Federal Court of Australia

Foster v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 1750

Application for review of:

Foster v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2023] AATA 864

File number(s):

VID 582 of 2023

Judgment of:

ANDERSON J

Date of judgment:

20 November 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time to review decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (now the Administrative Review Tribunal) to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister – principles applicable to extension of time – whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time – whether adequate explanation for delay in seeking review – difficulty in obtaining legal representation not a sufficient reason – where the Minister faces no specific prejudice if the application were to be allowed – whether there is merit to the proposed grounds of review – where first applicant was not a party to the Tribunal proceeding – leave granted for the second applicant’s wife (the first applicant) to appear as a McKenzie friend.

MIGRATION – refusal of the visa applicant’s visitor visa on character grounds – applicant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months in a foreign jurisdiction – whether s 501(7)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) applies to a sentence imposed by a foreign court – crime of a sexual nature against a child – foreign conviction – allegations of corruption in relation to foreign conviction – proposed grounds of review lack merit – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 477, 477A, 479, 486C, 499, 500, 501

Cases cited:

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

GOK18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 169

GXT25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] HCA 32

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344

HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 202; 273 FCR 121

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Darnia-Wilson [2022] FCAFC 28; 289 FCR 72

Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v LLF [2018] VSCA 155

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

60

Date of hearing:

29 October 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

Ms Z Chang appeared as the McKenzie friend for the Applicant

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr K Sypott

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 582 of 2023

BETWEEN:

ZHIYING CHANG

First Applicant

WARWICK FOSTER

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The First Applicant be removed as a party to the proceeding.

2.    The name of the First Respondent be amended to the “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

3.    The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

4.    The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANDERSON J:

Introduction

1    This is an application for an extension of time in which to seek judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) made on 24 April 2023. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse the grant of a Visitor (Class FA) (Subclass 600) visa (visa) under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (Decision or TD).

2    For the reasons that follow, the application for an extension of time will be dismissed, with costs.

Background

3    The visa applicant, Mr He Zhu, is a Chinese national. The proceeding was commenced with two applicants: his mother and his stepfather.

4    On 16 September 2013, Mr Zhu was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment by the Shenzhen Bao’an District Procuratorate in China for “indecent acts against a child”.

5    On 23 November 2016, Mr Zhu applied for the visa.

6    The visa was initially refused on the basis that Mr Zhu did not meet Public Interest Criterion 4020 but, in 2018, that refusal was set aside by the Tribunal on the basis that compassionate or compelling circumstances existed to waive that criterion. The visa was then refused on the basis that Mr Zhu did not intend genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, but that refusal was also set aside by the Tribunal in 2019.

7    On 6 May 2020, the Department of Home Affairs (Department) sent Mr Zhu a Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal (NOICR) of the visa under s 501(1) of the Act. Mr Zhu provided material in response to the NOICR and further invitations to comment.

8    On 23 November 2022, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa under s 501(1) of the Act.

9    On 14 December 2022, Mr Zhu’s stepfather lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision with the Tribunal (then the Administrative Appeals Tribunal). The Tribunal heard the application on 27 and 28 March 2023.

10    On 24 April 2023, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

The proper parties, and consequential issues arising from the second applicant’s health

11    An initial issue which requires resolution is the question of who the proper parties are to the application; in particular, whether the first applicant is a proper party to the proceeding and whether, in any event, she should be permitted to appear as the McKenzie friend for the second applicant.

12    The only persons who may commence or continue an application for judicial review under the Act in this Court are (pursuant to s 486C of the Act): a party “mentioned in s 479” of the Act; the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, or of a State or Territory; a person who commences or continues the proceeding in performing his or her statutory functions; or any other person prescribed by the regulations. There were (at the time of the application) and are no regulations prescribing persons, and the applicants are neither attorneys-general nor are they statutory office-holders. Accordingly, their standing to seek judicial review must be found in s 479 of the Act.

13    Section 479 of the Act provides as follows:

The parties to a review of a migration decision resulting from an application referred to in section 477 or 477A are the Minister, or where appropriate the Secretary or Australian Border Force Commissioner, and:

(a)    if the migration decision concerned is made on review by application under Part 5 or section 500—the applicant in the review by the ART; or

(b)    in any other case—the person who is the subject of the migration decision; or

(c)    in any case—a person prescribed by the regulations.

14    Mr Zhu’s stepfather, Mr Foster, is a person contemplated by s 479(a) – he was the applicant in the review before the Tribunal (the application for review having been made under s 500 of the Act). However, Mr Zhu’s mother, Ms Chang, was not an applicant before the Tribunal. Accordingly, she does not have standing to be an applicant in this proceeding and should be removed as a party.

15    Nonetheless, at the hearing I granted leave for Ms Chang to appear as the McKenzie friend for Mr Foster. I was satisfied that this was appropriate because Mr Foster stated in a statement annexed to a joint affidavit with his wife dated 3 March 2026 that he is currently undergoing treatment for prostate cancer and is unable to attend Court in person. In that same statement he also said that he “authorise[s] [his] wife Zhiying to speak on [his] behalf”. A further affidavit dated 16 March 2026 annexed a letter dated 11 March 2026 from Dr Thomas Gardiner (of the Launceston Medical Centre) which says that Mr Foster “is currently undergoing monitoring and management for a number of chronic conditions, and thus it would be in his best interest if he was able to attend the court hearing via virtually if required”.

16    Given I have determined that Ms Chang will be removed as a party to the proceeding, the balance of these reasons will simply refer to the applicant (being Mr Foster).

The Tribunal’s decision

Character test

17    The Tribunal found that Mr Zhu did not pass the character test, as he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. The Tribunal found that this was the case regardless of the fact that the sentence in question was that of a foreign jurisdiction and the fact that Mr Zhu was in the process of challenging his sentence via an appellate procedure: TD [35]–[43]. Accordingly, the Tribunal turned to consider whether it should exercise its discretion to refuse the visa: TD [44].

18    As the Tribunal noted at TD [12] and [45], “Direction no. 99 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA” provided guidance on the exercise of the discretionary power under s 501. Pursuant to s 499(2A) of the Act, a decision-maker must comply with a direction given under s 499; that is, the Tribunal was required to comply with Direction no. 99 (note that Direction no. 99 was revoked on 21 June 2024 with the commencement of Direction no. 110).

19    Direction no. 99 provided for the following primary considerations:

(1)    protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;

(2)    whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence;

(3)    the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia;

(4)    the best interests of minor children in Australia; and

(5)    expectations of the Australian community.

20    Direction no. 99 then provided for “other considerations” which had to be considered where relevant and included (but were not limited to):

(1)    legal consequences of the decision;

(2)    extent of impediments if removed;

(3)    impact on victims; and

(4)    impact on Australian business interests.

21    The Tribunal set out the above primary and other considerations at TD [46]–[47] and then considered each in turn. In summary, the Tribunal found there were three relevant considerations, being primary considerations one, three and five: protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct; strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia; and expectations of the Australian community.

Protection of the Australian community

22    The Tribunal acknowledged that there was considerable uncertainty as to the conduct for which Mr Zhu was convicted, as there were no sentencing remarks and Mr Zhu denied the offending. It noted that Mr Zhu had provided three different narratives of the events that led to him being convicted: TD [51]–[60]. It further noted Mr Zhu’s and his parents’ evidence regarding the basis on which he was charged and convicted, which was to the effect that Mr Zhu had touched a young girl’s buttocks and (in the case of the evidence of the applicant and Ms Chang) breasts: TD [61]–[64].

23    The Tribunal observed that an alternative source of information as to the nature and seriousness of Mr Zhu’s offending was the length of the sentence imposed. It found that an 18-month sentence of imprisonment was not a “light sentence reflecting a minor infraction”: TD [67]. In this regard, it refused to make findings on Mr Zhu’s claims that both his conviction and sentence were a product of corruption, as it considered that it could not impugn the essential facts underpinning his conviction and sentence: TD [68]–[73].

24    The Tribunal considered whether Mr Zhu had provided false or misleading information to the Department, including by not disclosing prior criminal offending. It noted that, even if it accepted that the applicant and Ms Chang had completed his visa application form (with the assistance of a migration agent said to have acted improperly), Mr Zhu’s evidence at hearing was that he had allowed incorrect information about his offending to be included in his application form because he believed he was not guilty: TD [74]–[80]. However, the Tribunal made no adverse finding about Mr Zhu in relation to a notarial certificate which did not display his offending, finding that the content of the certificate was likely the product of an administrative error: TD [81]–[83].

25    In light of the sexual nature of Mr Zhu’s past offence and the severity of the sentence imposed, as well as Mr Zhu’s provision of incorrect information to the Department, the Tribunal placed “considerable weight” on the nature and seriousness of his conduct: TD [85].

26    In relation to Mr Zhu’s risk of reoffending, the Tribunal noted a number of matters in his favour, namely: his conviction for a single offence, his positive character references, his ties in China that he would not wish to jeopardise by spending time in an Australian prison, and the fact that he was only visiting Australia for a short period of time: TD [88]–[103]. It also accepted that there were “some” compassionate grounds to allow him to visit his parents, albeit the weight to be given to that matter was lessened given his family could visit him in China: TD [104]–[108]. Having regard to these matters, the Tribunal placed limited weight on Mr Zhu’s risk of reoffending: TD [109].

27    Coupling Mr Zhu’s risk of reoffending with the nature and seriousness of his past conduct, the Tribunal found that the protection of the Australian community weighed moderately in favour of refusal: TD [110].

Strength, nature and duration of ties

28    The Tribunal found that the applicant and Ms Chang reside in Australia and that there were reasons why recently it had been difficult for them to visit Mr Zhu. It further noted that Ms Chang had suffered emotional hardship as a result of her son’s inability to visit her. However, it observed that, if Mr Zhu was successful in his appeal against his conviction, he could reapply for the visa without “character concerns”. The Tribunal gave Mr Zhu’s ties to Australia “some weight” against refusal: TD [113]–[118].

Expectations of the Australian community

29    The Tribunal found that Mr Zhu had been convicted of a serious crime. Therefore, the Australian community’s deemed expectation was that he not hold a visa. The Tribunal found this factor weighed considerably in favour of refusal: TD [123]–[124].

Conclusion

30    Having regard to the above, the Tribunal noted that the weight it ascribed to the protection of the Australian community and the strength, nature and duration of ties was equal. However, in light of the weight it gave to the Australian community’s expectations, it exercised its discretion to refuse the visa: TD [131].

The applicant’s case

Application for an extension of time and accompanying documents

31    On 10 July 2023, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time in which to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. An extension of 42 days is required.

32    Annexed to the application is a statement from Ms Chang headed “reasons for requesting extension of time”, in which she states that she is learning English and needed the help of a translator to understand and prepare court documents and cites an inability to afford a lawyer.

33    A draft originating application was not provided with the application. However, the application is supported by a joint affidavit of the applicant and Ms Chang made 23 May 2023. That affidavit attaches two statements. The first of those statements is in the nature of a submission to the Tribunal, inviting it to rehear the application for merits review, complaining that “two days in the AAT is not enough” and stating that the Tribunal failed to inform them of the “need to hire our lawyers”. The second of those statements, although addressed to the presiding Judge for this application, is also in the nature of a submission to a Tribunal member and makes various submissions about Mr Zhu’s offending and why he should be granted a visa.

Further material filed by the applicants

34    On 10 April 2026, the applicant filed an outline of submissions and 13 further joint affidavits.

35    The outline of submissions is essentially in the format of a draft originating application, and advances five grounds of review. In summary, the arguments advanced in that document are as follows:

(a)    Ground 1: the Tribunal failed to consider a mandatory relevant consideration, being evidence that a foreign conviction was affected by corruption, that the conviction may have been coerced, and that Chinese court records were missing or unreliable.

(b)    Ground 2: the Tribunal misunderstood the law by treating the principles regarding impugning convictions as preventing any consideration of the reliability of the conviction and the surrounding circumstances.

(c)    Ground 3: the Tribunal made legally unreasonable findings to give considerable weight to the nature and seriousness of Mr Zhu’s past conduct based on the length of his sentence and to refuse the visa. The Tribunal’s findings are said to be unreasonable in circumstances where the Tribunal relied on the length of the sentence imposed while simultaneously acknowledging evidence of Mr Zhu’s good character, evidentiary gaps about his offending and potential corruption in relation to his offending.

(d)    Ground 4: the Tribunal failed to properly apply Direction no. 99 by relying on the label of the offence rather than proven conduct, failing to “meaningfully engage with uncertainty in factual findings”, and conducting an internally inconsistent balancing exercise by “finding low risk, yet giving moderate weight to refusal”.

(e)    Ground 5: the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by “excluding corruption evidence”, misconstruing its function and failing to properly weigh critical considerations.

36    In large part, the attachments to the 13 further joint affidavits make submissions about Mr Zhu’s character and the circumstances of his past offending, complain about the Department’s conduct, pose rhetorical questions to the Department and Tribunal, and extract documents that were before the Tribunal. Those matters do not disclose any arguable jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision.

37    However, one relevant matter that arises from the 13 further joint affidavits is the repeated argument of ‘insufficient time’ being given to the applicant at the Tribunal hearing: for example, at page 15 of the joint affidavit accepted for filing at 12.54.38 pm on 10 April 2026, the applicant repeats the claim made in the affidavit that accompanied the application for an extension of time that they were not given “sufficient time to articulate the grounds and significance of our appeal”.

Consideration

Extension of time – relevant principles

38    The Court may extend the 35-day period within which a person may seek judicial review of a migration decision with this Court if an application is made to the Court in the required form and the Court is satisfied it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order.

39    There are no mandatory relevant considerations for the making of an order extending time (save for the interests of the administration of justice): Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579 at [12] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ) and see [39] (Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ). However, the Court will typically have regard to the length of the delay in seeking judicial review, whether there is an adequate explanation for that delay, prejudice to the Minister or third parties, and the merits of the underlying application: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344 at 348–349 (Wilcox J), referred to with approval in Tu’uta Katoa at [13].

40    In considering the merits of the underlying application, the Court “is not required to go into too great a detail, but is to ‘assess the merits in a fairly rough and ready way’”: BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33(e)] (Yates, Wheelahan and O’Bryan JJ) and the cases there cited, and see Tu’uta Katoa at [17] (it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a “reasonably impressionistic level”). An order extending time will not be made if the proposed appeal (or review) has no reasonable prospects of success; that is, where the case is devoid of merit, is hopeless, or is unarguable: BQQ15 at [33(e)].

Prejudice to the Minister

41    The Minister accepts that there is no specific prejudice to him in the grant of an extension of time that cannot be remedied by an order for costs. However, the absence of prejudice, of itself, is insufficient to warrant the grant of an extension of time.

42    Further, the Minister submits that there is a public interest in the prompt disposition of allegations that Commonwealth officers have acted in excess of jurisdiction and he does have an interest in the timely disposal of visa applications that would be prejudiced by the grant of an extension of time.

Length of, and explanation for, the delay

43    In my view, the delay in seeking review – 42 days – is not insignificant, and has not been adequately explained. The fact that Ms Chang has limited English does not provide an adequate explanation for that delay, particularly in circumstances where she has no standing to be a party (and I will make an order removing her as a party) and where her husband, Mr Foster, understands English. Further, a lack of legal representation and/or sufficient funds does not provide an adequate explanation for a delay in seeking review: GOK18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 169 at [25] (Collier, Rangiah and Derrington JJ), BQQ15 at [38].

Merits of the proposed application

44    For the reasons that follow, I am of the view that the merits of the applicant’s proposed grounds of review are poor and that the application is not sufficiently meritorious to warrant the grant of an extension of time.

Proposed grounds 1 and 2

45    Although proposed grounds 1 and 2 are framed differently, they turn on the same question – could the Tribunal make findings of fact about the reliability of Mr Zhu’s conviction and his allegations of ‘corruption’ leading up to that conviction? The Tribunal correctly concluded that it could not.

46    Where the existence of a conviction or sentence is the jurisdictional precondition to the exercise of a power, the essential factual bases of the conviction or sentence cannot be impugned by the decision-maker: HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 202; 273 FCR 121 at [56], [63], [77]–[79] (McKerracher J, Colvin J agreeing at [179]–[182]), see also Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v LLF [2018] VSCA 155 at [42] (Beach, McLeish and Niall JJA). Here, the Tribunal’s discretion to refuse the visa was enlivened by the fact that Mr Zhu had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. In this regard, the Minister submits that s 501(7)(c) of the Act is unqualified by geographical or jurisdictional limitations; it applies to both Australian and foreign sentences of imprisonment: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Darnia-Wilson [2022] FCAFC 28; 289 FCR 72 at [26] (Rares J, Bromwich J agreeing at [45] and Goodman J agreeing at [51]).

47    The core submission advanced before the Tribunal by the applicant was that Mr Zhu’s sentence of imprisonment (including the conviction on which it was based) was a product of corruption. The Tribunal correctly held at TD [39]–[43], after discussing HZCP and Darnia-Wilson, that the Tribunal could not go behind the conviction in relation to whether Mr Zhu passed the character test. The Tribunal’s approach of refusing to engage with and make findings of fact on the applicant’s evidence as to ‘corruption’ was entirely proper.

Proposed ground 3

48    No legal unreasonableness (or, perhaps more appropriately, irrationality or illogicality) is disclosed by the Tribunal’s reliance on the length of Mr Zhu’s sentence of imprisonment in evaluating the nature and seriousness of his past conduct; that exact mode of reasoning is contemplated by Direction no. 99: see paras 8.1.1(c) and 8.1(2).

49    This proposed ground otherwise points to matters which were in Mr Zhu’s favour (evidence of his good character) or which were neutral (“evidentiary gaps about his offending”) with a view to disputing the Tribunal’s finding.

50    Such disagreement with the finding made is not the proper standard of scrutiny for legal unreasonableness or irrationality/illogicality: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99 at [148]. As Gageler CJ, Steward and Jagot JJ said in GXT25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] HCA 32 at [44] (footnotes omitted):

As explained otherwise in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [[2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611], the question of legal unreasonableness and illogicality ultimately involves deciding if, on the material, the conclusion reached was open or not. If the conclusion is one in respect of which, on the available material, “different minds might reach different conclusions”, it cannot be said that the conclusion is legally unreasonable or illogical. That is, “[u]nreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification”.

51    I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s conclusion did not lack an evident and intelligible justification.

Proposed ground 4

52    No error is disclosed by the Tribunal’s reliance on the label of the offence when evaluating the nature and seriousness of Mr Zhu’s conduct. The name of the offence made clear that it was of a sexual nature. The Tribunal correctly understood that an offence of that nature engaged para 8.1.1(1)(a)(i) of Direction no. 99, which provided that it was viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and Australian community. The Tribunal was obliged to take those views into account when conducting its assessment of the nature and seriousness of Mr Zhu’s conduct, and it did so.

53    It is difficult to ascertain what the applicant’s claim that the Tribunal failed to “meaningfully engage with uncertainty in factual findings” is directed towards. Absent any meaningful elaboration, it does not disclose an arguable jurisdictional error.

54    The applicant’s claim that the Tribunal made “internally inconsistent” findings that Mr Zhu was “… low risk yet giving moderate weight to refusal” is also without merit. Direction no. 99 required that, when assessing the protection of the Australian community, the Tribunal consider both the nature and seriousness of Mr Zhu’s previous conduct and the risk he posed to the Australian community. The Tribunal’s attribution of moderate weight to that consideration was a product of its findings that Mr Zhu’s past (very serious) conduct attracted considerable weight and that his risk of reoffending attracted limited weight. When regard is had to the weight that the Tribunal gave to the nature and seriousness of Mr Zhu’s past conduct, there is no internal inconsistency between the Tribunal’s overall finding on the weight to be given to the protection of the Australian community and Mr Zhu’s risk of reoffending.

Proposed ground 5

55    Proposed ground 5 does not contain any meaningful elaboration and appears to rely on arguments made under other proposed grounds. It lacks merit for the same reasons as the other proposed grounds lack merit.

Further arguments

56    Some of the other documents filed by the applicant argue that a two-day hearing was insufficient. No explanation has been provided as to why that (relatively lengthy) period of time was insufficient and there is no evidence before the Court suggesting that, in the two days provided, the applicant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case.

57    The complaint that the Tribunal failed to inform the applicant of the “need” to hire a lawyer is without merit. The applicant was not prohibited from appearing without a legal representative and procedural fairness did not require that he be legally represented.

Availability of a more appropriate remedy

58    Unlike a person who has been the subject of a cancellation or mandatory cancellation decision, it is open to Mr Zhu to make a fresh application for a visa at any time (including after any successful appeal from his conviction). The availability of that course of action further weighs against the grant of an extension of time.

Disposition

59    The application for an extension of time will be refused, with costs.

60    It is also necessary to amend the name of the first respondent to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

I certify that the preceding sixty (60) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anderson.

Associate:

Dated:    20 November 2026