Federal Court of Australia

CCL24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1738

Appeal from:

CCL24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 896

File number(s):

NSD 1067 of 2025

Judgment of:

BROMWICH J

Date of judgment:

11 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of primary judge to dismiss application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (now the Administrative Review Tribunal) – where grounds of appeal not raised before primary judge – where Tribunal did not consider merits of protection claim due to non-attendance of appellant – where primary judge declined to consider protection claim – where appellant contends she did not receive notification of Tribunal hearing or decisions – where appellant did not show she was innocent victim of fraud committed against the Tribunal – HELD: appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 425, 425A, 426A(1A)(b), 426A(1E), 441A(5)(b), 441C

Cases cited:

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 464; [2019] FCAFC 53

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; 232 CLR 189

SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 151; 119 ALD 233

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

13

Date of hearing:

11 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellant:

The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

J Djasmeini of Mills Oakley

ORDERS

NSD 1067 of 2025

BETWEEN:

CCL24

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appellant be refused leave to rely upon grounds 2, 3 and 4 of the notice of appeal.

2.    Ground 1 in the notice of appeal be dismissed.

3.    The appeal be dismissed.

4.    The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as assessed or agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Ex tempore and revised

BROMWICH J:

1    By a notice of appeal, the appellant appeals against the judgment and orders of a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia: CCL24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 896. His Honor dismissed an application for judicial review of two decisions of the second respondent, then the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, now the Administrative Review Tribunal, dated 12 March 2024 and 27 March 2024. Those decisions concern the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the application for judicial review pursuant to s 426A(1A)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (non-appearance decision), and its confirmation of the non-appearance decision pursuant to s 426A(1E) of the Migration Act (confirmation decision).

2    The background to the judicial review application and the summary of the Tribunal’s decision were summarised by the primary judge at [2]-[10] and [11]-[13] respectively. I incorporate them by reference. I need not detail what took place before the primary judge. That too is described in his Honour’s reasons.

3    The notice of appeal raises four grounds of appeal (verbatim):

[1]    The primary judge erred in the judgment by failing to consider that the Tribunal should consider the applicant’s merit application on the existing evidence, even if the department has made its decision based on the same evidence.

[2]    The primary judge erred in the judgment without considering the applicant’s argument that the nominated email was his former agent, not her own. The applicant didn’t receive the notification of hearing invitation dated 20 February 2024, notification of reinstatement dated 12 March 2024 & non-appearance decision dated 12 December 2024, and notification to dismiss application & its decision record dated 27 March 2024, nor did he return respond to hearing Invitation.

[3]    The primary judge erred in the judgment by failing to take into account that the Tribunal didn’t send the pre-hearing information to her former agent. The applicant lost her opportunity to update her details.

[4]    The primary judge erred in the judgment by failing to consider that the Tribunal didn’t to notify the applicant in respect of hearing date by text message. If the Tribunal had done so, the applicant would receive the hearing reminder directly and be able to attend the hearing.

4    The Minister submits that grounds 2, 3 and 4 were not raised before the primary judge, and accordingly the appellant requires leave to rely upon them: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588 at [48] (Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ). The Minister accepts that there would be no actual prejudice suffered by granting leave, but submits that leave should be refused on the basis that the appellant has not provided an adequate explanation for why the grounds were not raised before the primary judge and because the grounds lack merit. If that is so, then leave to reply upon those grounds ought not be granted.

Ground 1

5    Ground 1 contends that the primary judge erred by not finding that the Tribunal failed to consider the merits of the appellant’s protection claims. That is not a stance that is properly able to be advanced because there was no occasion for the Tribunal to consider the merits for the appellant’s protection claims. The appellant had not attended the Tribunal hearing, and the judicial review application was dismissed for that reason. The Tribunal was not required to consider the merits of the judicial review application in those circumstances. Accordingly, this ground of appeal must fail.

Grounds 2 and 3

6    By ground 2, the appellant contends that the primary judge erred in failing to consider her arguments that the nominated email address was her former agent’s and not her own, and that she did not receive the hearing invitation, non-appearance decision and confirmation decision. By ground 3, the appellant contends that the primary judge erred by failing to consider that the Tribunal did not send the pre-hearing information to her former agent and that she had lost her opportunity to update her details.

7    The primary judge found that the relevant correspondence was sent to the appellant’s nominated email address in compliance with ss 425, 425A and 441A(5)(b) of the Migration Act and as such the appellant was deemed to have received the correspondence under s 441C of the Migration Act. The primary judge noted that there was no evidence before the Tribunal that the appellant did not receive the correspondence. Moreover, as a matter of law, it did not matter whether the appellant actually received the documents if the conditions for the application of the deemed service provisions have been met: SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 151; 119 ALD 233 at [18] (Stone and Jagot JJ).

8    If the appellant was meaning to contend that she was a victim of fraud, she needed to establish not merely that she was the innocent victim of fraud (which may well have been so, but is at most asserted and not proven), but that the fraud had in some way stultified the operation of the legislative scheme or caused the Tribunal to be disabled from performing its statutory function. That is, that the fraud was perpetrated on the Tribunal: SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; 232 CLR 189 at [51] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). That has not been sought to be proven, much less established.

9    The appellant provided no evidence to the primary judge or to this Court that the email address did not belong to her but to an agent. But even if this Court was to find that there was third party fraud, the appellant bears the onus of proving that she was not complicit in nor (recklessly) indifferent to any such fraudulent conduct: (Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 53; 269 FCR 464 at [178] (Murphy, Mortimer and O’Callaghan JJ).

10    It follows that these grounds of appeal have no merit, and leave to rely upon them should be refused.

Ground 4

11    By ground four, the appellant contends that the primary judge erred by failing to consider that the Tribunal did not notify the appellant of the hearing by text message. This ground is fatally misconceived. As the primary judge found, the Tribunal was not required under s 426A or any other provision of the Migration Act (or of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)) to contact the appellant by text to remind her of the upcoming hearing of the Tribunal. If the Tribunal had done so, that would have been no more than a voluntary reminder. In any event, the appellant did not nominate any telephone number in her application to the Tribunal nor at any time prior to the scheduled hearing.

12    It follows that this ground has no merit and leave to rely upon it should be refused.

Conclusion

13    As ground 1 has failed and leave to rely upon any of grounds 2-4 must be refused, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding thirteen (13) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bromwich.

Associate:

Dated:    16 November 2026