Federal Court of Australia

GQN18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1737

Appeal from:

GQN18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 935

File number(s):

NSD 1176 of 2025

Judgment of:

JACKMAN J

Date of judgment:

16 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa – where grounds of appeal are unparticularised – where grounds of appeal do not establish any error in decision of primary judge

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

GQN18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 935

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

27

Date of hearing:

16 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellant:

The Appellant did not appear

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Mr C Nicholls of Mills Oakley

ORDERS

NSD 1176 of 2025

BETWEEN:

GQN18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

JACKMAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal be dismissed.

2.    The appellant pay the Minister’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Delivered ex tempore

JACKMAN J:

Introduction

1    This is an appeal from the orders and judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dated 17 June 2025 in GQN18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 935.

2    The primary judge dismissed an application made under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia for judicial review of a decision made by the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority), on 22 November 2018. By that decision, the Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) to the appellant.

3    There was no appearance by the appellant when the appeal was called on for hearing, and the Minister sought an order dismissing the appeal under r 36.75(1)(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), noting that the appellant had consented to the matter being fixed for hearing today. Although I accept that the rule is applicable, I regard the preferable course as being to deal with the appeal on its merits, given the potential importance of the matter to the appellant.

Background

4    The appellant is a male citizen of Sri Lanka with Tamil ethnicity. He arrived on Christmas Island on 25 June 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 21 August 2017, the appellant lodged an application for a SHEV. The appellant claimed to fear harm due to his cousins being members of the LTTE, him being accused of being a member of the LTTE, and on return to Sri Lanka from the CID and Sri Lankan military, due to his Tamil ethnicity, his imputed political opinion as an LTTE supporter, as a failed asylum seeker and as a Tamil man with no connections in Sri Lanka.

5    On 8 June 2018, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the appellant a SHEV. The delegate found that the appellant’s profile would not be of interest to Sri Lankan authorities and found that the chance that the appellant would face serious harm because of any real or perceived links to the LTTE was remote. Overall, the delegate found that the appellant would not face a real chance of persecution or real risk of significant harm.

6    On 14 June 2018, the matter was referred to the Authority. On 5 July 2018, the appellant’s representative provided submissions to the Authority. On 25 July 2018, the appellant’s representative provided further submissions to the Authority, containing submissions regarding new information and attaching a 2018 report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism (2018 report) and an article published by The Guardian. On 1 November 2018, the appellant’s representative provided submissions to the Authority, including information on the recent appointment of President Mahinda Rajapaksa and submissions regarding the justification for consideration of the new information.

7    On 22 November 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision.

Grounds of Appeal

8    By way of a notice of appeal filed on 14 July 2025, the appellant advances the following grounds of appeal:

1.    The primary judge erred by failing to find that the Administrative Review Tribunal has erred in failed to ask relevant questions and not considering relevant considerations or considered irrelevant consideration.

2.    Ground 1

Identifying wrong issues

3.    Ground 2

Asking wrong questions

4.    Ground 3

Ignoring relevant materials

5.    Ground 4

Relying on irrelevant material

6.    Ground 5

Incorrect interpretation and/or application to the facts applicable to law

9    Grounds two to six of the notice of appeal are essentially the same as the grounds of review raised before the primary judge, namely:

1.    Identifying wrong issues

2.    Asking wrong questions

3.    Ignoring relevant materials

4.    Relying on irrelevant material or

5.    Incorrect interpretation and/or application to the facts applicable to law.

10    Insofar as ground one of the notice of appeal contends that the Authority failed to take into account relevant considerations and took into account irrelevant considerations, the Minister submits, and I accept, that this corresponds to ground five as was raised before the primary judge, noting that “grounds of judicial review that fasten upon the use made of relevant and irrelevant considerations are concerned essentially with whether the decision-maker has properly applied the law”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [74] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

Primary Judgment

11    The primary judge set out the factual background of the matter and summarised the Authority’s decision. The primary judge then summarised the procedural history of the matter and the hearing ([13]–[23]). In particular, the primary judge noted the appellant submitted orally that he could not “identify a legal error in the [Authority’s] decision because he does not know how to do this”, and that the Minister relied on his written submissions.

12    In relation to grounds one and two, the primary judge found that a failure to particularise the grounds is itself a sufficient basis to dismiss a ground, citing NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 (NWWJ) at [37] (Perram, Derrington and Stewart JJ). In any event, the primary judge found (at [25]) that the Authority had correctly identified the key issues in the matter, and applied the correct test and the appropriate considerations. Accordingly, the primary judge found that grounds one and two did not identify any jurisdictional error in the Authority’s decision.

13    In relation to grounds three and four, the primary judge again cited NWWJ at [37] in relation to unparticularised grounds. In any event, the primary judge found (at [28]) that the Authority had considered the material it was required to consider by statute, and did not have regard to irrelevant material.

14    In relation to ground five, the primary judge again cited NWWJ at [37] in relation to unparticularised grounds. In any event, the primary judge found that there was no incorrect interpretation of the law, nor any incorrect application of the law to the facts in the Authority’s decision (at [30]).

15    The primary judge independently considered whether the Authority had committed jurisdictional error and concluded that this was not the case (at [31]). Accordingly, the primary judge dismissed the application (at [32]).

The Appeal

16    Grounds one to three contend that the primary judge erred by failing to ask relevant questions, identifying the wrong issues, asking the wrong questions and failing to consider relevant considerations and considering irrelevant considerations. These grounds are unparticularised, which is in itself a sufficient basis to dismiss them: NWWJ at [37]. To that fatal defect may be added the following.

17    Insofar as ground one contends that the Authority failed to consider relevant considerations and took into account irrelevant considerations, this is addressed below under ground six.

18    The Minister submits, and I accept, that the primary judge was correct to find that the Authority correctly identified that the key issue before it was whether the appellant was owed protection pursuant to ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act (at [25]). As observed by the primary judge (at [25]), the Authority outlined the appellant’s claims to fear harm and comprehensively considered those claims with reference to both ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Further, the Authority asked itself the correct question in applying the real chance and real risk test (at [25]). Accordingly, these grounds do not establish error.

19    Grounds four and five contend that the primary judge erred by failing to find that the Authority ignored relevant material and relied on irrelevant material. These grounds are not particularised, which is again fatal in itself.

20    In addition, the Minister submits, and I accept, that the primary judge was correct to find that the Authority considered “all material it was statutorily required to” and that it did “not have regard to any irrelevant material” (at [28]). The Authority had regard to the material referred to it by the Secretary pursuant to s 473CB of the Act (at [2]). The Authority otherwise considered the new documents provided by the appellant pursuant to s 473DD (at [3]–[5]). The Authority accepted there were exceptional circumstances to consider all the new material except for one media article.

21    Paragraph 473DD(b)(i) of the Act required the Authority to consider whether new information “was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65”. Although the Authority did not expressly consider this in relation to the article in The Guardian, it did consider it in relation to the 2018 report which the article reported on. The Minister submits, and I accept, that the Authority implicitly considered s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act.

22    Paragraph 473DD(b)(ii) required the Authority to consider whether new information “is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims”. The Authority was not required to consider this provision of the Act in relation to the article in The Guardian, which was not personal information.

23    The Authority had regard to the criteria in s 473DD(b) insofar as these factors were relevant and capable of assessment, and no error is therefore revealed in the Authority’s approach. The Authority considered all material it was required to for the purposes of making a decision under the Act. The Minister submits, and I accept, that the Authority did not have regard to any irrelevant material. To the extent that this ground takes issue with the Authority’s reliance on country information, the choice, and the assessment of the weight, of country information is a matter for the Authority: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]–[13] (Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ).

24    Ground six contends that the primary judge (or perhaps the Authority) erred in incorrectly interpreting the law and/or incorrectly applying the facts to the applicable law.

25    Having regard to the unparticularised nature of the ground, and the appellant’s oral submissions at the hearing before the primary judge that he was unable to identify any error in the Authority’s decision, the primary judge was correct to observe that this was a sufficient basis for dismissal: NWWJ at [37].

26    In any event, the primary judge was correct to conclude that there was no incorrect interpretation of the law or application of the law to the facts in the Authority’s decision (at [30]). It further follows that neither the primary judge nor the Authority failed to take into account a relevant consideration or take into account an irrelevant consideration, as raised in ground one of the notice of appeal.

Conclusion

27    No error by the primary judge has been established. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I note that the time is now 10.39 am and there is still no appearance by the appellant.

I certify that the preceding twenty-seven (27) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Jackman.

Associate:

Dated:    16 November 2026