Federal Court of Australia
CYKF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1749
File number: | NSD 724 of 2025 |
Judgment of: | WIGNEY J |
Date of judgment: | 9 November 2026 |
Date of published reasons: | 17 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applicant’s application for adjournment of final hearing – where adjournment application opposed by the first respondent – consideration of s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether within the interests of the administration of justice to vacate final hearing date – adjournment application dismissed – applicant provided extension of time to file any further amended application and submissions |
Legislation: | Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M |
Cases cited: | EGH19 v Commonwealth of Australia [2026] HCA 7 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | New South Wales |
National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |
Number of paragraphs: | 19 |
Date of hearing: | 9 November 2026 |
Solicitor for the Applicant: | Mrs W Milojkovic |
Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms F McNeil |
Solicitor for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
Counsel for the Second Respondent: | The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs |
ORDERS
NSD 724 of 2025 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | CYKF Applicant | |
AND: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP First Respondent ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent | |
order made by: | WIGNEY J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 10 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to the “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2. Orders 1 to 3 of the orders made on 29 June 2026 be vacated.
3. The applicant have leave to file and serve any further amended originating application, giving complete particulars of each ground of review, on or before 13 November 2026.
4. The applicant file and serve written submissions, and a list of authorities, on or before 13 November 2026.
5. The first respondent file and serve written submissions, and a list of authorities, on or before 23 November 2026.
6. The applicant’s application to vacate the hearing be dismissed, and the hearing date of 26 November 2026 at 10:15am be confirmed.
7. The costs of the case management hearing of 9 November 2026, and the applicant’s application to vacate the hearing, be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)
WIGNEY J:
1 The applicant in this matter has applied to have the hearing of his application vacated, ostensibly on the basis that his solicitor needs to retain new counsel to give him further advice. That application is opposed by the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. For the reasons that follow, the applicant’s application to vacate the hearing must be refused, though he should be given a short extension of time to allow him to file a further amended application, should he wish to do so, along with written submissions.
2 The applicant commenced this proceeding as long ago as 7 May 2025. The originating application, as initially filed, sought constitutional writs quashing a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and directing the Tribunal to determine his review application according to law. The Tribunal’s decision, which was the subject of the applicant’s challenge, was its decision to affirm a decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the applicant a protection visa.
3 The applicant’s originating application was listed for a first case management hearing on 2 July 2025. At that case management hearing, a referral certificate was issued with a view to securing pro bono legal assistance for the applicant. The application was listed for a final hearing on 13 August 2025 and programming orders were made in respect of the filing of any amended originating application and the filing of written submissions and lists of authorities.
4 On 11 August 2025, further orders were made, by consent, extending the time within which the applicant could file an amended originating application. The hearing of the application was also vacated and the matter was listed for hearing on 27 August 2025.
5 On 14 August 2025, the applicant, who by this time had secured legal representation, filed an amended originating application. In the amended originating application, the applicant no longer challenged or sought any relief in respect of the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse him a protection visa. Rather, he sought a writ of habeas corpus and a mandatory injunction requiring the Minister to remove alleged “restraints” on his liberty arising from various conditions of his Bridging Visa R, which had been issued on 11 December 2024.
6 The matter was relisted for a further case management hearing two days before the date was listed for hearing. On that occasion, the hearing was again vacated and an order was made holding the proceeding in abeyance pending the determination of proceedings in the High Court of Australia in EGH19 v Commonwealth of Australia [2026] HCA 7. The parties were ordered to have the matter relisted for a case management hearing within 14 days of becoming aware of the resolution of the proceeding in the High Court. The Court was advised that the relief sought by the applicant in his amended application hinged on the decision of the High Court in EGH19. That case concerned, in brief terms, the constitutional validity of certain conditions of Bridging R (Subclass 070) visas. The applicant contended that some of the conditions of his Bridging R visa were unlawful constraints.
7 The High Court ultimately delivered its judgment in EGH19 on 18 March 2026. Within a week of the handing down of that judgment, the Minister’s solicitors wrote to the applicant’s solicitor in respect of the listing of the matter for further case management. Further correspondence ensued between the Minister’s solicitors and the applicant’s solicitor in respect of the listing of the matter. It is unnecessary to go into the detail of that correspondence, save as to say that from as early as April 2026 the applicant's solicitor was indicating that she was awaiting counsel’s further advice in respect of the conduct of the proceeding. The matter was eventually listed for a further case management hearing on 29 June 2026, largely on the insistence of the Minister’s solicitors.
8 At the case management hearing on 29 June 2026 the matter was listed for a final hearing on 26 November 2026 at 10.15 am. The applicant was ordered to file any further amended originating application giving complete particulars of each ground of review on or before 6 August 2026, and to file and serve written submissions and a list of authorities on or before 29 October 2026.
9 The applicant did not file any further amended originating application on or before 6 August 2026. That prompted the Minister’s solicitor to write to the applicant’s solicitor with a view to ascertaining whether the applicant proposed to proceed with his application given the outcome EGH19.
10 It is again unnecessary to detail the contents of the correspondence that flowed between the Minister’s solicitors and the applicant’s solicitor. It is sufficient to note that on 24 August 2026, the applicant’s solicitor indicated that she anticipated receiving advice from counsel regarding any amended application and the “appropriate way forward” by 1 September 2026. Subsequent correspondence indicated that the applicant’s solicitor anticipated that the applicant would either file an amended application, or notify the respondent that the applicant did not intend to file an amended application, by 8 September 2026.
11 That did not occur. That prompted the Minister’s solicitor to again write to the applicant’s solicitor. On this occasion, the Minister’s solicitor sought confirmation as to whether the applicant intended to rely on the existing amended application and requested the applicant to provide proper particulars of the factual and jurisdictional basis of the relief sought. On 23 September 2026, the applicant’s solicitor again communicated with the Minister’s solicitor and advised that she was awaiting further advice from counsel. She requested further time to obtain that advice. Similar correspondence followed in which the applicant’s solicitor effectively foreshadowed an application to vacate the hearing. The matter was eventually relisted to address any such application.
12 The applicant’s application to vacate the hearing was made orally, rather than by way of interlocutory application, and was not supported by any affidavit or documentary evidence. In written submissions lodged with the Court on the morning of the hearing, the applicant’s solicitor indicated, in essence, that the barrister that she had previously retained had been “unable to assist with the preparation of the applicant’s proceedings within the existing timetable” due to the barrister having suffered a family bereavement and, more recently, an injury. The applicant’s solicitor also indicated that she had “approached” four barristers, who were not named, but that none of whom were able to “undertake the necessary work within the existing timetable.” The applicant’s solicitor also indicated that another barrister, who was named, had initially advised that she was available to assist, but had subsequently advised that she was not available. The applicant’s solicitor also indicated that she too had been unwell and that her husband had been hospitalised in recent times.
13 As has already been noted, none of those assertions in the applicant’s solicitor’s written submissions were supported by affidavit or documentary evidence.
14 At the hearing of the application to vacate the final hearing, the applicant’s solicitor was asked to outline the orders that she proposed to seek on behalf of the applicant at the final hearing and the basis upon which those orders were to be sought. The applicant’s solicitor was unable to articulate any coherent response to that query, other than to say that her client’s case was very unique and complex, and that the applicant needed time to seek and obtain counsel’s advice. The applicant’s solicitor did, however, suggest that the applicant proposed to press for the orders in the existing amended originating application on the grounds there stated. It was, however, entirely unclear exactly what constraints imposed by the conditions of the applicant’s bridging visa were said to be invalid and on what basis.
15 This proceeding has now been on foot for over 16 months. The applicant has had, in my view, ample opportunity to obtain the advice of counsel. He has been granted extensions of time and other indulgences in relation to the preparation of the hearing on several previous occasions. While it may be the case that his existing counsel has become unavailable to assist in recent times, the applicant has since then had ample opportunity to retain new counsel to advise and appear, if necessary. There is no adequate or reasonable explanation for why the applicant has apparently been unable to obtain the assistance of new counsel. There is certainly no affidavit evidence to that effect. The applicant is, in any event, currently represented by a solicitor who has qualifications and experience in respect of migration law. There is no explanation for why that solicitor has been unable to provide the applicant with timely assistance in respect of the further conduct of the proceeding.
16 In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate, or in the interests of justice, to further delay the proceeding by vacating the hearing of the application once again. While I accept that the applicant may be in the somewhat invidious position of not presently having the assistance of experienced counsel to appear for him at the hearing in just over two weeks’ time, I am far from persuaded that he has provided a satisfactory explanation for how that state of affairs has come about. Nor am I entirely convinced that the applicant’s solicitor will, even at this late stage, be unable to obtain the assistance of a barrister who is available to appear at the hearing, or that the applicant’s solicitor will be unable to competently advise and represent the applicant even if counsel cannot be retained.
17 In considering the application to vacate the hearing, it is necessary and appropriate to consider not just the applicant’s interests, but also the interests of the administration of justice more broadly. It should be noted, in that context, that s 37M(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides that:
The overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes:
(a) according to law; and
(b) as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible.
18 Section 37M(2) of the Act provides that:
Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the overarching purpose includes the following objectives:
(a) the just determination of all proceedings before the Court;
(b) the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court;
(c) the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload;
(d) the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner;
(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.
19 Given the history of the matter to date, it would, in my view, be manifestly inconsistent with the overarching purpose to vacate the hearing once again. It is for those reasons that I propose to refuse the application to vacate the hearing. As foreshadowed earlier, however, it is appropriate to provide the applicant with a short extension of time in which to file and serve any further amended application and any written submissions he may wish to file.
I certify that the preceding nineteen (19) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wigney. |
Associate:
Dated: 17 November 2026