Federal Court of Australia
Tuileapa v Suntory Beverage & Food Australia Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1745
File number(s): | QUD 597 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | MEAGHER J |
Date of judgment: | 16 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – informal application for recusal– whether apprehended bias demonstrated – where plaintiff sought urgent hearing – where plaintiff sent voluminous correspondence to the Court – application dismissed |
Legislation: | Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317, Pt 9.4 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 343, 546 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 20A(5)(c), 35A, 35A(5) Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 78B, 78B(1), 78B(5) Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 8.06, 17.01(2), 17.04 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) s 104 |
Cases cited: | Antoun v The Queen [2006] HCA 2 Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 Glennan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2003] HCA 31 Irwin v Irwin [2016] FCA 1565 Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 2) [2016] FCA 746 Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17 Nkaweh v Trustee for Nonabel Trust [2026] FCA 145 Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 4) [2012] FCA 1170 QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15 Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39 SunshineLoans Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] HCA 8 |
Division: | Fair Work Division |
Registry: | Queensland |
National Practice Area: | Employment and Industrial Relations |
Number of paragraphs: | 54 |
Date of hearing: | 12 November 2026 |
Counsel for the Plaintiff: | Plaintiff appeared in person |
ORDERS
QUD 597 of 2026 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | MARK TUILAEPA Plaintiff | |
AND: | SUNTORY BEVERAGE AND FOOD AUSTRALIA PTY LTD First Defendant DAISUKE MINATO Second Defendant IAN ROBERTS (and others named in the Schedule) Third Defendant | |
order made by: | MEAGHER J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 16 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Olivia Hillier be joined as the eighth defendant in this proceeding.
2. The plaintiff’s application for the recusal of Justice Meagher is dismissed.
3. By 30 November 2026, the plaintiff is to serve on the defendants the following documents:
(a) The originating application filed on 3 September 2026.
(b) The interlocutory application filed on 3 September 2026.
(c) The affidavit of Mr Tuilaepa filed on 3 September 2026.
(d) The concise statement filed on 3 September 2026.
(e) The genuine steps statement filed on 3 September 2026.
4. In the event that the plaintiff does not take the steps referred to in order 3, the proceeding is dismissed forthwith.
5. The matter is listed for case management hearing on 3 December 2026 at 11:30am AEST.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MEAGHER J
INTRODUCTION
1 This is an application for my recusal (Recusal Application) made by the plaintiff in this proceeding, Mr Tuilaepa. For the reasons given below, I decline to recuse myself in this proceeding.
BACKGROUND
2 The applicant commenced this proceeding on 3 September 2026, by filing an originating application, an interlocutory application, a genuine steps statement, an affidavit dated 27 August 2026, and a concise statement. The proceeding arises out of the plaintiff’s employment with Suntory Beverage and Food Australia Pty Ltd, the first defendant, which is alleged by the plaintiff to have retaliated against the plaintiff after he and other workers submitted a collective safety report on 15 April 2026 regarding alleged hazards at its warehouse. Subsequent to that, the plaintiff ceased attending work. Broadly, the plaintiff claims various forms of relief to which he is said to be entitled under the whistleblower provisions of Pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The plaintiff alleges, inter alia, indirect retaliation in the form of a “Financial Starvation Siege”, being a failure to pay the plaintiff from 12 June 2026.
3 In addition to the relief sought under the whistleblower provisions in his originating application, in his concise statement the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief under ss 340 and 343 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and s 104 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld). He also seeks pecuniary penalties under Sch 3 of the Corporations Act and s 546 of the Fair Work Act. He also asserts breaches of various other statutes. The quantum of compensation sought in his concise statement is approximately $15,660,000.00.
4 The relief sought in the plaintiff’s interlocutory application is wide-ranging, but inter alia seeks payment by Suntory of salary which the plaintiff has not been paid since 12 June 2026, to which he says he is entitled. It seeks orders restraining the plaintiff’s dismissal, and seeks that the defendants produce certain documents responsive to various categories.
5 Around the time that the plaintiff commenced this proceeding, he sought that his interlocutory application be heard by the Duty Judge on an urgent basis. The basis for his request was, briefly that, as a result of Suntory’s alleged conduct, the plaintiff was inter alia being starved of wages, as a result of which he was facing eviction for non-payment of rent, and was unable to purchase medication. Another basis was the alleged risk of Suntory altering or deleting data which related to the plaintiff. That request was declined by the Duty Registrar, and on 2 September 2026 the Court Registry advised the plaintiff of that course of action, stating that the matter would be referred for allocation to a docket judge in the ordinary course. A later request made by the plaintiff that the matter be considered urgently was again referred to the Duty Registrar, who on 28 September 2026 determined that the matter was not urgent, which course of action was communicated to the plaintiff via the Court Registry.
6 The documents which the plaintiff provided to the Court Registry in support of his request for an urgent listing made clear that he had not served the defendants, or provided notice of his request. In his words, this was to “prevent pre-emptive dismissal execution and backend database sanitization prior to judicial intervention” (i.e., the asserted risk that he would be dismissed, and that documents relating to his employment would be altered or deleted). At other points in the proceeding, he said that because his documents had been accepted for filing, with the listing of the relevant applications marked “to be advised”, he was “legally barred from serving the defendants”.
7 The plaintiff was advised that this matter was allocated to my docket by way of an email sent on 21 September 2026. That email noted that no notice of appearance had been filed by the defendants, and in these circumstances, if no notice of appearance was filed, I would expect the plaintiff to prove service at the case management hearing. On 23 September 2026, an email from the Court Registry noted, among other things, that the plaintiff would be required to prove of service of the relevant documents on the defendants. On 28 September 2026, the plaintiff was put on notice by email from the Court Registry that he needed to serve the other parties to the proceeding with all documents filed with the Court, regardless of whether a listing date had been allocated. His obligation to serve the defendants was also drawn to his attention at the two case management hearings convened in this proceeding.
8 A common theme running through this proceeding is the plaintiff’s voluminous and repeated correspondence sent to the Court Registry since the proceeding has been on foot. While the plaintiff is not currently prevented from emailing the Court Registry, in the face of his voluminous correspondence, he has occasionally been advised that no further response will be provided in respect of certain requests he has made (e.g., his requests for an urgent hearing). By his voluminous correspondence, the plaintiff has made multiple requests for relief. Some of these relate to the substantive relief sought in this proceeding, others relate to procedural relief.
9 The requests for procedural relief largely relate to the Duty Registrar’s decisions that the relief which the plaintiff seeks was not urgent, and the consequent referral for allocation to a docket judge. They also relate to what the plaintiff characterises as prejudice allegedly inflicted upon him by the Court Registry in relation to his lodgements; this again appears to be a complaint by the plaintiff that the proceeding is not being allocated and determined sufficiently quickly.
10 These requests include the following:
(1) Multiple requests for a de novo review under s 35A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) of the Duty Registrar’s decision that the relief which the plaintiff seeks was not urgent, and the consequent referral for allocation to a docket judge in the ordinary course. In certain correspondence, he takes issue with the Court Registry’s alleged refusal to process purported applications to that effect, and its refusal to connect the plaintiff by telephone call to Chambers. He characterises this as “a constructive denial of natural justice and a severe breakdown of procedural fairness”, and an “absolute verbal screening blockade”.
(2) Requests that the Court amend the record to note Ms Olivia Hillier, of Maddocks Lawyers, as the eighth defendant. While the plaintiff had named “MADDOCKS LAWYERS / OLIVIA HILLIER” as the seventh defendant in the documents filed on 3 September 2026, only Maddocks Lawyers was named as the seventh defendant on the Court File, and Ms Hillier was not named as a party.
(3) A request on 23 September 2026 that the Court urgently convene an interlocutory hearing on 23 or 24 September 2026, and dispense with notice being required to be given to the defendants. Similar requests have been made at other points.
11 In addition to his requests for an urgent hearing, the relief sought by the plaintiff appears to arise out of difficulties that he has had in lodging documents with the Court Registry and, in the event that he has been able to lodge documents, with having them accepted for filing.
12 The plaintiff’s emails have been addressed to various email addresses within the Court, including to my associate, my executive assistant, the chambers of the relevant duty judge at various times, and the office of the Chief Executive and Principal Registrar of the Court.
13 The plaintiff seems to have proceeded under the impression that, where documents have been unable to be accepted for filing, he can simply email documents that are applications, or in the nature of applications, to addresses within the Court, and that this amounts to lodging or filing the documents. However, as has been explained to the plaintiff by way of correspondence sent by the Court Registry, and in open Court by me, applications for relief must be made by way of formal applications lodged and accepted for filing with the Court, and the Court will not entertain informal applications (save for what is said in relation to the Recusal Application below). This serves important purposes, including ensuring that everything properly brought before the Court is formally recorded for consideration, and promoting fairness, integrity and efficiency in litigation: Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 4) [2012] FCA 1170; 208 FCR 128 at [26]; Irwin v Irwin [2016] FCA 1565 at [61].
14 Emails sent by the plaintiff on and from 29 September 2026 demonstrate an escalation in the tone and language used by the plaintiff. Since that time, the plaintiff has included in, and attached to, emails, what purport to be applications whereby he seeks, inter alia:
(1) “Immediate written disclosure of all administrative, case management, call center, customer service, after-hours duty logs, and portal file notes”.
(2) A “demand for identity of section 35A decision-maker & stamped order”.
(3) A civil claim against the Queensland District Registry of the Court for misfeasance in public office, whistleblower victimisation under s 1317 of the Corporations Act, disability discrimination and breaches of the “constitutional fair trial guarantees” under Ch III of the Constitution.
(4) A “formal executive inquiry into whether confidential court filings … were communicated or leaked to Maddocks Lawyers or Suntory management”. He describes this as a “Backend index truncation (defendant #8), non-urgency triage & leakage inquiry”.
(5) Writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against various senior officers of the Court.
15 The plaintiff also appears to take issue with the manner in which the documents which he lodged for filing were treated once accepted for filing, including that no confidentiality regime was put in place in respect of the documents, and that the existence of this proceeding is visible via the Court’s publicly accessible portal.
16 The plaintiff has also at various points in the proceeding sent, and lodged, purported notices of a constitutional matter, which he says arises inter alia in relation to the Court Registry’s actions in relation to his applications, and correspondence and calls to the Court, in relation to his proceeding. In particular, a constitutional matter is said to arise in relation to the Court Registry’s handling of his requests for urgent relief and his request for review under s 35A of the FCA Act of the Duty Registrar’s decisions in this regard. The notice also relates to issues which the plaintiff takes with the Court’s governance. He also takes issue with the Court Registry determining whether to accept such lodgements for filing on the basis that for it do so puts it in a position of conflict in circumstances where the Duty Registrar’s decisions are sought to be reviewed under s 35A of the FCA Act. As already alluded to, however, no formal application under s 35A of the FCA Act has been made.
17 The nature of the plaintiff’s escalating correspondence is demonstrated by the following extract of an email received by the Court on 20 October 2026:
TAKE NOTICE that this formal legal transmittal and service of court filings is hereby formally announced and served directly and primarily upon the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS Reference: 26007564), acting as primary legal representative for the Commonwealth apparatus, and co-addressed to Court Executive Leadership in Proceeding QUD597/2026.
This direct service protocol is formally forced upon the Applicant an authenticated federal whistleblower due to the Queensland District Registry executing an unlawful, ultra vires full communications blockade across both telephony and email channels. Official registry logs confirm that during a telephone call on 14 October 2026, registry staff explicitly notified the Applicant that all oral and written communications were being blocked pursuant to "direct orders" issued by senior court administration. Executing forced direct service upon the Australian Government Solicitor bypasses this administrative blockade, fixing the Crown and all respondents with immediate, time-stamped actual judicial knowledge.
18 A complaint made to the Court’s senior management in relation to, inter alia, the Duty Registrar’s decision that the plaintiff’s application does not warrant an urgent hearing has been addressed by the Deputy Principal Registrar, who on 14 October 2026 responded to it and determined that no further action needed to be taken. The plaintiff was made aware that he could seek a review under s 35A(5) of the FCA Act if he did not agree with the Duty Registrar’s decision.
19 On 14 October 2026, a first case management hearing was held before me, where it became clear that the plaintiff still had not yet served the defendants with the documents filed in this proceeding. The plaintiff’s explanation for this was the existence of alleged threats of termination, as well as the asserted risk of evidence relevant to his purported whistleblower status being destroyed by the defendants pending the determination of his interlocutory application.
20 At that case management hearing, the plaintiff was placed on notice of the requirement under r 8.06 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to serve the defendants with copies of his originating application and accompanying documents, as soon as practicable, and at least five days before the first directions hearing. The requirement under r 17.04 of the Rules was also drawn to his attention. I made clear to the plaintiff that the Court required service to be effected in this proceeding, that is, that service was not dispensed with, on the basis that “[i]t is a fundamental tenet of litigation and procedural fairness that a respondent understand and know the case they have to answer”. Accordingly, I made orders requiring the plaintiff to serve the defendants with copies of his originating application, his interlocutory application, his affidavit and his concise statement, within 14 days of that case management hearing. As will be seen below, the plaintiff as of 12 November 2026 had still not served these documents on the defendants.
21 Also discussed at that case management hearing was the fact that while the plaintiff had named “MADDOCKS LAWYERS / OLIVIA HILLIER” as the seventh defendant, only Maddocks Lawyers was named as the seventh defendant on the Court File, and Ms Hillier was not named as a party. I advised the plaintiff that this could be regularised in due course.
22 As already referred to, the plaintiff has made much of the fact that he has sent, and lodged, notices of a constitutional matter in this proceeding. In that regard, after the 14 October case management hearing he advanced, inconsistently with his wish for the matter to be dealt with urgently, that the matter should be stayed. He also argued that the orders made on 14 October 2026 were invalid in view of s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Section 78B(1) provides:
Where a cause pending in a federal court including the High Court or in a court of a State or Territory involves a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, it is the duty of the court not to proceed in the cause unless and until the court is satisfied that notice of the cause, specifying the nature of the matter has been given to the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and of the States, and a reasonable time has elapsed since the giving of the notice for consideration by the Attorneys-General, of the question of intervention in the proceedings or removal of the cause to the High Court.
23 However, no notice of a constitutional matter is on the Court file. A notice of a constitutional matter was lodged on 30 September 2026; however, before being processed, on 2 October 2026 the plaintiff requested that the lodgement be deleted, “as it was submitted in error”. A notice of a constitutional matter was lodged on 2 October 2026, but this lodgement was rejected on 7 October 2026 because it did not comply with the Rules.
24 In any event, the orders made at the case management hearing were not substantive orders; rather, they required the plaintiff to serve the defendants, and listed the matter for a further case management hearing. Those were plainly orders that would be made in the ordinary course and did not determine any issue in the proceeding.
THE RECUSAL APPLICATION
25 The Recusal Application arises out the following paragraph contained in an interlocutory application that was sent to the Court, but not lodged, on 20 October 2026:
Expanded Ebner Judicial Recusal Grounds against Justice Meagher
Under the High Court double-aspect Ebner standard, Justice Meagher is statutorily disqualified from adjudicating Proceeding QUD597/2026. During the 14 October 2026 hearing, Her Honour placed an explicit assertion on the transcript record claiming she had read the Applicant’s emails, yet flatly failed and refused to specify, identify, or enumerate which specific communications she had reviewed. This statement was a demonstrable administrative falsehood, as Her Honour displayed total unfamiliarity with core survival filings, forcing an indigent whistleblower facing acute biological joint collapse and eviction precarity to waste the vast majority of emergency hearing time verbally re-explaining un-read primary filings. Furthermore, Her Honour authenticated a formal court order codifying registry document suppression by omitting the court-sealed Form NCF10, Genuine Steps Statement, Document ID 1757968, and Respondent 8 from the face of the decree. Adjudicating off a corrupted registry summary monitor while feigning review of primary communications establishes patent pre-determination and apprehended bias, requiring Her Honour's immediate recusal.
26 That paragraph, which relates to the conduct of the case management hearing on 14 October 2026, was drawn to my attention because, although it was not contained in a document that was lodged and accepted for filing, it was effectively an informal recusal application.
27 At a case management hearing convened on 12 November 2026, the applicant confirmed that he pressed the Recusal Application. The grounds on which he pressed the Recusal Application were “judicial error”, “apprehended bias”, a failure by the Court to “make accommodations” and, possibly, an alleged conflict of interest between the Court and Maddocks Lawyers, which the applicant has named as a defendant in this proceeding. I gave the plaintiff the opportunity to file written submissions in support of the Recusal Application within seven days of the case management hearing; however, he confirmed that everything was before the Court. He stated that he “had already put the submissions through”. In particular, the following exchange occurred:
HER HONOUR: Is there any further – is there any further information you wish to put before the court in relation to the recusal?
MR TUILAEPA: Everything should be in email, your Honour, …
28 The plaintiff also took objection to the opportunity to have seven days to file submissions in support of the Recusal Application, on the basis that it would further delay the conduct of the proceeding. In fact, he said it was “not fair” that he would have to “wait another seven days”. In these circumstances, I provided the plaintiff with an opportunity to address me orally on the basis of the Recusal Application, and advised him that I would determine the Recusal Application with due expedition thereafter.
29 I entertained the Recusal Application even though it was only raised informally by way of an attachment to correspondence to the Court, and orally thereafter, in light of the seriousness of the allegations made, and given that I did not consider it appropriate to take any further step in the proceeding before considering such allegations.
PRINCIPLES
30 Where the Court is constituted by a single Judge, as it is in this case, the single Judge must determine whether they should recuse themselves based on the evidence before them: QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; 279 CLR 148 at [123] – [124] (Edelman J) and [307] (Jagot J).
31 The principles relating to recusal applications are well-settled. A Judge is disqualified from determining a case if they are “biased or a party or a member of the public might reasonably apprehend that the judge is biased”: Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 195 ALR 225 at [30] (McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ).
32 Actual bias arises where a decision-maker is “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507 at [72] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J); see also at [178] – [187] (Hayne J). Apprehended bias arises if “a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
33 Referring to Ebner, in QYFM, Kiefel CJ and Gageler J explained at [38] that application of the criteria for determining apprehended bias requires:
(1) identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits; (2) articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and (3) assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer.
34 The criterion in the test in Ebner is a “double might”, which emphasises that it is “concerned with ‘possibility (real and not remote), not probability’”: QYFM at [37] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J). However, an application that a Judge should not continue to sit should not be accepted “unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case”: Ebner at [19] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
35 The following points were made by various members of the High Court in the recently decided SunshineLoans Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] HCA 8; 100 ALJR 489:
(1) The logical connection that must be articulated between the asserted source of bias and the “feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits” must be objectively credible and cannot be speculative: at [40] – [42] (Gageler CJ and Gleeson J). In the Respondents’ submission, this required that there be something which logically contributed to an apprehension of bias.
(2) The fair-minded lay observer is taken to know of the function of judicial practice in a particular proceeding, and the reasonableness of an apprehension of bias is to be considered in this light: at [52] (Gageler CJ and Gleeson J), [69] (Gordon J), [176] (Beech-Jones J).
(3) In order to continue to sit and determine a matter, a Judge is not required to have a blank mind, as Judges are necessarily “constrained by the limits of human cognition and reasoning”: see at [101] (Edelman J), quoting Australian Law Reform Commission, Without Fear or Favour: Judicial Impartiality and the Law on Bias, Report No 138 (2021) at 133 [4.81].
36 The principles surrounding an application that a Judge recuse themselves should be applied whilst bearing in mind the Judge’s duty to sit. In Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; 151 CLR 288, Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ observed at 294:
[I]t would be an abdication of judicial function and an encouragement of procedural abuse for a judge to adopt the approach that he should automatically disqualify himself whenever he was requested by one party so to do on the grounds of a possible appearance of pre-judgment or bias, regardless of whether the other party desired that the matter be dealt with by him as the judge to whom the hearing of the case had been entrusted by the ordinary procedures and practice of the particular court.
37 In Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342, Mason J observed at 352:
Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.
38 As Flick J remarked in Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 2) [2016] FCA 746 at [19], quoting Olowofoyeku, ‘Inappropriate Recusals’ (2016) 132 LQR 318 at 323, “appeasement is not an appropriate ground for recusal” and further, “on occasions acceding to an application for disqualification is only succeeded by another application to disqualify a newly allocated judge”.
39 Therefore, in deciding whether the evidence adduced by the Applicant satisfies the tests for either actual or apprehended bias, I must bear in mind that unless either of these tests is satisfied, I have a duty to sit and hear this matter. The authorities make clear that no credence should be given to a mere preference of a recusal applicant that another Judge hear their matter, and that a Judge should not recuse themselves simply because a party has demanded it: see JRL at 352 (Mason J); Antoun v The Queen [2006] HCA 2; 80 ALJR 497 at [34] (Kirby J).
CONSIDERATION
40 Each of the grounds supporting the Recusal Application will be considered in turn. I did not understand the Recusal Application to proceed on the basis of actual bias. Accordingly, the consideration proceeds upon an allegation of apprehended bias on the part of the Court. That is consistent with the plaintiff’s reference to the “High Court double-aspect Ebner standard” in his interlocutory application sent to the Court Registry (see above at [25]).
41 Before considering the grounds in turn, it should be emphasised that this proceeding is at the earliest possible stage. The occasion has not arisen for me to consider the plaintiff’s substantive allegations in the proceeding. A fair-minded lay observer would be aware of the course taken by a matter from its infancy to a final hearing in accordance with ordinary judicial practice: SunshineLoans at [52] (Gageler CJ and Gleeson J), [69] (Gordon J), [176] (Beech-Jones J). Accordingly, to the extent that the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff are said to give rise to a reasonable apprehension that I might decide the substantive questions other than on their merits, there is no evidence supporting such an assertion.
Conduct of the case management hearing of 14 October 2026
42 First, the plaintiff’s assertion that my failure to state which of the plaintiff’s emails I had reviewed and my alleged unfamiliarity with his emails and the bases for his requests for urgent relief provides no basis for a reasonable apprehension that I will resolve the questions in this proceeding otherwise that on their legal and factual merits. Taking this as the factor upon which the plaintiff relies to say that I might resolve the questions other than on their legal and factual merits, no logical connection between it, and the apprehended deviation from deciding the questions on their merits, is articulated: QYFM at [38]. In circumstances where the Duty Registrar has twice determined that the plaintiff’s proceeding is not urgent, and no formal application for review has been made by the plaintiff, there is no logical connection with any apprehended deviation from deciding the question of the urgency of the plaintiff’s application.
43 In any event, the factor upon which this ground of the Recusal Application is based, is not made out. The relevant statement of mine with which the plaintiff appears to take issue is, “I’ve seen some of your correspondence, Mr Tuilaepa”. Nothing in what was said at that case management hearing supports the plaintiff’s proposition that I was unfamiliar with any documents described as the “core survival filings”. Further, the absence of any specification of the communications reviewed does not support a bare assertion that I have not reviewed the plaintiff’s correspondence. Additionally, the plaintiff’s reference to his having had to “verbally re-explain[] un-read primary filings” indicates that he had an opportunity to refer the Court to material upon which he relied in support of the asserted urgency of this proceeding. This ground of the Recusal Application should therefore fail.
44 Second, the fact of an order being made which (1) did not include Ms Hillier as a defendant, and (2) did not require the plaintiff to serve the defendants with his certificate of urgency or his genuine steps statement cannot give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. As to the first of these, at the case management hearing, I indicated to the plaintiff that Ms Hillier’s status as the eighth defendant in this proceeding could be regularised. I drew the plaintiff’s attention to the fact that in the documents which he had filed with the Court, the seventh defendant was noted as “MADDOCKS LAWYERS / OLIVIA HILLIER”. As to the second of these, the omission of a reference to the certificate of urgency or the genuine steps statement in the orders of 14 October 2026 does not indicate that the orders perpetuated an alleged “registry document suppression”. In fact, the correspondence from the Court indicates that the plaintiff’s certificate of urgency has been considered by the Court Registry, and the Court file indicates that the genuine steps statement has been accepted for filing. There is no logical connection between either of the above two bases for the Recusal Application, and a reasonable apprehension of bias on the Court’s part. Neither of these circumstances establishes the Court’s alleged complicity in suppressing the documents provided by the plaintiff, or alternatively in proceeding from an incomplete record. Accordingly, this ground of the Recusal Application should fail.
Grounds addressed orally at the case management hearing of 12 November 2026: judicial error, apprehended bias, a failure to make accommodations and Maddocks’ relationship with the Court
45 These grounds were not well particularised by the plaintiff at the case management hearing of 12 November 2026.
46 To the extent that “judicial error” and apprehended bias were relied upon as grounds, it was possible that the plaintiff simply reiterated the grounds summarised immediately above. Alternatively, it appeared at the case management hearing of 12 November 2026 that the plaintiff considered that, once his documents were sent to the Court, or alternatively accepted for filing, the Court had “approved” the relief he sought, and he was therefore entitled to it as of right. The plaintiff also seemed to derive support for this position from s 78B(5) of the Judiciary Act which states:
Nothing in subsection (1) prevents a court from proceeding without delay to hear and determine proceedings, so far as they relate to the grant of urgent relief of an interlocutory nature, where the court thinks it necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
47 At the case management hearing held on 12 November 2026, I explained to the plaintiff that the fact of documents being accepted for filing by the Court does not mean that he has an automatic entitlement to the relief claimed therein. Nor does the plaintiff marking a document “urgent” or “ex parte” when lodging it with the Court mean that it is accepted for filing on the basis that an urgent, or ex parte, hearing will be convened. As to the plaintiff’s reliance on s 78B(5) of the Judiciary Act, as is set out below, I explained that there was no notice of a constitutional matter on the Court file. To the extent that the plaintiff relies on this purported demonstration of “judicial error” or apprehended bias, it cannot support the Recusal Application. The fair-minded lay observer to which the test in Ebner is directed is taken to have knowledge of the Court’s processes and requirements: SunshineLoans at [36], [40], [52] (Gageler CJ and Gleeson J), [69] – [73] (Gordon J), [114] (Edelman J), [146] – [147] (Jagot J), [172], [176] – [178] (Beech-Jones J). He or she is therefore taken to know that documents sent to, or filed with, the Court, do not automatically entitle a party to the relief sought therein.
48 To the extent that the asserted “judicial error” arose out of my apparent failure to take into account the various notices of a constitutional matter referred to by the plaintiff, as is set out at [23] above, none is currently on the Court file. Accordingly, the factor said to support a reasonable apprehension of bias is not made out. In any event, even if a notice of a constitutional matter were on the Court file, as explained in Glennan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2003] HCA 31; 77 ALJR 1195 at [14], “In terms of s 78B, a cause does not ‘involve’ a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation merely because someone asserts that it does”. Furthermore, were s 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to be engaged, I do not consider that proceeding to make orders that the plaintiff serve the defendants, and listing a further case management hearing, constituted a “judicial error”. They certainly do not support a reasonable apprehension that I would determine the matter other than on its merits. The “judicial error” and apprehended bias grounds of the Recusal Application cannot succeed.
49 It was not clear what reasonable accommodations the plaintiff sought, or how there was said to be a logical connection between a failure to provide these, with a reasonable apprehension of bias. To the extent that the plaintiff again relied on the failure to accord him a hearing on an urgent basis, that cannot give rise to a reasonable apprehension of basis. Again, the fair-minded lay observer is taken to have knowledge of the Court’s processes and requirements. He or she is taken to know how a determination of the urgency of a matter occurs. In a proceeding where the party seeking urgent relief is a litigant-in-person, the relevant point of contact is the Court Registry: see Duty (Urgent) Applications Interim Practice Note during 3 Region Trial (GPN-DUTY) at [4.11(b)]. The determination that a proceeding does not raise urgent matters for consideration is not a reflection of an assessment of the underlying merits of the proceeding. Accordingly, the determination that the proceeding did not warrant an urgent hearing has no logical connection with the apprehended deviation from deciding the issues in the proceedings on their merits. Therefore, this ground also fails.
50 Finally, the plaintiff did not particularise how Maddocks was connected to the Court or how such a connection gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, save that there was some affiliation between Maddocks and the Court arising from what he described as the “VIQ scandal”, stating specifically that Maddocks “drafted the actual failed VIQ incident in regards to the transcription services already before the Senate already”. “VIQ” is a reference to the Court’s former transcript provider. As no evidence, or substantive submissions, were addressed in relation to this ground, it also fails.
NEXT STEPS: SERVICE ON THE DEFENDANTS
51 Despite the plaintiff repeatedly asserting that the matter was urgent and required an ex parte hearing, he has been put on notice several times that he is required to serve the defendants with the documents by which he commenced this proceeding. Those obligations are contained in rr 8.06 and 17.01(2) of the Rules. Rule 17.04 of the Rules provides:
An interlocutory application may be heard and determined in the absence of a party if:
(a) service of the interlocutory application on that party is not required; or
(b) service has been effected but the party does not appear; or
(c) the Court has dispensed with service.
52 The plaintiff is aware that the Court has not dispensed with service in this proceeding.
53 Further, simply because the plaintiff asserts that the matter is urgent, and that an ex parte interlocutory hearing is required, does not mean that the Court is prepared to entertain the proceeding on that basis.
54 The plaintiff indicated at the case management held on 12 November 2026 that he had still not served the defendants with the documents he had filed in this proceeding. The plaintiff has now been on notice since 21 September 2026 of his obligation to do so. A failure to serve parties in the face of opportunities to do so has been held to constitute a want of prosecution pursuant to s 20(5)(c) of the FCA Act, and has supported orders dismissing the proceeding on this basis: see Nkaweh v Trustee for Nonabel Trust [2026] FCA 145. In circumstances where the Court is not prepared to dispense with service, the Court will grant the plaintiff one final opportunity to serve the defendants, failing which the proceeding will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Meagher. |
Associate:
Dated: 16 November 2026
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
QUD 597 of 2026 | |
Defendants | |
Fourth Defendant: | ALICIA RYAN-DAVIS |
Fifth Defendant: | KASEY MCPHERSON |
Sixth Defendant: | BENJAMIN WRIGHT |
Seventh Defendant: | MADDOCKS LAWYERS |