Federal Court of Australia
Boots v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2026] FCA 1740
File numbers: | SAD 83 of 2026 SAD 84 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | CHARLESWORTH J |
Date of judgment: | 14 September 2026 |
Date of publication of reasons: | 16 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – objections to competency – self-represented applicant – application for extension of time to appeal two decisions by the Administrative Review Tribunal – where proposed grounds of appeal do not assert an error of law – where appeals otherwise enjoy no reasonable prospect of success – objections to competency upheld |
Legislation: | Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) s 172 Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth) ss 24, 27 |
Cases cited: | Boots and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation) [2017] AATA 177 Boots and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation) [2025] ARTA 1089 Boots v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation) [2025] ARTA 2793 |
Division: | Fair Work Division |
Registry: | South Australia |
National Practice Area: | Employment and Industrial Relations |
Number of paragraphs: | 49 |
Date of hearing: | 14 September 2026 |
Counsel for the Applicant: | The Applicant appeared in person |
Counsel for the Respondent: | B McMillan KC |
Solicitor for the Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
SAD 83 of 2026 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | PETER JOHN BOOTS Applicant | |
AND: | MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION Respondent | |
order made by: | CHARLESWORTH J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 14 September 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant has leave to amend his proposed grounds of appeal so as to substitute for the grounds originally proposed those grounds set out in the affidavit filed on 4 August 2026.
2. The originating application is dismissed as incompetent.
3. The time to commence an application for leave to appeal from the order in paragraph 2 is extended so as to run from the date on which formal written reasons for the order are published.
4. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the originating application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
SAD 84 of 2026 | ||
BETWEEN: | PETER JOHN BOOTS Applicant | |
AND: | MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION Respondent | |
order made by: | CHARLESWORTH J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 14 September 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant has leave to amend his proposed grounds of appeal so as to substitute for the grounds originally proposed those grounds set out in the affidavit filed on 4 August 2026.
2. The originating application is dismissed as incompetent, or alternatively as enjoying no reasonable prospect of success.
3. The time to commence an application for leave to appeal from the order in paragraph 2 is extended so as to run from the date on which formal written reasons for the order are published.
4. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the originating application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J:
1 The applicant, Peter Boots, commenced two proceedings in this Court. They have action numbers SAD 83 of 2026 and SAD 84 of 2026. In each proceeding, Mr Boots applied for an extension of time in which to appeal from decisions made by the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART). The respondent in both proceedings is the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission.
2 On 14 September 2026, the Court heard submissions from the parties on notices of objection to competency filed by the Commission in each matter. At the conclusion of the hearing I upheld the objections to competency, dismissed each action and provided oral reasons. I now provide written reasons to the same effect.
3 These reasons primarily focus on the proceeding with action number SAD 84 of 2026. That proceeding relates to a decision by the ART concerning an application that the applicant made for the payment of permanent impairment compensation under ss 24 and 27 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth). The application has some procedural history. It arose out of a period of service undertaken by Mr Boots with the Australian Army in 1992. The ART referred to some of that history in its reasons. It stated that Mr Boots was born in 1972 and served in the Australian Army for approximately six weeks between October and December 1992 as a recruit in the 1st Recruit Training Battalion in Kapooka.
4 Mr Boots suffered a mental health condition as a consequence of his experiences in the Australian Army. It is described in the Tribunal documents as “an adjustment disorder with elements of post-traumatic stress disorder”. He made an earlier application for compensation in relation to that condition. It is referred to in the Tribunal documents as the “accepted condition”, and I will refer to it by the same name.
5 In an earlier decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), two members found that the Commission was liable to pay compensation to the applicant for a period of six months for the adjustment disorder with elements of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), with a date of injury of 18 November 1992: Boots and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation) [2017] AATA 177 (2017 Decision). By that decision, the AAT concluded that whilst Mr Boots had suffered from that disorder, it was a disorder that had resolved after a period of six months.
6 Mr Boots made another claim for permanent impairment compensation on 16 June 2022 (2022 Claim) because he was not satisfied with the AAT’s decision. On that claim he alleged not only that the accepted condition was continuing but also that he was suffering from other conditions including schizoaffective disorder, cannabis abuse disorder, paranoid personality disorder, compulsive gambling and vulnerable personality. I will refer to those as the other conditions.
7 On the 2022 Claim, the Commission determined on 30 August 2023 that the applicant should be paid a small benefit in connection with the continuation of the accepted condition. The applicant made a request for reconsideration of that decision on the same day, and the Commission affirmed its decision on 15 March 2024. Mr Boots applied to the ART for review of that decision.
8 In the 2017 Decision, the AAT had before it a joint memorandum authored by three medical practitioners. They were Dr Rajan Nagesh, the applicant’s treating psychiatrist, and two psychiatrists who had been retained by the Commission, Dr Marty Ewer and Dr Tony Davis. At that time, the three practitioners were jointly of the view that the accepted condition had been overcome by the applicant within six months.
9 The application for review of the Commission’s decision in relation to the 2022 Claim was heard and determined by the ART with reasons published in July 2025: Boots and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation) [2025] ARTA 1089 (July 2025 Decision). In its reasons, the ART briefly set out some factual background. At [5(d)] of its reasons it extracted [15] – [22] of the 2017 Decision. Those paragraphs summarise the AAT’s views about that joint memorandum as follows:
15. In their joint written memorandum, all three doctors agreed (consistently with the respondent’s concession), that Mr Boots had suffered an adjustment disorder with elements of PTSD from late 1992 and for about six months thereafter. They also agreed that the conditions from which Mr Boots was currently suffering and had been suffering following his Army service were schizoaffective disorder, cannabis abuse, paranoid personality traits/disorder, compulsive gambling and vulnerable personality.
16. With respect to causation, none of the doctors considered there was any connection between Mr Boots’ service and his paranoid personality traits/disorder, compulsive gambling or vulnerable personality. Accordingly, we do not need to consider those conditions further.
17. With respect to Mr Boots’ schizoaffective disorder, all three doctors ultimately agreed that there was no direct connection between Mr Boots’ Army experiences and his adjustment disorder on the one hand, and the development of his schizoaffective disorder on the other. However, each of them conceded that it was quite possible that his cannabis abuse had brought forward the onset of his schizoaffective disorder and contributed to the disorder to that extent. In determining whether there was a causal connection between Mr Boots’ service and his schizoaffective disorder, it is accordingly important to scrutinise his cannabis use and the development of his condition of cannabis abuse. Clearly, if Mr Boots’ service contributed to the development of his condition of cannabis abuse, it could potentially be regarded as having contributed to the schizoaffective disorder as well.
18. During their oral evidence, all three doctors ultimately accepted that, assuming Mr Boots began to use cannabis regularly soon after his discharge from the Army, there was a causal connection between his Army experiences, the development of his adjustment disorder and his cannabis use. On the evidence before us, we accept that Mr Boots’ cannabis use did commence shortly after his discharge from the Army, and that those Army experiences contributed to his cannabis usage at that time.
19. Critically, however, none of the three doctors accepted that there was a sufficient causal relationship between Mr Boots’ cannabis use following his discharge and the development of his condition of cannabis dependence/abuse such that his Army service made an indirect (and meaningful) contribution to his development of schizoaffective disorder in 1995. Dr Nagesh appeared to express an opinion along those lines in one of his earlier reports, however he clearly resiled from this during his oral evidence before us.
20. In the event therefore, while there is medical evidence before us which links Mr Boots’ cannabis abuse with the development of his schizoaffective disorder, there is no medical evidence which supports a link between Mr Boots’ Army service and the development of his condition of cannabis dependence/abuse which, in turn, contributed to his schizoaffective disorder.
21. Clearly, in order to establish a causal connection between his service and his schizoaffective disorder, Mr Boots would need to show links between his service, his cannabis use, the development of cannabis dependence and the subsequent development of schizoaffective disorder. However, in the event, the medical evidence does not support one of the links in that chain of causation, namely the link between cannabis use and cannabis abuse.
22. It follows that there is no medical evidence before us which would support a conclusion that Mr Boots’ Army service made a material contribution to his cannabis abuse or schizoaffective disorder. Accordingly, we are not satisfied that the requisite causal connection has been established.
10 In the 2017 Decision, the AAT stated that consistent with the Commission’s position, all three doctors had agreed in the joint memorandum that Mr Boots had suffered an adjustment disorder with elements of PTSD from late 1992 and for about six months after that time. They also agreed that he suffered from the other conditions at that time. However, none of the three doctors considered that there was a causal connection between the other conditions and the applicant’s military service.
11 In the later proceeding before the ART, Mr Boots relied on evidence of Dr Nagesh including a written report dated 7 July 2023. He also relied on a report of his general practitioner, Dr Jaksic, dated 6 June 2023. The ART set out extracts of those reports in the July 2025 Decision at [8] – [10].
12 Dr Davis appeared as a witness in the proceedings before the ART and Mr Boots had an opportunity to cross-examine him. In the course of that cross-examination, Mr Boots put to Dr Davis a report authored by a senior consultant physician in psychological medicine, Dr Graham Douglas Craig, a practitioner at The Adelaide Clinic. Dr Craig’s report is dated 20 October 1999.
13 In the report, Dr Craig set out a longitudinal history of Mr Boots’ mental health and a summary of his Australian Army experience as reported by him. He described seeing the applicant on four occasions throughout 1999. Dr Craig then set out an opinion at the bottom of page 5 of his report. He said that he felt that Mr Boots was “clearly remaining vulnerable to stressful events which could in any way remind him of the treatment he received” in the course of his military service. Dr Craig continued:
In my opinion, Mr Boots’ overall life philosophy was altered irrevocably by his days at Kapooka, and he remains suffering from a greater level of paranoia than most people, and is at risk of developing a pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent. In my opinion, he suffers from paranoid personality disorder, which is likely to become more evident over time, particularly as his suspiciousness is aggravated by life events. He also has elements of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, but does not completely fill the DSM 4 criteria.
14 The opinion of Dr Craig is consistent with the Commission’s position in accepting that Mr Boots suffered, for some time at least, the adjustment disorder with elements of PTSD. It also indicates that to the extent that he suffered from that condition, it might have persisted for a period of time beyond six months following November 1992.
15 The ART said it could not give the report of Dr Nagesh any weight because he had not explained the report’s inconsistency with the remainder of his evidence and opinion, including the opinion that he had expressed earlier in the joint memorandum, and his opinion on 3 May 2023 that the accepted condition had resolved: July 2025 Decision at [24]. It further concluded that as Mr Boots’ treating psychiatrist, Dr Nagesh had failed to be objective in his opinion and had fallen into a position of advocating for Mr Boots against his long-held opinion that the accepted condition had resolved a long time ago: at [25].
16 The ART did not give the opinion of Dr Jaksic any weight because he had provided a diagnosis of “chronic PTSD” which was not a diagnosis that had ever been made by any of the various psychiatrists the applicant had seen: July 2025 Decision at [26] – [27]. The ART noted that Dr Jaksic was not a specialist in psychiatric health conditions but had consistently relied upon what Dr Nagesh had said in providing Mr Boots with an appropriate diagnosis and clinical treatment whilst being the applicant’s treating general practitioner: at [27]. The ART went on to say that Dr Jaksic had “also fallen into advocacy over objectivity in respect to Mr Boots”: at [28].
17 In action SAD 84 of 2026, Mr Boots seeks an extension of time to bring an appeal from the July 2025 Decision. At a hearing on 22 July 2026, I provided him with some guidance about the limitations on this Court’s powers on such an appeal and explained that the Court could only interfere with the decision of the ART if it was affected by an error of law, and that it would not be sufficient if the ART had made an error that could not be characterised in that way. Mr Boots took up the opportunity to amend his grounds, and I allowed him to do so. I have had regard to the amended grounds, and the Commission’s submissions on competency were based on them.
18 Mr Boots made another application to the ART in July 2025 by which he sought to have the ART reconsider the July 2025 Decision. The ART dismissed Mr Boots’ application on the basis that he was attempting to relitigate and reagitate the arguments he had made earlier: Boots v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation) [2025] ARTA 2793 (December 2025 Decision). It described the review application as “a repetitious claim based substantially on the same facts as the 2017 decision and the [July] 2025 decision” and the application as “misconceived and lacking in substance within the meaning of section 101(1)(a) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 [(Cth)]”: December 2025 Decision at [11]. It concluded that the issue of Mr Boots’ entitlement to incapacity payments had been “squarely decided already” and there was no new evidence before the ART to undermine the July 2025 Decision. Action SAD 83 of 2026 is an application for an extension of time to commence an appeal from the December 2025 Decision.
19 The two applications for extensions of time were both filed in April 2026. The Commission’s written submissions at [14] accurately summarise the grounds upon which Mr Boots relies on the applications, as follows:
14.1. [That] the Tribunal did not “hear” or act on medical reports from [the applicant’s] treating doctors
14.2. [That] the Tribunal incorrectly found that the applicant’s treating doctors were advocating for him
14.3. [That] the joint doctors’ memorandum that was before the Tribunal was wrong
14.4. [That] the applicant’s treating doctor’s reporting should have been accepted by the Tribunal
14.5. [That] 20% impairment and incapacity payments should have been made available to the applicant by the Tribunal.
20 I have interpreted Mr Boots’ grounds very broadly, having considered his status as a self-represented litigant. In doing so, I formed the view that I should understand his grounds to include an allegation that the Tribunal erred by failing to have regard to Dr Craig’s report of 20 October 1999.
21 This Court’s discretion to grant an extension of time is guided by well established principles. The Court has regard to the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, and whether or not the applicant would be prejudiced if the Court were to refuse the extension of time. When considering potential prejudice, the Court must consider the merits of the claim and the applicant’s likelihood of success. If the Court considers that the grounds do not have reasonable prospects of success it is less likely to grant an extension of time.
22 The delay in relation to the December 2025 Decision is about three months. In relation to the July 2025 Decision it is about nine months. Mr Boots provided no explanation for the length of the delay in his affidavits, but I have not weighed that against him, again given his status as a self-represented litigant and because these reasons are concerned with the Commission’s objections to competency.
23 The Commission contended that Mr Boots’ proposed grounds of appeal do not identify any error of law. It submitted that, even on a generous reading, the amended grounds disclose no error of law in either of the ART’s decisions including because they did not identify any misconstruction of legislation, any denial of procedural fairness, any failure to exercise jurisdiction, any consideration of an irrelevant matter or any failure to consider a mandatory relevant matter.
24 The Commission submitted that the proposed grounds amounted to a complaint that the ART did not accept or did not give sufficient weight to Mr Boots’ preferred medical evidence. It submitted that that complaint does not give rise to a question of law so as to engage the jurisdiction of the Court.
25 The requirement that the appeal be on a question of law is set out in s 172 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth). Mr Boots’ proposed grounds alleged that it is an error of law for the ART to place less weight on the opinion of a patient’s treating doctors than the opinion of a practitioner who is not the treating doctor. Ordinarily, an error of law cannot be demonstrated by showing that the ART should have given more weight to the evidence of one witness over another or more weight to one report over another.
26 As Mr Boots correctly identified, the ART acted on the opinion of Dr Davis and afforded no weight to the opinions of Dr Nagesh and Dr Jaksic.
27 In the July 2025 Decision, the ART found that it was reasonably satisfied that the applicant’s correct diagnosis was adjustment disorder with elements of PTSD that had resolved within six months and hence was no longer continuing: at [32]. It reasoned to that conclusion as follows.
28 First, the ART stated that the best evidence of the applicant’s diagnosis was contained in the joint memorandum, as accepted in the 2017 Decision.
29 Secondly, Dr Nagesh had, until July 2023, maintained that that was the correct diagnosis.
30 Thirdly, Dr Nagesh had provided no reasonable explanation for his change of position from as late as 3 May 2023, in opining that Mr Boots continued to suffer from adjustment disorder with elements of PTSD.
31 Fourthly, Dr Jaksic provided no reasonable explanation for how he came to his opinion of the diagnosis of chronic PTSD, where that diagnosis was wholly inconsistent with, and did not refer to, the schizoaffective disorder referred to in the joint memorandum and by Dr Nagesh.
32 Fifthly, evidence of Mr Boots’ family history of schizoaffective disorder and its impact on his mental health (and that of his brother) was persuasive and consistent with the opinions set out in the joint memorandum.
33 Sixthly, and importantly, the ART said that Dr Davis was a compelling witness, particularly in his evidence as to the joint memorandum and his opinion that the most recent opinions of Dr Nagesh and Dr Jaksic were inconsistent with the initial diagnosis that the accepted condition had resolved and Dr Davis had said that he was unable to understand how that had changed.
34 Finally, the ART said that it was reasonably satisfied based on all of the medical evidence before it, especially the joint memorandum, the evidence of Dr Davis and Dr Nagesh’s opinion up to 3 May 2023, that Mr Boots did not at the time suffer from the accepted condition.
35 The ART concluded that the Commission was not liable to pay Mr Boots permanent impairment compensation pursuant to ss 24 and 27 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth). It set aside the decision on review (a decision that had awarded Mr Boots a 10% incapacity payment).
36 Putting aside for a moment the issue in relation to Dr Craig’s report (discussed below), the reasons of the ART set out a chain of reasoning explaining why it preferred the opinion of Dr Davis to those of Mr Boots’ treating practitioners. That process of reasoning was open to the ART. It discloses no error of law and the application for review of the July 2025 Decision is to be dismissed on that basis.
37 Mr Boots’ amended grounds refer to the report of Dr Craig in a number of respects. The report is mentioned at [3] of the applicant’s grounds. There Mr Boots alleges that Dr Craig’s report should have been considered in addition to the opinion of the treating doctors.
38 Mr Boots submitted that Dr Craig produced his report before the joint memorandum was completed. He referred to a page number of the tribunal documents where that report can be found. He said that the joint memorandum was wrong and that his doctors were not being advocates, nor was Dr Craig. At [6] of his amended application, he asserted that Dr Craig had expressed an opinion that the applicant’s experiences in Kapooka had laid the groundwork for subsequent abnormal behaviour.
39 As I have mentioned, when exercising the discretion to grant an extension of time, regard must be had to the applicant’s prospects of success. If I were to interpret the grounds to include an allegation that the report of Dr Craig was ignored by the ART, as I have done, I would nonetheless conclude that the applicant has insufficient prospects of succeeding on a ground in relation to that issue.
40 The question of prospects was raised in the course of the competency hearing and the parties made submissions in connection with it.
41 I conclude that, in addition to the competency questions raised by the Commission, Mr Boots’ appeals would not enjoy reasonable prospects of success even if he was to be granted an extension of time. I would form that view even if Mr Boots had a very good explanation for commencing these proceedings out of time. That is because I consider, on the information provided to me (which appeared to be jointly accepted), Dr Craig’s opinion did feature in the Tribunal proceedings, in the context of it being put to Dr Davis. Dr Davis expressed a view about that. In addition, I have had regard to the content of Dr Craig’s report. Dr Craig did not express an opinion as to whether or not the accepted condition was continuing as at July 2023, the date with which the ART was concerned.
42 Dr Craig’s report dates back more than two decades. It predated the joint memorandum of 2017 that firmly stated that the accepted condition was one that had resolved within six months. In any event, Dr Craig’s report is subsumed in the ART’s finding that Dr Davis was an impressive witness and in the ART’s reliance upon the more recent joint memorandum.
43 My primary conclusion is that it is not apparent on the face of the ART’s reasons that the ART made an error of law by making no express reference to the opinion of Dr Craig of 1999 in its reasons because of the age of the report, because Dr Davis had an opportunity to say something about it, and because the ART formed a view about the impression that Dr Davis made on the ART, even after that report had been put to it. The ART was under no obligation to set out every question that was put to a witness in the course of cross-examination. For those reasons, the absence of a reference to Dr Craig’s report in the reasons does not disclose that the ART made an error of law.
44 Even if the ART had no regard to the report, I have formed the view that it would make no material difference to the outcome because of the age of the report and because three psychiatrists (18 years later) were jointly and firmly of the view that the condition had been resolved.
45 Whilst the issue in relation to Dr Craig’s report is not strictly raised on the Commission’s notice of objection to competency, it did arise in the course of the hearing, and it is a matter that affects the Court’s discretion as to whether or not the hearing in this matter should be adjourned for further argument. It also informs the discretion as to whether or not Mr Boots should be afforded a further opportunity to amend his proposed grounds.
46 The objection to competency in relation to the December 2025 Decision should also be upheld. In that decision, the ART did not engage fully with the merits relating to Mr Boots’ medical conditions. The basis of its decision was that Mr Boots was attempting to reagitate and repeat arguments that had been litigated on a previous application for merits review. The ART stated that the proper course was for Mr Boots to seek some form of judicial review or to commence an appeal in this Court.
47 I infer that one of the explanations for the delay in appealing from the July 2025 Decision was that Mr Boots was attempting to do something about the ART’s decision in a different way, before the ART. That is apparent from the history of the matter. However, the proposed grounds do not assert that the ART committed an error of law. The review culminating in the December 2025 Decision was properly characterised by the ART as an abuse of process, in that it was an attempt to relitigate a matter that had already been decided.
48 In conclusion, the grounds upon which the applicant relies do not disclose an error of law affecting the December 2025 Decision. In action SAD 83 of 2026, I uphold the objection to competency and dismiss the application for an extension of time.
49 Similarly, for the reasons that I have given, the application in action SAD 84 of 2026 for an extension of time to appeal from the July 2025 Decision is dismissed on the grounds of incompetency and because of my conclusions with respect to the proposed appeal having no reasonable prospects of success.
I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Charlesworth. |
Associate:
Dated: 16 November 2026