Federal Court of Australia

LGC24 v Assistant Minister for Citizenship, Customs and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 1748

File number(s):

NSD 1569 of 2026

NSD 1826 of 2026

Judgment of:

O'CALLAGHAN J

Date of judgment:

19 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – judicial review – separate applications by husband and wife to review a personal decision of the Assistant Minister for Citizenship, Customs and Multicultural Affairs to refuse their respective applications for a Protection (Class XA) visa – where refusal on character grounds – Where separate decisions made by Minister 80 days apart – where Minister overlooked wife’s claim in respect of the child of the husband and wife – where Minister found to have had knowledge of wife’s claim when later refusing husband’s application – where Minister ought to have had regard to the claim in determining husband’s application – applications for review of Minister’s decision allowed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476A, s 501(1), s 501(3)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 30.11(d)

Cases cited:

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506

Plaintiff M1 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582

Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 254 CLR 28

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

52

Date of last submission/s:

2 November 2026

Date of hearing:

15 October 2026

Counsel for the Applicants:

Mr T Bagley, Mr P Berg and Mr R McCaw

Solicitor for the Applicants:

Milojkovic Visa & Migration Legal Services

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr T Liu

Solicitor for the Respondent:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1569 of 2026

BETWEEN:

LGC24

Applicant

AND:

ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR CITIZENSHIP, CUSTOMS AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

order made by:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    A writ of certiorari issue, directed to the respondent, quashing the decision of the respondent made on 4 May 2026.

2.    The respondent is restrained, whether personally or by his officers, delegates, agents or howsoever otherwise, from acting upon, giving effect to, or taking any further step on the basis that the decision of the respondent made on 4 May 2026 was a valid decision under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

3.    A writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent, requiring the respondent to determine the applicant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) visa made on 20 June 2024 according to law.

4.    The respondent pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

NSD 1826 of 2026

BETWEEN:

JSP26

Applicant

AND:

ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR CITIZENSHIP, CUSTOMS AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

order made by:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 november 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    A writ of certiorari issue, directed to the respondent, quashing the decision of the respondent made on 23 July 2026.

2.    The respondent is restrained, whether personally or by his officers, delegates, agents or howsoever otherwise, from acting upon, giving effect to, or taking any further step on the basis that the decision of the respondent made on 23 July 2026 was a valid decision under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

3.    A writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent, requiring the respondent to determine the applicant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) visa made on 20 June 2024 according to law.

4.    The respondent pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

Introduction

1    These reasons concern applications for judicial review brought by a husband and wife (the applicants) respectively under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), challenging separate personal decisions of the respondent, the Assistant Minister for Citizenship, Customs and Multicultural Affairs, to refuse their applications made on the same date for a Protection (Class XA) visa under the Act, in the wife’s case under s 501(1) and in the husband’s case under s 501(3) of the Act.

2    I ordered pursuant to r 30.11(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that the proceedings be heard together. The applications were heard expeditiously because I formed the view that the circumstances, set out in email correspondence from the applicants’ lawyers to the court dated 11 September 2026 and the affidavit of LGC24 affirmed 25 August 2026, warranted their prompt hearing and determination.

3    In these reasons, I shall generally refer to the applicant LGC24 as the wife, the applicant JSP26 as the husband and XB as the child.

The two applications

4    The applicants relied on separate further amended originating applications for review both filed on 13 October 2026, contending that in denying them their Protection (Class XA) visas:

(1)    in the case of the wife, the Minister ignored or overlooked an articulated claim in the wife’s representations about the child; and

(2)    in the case of the husband (who was not permitted to make representations because the Minister elected to proceed without natural justice), the Minister ignored, overlooked or misunderstood relevant facts or materials or a substantial clearly articulated argument.

5    In both cases the applicants also contended that the decision was legally unreasonable for essentially the same reasons, and that the (jurisdictional) error was material.

LGC24

6    The wife is a national of Indonesia. She first arrived in Australia in January 2011, aged 22.

7    On 29 September 2017, following a plea of guilty, she was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales of dealing with property reasonably suspected of being proceeds of crime. She was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended on her entering a two-year good behaviour bond.

8    She applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 20 June 2024. She conceded that she did not pass the character test.

9    On 9 September 2024 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal found that the child was a refugee in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations, because there was a real chance that she would be subject to harassment, discrimination and denial of basic services in Indonesia as the child of her parents’ “interfaith or unregistered marriage”.

10    She provided the following material to the Minister in support of her application for a Protection visa: a statutory declaration dated 19 October 2024, a Personal Circumstances Form dated 28 November 2024 and, on 11 December 2024, a letter from her solicitors together with a submission from counsel.

11    The wife made the following claims before the Minister in respect of the child:

    she has a severe phonological speech delay;

    therapists have recommended that her parents speak to her only in English;

    she cannot speak Bahasa Indonesia; and

    she would be significantly disadvantaged in accessing the educational and therapeutic support she needs if required to live in Indonesia.

12    On 4 May 2026, being satisfied that refusal of the visa was in the national interest, the Minister exercised the discretion under s 501(1) to refuse her visa application.

JSP26

13    The husband is also an Indonesian national. He is now 45 years old. He arrived in Australia in 2014.

14    On 17 November 2017, he was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales of dealing with property reasonably suspected of being proceeds of crime. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment to be served by way of an intensive correction order.

15    He applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 20 June 2024. He did not pass the character test.

16    The Minister proceeded under s 501(3) of the Act without affording the husband an opportunity to be heard. The material before the Minister concerning the child comprised material provided by the Department, including the Tribunal’s decision of 9 September 2024 and the husband’s submissions in support of his earlier application for a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) visa.

17    On 23 July 2026, being satisfied that refusal of the visa was in the national interest, the Minister exercised the discretion under s 501(3) to refuse his visa application.

The Minister’s reasons

LGC24

18    The Minister considered the protection of the Australian community, the wife’s ties to Australia, the best interests of the child, the expectations of the Australian community, the legal consequences of the decision, and the impediments she would face if removed to Indonesia.

19    Under the heading “Best interests of minor children” at [88] to [95], the Minister reasoned as follows:

88    In considering whether to refuse to grant [LGC24] a visa, I was mindful of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Australia is a signatory, and treated the best interests of any affected minor children in Australia as a primary consideration.

89    The information before me indicates that there is one minor child whose interests would be impacted by an adverse decision, being her daughter [XB] born 10 February 2021 …

90    [LGC24] claims that her daughter would be adversely affected by a refusal decision for the following reasons:

•    [XB] has been diagnosed with a severe phonological speech delay and her therapists have recommended her parents only speak to her in English to support her development. A decision to refuse [LGC24] a visa would force [XB] to return to Indonesia with her parents where she would suffer a significant disadvantage in accessing educational and therapeutic supports for her condition. She would also suffer not being able to speak Bahasa Indonesia and would be challenged by her access to education and therapies.

•     If [XB] were to have to return to Indonesia with her parents, she may face discrimination from being unable to prove her legal status, be unable to access certain rights and benefits such as health and education, may encounter obstacles for inheritance rights and be subjected to societal stigmas. [XB] may also not be afforded the same legal rights due to her parents having an unregistered marriage.

91    I accept that [LGC24] and her daughter share a close relationship as claimed and that [LGC24] plays a positive parental role in [XB’s] life.

92    I note that [XB] is the subject of a finding by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) on 9 September 2024 that the child satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Act meaning that she has been found to engage Australia's non-refoulement obligations as a refugee.

93    The key findings by the Tribunal in respect of [XB] (paragraphs 58 to 64), where if she was to return to Indonesia, [XB] may be the subject of harassment, discrimination and denial of basic services for reason of being a child of an interfaith and unregistered marriage. Therefore, if [XB] meets the remaining visa criteria, I note that she may be eligible for the grant of a Protection visa and will have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely.

94    [LGC24] submits that if her visa is refused and she is removed from Australia, the family unit would be broken and the consequences for [XB] would be severe. I note that [XB] is only four (sic, she is five) years of age and has a close relationship with her mother. Therefore, I accept that separation from her mother during her formative years will have a significant adverse impact on [XB] and her wellbeing.

95    I find that it is in the best interests of [XB] that I grant [LGC24] a visa to allow her to continue to have a direct and personal relationship with her mother. I have given this consideration significant weight against visa refusal.

(References omitted.)

20    As I will explain, paragraph 90 is critical.

21    Under the heading “Legal consequences of the decision” at [107], the Minister said:

107    I have also had regard to the possibility that if [LGC24’s] visa is refused and she is subject to removal, she may decide to return to Indonesia with her family unit. I note the Tribunal did not make a protection finding for [LGC24] and her husband, finding that they could have their marriage registered in Indonesia and that there was nothing before the Tribunal to indicate that they would suffer serious harm. Given that [XB] has been found to engage Australia's non-refoulement obligations, should they return to Indonesia, [XB] may be the subject of harassment, discrimination and denial of basic services for reason of being a child of an interfaith and unregistered marriage. I consider this is not the intended consequences for someone who has been found to be owed protection obligations. I have also considered that should the family unit choose to return to Indonesia [LGC24] and her husband could have their marriage registered, which may reduce the likelihood of [XB] being subject to discrimination and harassment.

JSP26

22    In his reasons in respect of the husband, the Minister noted that the “national interest” is an undefined concept that is largely a political question, citing Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 254 CLR 28 at [40], and considered that the protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the Australian community were relevant considerations in assessing the national interest. The Minister considered the seriousness of the husband’s conviction, the inconsistency of his accounts of his offending, and expressed concerns about the genuineness of his claimed rehabilitation. The Minister also took into account further evidence that the husband had been engaged in other conduct connected to money laundering, including a number of transfers that were just below the reporting threshold, and suspected that he had given a false or misleading answer in his visa application. The Minister concluded that there was a likelihood of the husband reoffending, that the expectations of the Australian community weighed in favour of refusal, and that refusal was in the national interest.

23    In considering whether to exercise the discretion under s 501(3), the Minister considered the husband’s ties to Australia, including the length of time he had lived in Australia, his family ties, his ties to his local community and church, and the positive contribution he had made through his employment. In particular, the Minister noted that, should the husband’s visa application be refused, his existing bridging visa would be cancelled, and he would become an unlawful non-citizen, liable to detention and to removal to Indonesia. The Minister accepted that his wife and the child would be “practically, financially and emotionally impacted” by that outcome, and gave that matter significant weight against refusal. He found that the husband’s ties to Australia, as a whole, weigh “very strongly” against refusal.

24    Under the heading “Best interests of minor children” at [113] to [120], the Minister reasoned as follows:

113    In considering whether to refuse [JSP26’s] visa application, I was mindful of Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Australia is a signatory, and treated the best interests of any affected minor children in Australia as a primary consideration.

114    The information before me indicates that there is one minor child whose interests would be impacted by an adverse decision, being [his] daughter [XB] born 10 February 2021, now aged 5.

115    [XB] is the subject to a finding by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) on 9 September 2024 that she satisfies s36(2)(a) of the Act, meaning that she has been found to engage Australia’s non-refoulement obligations as a refugee and may be eligible for the grant of a permanent Protection visa.

116    The key findings by the Tribunal in respect of [XB] (paragraphs 58 to 64) are that, were she to return to Indonesia, [she] may be the subject of harassment, discrimination and denial of basic services for reasons of being a child of an interfaith and unregistered marriage. Therefore, if [XB] meets the remaining visa criteria, I note that she may be eligible for the grant of a Protection visa and will have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely.

117    The AAT decision outlines that, upon the advice of a speech therapist, [JSP26] and [LGC24] only communicate with [XB] in English. In 2023, [XB] was diagnosed with severe phonological speech sound delay. At the time of the hearing, [XB] was undertaking a schedule of 8 weekly appointments to address her speech delay.

118    I accept [JSP26] plays an active role in [XB’s] life, providing her with emotional, practical and financial support. I accept that [XB] requires medical intervention to assist with her speech delay and [JSP26] plays an active role in facilitating this.

119    [JSP26] outlines that a consequence for their daughter [XB] is that upon any return to Indonesia, her parents’ marriage will not be recognised, and the family would suffer discrimination. [XB] would experience less legal protection and rights in Indonesia and would have degraded access to education and other government services. [JSP26] also submits [XB] would be medically disadvantaged upon a return to Indonesia due to Indonesia not offering comparable vaccines to what is available in Australia. I have taken into account [JSP26’s] submissions, however as noted above [XB] is subject to a protection finding in respect of Indonesia and she will not be returned to Indonesia while the protection finding in is in place.

120    I find that it is in the best interests of [XB] that I grant [JSP26] a visa to allow her to continue to have a direct and personal relationship with her father. I have given this consideration significant weight against visa refusal.

(References omitted.)

25    Under the heading “Legal consequences of the decision” at [125], the Minister said:

125    I have had regard to the possibility that if [JSP26’s] visa were refused and he is subject to removal, he may decide to return to Indonesia with his family unit. Given that [XB] has been found to engage Australia's non-refoulement obligations, should they return to Indonesia as a family unit, [XB] may be the subject of harassment, discrimination and denial of basic services for the reason of being a child of an interfaith and unregistered marriage. I consider this is not the intended consequences for someone who has been found to be owed protection obligations. I have also considered that should the family unit choose to return to Indonesia [JSP26] and [LGC24] could have their marriage registered, which may reduce the likelihood of [XB] being subject to discrimination and harassment.

26    The departmental submission addressed to the Minister in respect of JSP26 contained the following information reminding him about the wife’s application:

29    If you wish to consider refusing [JSP26’s] visa application under s501(3) without affording him natural justice, you may proceed to do so on the basis of the information in this brief and anything else known to you.

…

35    You should note that on 4 May 2026 you made a decision to refuse [JSP26’s] wife, [LGC24’s] application for a Protection (Class XA) visa under s501(1) because you were satisfied she did not pass the character test. As a result of your decision, all other visas held, or any other visas applied for by [LGC24] have either ceased or been cancelled or refused under s501F of the Act. As noted above [LGC24] was found not to be owed protection obligations in her own right, and therefore, she is an unlawful non-citizen and liable for immigration detention. There is no legal barrier to [LGC24’s] involuntary removal to Indonesia under s197(3) of the Act.

36    In terms of [JSP26’s] (and [LGC24’s]) removal from Australia, the Department recommends that you closely consider the Convention of the Rights of the Child and the impact that separation of the family unit might have on [XB].

37    In the event you decide to refuse [JSP26’s] visa, the Department notes that there may be sensitivity associated with any detention or removal action for [JSP26] (and [LGC24]) given the indicative protection findings for their child, most notably, the welfare of the child, caring responsibilities, and the family’s ability to remain together in the event [JSP26] and [LGC24] are both detained and on a removal pathway.

38    Accordingly, the Department has not yet notified [LGC24] of her refusal decision until there is an outcome on [JSP26’s] visa consideration.

27    The Minister expressly referred to the wife’s refusal decision made (80 days) previously, at [106] (Ties to Australia), [126] (Legal consequences) and [143] (Conclusion) of his reasons, as follows:

106    [LGC24’s] Protection (Class XA) visa was refused on 4 May 2026. As a result of this refusal, all other visas held and/or pending visa applications for [LGC24] are taken to have been cancelled or refused. Therefore, [LGC24] is an unlawful non-citizen, liable for immigration detention and there is no legal barrier to her involuntary removal to Indonesia.

…

126    In the event of an adverse decision under s501 and given no protection finding has been made under s36(2)(a) or s36(2)(aa) in his own merit, there is no legal barrier to [JSP26’s] involuntary removal to Indonesia under s197(3) of the Act. The same applies to [JSP26’s] wife, [LGC24], although a refusal decision has already been made in relation to her Protection (Class XA) application.

…

143    I have found that [JSP26] does not engage Australia’s non-refoulment obligations and no protection finding in his favour has been made. He will therefore be liable to removal from Australia under s198 of the Act as soon as reasonably practicable, and in the meantime, be liable for detention under s189 of the Act. I also note the same applied to [JSP26’s] wife, [LGC24] as her Protection (Class XA) visa was refused. However, I have also taken into consideration the impact [JSP26’s] removal from Australia will have on his daughter [XB] and wife, [LGC24], including permanent separation of the family unit, and have given this consideration significant weight against refusing [JSP26] a visa.

The relief sought and grounds put by LGC24

28    By her further amended application, the wife sought:

(1)    A writ of certiorari issue directed to the respondent, quashing the respondent’s decision made on 4 May 2026.

(2)    A writ of prohibition issue directed to the respondent, his officers, delegates or agents, prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, or taking any further step in reliance upon the decision made on 4 May 2026.

(3)    A writ of mandamus issue directing the respondent to determine the applicant’s application according to law.

(4)    The respondent pay the applicant’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

(5)    Such further or other orders as the Court sees fit.

29    She advanced two grounds:

Ground 1 – Failure to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the best interests of the child, alternatively ignoring, overlooking or misunderstanding relevant facts or materials and a substantial and clearly articulated argument in the Applicant’s representations, including by reason of an unresolved factual inconsistency central to the assessment

Particulars

a.    The Assistant Minister (‘Minister’) was required to treat the best interests of the child, XB, as “a primary consideration”.

b.    The Minister was required to actively engage with what was actually in the best interests of XB on the available evidence and to read, identify, understand and evaluate the Applicant’s representations in response to the Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal, and to bring his mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments put forward.

c.    The Minister’s reasoning proceeds on the premise that the relevant harm to XB is permanent separation from her mother, and the Minister found that it was in XB’s best interests that the visa be granted “to allow her to continue to have a direct and personal relationship with her mother”.

d.    The Minister acknowledged that XB was subject to a protection finding and that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations were engaged.

e.    The Minister noted a claim by the Applicant that, if the Applicant’s visa was refused, that may force XB to be returned to Indonesia, where XB would face discrimination and harassment on account of the Applicant’s unregistered marriage, and would face significant obstacles in accessing educational and therapeutic supports for her severe phonological speech delay.

f.    A further claim was made that XB would further be disadvantaged on account of her inability to speak Bahasa. The claim was that:

[XB] has been diagnosed with severe phonological speech delay, and her therapists have advised us to communicate exclusively in English to support her development. A visa refusal would force [XB] to return to Indonesia, where she would face significant disadvantages in accessing the necessary educational and therapeutic support tailored to her condition. The language barrier would further delay her speech progress, as she is unable to speak Bahasa Indonesia, the primary language of instruction in schools there.

g.    The best interests of the child, and the weight properly attributable to that consideration, cannot be assessed in the abstract; it required the Minister to make findings as to the consequences that XB would actually or probably face, and treating them as a primary consideration required the Minister first to determine what in fact were XB’s best interests, rather than leaving them at the level of hypothesis of possible harm.

h.    In assessing the best interests of XB, the Minister did not consider or engage with and ignored, overlooked or misunderstood the claim and material concerning the disadvantages that XB would face if forced to return to Indonesia with the Applicant in respect of accessing educational and therapeutic services for XB’s severe phonological speech delay. In particular, the Minister did not consider or engage with and ignored, overlooked or misunderstood the material demonstrating that due to XB’s speech delay she was advised to only speak English with her and as such, XB can only speak English.

i.    The Minister also did not consider or engage with and ignored, overlooked or misunderstood the disadvantage that XB would face on account of her inability to speak Bahasa, including the likely inability of a five-year-old with severe phonological speech delay to access education.

j.    By failing to consider and make findings concerning the prospect that XB would be unable to access educational and therapeutic supports and would be disadvantaged by her inability to speak Bahasa, the Minister failed to engage in the proper, genuine and realistic consideration of the child’s best interests on the available evidence, ignored or overlooked the claim, or misunderstood its significance, and misunderstood the case being made, on a matter of objective importance to the assessment of XB’s best interests as a primary consideration.

k.    The Minister also failed to engage with, ignored, overlooked or misunderstood the practical consequences of the decision for XB, which arose on the representations and on the Minister’s own findings, including:

(i)    The immediate consequence of the decision, including the Applicant’s liability to detention and the removal from her family home to community detention and the separation from her father; and

(ii)     The long-term consequence of the decision if the Applicant took XB with her to Indonesia, which the Minister treated as a real possibility and which XB’s prospective right to remain in Australia did not answer, including the fact that her subsequently granted protection visa is subject to the standard condition 8559 and if she is returned to Indonesia “The visa could be cancelled; you may be detained or even removed from Australia. It may not be possible for you to apply for another Australian visa in the future”, a decision about which she has no practical control over as a 5-year-old minor.

Ground 2 – Legal unreasonableness / illogicality in the treatment of the best interests of the child

Particulars

The Minister’s reasoning is internally inconsistent in a manner that renders the decision legally unreasonable.

l.    In considering the best interests of the child, XB, the Minister’s reasoning proceeded on the basis that the relevant harm that XB faced was permanent separation from the Applicant.

m.    That reasoning included a finding that Australia owed protection obligations to XB, and that she may have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely.

n.    The Applicant’s child XB was granted Protection (subclass 866) on 19 August 2026.

o.    On the basis that XB would be separated from the Applicant if the Applicant was refused the visa, the Minister found that it was in XB’s best interests that the visa be granted “to allow her to continue to have a direct and personal relationship with her mother”.

p.    The conclusion at [95] necessarily assumed that XB would remain in Australia if the Applicant was removed.

q.    In considering the legal consequences of the decision, extent of impediments if removed, the Minister’s reasoning proceeded on the basis that relocating “the family unit”, which necessarily included XB, to Indonesia was a real possibility.

r.    In considering the extent of impediments if removed, the Minister’s reasoning proceeded on the basis that the Applicant would be separated from XB.

s.    The Minister’s reasoning therefore proceeded on the basis that the Applicant would be separated from XB when assessing two considerations (best interests of the child and the extent of impediments if removed, while proceeding on the basis that the family unit would return to Indonesia when considering the legal consequences of the decision.

(References to the Minister’s reasons omitted.)

The relief sought and grounds put by JSP26

30    By his amended application, the husband sought:

(1)    A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the respondent made on 23 July 2026.

(2)    A writ of prohibition issue directed to the respondent, his officers, delegates or agents, prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, or taking any further step in reliance upon the decision made on 23 July 2026.

(3)    A writ of mandamus issue directing the respondent to determine the applicant’s application according to law.

(4)    The respondent pay the applicant’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

(5)    Such further or other orders as the Court sees fit.

31    He advanced two grounds:

Ground 1 – Failure to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the best interests of the child, alternatively ignoring, overlooking or misunderstanding relevant facts or materials or a substantial clearly articulated argument, including by reason of an unresolved factual inconsistency central to the assessment

Particulars

a.    The Minister considered the best interests of the child, XB, as “a primary consideration”.

b.    The Minister was required to actively engage with what was actually in the best interests of XB on the available evidence and to read, identify, understand and evaluate the material before him, including matters which clearly arose on it, and to bring his mind to bear upon the facts stated in it and the arguments put forward.

c.    The Minister acknowledged that XB was subject to a protection finding and that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations were engaged with respect to XB.

d.    The child XB, was notified and granted Protection (subclass 866) on 19 August 2026.

e.    The Minister referred to findings made by the Administrative Appeal Tribunal that XB may be subject to harassment, discrimination and denial of basic services by reason of being the child of an unregistered interfaith marriage.

f.    The Minister noted that in 2023 XB was diagnosed with a severe phonological speech sound delay and found that the Applicant provided XB with emotional and financial support and played an active role in the treatment received by XB for her condition.

g.    A further claim was made that XB would further be disadvantaged if returned to Indonesia on account of the lack of access to education and government services, including vaccines.

h.    The best interests of the child, and the weight properly attributable to that consideration, cannot be assessed in the abstract; it required the Minister to make findings as to the consequences that XB would actually or probably face, and treating them as a primary consideration required the Minister first to determine what in fact were XB’s best interests, rather than leaving them at the level of hypothesis of possible harm.

i.    In assessing the best interests of XB, the Minister did not consider or engage with and ignored, overlooked or misunderstood the facts and materials before him concerning the disadvantages that XB would face if forced to return to Indonesia with the Applicant in respect of accessing educational and therapeutic services for XB’s severe phonological speech delay. In particular, the Minister did not consider or engage with and ignored, overlooked or misunderstood the material demonstrating that due to XB’s speech delay she was advised to only speak English with her and as such, XB can only speak English, nor did the Minister consider the serious harm that would be caused to XB by the delay in the registration of the Applicant’s marriage.

j.    The Minister also did not consider or engage with and ignored, overlooked or misunderstood the disadvantage that XB would face on account of her inability to speak Bahasa, including the likely inability of a five-year-old with severe phonological speech delay to access education.

k.    By failing to consider and make findings concerning the prospect that XB would be unable to access educational and therapeutic supports and would be disadvantaged by her inability to speak Bahasa, the Minister failed to engage in the proper, genuine and realistic consideration of the child’s best interests on the available evidence, ignored or overlooked the relevant facts and materials, or misunderstood their significance, on a matter of objective importance to the assessment of XB’s best interests as a primary consideration.

l.    The Minister also failed to engage with, ignored, overlooked or misunderstood the practical consequences of the decision for XB, which clearly arose on the material before him and on the Minister’s own findings, including:

(i)    The immediate consequence of the decision, including the removal from her family home to community detention, and the caring arrangements for XB if both of her parents were in immigration detention, a matter raised in the Department’s submission to the Minister and not addressed in the Reasons; and

(ii)    The long-term consequence of the decision if XB’s parents took her with them to Indonesia, which the Minister treated as a real possibility and which XB’s right to remain in Australia did not answer, including the fact that her subsequently granted protection visa is subject to the standard condition 8559 and if she is returned to Indonesia “The visa could be cancelled; you may be detained or even removed from Australia. It may not be possible for you to apply for another Australian visa in the future”, a decision about which she has no practical control over as a 5 year old minor.

Ground 2 – Legal unreasonableness / illogicality in the treatment of the best interests of the child and the legal consequences of the decision

Particulars

m.    In considering the best interests of minor children, the Minister proceeded on the premise that, if the Applicant were removed from Australia, he would be separated from his daughter, XB.

n.    That assessment proceeded on the basis that XB was the subject of a protection finding and may have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely.

o.    In reaching a conclusion concerning the best interests of XB, the Minister did not consider the prospect that XB would be returned to Indonesia with the Applicant.

p.    In considering the extent of impediments if removed to Indonesia, the Minister again proceeded on the basis that if the Applicant were removed from Australia, he would be separated from XB, and weighed that consideration on that basis of the impediments the Applicant alone would face.

q.    In reaching a conclusion concerning the extent of impediments if removed, the Minister did not consider the prospect that XB would be returned to Indonesia with the Applicant.

r.    In considering the legal consequences of the decision, the Minister proceeded on a materially different and inconsistent premise, namely that the Applicant may return to Indonesia with his “family unit”.

s.    The Minister’s reasoning therefore proceeded on the basis that the Applicant would be separated from XB when assessing two considerations (best interests of the child and the extent of impediments if removed, while proceeding on the basis that the family unit would return to Indonesia when considering the legal consequences of the decision.

(References to the Minister’s reasons omitted.)

Further submissions

32    During the course of the hearing, the question arose as to whether, and if so, how, in deciding the husband’s application, the Minister could be said to have notice of the wife’s claims in respect of the child, set out in the first dot point of [90] of the Minister’s reasons concerning the wife.

33    I gave leave to the parties to file written submissions on the issue, which they duly did.

Consideration

The wife’s application

34    In my view, the Minister’s reasons reveal that he overlooked the wife’s claim that he summarised in dot point 1 of [90], set out at [19] above, namely that:

[the child] has been diagnosed with a severe phonological speech delay and her therapists have recommended her parents only speak to her in English to support her development. A decision to refuse [the wife] a visa would force [the child] to return to Indonesia with her parents where she would suffer a significant disadvantage in accessing educational and therapeutic supports for her condition. She would also suffer not being able to speak Bahasa Indonesia and would be challenged by her access to education and therapies.

(Reference omitted.)

35    That the Minister overlooked the claim is apparent from the structure of his reasons.

36    Paragraph 90 recorded two separate claims by the wife, in dot points 1 and 2.

37    They are obviously important claims because they deal with the best interests of the child, which is a primary consideration.

38    Dot point 2 is expressly dealt with at [93] and [107] of the Minister’s reasons.

39    But there is no further reference made to the wife’s dot point 1 claim.

40    In those circumstances, that is, where the Minister has recorded two important claims, and dealt expressly with one and not the other, it seems to me to be tolerably clear that the reasons disclose that he overlooked the latter.

41    As the High Court said in Plaintiff M1 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582 at 598-600 (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Steward JJ):

24    Consistently with well-established authority in different statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations … the decision-maker must have regard to what is said in the representations, bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them. From that point, the decision-maker might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate. The weight to be afforded to the representations is a matter for the decision-maker. And the decision-maker is not obliged to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims made by a former visa holder.

25    It is also well-established that the requisite level of engagement by the decision-maker with the representations must occur within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness. What is necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for a valid exercise of power will necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations. The requisite level of engagement – the degree of effort needed by the decision-maker – will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations. The decision-maker is not required to consider claims that are not clearly articulated or which do not clearly arise on the materials before them.

26    Labels like “active intellectual process” and “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” must be understood in their proper context. These formulas have the danger of creating a kind of general warrant, invoking language of indefinite and subjective application, in which the procedural and substantive merits of any decision-maker’s decision can be scrutinised. That is not the correct approach … The court does not substitute its decision for that of an administrative decision-maker.

27    None of the preceding analysis detracts from, or is inconsistent with, established principle that, for example, if review of a decision-maker’s reasons discloses that the decision-maker ignored, overlooked or misunderstood relevant facts or materials or a substantial and clearly articulated argument; misunderstood the applicable law; or misunderstood the case being made by the former visa holder, that may give rise to jurisdictional error.

(Footnotes and internal quotations omitted, emphasis added.)

42    There are other cases where, in the context of the whole of the decision, the recording of a submission or a representation has been held to be sufficient – that is, the recording of the submission or the representation is read as an acceptance or sufficient consideration of the claim so as to avoid the decision maker falling into jurisdictional error. But that is not this case.

43    It follows that the wife’s case should be remitted so that the overlooked claim can be considered.

The husband’s application

44    As for the husband’s claim, that too must be remitted.

45    In Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352 at 368 [62], the Full Court (Griffiths, White and Bromwich JJ) accepted that “another relevant matter to take into account in the assessment of whether the Minister did engage in the requisite intellectual process is the extent to which he may have been familiar with the matters given his previous decisions to cancel the visas of Mr Carrascalao and Mr Taulahi …” (which occurred seven or eight months beforehand).

46    It seems to me that in the particular and unusual circumstances of this case, it is tolerably clear that the Minister must have known about the wife’s claim, and that he should have turned his mind to it (but overlooked it).

47    The Minister had recorded the wife’s claim as having been made, in his reasons in respect of LGC24, only 80 days before.

48    And as counsel for the husband submitted, “[t]he JSP26 reasons about XB’s best interests, her protection finding and the possible return of the family to Indonesia repeat the LGC24 reasons almost word for word but fail to consider the [wife’s claim] (compare LGC24 Reasons [88]–[93], [107] with JSP26 Reasons [113]–[116], [125])”, which are set out above in [19]-[20] and [23]-[24], respectively.

49    As counsel for JSP26 submitted, and I agree, the better inference is that, at the JSP26 decision date, the Minister actually knew about the wife’s claim because:

[he] made the LGC24 decision personally on 4 May 2026 and his signed reasons record the Claim (LGC24 Reasons [90]). The JSP26 reasons repeatedly refer to that other refusal decision (JSP26 Reasons [106], [126], [143]). The departmental submission for the JSP26 decision, addressed to the Assistant Minister, reminded him that “on 4 May 2026 you made a decision to refuse” LGC24’s visa application ([35]; [18], [47]), recommending that he “closely consider the Convention of the Rights of the Child and the impact that separation of the family unit might have on [XB]” ([36]) and telling him that he could proceed “on the basis of the information in this brief and anything else known to you” ([29], [counsel’s] emphasis). Unlike Carrascalao, only 80 days had passed, and he had been reminded of the earlier decision.

(Appeal book references omitted.)

50    It follows that it is unnecessary to deal with the written submissions about whether the Minister may be taken to have had constructive knowledge of the wife’s claim.

Materiality

51    As to materiality, it seems to me that there is a realistic possibility, as distinct from a fanciful or improbable one, that the decision in fact made could have been different had the error not occurred: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321 at [7], [14] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ); MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 at [2], [38]–[39] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ). Had the Minister considered the matters identified in dot point 1 of [90] in the wife’s claim, the weight given to her and the husband’s best interests, and to the related considerations, could realistically have been greater, and the balance struck between the factors that weighed against the grant of a visa and the factors in favour of it could have been different.

Disposition

52    Accordingly, each application is to be allowed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Callaghan.

Associate:

Dated:    19 November 2026