noted that that clause required an applicant to meet one of the seven alternative sub-criteria in clause 602.212(2)-(8). The only alternative which appeared to be possibly relevant was clause 602.212(6). This required, among other things, that the applicant had turned 50. The Tribunal stated at [11] that the information available to the Tribunal showed that the appellant had not turned 50. Therefore, the requirements of clause 602.212(6) were not met.
8 The Tribunal then considered clause 602.213, which applied to applicants who were not medically unfit to depart Australia as required by clause 602.212(6), and who were in Australia at the time the application was made. In the appellant’s circumstances, to meet the requirements of clause 602.213 required (among other things) that the appellant satisfied criterion 3001 in Sch 3 to the Migration Regulations.
9 The Tribunal stated at [14] that, in order to satisfy criterion 3001, the application for the Visa must have been lodged within 28 days of the relevant day. The “relevant day” was defined in clause 3001(2). In the appellant’s circumstances, the relevant day was the last day on which she held a substantive visa. The Tribunal stated at [15] that the departmental records indicated that the appellant’s last substantive visa ceased on 30 December 2009; as the visa application was not made until 10 April 2017, it was not made within 28 days of the relevant day. Therefore, the appellant did not satisfy criterion 3001.
The primary judge’s reasons
10 The primary judge noted at [19] of his reasons that the appellant’s application for review contained seven grounds of review. These were set out at [19].
11 The primary judge set out the appellant’s oral submissions at [29]-[33] of his reasons.
12 The primary judge considered the appellant’s grounds of review at [50]-[56], concluding that none of the grounds established jurisdictional error.
13 At [57]-[64], the primary judge considered the judgment of Horan J in DNK17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 975 (DNK17), which had been referred to in the Minister’s submissions. The primary judge considered whether, in light of that decision, the Tribunal’s decision in the present case to proceed to determine the application on its merits (rather than dismissing the application for want of appearance) (see s 362B(1A)) was legally unreasonable. The primary judge held at [63] that, in the circumstances of this case, it was not legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to proceed to determine the application for review on its merits.
The appeal to this Court
14 The appellant’s notice of appeal contains five grounds. The appellant did not file an outline of submissions. She made brief oral submissions at the hearing. These were largely directed to the financial hardship she is currently experiencing. Despite questions from the Court, the appellant did not identify any error in the reasons of the primary judge.
15 The critical feature of the present case is that, as explained in the Tribunal’s reasons and summarised above, the appellant did not satisfy criterion 3001 of Sch 3 to the Migration Regulations, and therefore did not satisfy the criteria for the Visa. There does not appear to be any real issue about this. Accordingly, even if the appellant were able to point to some error in the reasoning of the primary judge, it is difficult to see how it could be material. In any event, for the reasons that follow, I do not consider there to be any error in the primary judge’s reasons.
16 I will consider each of the appeal grounds in turn.
17 The first ground is:
The court noted that I had been here since November 2006, but failed to give any weight to the fact that I had not been out of Australia since then, which is now more than 18 years. I have no other place that I can call “home”.
18 In my view, this ground does not establish any error in the reasons of the primary judge. It does not appear that this point was raised below. The point does not have any bearing on whether the appellant met the criteria for the Visa or whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.
19 The second ground is:
The Tribunal was to consider whether I was unfit to travel. In considering this, the Tribunal did not consider the fact that other than Australia, I had no other place that I could call “home”. Also, I could not travel because of my current medical condition. Moreover, there were reasons even before my current medical condition that I could not leave Australia. These reasons were me being a victim of domestic violence and abuse, which traumatised me a lot and led me to severe depression.
20 In my view, this ground does not establish any error in the reasons of the primary judge. These matters do not affect the conclusion of the Tribunal that the appellant did not meet the criteria for the Visa. They do not provide a basis to suggest that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.
21 The third ground is:
The Tribunal also noted that I had not turned fifty. The Tribunal, however, failed to recognise that I was nearing fifty. In any case, I am now over fifty. So, this criteria is now met. Tribunal should not apply this criteria rigidly, but consider each case individually and with compassion.
22 I am not satisfied that this ground establishes any error by the primary judge. Clause 602.212(6) required, among other things, that an applicant had actually turned 50, not merely that they were nearly 50. The criteria needed to be satisfied at the time of decision. Accordingly, this ground does not suggest that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.
23 The fourth ground is:
The Tribunal was critical about the fact that I had lodged my current visa application more than 28 days after I last held substantive visa. Again, the Tribunal was very rigid in applying this criteria and did not consider my reasons and circumstances as to why I could not meet this criteria. The Tribunal ignored my depression and being a victim of domestic violence and abuse.
24 In my view, this ground does not establish any error by the primary judge. In order to satisfy criterion 3001, the application for the Visa must have been lodged within 28 days of the relevant day. The “relevant day” was defined in clause 3001(2). In the appellant’s circumstances, the relevant day was the last day on which she held a substantive visa. The Tribunal found that the appellant failed to satisfy this criterion. There does not appear to be any real issue about this. In these circumstances, the points raised by this ground to not address relevant issues. They do not provide a basis to suggest that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.
25 The fifth ground is:
The court, acknowledging my trauma, noted at para 54 of the reasons for judgement (Annexure “A2” of my Affidavit) that the history of violence (against me) does not undermine the reasoning of Tribunal which was properly focused on the primary criteria required by the Regulations.
I submit that for the Natural Justice to prevail, the focus should not be narrow, but the Tribunal and the Court should have a wide approach. In my case, the examples of this are at paras 55 and 56 of the reasons for judgement.
At para 55 the Court noted that I was genuine in my application for the visa and was suffering from diagnosed illness, but applied a strict, narrow and rigid approach to disregard my trauma and victimisation as not a “recognised reason” to remit the application to the Tribunal.
At para 56, the Court stated that the burden of proof was on me to establish jurisdictional error by the Tribunal in arriving at its decision, and that I had not discharged that onus in the grounds of review or by any other means. in stating this, the Court did not consider the “natural justice” argument or decide my case by considering compelling, exceptional and compassionate circumstances of my case, being my age, medical conditions, time in Australia, and above all me being a victim of severe violence and abuse while living in Australia. The Court once again had a narrow focus and looked at strict compliance with rigid criteria without even considering what natural justice would require in my case.
26 In my view, this ground does not establish any error by the primary judge. The critical issue before the Tribunal was whether the appellant satisfied the criteria for the Visa. The Tribunal decided that she did not satisfy those criteria. The points raised by this ground to not provide any proper basis to question that decision. Further, they do not provide any proper basis to suggest that the primary judge erred in his reasoning or in his conclusion that the application for judicial review should be dismissed. Moreover, the points do not provide a proper basis to suggest that the appellant was denied natural justice (either by the Tribunal or the primary judge).
27 During the hearing before me, the Minister referred to DNK17 and made submissions as to why that case was distinguishable. I accept those submissions. In my view, the primary judge was correct to conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, it was not legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to decide to proceed to determine the application on its merits.
Conclusion
28 It follows that the appeal is to be dismissed. There is no apparent reason why costs should not follow the event. I will therefore make an order that the appellant pay the Minister’s costs, with these costs to be determined on a lump sum basis.
I certify that the preceding twenty-eight (28) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Moshinsky. |
Associate:
Dated: 20 November 2026