Federal Court of Australia
Liebovitz v Golden Steel International Pty Ltd t/a Ariston Wire [2026] FCA 1739
File number(s): | NSD 451 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | GOODMAN J |
Date of judgment: | 18 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – jurisdiction of Federal Court – where the Court has jurisdiction because of claims brought for contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act claims) – where the respondent brings an interlocutory application to dismiss, permanently stay, or sever a breach of contract claim – whether breach of contract claim forms part of the same matter as the FW Act claims – respondent’s interlocutory application dismissed |
Legislation: | Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 15AA, 15AB, 44, 87, 90, 116B, 357, 536 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 19 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B |
Cases cited: | Australian Securities and Investments Commissioner v Edensor Nominees Pty Limited [2001] HCA 1; (2001) 204 CLR 559 Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Limited [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 275 CLR 165 Houghton v Arms [2006] HCA 59; (2006) 225 CLR 553 Philip Morris Incorporated v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Proprietary Limited [1981] HCA 7; (1981) 148 CLR 457 Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156; (2017) 254 FCR 1 Re Wakim; Ex Parte McNally [1999] HCA 27; (1999) 198 CLR 511 Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd [1983] HCA 36; (1983) 154 CLR 261 |
Division: | Fair Work Division |
Registry: | New South Wales |
National Practice Area: | Employment and Industrial Relations |
Number of paragraphs: | 35 |
Date of hearing: | 10 September 2026 |
Date of last submissions: | 29 October 2026 |
Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr B Miles |
Solicitor for the Applicant: | Pendlebury Workplace Law |
Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr M Friedgut with Ms M Meares |
Solicitor for the Respondent: | Sasphire Legal |
ORDERS
NSD 451 of 2026 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | FRANINE LIEBOVITZ Applicant | |
AND: | GOLDEN STEEL INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD T/A ARISTON WIRE ABN 32 129 865 238 Respondent | |
order made by: | GOODMAN J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 18 november 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 11 May 2026 be dismissed.
2. If the applicant continues to seek the costs of that application, then:
(a) the applicant file and serve an outline of submissions of no more than three (3) pages, together with any affidavit evidence, by 27 November 2026;
(b) the respondent file and serve an outline of submissions of no more than three (3) pages, together with any affidavit evidence, by 7 December 2026;
(c) the applicant file and serve an outline of submissions in reply of no more than two (2) pages by 14 December 2026;
(d) the question of costs be determined on the papers unless either party notifies the Associate to Goodman J by 18 December 2026 that they wish to be heard at an oral hearing; and
(e) the parties have liberty to apply on two (2) days’ notice.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GOODMAN J:
A. Introduction
1 The applicant, Ms Franine Liebovitz, brings this proceeding against her former employer, Ariston Wire. By her originating application and statement of claim (SOC), Ms Liebovitz contends in broad terms, inter alia, that Ariston Wire:
(1) contravened various sections of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) with respect to her employment by Ariston Wire (FW Act claims); and
(2) breached a contract described as an Agency Agreement between Ms Liebovitz and Ariston Wire (breach of contract claim).
2 These reasons for judgment address an application brought by Ariston Wire to strike out, permanently stay or otherwise sever from the proceeding, the breach of contract claim.
B. Background
3 The following background is taken from the allegations made in the SOC, as supplemented by affidavit and documentary material adduced on this application. Necessarily, the application falls to be determined by reference to the limited information presently available in circumstances where pleadings are not closed and limited evidence has been adduced. It is appropriate for the Court to address the application by reference to the limited material available, and as a matter of impression and practical judgment: Re Wakim; Ex Parte McNally [1999] HCA 27; (1999) 198 CLR 511 at 585 [140] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156; (2017) 254 FCR 1 at 11 [36] (Allsop CJ, Besanko and White JJ).
4 In about May 2002, Ms Liebovitz commenced employment with Ariston Wire (SOC [4] and [5]).
5 On 1 March 2024, Ms Liebovitz and Ariston Wire entered into an agreement titled Incentive Plan Agreement (SOC [7]). Clause 4 of the Incentive Plan Agreement, which is described at SOC [8], provides (as written):
4. Non-Compete
4.1 [Ms Liebovitz] covenants, undertakes and agrees that she will not, either directly or indirectly, for a period of 24 months from when she ceases employment with the the Company, whether solely or jointly with any other person and whether as principal, agent, director, executive, officer, employee, shareholder, beneficiary, partner, joint venturer, adviser, consultant, trustee, financier, contractor, manager, associate, unit holder or member or on behalf of any other person or corporation or trust or through an agent or independent contractor:-
(a) be engaged by a business which was a direct competitor with the Company during the 24 months immediately preceding [Ms Liebovitz’s] last day of employment;
(b) employ, solicit, entice away from the Business or the related bodies corporate of the Company any employee, contractor, supplier or customer of the Company or otherwise act in any way or to assist them, or any of them, to leave the employment of, or to terminate its engagement or contract with the Business.
4.2 [Ms Liebovitz]:
(a) considers the clause 4.1 to be fair and reasonable; and
(b) agrees and accept that the provisions of clause 4.1 confer a benefit on [Ms Liebovitz] that is no more than is reasonably and necessarily required by the Business for the protection of its business, assets and goodwill and its legitimate commercial and business interest against conduct by [Ms Liebovitz] (directly or indirectly, in any capacity or by any means).
4.3 This non-compete arrangement is subject to and conditional upon a payment of $ 810,000.00 to [Ms Liebovitz] paid over the period of 24 months of the restraint period if [Ms Liebovitz] ceases employment prior to 30 June 2025. The $810,000 shall be payable in equal monthly instalments over the 24 months, on the 1st of each month, and if there is a late payment, interest shall be applied at the current NSW Supreme Court rate and payable to [Ms Liebovitz]. If [Ms Liebovitz] ceases employment anytime between 01 July 2025 and 30 June 2027, then the non-compete payment is payable on a pro rata basis for outstanding time left until 30 June 2027.
6 In or around June 2024, Ariston Wire proposed that Ms Liebovitz’s employment be terminated and that Ms Liebovitz be engaged as an agent under a contract for services (SOC [9]).
7 On 23 June 2024, Ms Liebovitz (as agent) and Ariston Wire (as principal) entered into the Agency Agreement. The Agency Agreement included as express terms (SOC [10]) the following:
(1) Ariston Wire could direct Ms Liebovitz to attend meetings, conferences, trade shows, supplier events and customer events;
(2) Ms Liebovitz could only utilise suppliers designated by Ariston Wire;
(3) customers were customers of Ariston Wire and were required to confirm the sales order with Ariston Wire;
(4) payment terms for new customers were subject to approval by Ariston Wire;
(5) Ariston Wire reserved the right to reject an order;
(6) Ms Liebovitz could use office staff and office reporting systems of Ariston Wire;
(7) Ms Liebovitz was required to use the email system of Ariston Wire;
(8) Ms Liebovitz was required to use the customer relationship software of Ariston Wire;
(9) Ms Liebovitz reported to the Managing Director;
(10) Ariston Wire would pay Ms Liebovitz:
(a) an hourly or daily rate for any activity conducted in accordance with subparagraph (1) above;
(b) all of her domestic and New Zealand business travel costs and conference fees;
(c) commission of 30 per cent of the net profit for Ariston Wire for back-to-back and blanket orders;
(d) commission of 18 per cent of the net profit for Ariston Wire for stock orders;
(e) a minimum commission of $360,000 plus GST per year in 12 equal instalments;
(11) Ms Liebovitz was required to pay her own superannuation;
(12) after the expiration of one year, the Agency Agreement could be terminated on three months written notice;
(13) clause 4 of the Incentive Plan Agreement would be varied so that payment was not due when Ms Liebovitz ceased employment and instead it would be due when the Agency Agreement was terminated; and
(14) payment under clause 4 of the Incentive Plan Agreement would commence immediately after the three month notice period ended.
8 The Agency Agreement commenced on 1 July 2024.
9 Ms Liebovitz alleges that the Agency Agreement was principally for her labour and that under that agreement she would be performing the same, or substantially the same, work as she had performed prior to 30 June 2024 (SOC [11], [12] and [27]).
10 From July 2024, Ms Liebovitz issued a tax invoice at the end of each month for $30,000 plus GST, in relation to the performance of work (SOC [14]). In the month following the invoice, Ariston Wire paid the amount of $30,000 plus GST (SOC [15]). This occurred up to and including 31 May 2025 (SOC [20]).
11 On 12 June 2025, Ariston Wire gave notice to Ms Liebovitz that it had decided to terminate the Agency Agreement with effect from 12 September 2025 (Termination Letter) (SOC [16]). The Termination Letter stated that Artison Wire:
(1) had elected not to exercise its rights under clause 4 of the Incentive Plan Agreement (as incorporated into the Agency Agreement) (SOC [17]);
(2) would make the following payments to Ms Liebovitz:
(a) $30,000 plus GST, less applicable payroll tax for FY2025 by 30 June 2025;
(b) $30,000 plus GST, less applicable payroll tax by 31 July 2025;
(c) $30,000 plus GST, less applicable payroll tax by 31 August 2025;
(d) $30,000 plus GST, less applicable payroll tax by 30 September 2025;
(e) $30,000 plus GST, less applicable payroll tax by 31 October 2025; and
(f) $15,000 plus GST, less applicable payroll tax by 15 November 2025.
(SOC [18])
12 Between 30 June 2025 and 12 November 2025, Ariston Wire made a series of payments to Ms Liebovitz (SOC [20]).
C. Consideration
13 As noted above, Ariston Wire seeks to strike out, permanently stay or otherwise sever from the proceeding, the breach of contract claim on the basis that it falls outside of the jurisdiction of this Court.
14 The original jurisdiction of this Court includes – save for some exceptions which are not presently relevant – any “matter” arising under any laws made by the Commonwealth Parliament: s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 19(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
15 A “matter” in this context is the justiciable controversy between the parties, comprised of the substratum of facts representing or amounting to the dispute or controversy between them: Rana at 5 [17].
16 It is well-settled that where a matter comprises both “federal” claims (such as the FW Act claims, which I note were accepted, for the purpose of this application, to be bona fide claims) and “non-federal” claims (such as the breach of contract claim), a court exercising federal jurisdiction has jurisdiction to resolve all issues which form part of the matter: Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd [1983] HCA 36; (1983) 154 CLR 261 at 278 (Gibbs CJ) and 290 to 291 (Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ); Rana at 5 [17].
17 The observations of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Re Wakim at 583 to 586 ([135] and [139] to [141]) provide valuable guidance:
135 It must now be regarded as established that the jurisdiction of a federal court having jurisdiction in a matter arising under a law made by the Parliament is not ‘‘restricted to the determination of the federal claim or cause of action in the proceeding, but extend[s] beyond that to the litigious or justiciable controversy between parties of which the federal claim or cause of action forms part’’. In Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd the majority said:
“In this, as in other cases, the recurrent problem is to identify what it is that falls within the Federal Court’s accrued jurisdiction. The majority judgment in Fencott v Muller provides this assistance in reaching an answer: ‘What is and what is not part of the one controversy depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships. The scope of a controversy which constitutes a matter is not ascertained merely by reference to the proceedings which a party may institute, but may be illuminated by the conduct of those proceedings and especially by the pleadings in which the issues in controversy are defined and the claims for relief are set out. But in the end, it is a matter of impression and of practical judgment whether a non-federal claim and a federal claim joined in a proceeding are within the scope of one controversy and thus within the ambit of a matter.’ ”
…
139 The central task is to identify the justiciable controversy. In civil proceedings that will ordinarily require close attention to the pleadings (if any) and to the factual basis of each claim.
140 In Fencott it was said that ‘‘in the end, it is a matter of impression and of practical judgment whether a non-federal claim and a federal claim joined in a proceeding are within the scope of one controversy and thus within the ambit of a matter.’’ The references to ‘‘impression’’ and ‘‘practical judgment’’ cannot be understood, however, as stating a test that is to be applied. Considerations of impression and practical judgment are relevant because the question of jurisdiction usually arises before evidence is adduced and often before the pleadings are complete. Necessarily, then, the question will have to be decided on limited information. But the question is not at large. What is a single controversy ‘‘depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships’’. There is but a single matter if different claims arise out of ‘‘common transactions and facts’’ or ‘‘a common substratum of facts’’, notwithstanding that the facts upon which the claims depend ‘‘do not wholly coincide’’. So, too, there is but one matter where different claims are so related that the determination of one is essential to the determination of the other, as, for example, in the case of third party proceedings or where there are alternative claims for the same damage...
141 Often, the conclusion that, if proceedings were tried in different courts, there could be conflicting findings made on one or more issues common to the two proceedings will indicate that there is a single matter. By contrast, if the several proceedings could not have been joined in one proceeding, it is difficult to see that they could be said to constitute a single matter.
(italic emphasis in original; bold emphasis added; citations omitted)
18 Similarly, the Full Court of this Court in Rana at 9 [29] and 10 to 11 [36] explained:
29 … the task in relation to ascertaining whether there is a sufficient commonality of a substratum of facts and claims between what remains on the pleading in terms of the “non-federal issue” and the struck out “federal issue” does not turn upon the inadequacy of the pleading. Rather, it turns upon whether there is sufficient commonality of underlying facts, allegations and claims such that the ACL claim and the defamation claim can be seen to arise out of a common substratum of fact, even if it is not equivalent in scope. As the circumstances in Re Wakim reveal, there is no requirement for a complete overlapping of the underlying substratum of facts, allegations and claims for relief between the different parts of the matter, or, to use old terminology, the federal issue and the accrued claim. If there is common substance, a substantial overlapping of the underlying facts and allegations in the federal claim and the non-federal claim out of which the different claims arise, that will suffice. It will always be a matter of practical judgment.
…
36 The question whether the overlap of common factual matters and complaints leads to a wider matter with two separate claims or whether there are two quite separate and distinct matters or controversies is a matter of practical judgment. The well-known passage from the joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Re Wakim at [139]–[142] (which we do not set out here) is critical. Their Honours recognised that question will have to be decided on limited information. One can add here that it may have to be decided on defectively expressed information and pleading. What is relevant is “what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them, and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships”: Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 at 608. There is but a single matter if different claims arise out of common transactions and facts or a common substratum of facts: Philip Morris 148 CLR 512. Notwithstanding that the facts on which the claims depend do not wholly coincide: Fencott at 607. The common transaction and facts or common substratum of facts are those that the different claims arise out of, not are composed of. There may be various ways of otherwise describing the matter. It is sometimes put in the negative: whether the claims are completely disparate, completely separate and distinct, or distinct and unrelated…
(italic emphasis in original; bold emphasis added)
19 I turn now to the pleading of the FW Act claims and the breach of contract claim in the SOC. As Gummow and Hayne JJ observed in Re Wakim at 585 [139], identification of the justiciable controversy will ordinarily require close attention to the pleadings and the factual basis of each claim.
20 The FW Act claims include:
(1) a claim based upon s 357 of the FW Act that Ariston Wire represented that the Agency Agreement was a contract for services under which Ms Liebovitz was an independent contractor when, in truth, the Agency Agreement was a contract of employment (SOC [21] to [25], [35], [42], [47] and [48]);
(2) a claim based upon ss 44, 87(1) and 90(2) of the FW Act concerning an alleged failure to pay accrued but untaken annual leave entitlements (SOC [21] to [23], [26] to [32], [36], [43], [47] and [48]);
(3) a claim based upon s 536(1) of the FW Act concerning an alleged failure to provide Ms Liebovitz with payslips within one working day of payment (SOC [38], [47] and [48]); and
(4) a claim based upon s 44 and 116B of the FW Act concerning an alleged failure to make contributions to a superannuation fund so as to avoid a superannuation guarantee charge liability (SOC [21] to [25], [26] to [31], [39], [40], [46], [47] and [48]).
21 A number of the FW Act claims start from the premise that Ms Liebovitz was an employee of Ariston Wire (SOC [3]). The foundation for that premise is pleaded in two ways.
22 The primary case is that Ms Liebovitz became an employee of Ariston Wire in about May 2002 and continued as such despite the commencement of the Agency Agreement from 1 July 2024, because, in accordance with the terms of the Agency Agreement:
(1) the contract was principally for the labour of Ms Liebovitz;
(2) Ms Liebovitz’s role was integrated into the business of Ariston Wire;
(3) Ms Liebovitz could not act for parties that compete with Ariston Wire;
(4) Ms Liebovitz was required to report to Ariston Wire’s managing director;
(5) Ms Liebovitz was required to use the email system of Ariston Wire;
(6) Ms Liebovitz was required to use the customer relationship software of Ariston Wire;
(7) Ariston Wire had the contractual right to direct Ms Liebovitz to attend meetings, conferences, trade shows, and events;
(8) Ariston Wire paid a minimum commission of $360,000 per annum;
(9) any additional commission payable to Ms Liebovitz was calculated according to profits made by Ariston Wire;
(10) Ms Liebovitz was required to use Ariston Wire’s suppliers;
(11) purchase orders were between Ariston Wire and the supplier;
(12) customer purchase orders were directed to Ariston Wire and not to Ms Liebovitz;
(13) payment was made by the customer to Ariston Wire; and
(14) Ms Liebovitz had no contractual right to delegate work.
(SOC [4] to [5] and [21] to [22])
23 The alternative case – which assumes that Ms Liebovitz’s employment with Ariston Wire ended on 30 June 2024 because of the Agency Agreement – is that by dint of the operation of ss 15AA and 15AB of the FW Act Ms Liebovitz was an employee of Ariston Wire from 26 August 2024 until 12 September 2025 (SOC [26] to [31]). In this regard, s 15AA of the FW Act provides, in so far as is presently relevant:
15AA Determining the ordinary meanings of employee and employer
(1) For the purposes of this Act, whether an individual is an employee of a person within the ordinary meaning of that expression, or whether a person is an employer of an individual within the ordinary meaning of that expression, is to be determined by ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the individual and the person.
(2) For the purposes of ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the individual and the person:
(a) the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person must be considered; and
(b) in considering the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person, regard must be had not only to the terms of the contract governing the relationship, but also to other factors relating to the totality of the relationship including, but not limited to, how the contract is performed in practice.
…
(bold and italic emphasis in original; underline emphasis added)
24 The breach of contract claim is in essence that:
(1) the Agency Agreement included terms that:
(a) following termination of the Agency Agreement and the expiry of a three month notice period, Ariston Wire would pay Ms Liebovitz $33,750 per month;
(b) interest was payable if such payments were late;
(2) the monthly payments were due on and from 1 September 2025 until 1 August 2027;
(3) Ariston Wire failed to make such payments; and
(4) Ariston Wire is liable to pay an amount equivalent to the missed payments, together with interest.
(SOC [8], [10(m) and (n)], [33] to [34], [45] and [48(f)])
25 For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the FW Act claims and the breach of contract claim form one justiciable controversy and thus one matter.
26 First, it is apparent that the FW Act claims on the one hand, and the breach of contract claim on the other, each arise out of the relationship between Ms Liebovitz and Ariston Wire pursuant to which Ms Liebovitz provided services to Ariston Wire for reward.
27 Secondly, a significant aspect of that relationship was the Agency Agreement.
28 Thirdly, the Agency Agreement is central to the determination of each of the FW Act claims and the breach of contract claim. In this regard:
(1) the breach of contract claim is based squarely upon terms of the Agency Agreement;
(2) as to the FW Act claims:
(a) a threshold issue is whether Ms Liebovitz was an employee of Ariston Wire. The determination of this question requires consideration of the Agency Agreement. For the period prior to 26 August 2024, this is because of the primacy of the contractual relationship, as explained in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Limited [2022] HCA 1; (2022) 275 CLR 165. For the period from 26 August 2024, this is because of the operation of s 15AA of the FW Act, which requires the Court when considering the totality of the relationship between Ms Liebovitz and Ariston Wire – as part of the broader task of ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of that relationship – to have regard to, inter alia, “the terms of the contract governing the relationship” and “how the contract is performed in practice” (see [23] above); and
(b) it follows that all of the terms of the Agency Agreement, including clause 4 of the Incentive Plan Agreement (as incorporated into the Agency Agreement), are relevant to the FW Act claims.
29 Thus, I do not accept the submission of counsel for Ariston Wire that there is no overlap within the facts and allegations between the two claims.
30 Whilst it can be accepted that, as counsel for Ariston Wire submitted, there are differences between the facts and allegations as pleaded in respect of the FW Act claims on the one hand and the breach of contract claim on the other (including the varying degrees to which each claim relies on the Agency Agreement and the terms of that Agreement), it does not follow that the two claims are otherwise separate or distinct in the requisite sense. Similarly, the fact that the two claims seek different relief is of little moment.
31 Counsel for Ariston Wire also submitted that in the event the Court made a finding that there was one justiciable controversy in this proceeding and that it had jurisdiction, the Court should nevertheless decline to exercise such jurisdiction as a matter of discretion. In this regard, Ariston Wire placed weight upon: (1) the relativity of the two claims, and in particular the amounts claimed being in the order of $800,000 for the breach of contract claim and $90,000 for the FW Act claims (a submission which does not take into account the possibility of substantial penalties if the FW Act claims are established); (2) the “no cost” regime for the FW Act claims as opposed to the usual costs position for the breach of contract claim; and (3) the differential treatment of evidence between the two species of claim, e.g., evidence concerning the surrounding circumstances of the parties’ entry into the Agency Agreement or post formation conduct would be admissible for the purposes of the FW Act claims, but would likely not be admissible for the purposes of the determination of the breach of contract claim.
32 I do not accept this submission as it proceeds upon the false premise that where the Court has found that it has jurisdiction over a “non-federal” matter, it retains a discretion to decline to exercise that jurisdiction.
33 In Philip Morris Incorporated v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Proprietary Limited [1981] HCA 7; (1981) 148 CLR 457 at 475 to 476, Barwick CJ expressed the view that the exercise of the Court’s “accrued jurisdiction” was “discretionary and not mandatory”. However, that view has not prevailed and the prevailing view is that there is no such discretion (putting to one side questions of abuse of process, forum non conveniens and the like): Re Wakim at 588 [149] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Australian Securities and Investments Commissioner v Edensor Nominees Pty Limited [2001] HCA 1; (2001) 204 CLR 559 at 585 to 586 [52] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ) and 638 to 639 [218] (Hayne and Callinan JJ); Houghton v Arms [2006] HCA 59; (2006) 225 CLR 553 at 564 [27] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
34 Had such a discretion been available, I would not have exercised it in the manner sought by Ariston Wire, for reasons including: (1) the substantial overlap in the factual substratum, as discussed above; (2) the efficiencies inherent in having all claims dealt with in the same forum; and (3) the reasons suggested by Ariston Wire not providing a sufficient reason not to exercise the jurisdiction.
D. Conclusion
35 For the foregoing reasons, Ariston Wire’s interlocutory application must be dismissed. Counsel for Ms Liebovitz indicated that his client wished to be heard on the question of costs. I will make orders accordingly.
I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Goodman. |
Associate:
Dated: 18 November 2026