Federal Court of Australia

PDYY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1735

Appeal from:

PDYY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 2485 (20 November 2025)

File number:

NSD 2415 of 2025

Judgment of:

MARKOVIC J

Date of judgment:

18 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – judicial review – protection visa – whether Administrative Review Tribunal engaged in legally unreasonable reasoning in its treatment of evidence concerning the applicant’s risk of reoffending – whether Tribunal’s reasons disclosed an evident and intelligible justification – application dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 501

Cases cited:

BOH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 573

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94; (2018) 263 FCR 292

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175

EGH19 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2026] HCA 33

King v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 152

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Sultana v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1283

WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 437; (2002) 194 ALR 676

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

35

Date of last submission/s:

30 September 2026

Date of hearing:

14 October 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr O Jones SC

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Heretic Law

Counsel for the Respondents:

Mr N Swan

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 2415 of 2025

BETWEEN:

PDYY

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 november 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The originating application for review of a migration decision filed on 24 December 2025 is dismissed.

2.    The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

1    This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal made on 20 November 2025. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa on the basis that he did not satisfy s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

2    Section 36 of the Migration Act relevantly provides:

(1A)    An applicant for a protection visa must satisfy:

(a)    both of the criteria in subsections (1B) and (1C); and

…

…

(1C)    A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is not a person whom the Minister considers, on reasonable grounds:

(a)    is a danger to Australia’s security; or

(b)    having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger to the Australian community.

Background

3    The applicant is a male citizen of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He left Iran more than 15 years ago, and while living in Syria, was assessed by the United Nations to be a refugee. He migrated to Australia in 2012 under an XB (subclass 200) Refugee and Humanitarian visa: Tribunal decision (TD) at [4]-[5].

4    The applicant has an extensive criminal history in Australia, commencing in 2014: TD [6].

5    In 2019 the applicant commenced a relationship with an Australian citizen, referred to as Ms AA. Since that time, much of the applicant’s violence has been directed at Ms AA: TD [7].

6    The Tribunal summarised the applicant’s history of offending and its effect on his visa status at TD [8] including that:

(1)    on 24 June 2020 the Minister issued to the applicant a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation of his Refugee visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act;

(2)    in December 2020 and again in September 2022 the applicant was convicted of a number of offences and sentenced to terms of imprisonment;

(3)    on 28 September 2022 the applicant’s Refugee visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act and he was taken into immigration detention;

(4)    the applicant made representations to have the cancellation decision revoked. On 26 May 2023, a delegate of the Minister refused the revocation request;

(5)    on 21 August 2023 the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as the Tribunal was then known) set aside the non-revocation decision. As a result, the applicant’s Refugee visa was restored, and he was released from immigration detention;

(6)    on 2 June 2024 the Minister personally cancelled the applicant’s Refugee visa pursuant to s 501(BA) of the Migration Act. The applicant was returned to immigration detention;

(7)    on 22 July 2024 the applicant applied for a Protection visa, which was refused on 9 September 2024;

(8)    on 13 December 2024 the Tribunal set aside the decision to refuse the application for a protection visa and remitted the application to the Minister with a direction that the applicant satisfied s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act;

(9)    on 30 June 2025, based on the protection finding, the applicant was granted a Class WR Bridging R (subclass 070) visa and released from immigration detention; and

(10)    on 30 June 2025 a delegate of the Minister refused the Protection visa application, having found that the applicant did not satisfy s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act. The applicant sought review of the decision in the Tribunal.

7    The applicant identified the following material that was before the Tribunal:

(1)    the applicant’s solicitors’ submission dated 3 February 2025 to the Department of Home Affairs in response to the “Invitation to comment on information for a protection visa” addressed whether the applicant “is a danger to the Australian community” and submitted that he is not. Those submissions included at [22(i)]:

[The applicant’s] partner, [Ms AA], is struggling mentally and financially without [the applicant’s] support (see attached report from Psychological [sic] Massoud Amani dated 23 November 2024). [Ms AA] has stated on multiple occasions that she does not fear [the applicant], that he has changed and that she desires his release so they can live together as a family. [Ms AA] also notes the behaviour of their children in pretending that [the applicant] still lives with them. The views and actions of [Ms AA], and [the children] should be given significant weight. There is no evidence that the children are fearful of [the applicant]. …

(2)    the submission recorded above was substantially repeated in the applicant’s statement of facts, issues and contentions dated 7 October 2025 and relied on before the Tribunal;

(3)    a report prepared by Massoud Amani, Ms AA’s psychologist, dated 23 November 2024, which included:

…

According to [Ms AA] her partner is in currently in detention centre, and he is attending therapy sessions with a psychologist. [Ms AA] states that she could see improvement in her partners behaviour toward and her children. She states that her partner was a good supportive person (emotionally, and financially). [Ms AA] is convinced that her partner acknowledges and understands that his aggressive behaviour toward her was wrong and unacceptable. She states that her partner regrets how he behaved toward her and will not repeat it anymore. [Ms AA] is a very family orientated person, and she is the proud mother of children. She enjoys having her partner as strong support in future life.

The purpose of the providing report is to provide the negative impact that [Ms AA’s] partner, detention has had on her and her children. [Ms AA] states that as a family, they were living happily together before his visa was cancelled and he was detained. Ms Sarina Abed states that his sudden absence has completely disrupted their lives, causing emotional, financial, and mental strain on all of them.

[Ms AA] states that her partner is an exceptional father who has always been deeply involved in the lives of their children. [Ms AA] states that her partner provided not only financial support but also emotional stability and care and since his detention, their children have been profoundly affected. [Ms AA] states that every day, her children pretend their father is still with them and they stand behind the window waiting for him to return, and this breaks her heart. [Ms AA] states that during FaceTime calls, her children cry and struggle to express their feelings, often making excuses to stay on the call longer, longing for his presence.

… [Ms AA] states that her support system has been taken away, and there is no one to help her manage the daily demands of caring for the children. …

…

[Ms AA] states that the emotional toll on her children is especially concerning. They are deeply attached to their father, and his absence has left a void that cannot be filled. They call out for him day and night, and it is painful to watch them suffer in ways that are beyond their understanding.

[Ms AA] states that her partner is not only a wonderful father but also the best partner she could ask for. …

… Reuniting their family would bring stability and relief to their lives, ensuring that their children can grow up in the loving and supportive environment they need.

(4)    Ms AA’s statement dated 31 January 2025 in which she said, amongst other things, that: she and the applicant have two children; after the applicant was released from detention in 2023, they had “an amazing life together”; one night “two officers” came to their home and when they asked her questions she told them that they were “doing great” and that the applicant “was a good father and a partner”; the applicant helped her at home with the children and “had [her] back”; the applicant was then returned to detention and was “taken away without warning” at a time when he “had been on good behaviour”; and

(5)    Ms AA’s statutory declaration which included:

…

3.    [The applicant] has behaved very badly towards me in the past. It is unacceptable, but I believe he has the skills now to cope with stress and adverse events in his life. Neither [the applicant] or I have had easy lives - I have my own trauma and behaviours. …

4.    Since [the applicant] last offended, he has completed courses and I believe grown as a man. The last time he was taken away from us, something really changed in him. He just wants to be at home with us. He cooks and cleans and is focused on us, his family.

5.    [The children] love their dad. He has never harmed them and I don't think he ever could. [The applicant] understands that if he is ever in trouble with the police again that he will lose us.

6.    I stand by [the applicant], but I’m not ignoring our past. I love him.

…

The Tribunal’s decision

8    After summarising the background to the application before it, the relevant legislative framework and the authorities in relation to the application of s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal noted that there was no dispute that the applicant has been convicted of a particularly serious crime and identified the question before it to be whether the applicant was a danger to the Australian community: TD [19].

9    The Tribunal then summarised the evidence and submissions before it: TD [20]-[24].

10    The Tribunal commenced its consideration at TD [25]. It observed that the applicant’s offending commenced in 2014 and that, with the exception of 2021, he has answered charges every year between 2015 to 2022. The Tribunal described the applicant’s conduct in the following way at TD [25]:

The Applicant’s violence includes punching, kicking, and threatening to kill a housemate, starting a fight with a driver on a roadway, resisting a police officer trying to arrest him, and repeated violence against Ms AA. The latter includes instances of actual violence, threats, derogatory taunts, intimidation, and stalking. On one occasion he kicked Ms AA while she was pregnant and in the presence of their youngest child. He has also slapped her, hit her in the face with his mobile phone pulled her hair, pushed her, abused her ‘in the most vulgar of terms’, and threatened to hurt her so badly she would not be able to walk if she reported his conduct.

    (Footnotes omitted.)

11    The Tribunal also observed that a court had found that the applicant had a “poor record for matters of domestic violence”, non-violent crimes and a long history of non-compliance with court orders: at TD [25]-[26].

12    The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence that he had been drug free since, and stopped gambling in, 2015 but observed that nonetheless he continued to reoffend: TD [26].

13    The Tribunal referred to the evidence before it concerning the applicant’s risk of reoffending. This included a report prepared by Dr Emily Kwok, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who assessed the applicant as a “‘moderate’ risk of general reoffending” with a 74% likelihood of committing another assault against Ms AA in the five year period since his last domestic violence conduct in 2022. Overall, Dr Kwok assessed the applicant as a “high-moderate risk (i.e. the higher end of moderate risk)” and considered that the applicant’s recidivism risk could be reduced if he “engages in further intervention, remains abstinent from drug use and gambling and maintains pro-social living in the community”. Dr Kwok also recommended that the applicant have “further education on domestic violence either through a specialised domestic violence treatment program or from his current psychologist”: TD [30(c)].

14    There was evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant had completed various courses aimed at rehabilitation, but the Tribunal noted that there was no evidence about the content of those courses or how the applicant participated given his continuing reliance on an interpreter. While the Tribunal placed some weight on them, given the uncertainty as to how meaningfully they advanced the applicant’s rehabilitative needs, it preferred Dr Kwok’s report as a more recent and authoritative indicator of his unmet rehabilitation needs: TD [32].

15    At TD [34] the Tribunal found the applicant’s reliance on events prior to his arrival in Australia as context for his offending to be unpersuasive. It also referred to Ms AA’s evidence that those experiences affected his ability to cope with stressful situations. The Tribunal found that:

Any adverse experiences in Iran, however, do not excuse why the Applicant punched and kicked a housemate, engaged in violence against another driver, engaged in polysubstance abuse, repeatedly struck and abused Ms AA, or persistently breached judicial orders. He has been unable to appropriately regulate his emotions in the community despite considerable supports. The Applicant has instead engaged in a persistent pattern of criminal conduct that reflects a disregard of Australian laws and the rights of others. …

16    The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been law abiding since his last offences in 2022 but noted that he had spent much of the time since in custodial settings or under conditional liberty. The Tribunal was of the view that the applicant’s “inability to meaningfully grasp past opportunities to reform, custodial misconduct, incomplete insight, and unresolved rehabilitative needs diminish the persuasiveness of his current claims” and that a person “who has made enduring changes would not continue to conduct themselves as the [a]pplicant has in custody”: at TD [36].

17    At TD [38]-[40] the Tribunal said:

38    The Applicant’s evidence is that he currently remains unable to work, has no savings, and previously relied on Centrelink or carer payments. He also referred Ms AA’s Centrelink payments, albeit in the context of her problem gambling, such that she finds it hard to fund daily expenses. There is also evidence of recent conflict between the Applicant and Ms AA in August 2025 requiring police attendance. The Tribunal remains concerned about how the Applicant might respond to everyday stressors relating to financial problems or his relationship with Ms AA. This includes because of the incomplete nature of his insight relating to family violence and unresolved rehabilitative needs. There is scant evidence of him having prosocial support in the community. The supportive letters he relies upon are relatively brief, pitched at a high level of generality, and do not reflect a complete understanding of the Applicant’s past conduct.

39    In terms of the protective effect of the Applicant’s relationship with Ms AA and their children, less weight is placed on this because of the persistence of his violence against her. This includes while she was pregnant or in the presence of their eldest child. Family interests were previously insufficient to ameliorate the Applicant’s violence. As a frequent, vulnerable victim, the Tribunal is unpersuaded that Ms AA is well placed to provide judgements about the Applicant’s rehabilitative progress, or to modify his conduct, or hold him accountable for it should it reoccur. It remains of concern that the Applicant attempted to minimise past wrongdoing against her during this hearing and to make an unsubstantiated claim that she struck him in August 2025. The prospect of future conflict between them, leading to a repeat of the Applicant’s family violence, is unacceptably high. This is regardless of Ms AA’s claim that she does not fear the Applicant.

40    Little comfort can be drawn from the Applicant’s past failure to make meaningful and enduring changes despite considerable supports. He is yet to undertake the interventions recommended by Dr Kwok and his future willingness to do so remains aspirational. In the Tribunal’s view he has considerable supervisory and rehabilitative needs. Concerns are only amplified by the Applicant’s limited insight into his offending during interview with Dr Kwok and aspects of his evidence at the current hearing.

    (Footnotes omitted.)

18    The Tribunal concluded that the totality of the applicant’s crimes and other misconduct was very serious. It considered his family violence to be particularly serious and to fall within a category of conduct for which even a low risk of repetition was unacceptable. The Tribunal found that the applicant “currently constitutes an unacceptable risk of committing further violence against Ms AA”: TD [41]. The Tribunal further found that there were reasonable grounds to consider that the applicant “poses a serious and unacceptable risk of committing further family violence” and that “it follows that he constitutes a danger to the Australian community within the meaning of the [Migration] Act”: TD [42].

The applicant’s ground of review

19    The applicant advances one ground of review, namely that the Tribunal engaged in a legally unreasonable process of reasoning in placing no or limited weight on Ms AA’s evidence (at TD [39]) and thus committed jurisdictional error. The particulars to the ground are as follows:

(a)    One of the protective factors relied on by the Applicant to support his claim of a low risk of reoffending was the interests of Ms AA and his children: [30].

(b)    The Applicant tendered into evidence, inter alia, three Statutory Declarations of Ms AA: [21(c)]. Ms AA gave evidence to the effect that the Applicant had engaged in rehabilitation efforts and would not reoffend.

(c)    The Tribunal concluded at [39] that because Ms AA was a “frequent, vulnerable victim”, the Tribunal placed no reliance on Ms AA’s judgments about the Applicant’s rehabilitative progress and concluded that she was not “well placed” to modify his conduct or hold him accountable should it reoccur.

(d)    There was no evident or intelligible justification for the Tribunal’s conclusions that Ms AA’s views should be given no or limited weight, or that she was not able to modify the Applicant’s conduct or to hold him to account, because she was a “frequent vulnerable victim”.

(e)    The Tribunal’s reasoning process was based on an unwarranted and unevidenced assumption that victim-survivors of domestic violence are not able to make judgements about a person’s risk of reoffending, and have no ability to modify their partner’s behaviour or hold that person to account.

Consideration

20    As is apparent, the applicant focuses on a single paragraph in the Tribunal’s decision (TD [39]) and more particularly where the Tribunal said that “[a]s a frequent, vulnerable victim, the Tribunal is unpersuaded that Ms AA is well placed to provide judgements about the [a]pplicant’s rehabilitative progress, or to modify his conduct, or hold him accountable for it should it reoccur”.

21    The applicant submits that a reasonable interpretation of TD [39] is that the Tribunal decided to place little or no weight on Ms AA’s views about the applicant’s rehabilitative progress, whether he could modify his past conduct or whether he could be held accountable for his conduct. He contends that those matters were central to the Tribunal’s assessment of whether s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act was made out and that the Tribunal did not give any reason for taking this approach other than that Ms AA was, in the Tribunal’s view, a “frequent, vulnerable victim”.

22    The applicant submits that this is the source of the error and that the suggestion that Ms AA is a “frequent, vulnerable victim” does not provide any evident or intelligible justification for the Tribunal’s rejection of Ms AA’s opinions on these important matters. He says that it appears to proceed from an assumption, which was entirely unwarranted, that Ms AA, as the person subject to the applicant’s offending in 2022 and prior, was, as a result, unable to make any useful assessment of his character or conduct.

23    Put another way, the applicant submits that the Tribunal did not identify any logical connection between the fact that Ms AA had been the subject of his offending in 2022 and prior and the conclusion that she was now “not well placed” to provide judgements about his rehabilitative progress, or to modify his conduct, or hold him accountable for it should it reoccur.

24    On this basis, the applicant submits that the Tribunal decision was therefore made on the basis of an unwarranted assumption, was legally unreasonable and was affected by jurisdictional error.

25    It was not in dispute that a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification may be unreasonable: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [76] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). In King v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 152 a Full Court of this Court (Anderson, Feutrill and Raper JJ) summarised the relevant principles at [53]-[54]:

53    Review for legal unreasonableness is concerned with enforcement of the law governing the limits of the power in question, and not the manner in which that power was exercised. ‘[T]he Court’s role is strictly supervisory. It is concerned with determining whether there has been a lawful exercise of power having regard, in particular, to the terms, scope and purpose of the statute conferring the power. In circumstances in which reasonable minds might differ about the outcome of, or justification for, the exercise of power, or where the outcome falls within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes, the exercise of the power is not legally unreasonable simply because the Court disagrees, even emphatically, with the outcome or justification.’: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1 at [92].

54    Accepting that statutory discretions confer an ‘area of decisional freedom’ a decision may be legally unreasonable if it is shown ‘to be arbitrary or capricious or to abandon common sense’, or if it ‘lacks an evident and intelligible justification’: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [28], [76]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44]. Such expressions are not to be regarded as rigid formulae, but rather, as assisting in the evaluative task of determining whether a decision may be properly characterised as sitting outside the boundaries of legal reasonableness: Stretton at [2]-[13] (per Allsop CJ).

26    Legal unreasonableness is a stringent standard. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541, the High Court (Kiefel CJ) observed at [11]:

Statements such as that made in the Wednesbury case, that a decision may be regarded as unreasonable if no reasonable person could have made it, may not provide the means by which a conclusion of unreasonableness may be arrived at in every case. But it serves to highlight the fact that the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent. And that is because the courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion. The question is where that area lies.

    (Footnotes omitted.)

27    As to reliance on an unwarranted assumption as a basis for finding that a decision is legally unreasonable, in BOH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 573 Perram J reviewed the relevant authorities and held (at [7]) that, in his Honour’s view, on the current state of the authorities “there is no freestanding ground of unwarranted assumptions” but that the making of unwarranted assumptions as part of a credit finding may be reviewed on rationality grounds, referring to DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175, or because the decision maker has failed duly to consider the question raised by the material, referring to WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 437; (2002) 194 ALR 676 and BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94; (2018) 263 FCR 292. His Honour relevantly said at [8]:

Thus, a party relying upon an unwarranted assumption to establish jurisdictional error will need to establish that the assumption is not one which a reasonable decision maker could make. Another way of asking this question is to ask whether the decision has an evident and intelligible basis: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [10] per Kiefel CJ, [82] per Nettle and Gordon JJ, citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 at [76] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ. …

28    As I have already observed the applicant’s ground of review focuses on one paragraph in the Tribunal’s reasons, which he contends is the “critical” passage. However, as the Minister points out, the Tribunal’s reasons must be read fairly and as a whole: see EGH19 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2026] HCA 33 at [68] (Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ).

29    The Tribunal concluded at TD [42] that there are reasonable grounds to consider that the applicant “poses a serious and unacceptable risk of committing further family violence” and that therefore he constitutes a danger to the Australian community within the meaning of the Migration Act. The Tribunal did not reach that conclusion based only on the conclusion it came to about the lack of persuasiveness of Ms AA’s evidence about the applicant. Among other things the Tribunal referred to:

(1)    a recent report prepared by Dr Kwok assessed the applicant as having a ‘moderate’ risk of general reoffending and having a 74% likelihood of committing another assault against Ms AA within five years of his last domestic violence offence in August 2022. Dr Kwok recommended that the applicant obtain further education on domestic violence because of his limited insight into his offending. The applicant had not yet undertaken any of Dr Kwok’s recommended courses or steps and the Tribunal considered that his willingness to do so remained “aspirational”: see [13] above and TD [30(c)], [40]. I pause to note that, while Dr Kwok’s recommendations were made only shortly before the Tribunal hearing, the Tribunal nevertheless relied on the fact that the recommended interventions had not been undertaken, together with the applicant’s limited insight and unresolved rehabilitative needs;

(2)    custodial reports from 2020 and 2022 which respectively recorded the applicant’s recidivism risk as significant and his “Consequences of Reoffending assessment as ‘T3/Medium-High’”: see TD [30(a)-(b)];

(3)    the fact that the applicant had reoffended, committing “more serious family violence in 2022”, after engaging in an EQUIPS Domestic Abuse Program in 2020. As a result the Tribunal placed little weight on the effectiveness of that course: see TD [32(b)];

(4)    the applicant’s reliance on his experiences prior to his arrival in Australia as a factor which impacted his behaviour but was not satisfied that this provided an excuse for his behaviours. The Tribunal was of the view that the applicant had been unable to appropriately regulate his emotions in the community despite considerable support and had, instead, engaged in a persistent pattern of criminal conduct which the Tribunal considered “reflects a disregard of Australian laws and the rights of others”: see [15] above and TD [34];

(5)    evidence of recent conflict between the applicant and Ms AA in 2025 requiring the police to attend. The Tribunal was concerned about how the applicant might respond to everyday stressors relating to financial problems or his relationship with Ms AA, including because of the incomplete nature of his insight relating to family violence and unresolved rehabilitative needs. The Tribunal observed that there was scant evidence of the applicant having “prosocial support” in the community, the letters of support the applicant relied on were relatively brief, general and did not reflect a complete understanding of the applicant’s past conduct: see TD [38]; and

(6)    the fact that the applicant had been law abiding since August 2022 but noted that the applicant had spent much of that time in custody or under conditional liberty and that there had been comparable periods of law-abiding conduct followed by reoffending in the past: see [16] above and TD [36].

30    At TD [39] the Tribunal expressed its view that it placed less weight on the protective effect of the applicant’s relationship with Ms AA and their children because of the persistence of the applicant’s violence against Ms AA, including while she was pregnant and in the presence of their first child. The Tribunal observed that “[f]amily interests were previously insufficient to ameliorate the [a]pplicant’s violence” and referred to the weight (or lack of it) that it felt it could place on Ms AA’s evidence. The Tribunal was of the view that the prospect of future conflict between the applicant and Ms AA leading to further family violence by the applicant was “unacceptably high”. In that way, TD [39] addressed the applicant’s contention that his relationship with Ms AA and their children operated as a protective factor against future offending.

31    I turn to consider the single sentence in TD [39], that “[a]s a frequent, vulnerable victim, the Tribunal is unpersuaded that Ms AA is well placed to provide judgements about the [a]pplicant’s rehabilitative progress, or to modify his conduct, or hold him accountable for it should it reoccur”, which the applicant seeks to impugn. In particular, the applicant submits that sentence does not explicitly give, for example, “non-expertise” as its reason for finding that Ms AA is not well placed to provide judgments about the applicant. It instead relies on Ms AA’s position as a “frequent, vulnerable victim” to ground its finding that Ms AA is not well placed to provide judgements about the applicant.

32    There was nothing illogical or unreasonable in the Tribunal forming the view that it did about Ms AA’s evidence. Earlier in its reasons, the Tribunal had observed that the applicant had offended against Ms AA on numerous occasions, even after being convicted and promising that there would be no recurrence, and, as recently as a few months before the Tribunal hearing, had made an unsubstantiated claim that Ms AA had struck him: see TD [22], [39]. It was open to the Tribunal to make the finding it did and to have doubts about whether Ms AA could successfully modify the applicant’s conduct or hold him to account in the future. It was equally open to the Tribunal to be unpersuaded that Ms AA was “well placed” to provide “judgements” about the applicant’s rehabilitation. In that context, and having regard to the Tribunal’s earlier findings concerning the repeated violence within the relationship and the applicant’s continuing rehabilitative needs, it was open to the Tribunal to be unpersuaded by Ms AA’s assessment to the extent stated in TD [39]. In my view, the Tribunal’s reasons are not “arbitrary or capricious” nor did the Tribunal make any unwarranted assumption about Ms AA’s evidence.

33    Read fairly and as a whole, it is clear the Tribunal’s conclusion at TD [42] did not depend solely on TD [39], less still, on the particular sentence impugned by the applicant. It was the product of the Tribunal’s assessment of the matters identified at [29] above. Accordingly, the Tribunal’s reasons provide an evident and intelligible justification for the conclusion that it reached, which was a conclusion that a rational and reasonable decision-maker could have reached on the available materials.

34    There was no error as alleged in the Tribunal’s reasons.

Conclusion

35    The applicant has not made out his single ground of review. The application will be dismissed. In light of the applicant’s lack of success, I will also make an order that the applicant pay the Minister’s costs.

I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Markovic.

Associate:

Dated:    18 November 2026