Federal Court of Australia

ACN 164 353 459 Pty Ltd v Rouholamin [2026] FCA 1744

Appeal from:

Rouholamin v ACN 164 353 459 Pty Ltd [2026] FedCFamC2G 925

File number(s):

QUD 382 of 2026

Judgment of:

LONGBOTTOM J

Date of judgment:

9 November 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Corporations – Application to dispense with requirement under r 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) for a corporation to be represented by a lawyer – Court has power to dispense with requirement under the rules by virtue of r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – Overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions according to s 37M and s 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – Where asserted company and sole director have financial constraints – Where company and director have obtained limited pro bono assistance – Where affidavit filed immediately before hearing includes bank statements indicating director has significant funds – Where protection orders and criminal proceeding creates a risk of lack of objectivity – Interests of justice best achieved through requiring representation of corporation by a lawyer – Application dismissed. 

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 37M, 37N

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 1.34, 4.01(2)

Cases cited:

Dynamic Insurance Services Pty Ltd v Steadfast Group Limited [2026] FCA 964

Francis (Trustee) v Oculus Accounting Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 448

Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52; (1988) 165 CLR 543

Rouholamin v ACN 164 353 459 Pty Ltd [2026] FedCFamC2G 925

Division:

Fair Work Division

Registry:

Queensland

National Practice Area:

Employment and Industrial Relations

Number of paragraphs:

18

Date of hearing:

9 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellants:

The Second Appellant sought leave to represent the First Appellant and appeared in person

Counsel for the Respondent:

The Respondent appeared in person

ORDERS

QUD 382 of 2026

BETWEEN:

ACN 164 353 459 PTY LTD

First Appellant

RAMIN AGHA ZADEH

Second Appellant

AND:

SEPIDEH ROUHOLAMIN

Respondent

order made by:

LONGBOTTOM J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 NOVEMBER 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application filed on 6 August 2026 seeking an order that ACN 164 353 459 Pty Ltd be represented by its sole director, Mr Ramin Agha Zadeh, is dismissed.

2.    No order as to costs.

3.    The matter is listed for a further case management hearing at 9 am AEST on 21 December 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)

LONGBOTTOM J:

INTRODUCTION

1    By interlocutory application filed on 6 August 2026, the Second Appellant (Mr Zadeh) seeks an order dispensing with the requirement under r 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), that the First Appellant company (of which he is the sole director) not proceed in the Court other than by a lawyer.

2    In the proceeding Mr Zadeh and the company appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing his cross-claim against the Respondent (Ms Rouholamin), for money allegedly advanced on the proviso that Ms Rouholamin do work for the company (alleged loan): see Rouholamin v ACN 164 353 459 Pty Ltd [2026] FedCFamC2G 925. Mr Zadeh contended before the Federal Circuit Court that Ms Rouholamin, who is his former wife, did not work at all for the company. By the cross-claim, they sought orders for the repayment of the money said to have been advanced with interest. The notice of appeal contains 12 grounds, including a denial of procedural fairness, an alleged error in the legal approach taken by the primary judge to the cross-claim and impermissible speculation.

3    Ms Rouholamin opposes Mr Zadeh being granted leave to represent the company in the proceeding.

applicable principles

4    Rule 4.01(2) of the Rules provides that “a corporation must not proceed in the Court other than by a lawyer”.

5    The reasons for the imposition of a requirement for a company to obtain leave to be represented other than by a lawyer relevantly include the aim of “ensuring that the officer seeking to represent the company truly represents the interests of the company and not his own”: Francis (Trustee) v Oculus Accounting Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 448 at [36] (Derrington J) and the authorities there cited.

6    Rule 1.34 of the Rules confers a general discretion to dispense with compliance with the Rules, including r 4.01(2). The principles relevant to such an application were summarised by Feutrill J in Dynamic Insurance Services Pty Ltd v Steadfast Group Limited [2026] FCA 964 at [4]-[9]. As his Honour there observed, the power to dispense with compliance with r 4.01(2) is to be exercised in a way that best promotes the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions and the public interest in the just resolution of disputes as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: at [4]-[5]; see also, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37M and s 37N.

7    It has been recognised that the public interest is best achieved through the representation of both parties by lawyers, given the duties lawyers owe to both the court and the client, which litigants-in-person do not owe: Dynamic Insurance at [6], citing Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52; (1988) 165 CLR 543 at pp 556-557 (Mason CJ). A further consideration is that a lay advocate is not constrained by the professional duties a lawyer owes to other parties in the proceeding: Dynamic Insurance at [7].

8    The factors relevant to determining whether it is in the interests of justice to dispense with compliance with r 4.01(2) of the Rules were summarised in Dynamic Insurance, as follows (at [9]):

(1)    The extent to which a lack of financial capacity would inhibit a corporation from obtaining legal representation. While stultification of the proceeding and access to justice may be a significant factor in favour of dispensation, it is necessary to have regard to the financial capacity of those behind the corporation who stand to benefit from the litigation as part of considering the corporation’s true financial capacity. It is also not a determinative factor and all factors should be taken into account when considering where the balance of the interests of the administration of justice lie.

(2)    Having regard to the factual and legal complexity of the proceeding, the extent to which the proposed representative of the corporation has appropriate skills, training, qualifications and experience to represent the corporation effectively.

(3)    The extent to which the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions will be or is likely to be attained if the corporation is represented in the proceeding by the proposed representative compared to the extent to which that purpose will be or is likely to be attained if the corporation is represented by a lawyer.

(4)    The extent to which the proposed representative is able to represent the corporation with the degree of objectivity expected of a legal practitioner. Specifically, the extent to which the proposed representative will be or is likely to be a witness in the proceeding particularly if credit is likely to be in issue and (or) it will be or is likely to be necessary to instruct independent expert witnesses.

(5)    The extent to which a lack of available disciplinary measures in relation to the proposed representative of the corporation will or may affect the proper administration of justice.

(6)    The manner in which the proceeding has progressed to the date of the dispensation application and the manner in which it may progress to resolution if the corporation is not represented by a lawyer.

(7)    If the corporation is a respondent, rather than an applicant, a more liberal approach may be appropriate.

disposition

9    For the following reasons, and having regard to the considerations identified above, I do not consider it to be in the interests of the administration of justice that Mr Zadeh be permitted to represent the company in the proceeding.

10    First, following the filing of the interlocutory application, Mr Zadeh and the company were referred for, and obtained, pro bono legal assistance with respect to their appeal. That pro bono assistance is limited to the provision of legal advice, orally or in writing, and, if appropriate, preparation of necessary documents and appearances in the proceeding. Pro bono counsel have since advised the Court that they are unlikely to appear without a solicitor. While the terms of the pro bono assistance to be provided to the company and Mr Zadeh is, therefore, limited, it is nonetheless such that the Court can be satisfied that, at the least, the company will obtain advice in the proceeding from a person with appropriate skills, training, qualifications and experience.

11    Second, although he has made statements in an affidavit filed in support of the interlocutory application to the contrary effect, it appears from bank statements in evidence that Mr Zadeh has sufficient funds to obtain legal representation for the company. Mr Zadeh filed an affidavit on 6 August 2026, in which he deposed that both he and the company are experiencing financial hardship. On 6 November 2026, Mr Zadeh filed a further affidavit addressing contentions by Ms Rouholamin that this was not, in fact, the case. At the hearing of the interlocutory application, Mr Zadeh was granted leave to rely on that further affidavit on the basis that Ms Rouholamin, who was not then in a position to cross-examine him, could make submissions as to weight.

12    The further affidavit reveals that, as of 5 November 2026, Mr Zadeh owns two investment properties from which he receives rental income and has approximately $60,000 in a bank account in his name. This is an increase from the $49,991.05 in that bank account as of 4 August 2026.

13    Mr Zadeh contends that, while he is in funds, those amounts are offset by liabilities for personal loans for his living and legal expenses; a motor vehicle and an air-conditioning system; mortgages and associated costs for his rental properties; and company loans to his former and current employees and to his sister’s company. A balance sheet for the company reveals that the single largest company loan ($363,133.84) is to Mr Zadeh. Mr Zadeh has deposed to the existence, and amount, of certain of these other loans, the largest of which is a personal loan with a current balance of $1,432,706.77. Notwithstanding, Mr Zadeh has not provided evidence of the terms upon which the loans are to be repaid, such that I can be satisfied that his obligations under the loan agreements preclude him from accessing the money he has in his bank account to obtain legal representation for the company, alongside meeting those liabilities.

14    Mr Zadeh has also provided amended tax returns for the 2025 and 2026 financial years, but those returns are incomplete and do not include that part of the document which states his taxable income or loss. There is also the company balance sheet which shows a net deficit in company assets as of 30 June 2025, taking into account the loan to Mr Zadeh as well as the alleged loan the subject of the cross-claim. But, again, while the balance sheet provides some indication that the company itself is not in funds, against that there are the bank statements which indicate that Mr Zadeh himself has sufficient money to enable him to obtain legal representation for the company.

15    In short, viewed as a whole, I am not persuaded on the evidence that Mr Zadeh lacks the financial capacity to obtain legal representation for the company in the appeal.

16    Third, Mr Zadeh and Ms Rouholamin have protection orders against each other, which preclude them from contacting one another other than through a lawyer. There is also a criminal case pending against Mr Zadeh, in which Ms Rouholamin is the complainant. Mr Zadeh contends that the protection orders were obtained without admission and places emphasis on the arrangements the Court has put in place to ensure that the appeal can proceed in accordance with the terms of the protection orders. Notwithstanding, in my view, the fact of the protection orders and the criminal proceeding create an inherent risk that Mr Zadeh may not be able to represent the company with the degree of objectivity expected of a legal representative. At the hearing of the interlocutory application, Mr Zadeh disputed that this was the case. But at the same time, he made submissions pointing to a contrary conclusion, including that the current appeal is a “domino” effect of the application Ms Rouholamin instituted in the Federal Circuit Court, in which he made the cross-claim. I note that the application by Ms Rouholamin was dismissed by the primary judge and is not the subject of an appeal.

17    I am conscious that the appeal does not involve the types of steps identified in Dynamic Insurance at [9(4)]. The capacity to be objective is nonetheless a material aspect of the conduct of such litigation in accordance with the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions. As Feutrill J observed in Dynamic Insurance at [14], an absence of objectivity risks a party “wishing ‘to chase every rabbit down its burrow’ irrespective of merit leading to prolongation, increased cost and inefficiency in resolution of disputes that can be avoided by lawyers discharging their paramount duty to the Court” and in respect of whom disciplinary measures are available.

18    The circumstances of this case are not, therefore, such that I am persuaded that there is a reason to depart from the requirement in the Rules that the company be represented in this proceeding by a lawyer. As such, the application to dispense with the requirement of r 4.01(2) of the Rules is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighteen (18) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Longbottom.

Associate:

Dated:    18 November 2026