Federal Court of Australia
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd (Penalty Hearing) [2026] FCA 1734
File number(s): | NSD 1326 of 2024 |
Judgment of: | LEE J |
Date of judgment: | 17 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | CORPORATIONS – civil pecuniary penalties – corporate contraveners operated as constituent parts of an economically coordinated family business – capacity to pay – historical financial support from related entities – qualified findings of referee – distinction between economic interdependence and demonstrated access to resources – associated persons’ assets not attributed to corporate contraveners – appropriate corporate penalties determined at $2.5 million and $3.5 million CONSUMER LAW – admitted contraventions of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) and National Credit Code – provision of consumer credit and collection of repayments without an Australian credit licence – interest calculated on original loan amounts rather than unpaid daily balances – involvement of director in corporate contraventions PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – civil pecuniary penalties – general and specific deterrence – intended commercial advantage, actual receipts and net financial benefit – assessment of consumer harm – cooperation, admissions and remediation – civil double jeopardy, course of conduct, parity and totality – agreed penalty for individual contravener – rational relationship between individual and corporate penalties – agreed individual penalty of $750,000 approved CONSUMER LAW – statutory injunctions – protective purpose – restraints concerning existing contracts and unlicensed credit activity – proposed permanent restraint on individual’s participation in regulated consumer credit – good-faith but mistaken reliance on arrangements involving licence holder – scope and duration of restraint – five-year restraint appropriate |
Legislation: | National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 29, 32, 167, 167B, 167D, 169, 175, 177; Sch 1 (National Credit Code) s 24 |
Cases cited: | Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson [2022] HCA 13; (2022) 274 CLR 450 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation [2018] FCAFC 73; (2018) 262 FCR 243 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v BSF Solutions Pty Ltd (Penalty) [2026] FCA 450 Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre v Castra Licensee Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 709 Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39; (2010) 194 IR 461 Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | New South Wales |
National Practice Area: | Commercial and Corporations |
Sub-area: | Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance |
Number of paragraphs: | 191 |
Date of hearing: | 3–4 November 2026 |
Counsel for the applicant: | Ms J Shepard SC with Ms A Poukchanski |
Solicitor for the applicant: | MinterEllison |
Counsel for the first respondent: | Mr O Jones SC with Mr H Rogers |
Solicitor for the first respondent: | Mills Oakley |
Counsel for the second and third respondents: | Mr N Kidd SC with Mr F Maghami and Mr F Empeigne |
Solicitor for the second and third respondents: | Longton Blackwell |
ORDERS
NSD 1326 of 2024 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION Applicant | |
AND: | DIAMOND WHEELS PTY LTD First Respondent KEO AUTOMOTIVE PTY LTD Second Respondent KEN KEOMANIVONG Third Respondent | |
order made by: | LEE J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 17 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. By 4:00 pm on 20 November 2026, the parties confer and provide to the Associate to Justice Lee agreed short minutes of order giving effect to these reasons, including the terms of payment of the pecuniary penalties, the form of the declarations and injunctions, consequential relief and costs.
2. To the extent agreement is not reached, each party provide by the same time its proposed orders, identifying the matters in dispute, together with any submissions upon which it wishes to rely concerning those matters.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
A INTRODUCTION | [1] |
B BACKGROUND | [7] |
B.1 The businesses and lending arrangements | [7] |
B.2 The establishment of Keo Automotive | [13] |
B.2.1 Existing Diamond Wheels contracts | [15] |
B.2.2 The Keo Finance arrangements | [16] |
B.3 The regulatory problem | [22] |
B.4 The proceeding and resolution of liability | [23] |
C CONTRAVENTIONS | [25] |
C.1 Diamond Wheels | [25] |
C.2 Keo Automotive | [27] |
C.3 Ken Keomanivong | [29] |
D THE PARTIES’ PRINCIPAL CONTENTIONS AS TO RELIEF | [31] |
E FACTUAL FINDINGS | [34] |
E.1 The evidence and the findings | [34] |
E.2 The Keomanivong family and its businesses | [35] |
E.3 The Laotian entities | [45] |
E.4 A single family business and its relevance | [47] |
E.5 The financial position of Keo Automotive and the Referee’s report | [61] |
E.6 The financial position of Diamond Wheels viewed in isolation | [67] |
E.7 Financial benefit | [75] |
F APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES | [89] |
F.1 Civil penalties | [89] |
F.1.1 Financial benefit | [93] |
F.2 Multiple contraventions | [96] |
F.3 Maximum penalties | [100] |
F.4 Capacity to pay | [104] |
F.5 Parity | [107] |
G KEN – DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY | [109] |
H DIAMOND WHEELS – DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY | [115] |
H.1 Nature and extent of the conduct | [115] |
H.2 The period before 24 September 2018 | [117] |
H.3 Culpability and the role of Ken | [120] |
H.4 Culpability and the role of Mark | [123] |
H.5 Consumer harm | [127] |
H.6 Remediation and subsequent conduct | [135] |
H.7 Cooperation and absence of previous contraventions | [137] |
H.8 Capacity to pay | [140] |
H.9 General and specific deterrence | [141] |
H.10 Course of conduct | [143] |
H.11 The appropriate penalty | [145] |
I KEO AUTOMOTIVE – DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY | [158] |
I.1 General | [158] |
I.2 Benefit and harm | [168] |
I.3 Cooperation | [169] |
I.4 Course of conduct | [170] |
I.5 Capacity to pay, deterrence and fixing the penalty | [172] |
J INJUNCTIVE RELIEF | [186] |
K CONCLUSION | [191] |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEE J:
A INTRODUCTION
1 These reasons concern the appropriate relief to be granted following contraventions of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (Act) and the National Credit Code (Code) by the first respondent, Diamond Wheels Pty Ltd (Diamond Wheels), and the second respondent, Keo Automotive Pty Ltd (Keo Automotive), and the involvement of the third respondent, Ken Keomanivong (Ken), in those contraventions. Declarations reflecting admissions by the respondents have previously been made by the Court.
2 In broad terms, the contraventions arose from the provision of consumer credit, and the receipt of payments in connexion with consumer credit contracts, without the requisite Australian credit licence. They also included the imposition and receipt of interest calculated in a manner prohibited by the Code.
3 The remaining controversy principally concerns the pecuniary penalties to be imposed upon Diamond Wheels and Keo Automotive. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) seeks penalties of $6.5 million and $9 million respectively. Diamond Wheels contends that the penalty sought against it is manifestly excessive and says that a penalty exceeding $250,000, inclusive of costs, would likely render it insolvent. Keo Automotive submits that a penalty of no more than $1.5 million should be imposed, payable in two equal instalments.
4 The position of Ken is different. ASIC and Ken have agreed that a pecuniary penalty of $750,000 is appropriate in respect of his involvement in the contraventions. It nonetheless remains for the Court to determine whether the proposed penalty is appropriate.
5 ASIC also seeks injunctive relief against each respondent. Diamond Wheels and Keo Automotive do not oppose being enjoined. Ken also accepts that injunctive relief should be granted but contends that the injunction restraining his participation in the provision of consumer credit should operate for five years rather than permanently (as proposed by ASIC).
6 For convenience, I use the following abbreviations for the principal written materials: AS, ASIC’s written outline of submissions on penalty; DWS, Diamond Wheels’ written outline of submissions on final relief, including submissions in reply; KAS, Keo Automotive and Ken’s written submissions on relief; ABF, the Agreed Background Facts between ASIC, Keo Automotive and Ken; DW SABF, the Supplementary Agreed Background Facts between ASIC and Diamond Wheels; SAFA 10, the Statement of Agreed Facts and Admissions for Liability between ASIC and Diamond Wheels; and SAFA 11, the corresponding statement between ASIC, Keo Automotive and Ken. References prefixed T are to the transcript of the penalty hearing, by page and line.
B BACKGROUND
B.1 The businesses and lending arrangements
7 The contravening credit activity was connected with the sale and financing of motor vehicles by businesses associated with the Keomanivong family. Diamond Wheels was incorporated on 17 March 1995 and has since operated a motor vehicle dealership, initially trading as Car Care Company and, from 2013, as Lansvale Motor Group. It sold both new and used vehicles. The family’s other dealership, Maureen Motors, was conducted by Keo Group Pty Ltd (Keo Group).
8 Ken was the managing director of Diamond Wheels between 2009 and March 2019 and had oversight and charge of its day-to-day operations. His nephew, Mark Keomanivong (Mark), was also a director but was not involved in the day-to-day operations during that period. Ken returned to work at Maureen Motors in March 2019.
9 An aspect of Diamond Wheels’ business was the provision of finance to facilitate vehicle sales. Between 2009 and March 2019 it offered finance directly to prospective purchasers, usually those who had been declined finance by a mainstream lender or were ineligible for mainstream lending (DW SABF [1]). SAFA 10 dates that direct lending from 20 May 2014 to 22 February 2019 (SAFA 10 [17]), and the ABF puts its commencement at “about 2014” (ABF [19]), but the difference is immaterial to the contraventions, which concern only the contracts that were on foot at some time between 24 September 2018 and 5 December 2019. It also offered business finance to customers with an Australian Business Number. The present contraventions concern its consumer lending, not that business finance (DW SABF [2]; SAFA 10 [18]).
10 Diamond Wheels also facilitated finance from third-party lenders. The direct lending with which this proceeding is concerned was therefore an alternative means by which some customers who could not obtain mainstream finance could fund the purchase of a vehicle from Diamond Wheels. ASIC explained the distinction between the ordinary third-party financing arrangements and the direct finance provided by Diamond Wheels.
11 In broad terms, the direct lending operated as follows. Diamond Wheels staff obtained information about a proposed customer’s income and living expenses and assessed whether the customer’s income was sufficient to service the proposed weekly repayment. Ken executed or approved the execution of the consumer contracts. Those contracts generally took the form of a “Diamond Wheels Loan Contract” naming Diamond Wheels as the credit provider. They provided for the amount advanced for the purchase of the vehicle, an establishment fee, interest and, in most instances, a loan administration charge.
12 The 205 consumer contracts in respect of which the Court has declared that Diamond Wheels was the credit provider in contravention of s 29 of the Act (see [25]; SAFA 10 [19]; SAFA 11 [22]), which I refer to as the Diamond Wheels Contracts, provided for interest at a fixed flat rate applied to the total contract amount rather than to the unpaid amount outstanding from time to time. That produced a higher interest charge than interest calculated upon the unpaid amount. Repayments, fees and charges were collected through a service provider (called in this proceeding Ezidebit) and paid into one of Diamond Wheels’ accounts.
B.2 The establishment of Keo Automotive
13 The arrangements changed following Ken’s departure from Diamond Wheels. In August 2019, he established Keo Automotive to provide loans and operate, as he put it, “like a finance company”.
14 As explained in more detail below, Keo Automotive became involved in two different streams of financing activity: first, from December 2019 it received payments made by borrowers under existing contracts which named Diamond Wheels as the credit provider; secondly, it provided the capital and bore the credit risk under a later series of consumer loans used to purchase vehicles from Diamond Wheels or Maureen Motors.
B.2.1 Existing Diamond Wheels contracts
15 As to the first stream, on 18 November 2019, Ken and Mark signed a change-of-entity form directing that payments previously remitted by Ezidebit to Diamond Wheels be redirected to Keo Automotive. That change took effect on 5 December 2019 (SAFA 10 [27]). The payments so redirected were those made by borrowers under two groups of contracts which the agreed facts keep distinct: the 205 Diamond Wheels Contracts, and a further 33 contracts which Ken, while still a director of Diamond Wheels, arranged to be entered into on the Diamond Wheels template between 12 March and 17 November 2019 and which SAFA 11 calls the DW Contracts (SAFA 11 [22], [28]). The ABF uses that expression more widely, to include the earlier contracts as well (ABF [23]), but I adopt the narrower meaning given by SAFA 11, which keeps the two groups apart. After the redirection, Keo Automotive received payments under 144 of the Diamond Wheels Contracts and 27 of the DW Contracts (SAFA 11 [30]), and I refer to those 171 contracts together as the Redirected Contracts. Reflecting the informality of arrangements between the family companies, the benefit of the Redirected Contracts was not legally assigned to Keo Automotive or any other person (ABF [41A]; DW SABF [3]). I am not asked by any party to resolve finally the true position in law or in equity as to the purported transfer of the benefits under the Redirected Contracts, which is a question not without difficulty on the material before me and in respect of which I have received no submissions (and hence it is unnecessary to make definitive findings in this regard).
B.2.2 The Keo Finance arrangements
16 The second stream requires more explanation. During 2019, Ken had discussions with Mark Smith, a director of what was described to me as “DCP Partners”, concerning an arrangement under which consumer finance could be offered to prospective customers of Diamond Wheels and Maureen Motors, with Keo Automotive providing the capital for the loans. The arrangement was recorded at least in part in Heads of Agreement dated 16 September 2019.
17 DCP Capital (Finance) Pty Ltd, trading as Keo Finance, was subsequently incorporated. Under the arrangements ultimately implemented, Keo Finance was named as the lender in the consumer contracts and purported to offer the finance to prospective customers. But Keo Finance did not fund the advances. Keo Automotive provided the economic substance of the lending: it obtained funds from Mazda Laos Co Ltd (Mazda Laos), paid Diamond Wheels or Maureen Motors for the vehicles purchased by borrowers, and bore the credit risk associated with the loans. The arrangements relied upon the Australian credit licence held by Timothy Slarke, which authorised credit activities other than acting as a credit provider (SAFA 11 [62]).
18 Staff at Maureen Motors collected information from prospective borrowers and submitted applications to Keo Finance for approval. If an application was approved, a prepared contract was sent to staff at Maureen Motors for execution. The contracts identified “Keo Finance” as the lender. But repayments were collected from borrowers by Ezidebit and paid to Keo Automotive, and, apart from a one-off commission in respect of each loan, the repayments and fees were not remitted to Keo Finance.
19 The 119 consumer loans under this arrangement are referred to in these reasons as the Keo Finance Contracts. The vehicles financed under them were sold by Diamond Wheels or Maureen Motors, and the funds used by Keo Automotive to make the advances were obtained from Mazda Laos, which was owned and controlled by a brother of Ken.
20 Like the earlier Diamond Wheels Contracts, the Keo Finance Contracts provided for a fixed flat rate of interest calculated by reference to the original loan amount rather than the unpaid daily balance. They also provided for a $990 establishment fee and a $2.50 account-keeping fee for each attempted direct debit. Most customers authorised Ezidebit to deduct their repayments, which were ultimately received by Keo Automotive.
21 There was also a business-lending aspect to Keo Automotive’s operations which is not the subject of the consumer-credit contraventions presently under consideration. ASIC explained in its oral submissions on 1 June 2026 that, where the customer had an ABN, Keo Automotive provided business finance directly; consumer lending, by contrast, proceeded through the Keo Finance arrangement described above (T25.1–10, 1 June 2026).
B.3 The regulatory problem
22 The obvious regulatory difficulty was that neither Diamond Wheels nor Keo Automotive held an Australian credit licence authorising it to provide consumer credit. Despite this, Diamond Wheels provided consumer credit directly, while Keo Automotive later provided the funds and bore the credit risk under the Keo Finance Contracts notwithstanding another entity being named as lender. Keo Automotive was never appointed as an authorised representative of an Australian credit licensee in a capacity which entitled it to engage in credit activities as a credit provider.
B.4 The proceeding and resolution of liability
23 ASIC commenced this proceeding in September 2024. It sought, among other relief, declarations that Diamond Wheels and Keo Automotive had contravened ss 29 and 32 of the Act by engaging in credit activities without holding an Australian credit licence, and that each had contravened s 24(1) of the Code in connexion with the imposition or receipt of interest. ASIC also alleged that Ken, who was a director of both companies during relevant periods, was involved in the corporate respondents’ contraventions.
24 The proceeding was initially to involve a five-day contested hearing on liability. That course ultimately proved unnecessary. Following admissions, on 1 June 2026, the Court made declarations by consent recording contraventions by Diamond Wheels and Keo Automotive and the involvement of Ken in those contraventions. On 20 August 2026, the Court made a further declaration, concerning the number of Diamond Wheels’ interest contraventions occurring on or after 13 March 2019.
C CONTRAVENTIONS
C.1 Diamond Wheels
25 As noted above, Diamond Wheels’ contraventions concern consumer credit activity undertaken between 24 September 2018 and 5 December 2019. The declarations record that Diamond Wheels was the credit provider in respect of the 205 Diamond Wheels Contracts in contravention of s 29 of the Act. Between 24 September 2018 and 5 December 2019 it sought recovery of, demanded, received or accepted payments of principal, interest, fees and charges under those contracts on 5,890 occasions, thereby contravening ss 29 and 32 of the Act.
26 In addition, of the 5,890 occasions on which Diamond Wheels required or accepted payment of interest calculated on the total contract amount rather than the unpaid amount owing, 3,531 occurred between 13 March 2019 and 5 December 2019. Section 24(1) of the Code became a civil penalty provision on 13 March 2019, and on 20 August 2026 the Court declared that Diamond Wheels contravened s 24(1)(b) of the Code on those 3,531 occasions.
C.2 Keo Automotive
27 Keo Automotive was incorporated in August 2019. Its contraventions extended from 6 December 2019 to 30 April 2024 and arose from the two streams of consumer credit activity already described: the collection of repayments under the Redirected Contracts, and the provision of credit and collection of repayments under the Keo Finance Contracts.
28 Under the first stream, Keo Automotive contravened ss 29 and 32 of the Act on 10,136 occasions by demanding, receiving or accepting payments of principal, interest or fees in relation to the Diamond Wheels Contracts and the DW Contracts, those payments having in fact been received under 144 of the Diamond Wheels Contracts and 27 of the DW Contracts, which together make up the Redirected Contracts (declarations of 1 June 2026 at [6]; SAFA 11 [30], [48]). Under the second stream, Keo Automotive contravened s 29 by acting as credit provider under each of the 119 Keo Finance Contracts, and ss 29 and 32 on 7,668 occasions by demanding, receiving or accepting repayments. It also contravened s 24(1) of the Code upon entry into each contract and upon each acceptance of interest, making 7,787 contraventions of that provision (AS [4]; KAS [12]).
C.3 Ken Keomanivong
29 Ken was a director of Diamond Wheels from 20 March 1995 and was its managing director and dealer principal from 2009 until March 2019. The directors of Diamond Wheels resolved on 14 April 2022 to accept his resignation, but he was not removed from the ASIC register until 30 July 2024. He executed or approved the execution of consumer credit contracts on behalf of Diamond Wheels. Since incorporating Keo Automotive in August 2019, he has had sole responsibility for its management.
30 Ken admitted knowledge of the facts underlying the contraventions committed by both Diamond Wheels and Keo Automotive. The declarations record his involvement in the corporate respondents’ contraventions.
D THE PARTIES’ PRINCIPAL CONTENTIONS AS TO RELIEF
31 Diamond Wheels characterises the penalty sought against it as manifestly excessive and oppressive. Among other things, it contends that the contravening conduct caused it substantial financial losses, that consumers did not suffer the financial harm alleged by ASIC, that Ken was removed from the business once his conduct was discovered, and that insolvency would likely follow from any penalty beyond the sum identified at [3]. ASIC disputes many aspects of that characterisation.
32 ASIC contends that the contraventions were extensive and prolonged and that the companies are to be treated as parts of one family enterprise whose resources and benefit are not to be assessed entity by entity (AS [124], [144], [189]). It supports the penalty agreed with Ken (AS [216]–[218]) and seeks the permanent restraint upon him (AS [235]–[236]).
33 Keo Automotive and Ken answer that Keo Automotive is a small company which has operated independently of the other family entities, that the Keo Finance arrangements were entered upon in good faith, and that the benefit and the consumer harm were modest, so that a lower penalty would suffice (KAS [16]–[18], [94]–[100], [110]–[112], [127]–[138]). Ken, who accepts the other restraints, would confine the restraint upon his participation in the provision of consumer credit to regulated credit (KAS [121]–[125], [143]–[146]). Diamond Wheels adds to the contentions summarised above that the penalty agreed with Ken makes a substantial further penalty upon it unnecessary (DWS [60]–[61], [92]). Each of these contentions is addressed in the section to which it relates.
E FACTUAL FINDINGS
E.1 The evidence and the findings
34 The findings in this section are based on the evidence adduced at the penalty hearing, the relevant agreed facts and the findings adopted from the report (Report) of the Court-appointed referee (Referee), discussed in Section E.5. The primary facts are largely undisputed; the principal controversy concerns the inferences to be drawn from them. Mark, a director and shareholder of Diamond Wheels, gave evidence and was cross-examined. References to Mark 1 are to his affidavit affirmed on 20 October 2025. He affirmed further affidavits on 5 August 2026 and 12 October 2026.
E.2 The Keomanivong family and its businesses
35 The Keomanivong family is originally from Laos. Some of its members still live there, and others live in Sydney or Melbourne. From 1989, Ken and his extended family have, to varying degrees, established, operated and worked in a succession of motor vehicle businesses in Sydney. The first was a used-car dealership trading as Maureen Motors, conducted from 111-113 Hume Highway, which two of Ken’s older brothers set up in 1989 and which was operated by members of the family as sole traders until about 1999, when it moved to a corporate structure under Keo Holdings Pty Ltd, later Keo Group Pty Ltd (SAFA 11 [12(a)]). The second was Diamond Wheels, incorporated in 1995, which operated its dealership at 255 Hume Highway, first as Car Care Company and, from 2013, as Lansvale Motor Group. The two dealerships are about 800 metres, or two minutes’ drive, apart (T22.11–15).
36 The ownership and management of the companies overlapped to a marked degree. Ken was appointed a director of Diamond Wheels on 20 March 1995 and became a shareholder on 15 December 1995 and, as I have noted, he later resigned. Its other shareholders include Mark, who is Ken’s nephew and has been a director since 2006, other members of the extended family, and Mazda Laos (T21.37–43).
37 Mark, who has lived in Melbourne since 2001, is also a director and shareholder of Keo Group, a position he has held from about 1999 (T21.44–47), and Ken became a director of Keo Group on 24 November 2017, the other directors being members of the family. Keo Automotive, which Ken caused to be incorporated in August 2019, has three shareholders, namely Ken (55 shares), Bouaket Keomanivong (25 shares) and Pat Keomanivong (20 shares), the last two of whom were also directors from 22 April 2021 until 29 May 2026. Mark is neither a director nor a shareholder of Keo Automotive.
38 Keo Group carried on property development as well as the Maureen Motors dealership. By the time of the hearing, it no longer operated Maureen Motors, which is now conducted by Keo Group Aust Pty Ltd (Keo Group Australia) (T22.16–27). Keo Group’s reported revenue was $13.7 million in 2023, $7.1 million in 2024 and nil in 2025, the last two figures being consistent with the transfer of the dealership to Keo Group Australia in about 2024 (T51–52). Mark’s explanation for the establishment of that company was that Ken, who held no shares in Keo Group, wished to hold shares in the entity conducting Maureen Motors in order to protect his interest after his affairs had been separated from those of Diamond Wheels (T51–52). Mark is also a director and shareholder of Keo Developments Pty Ltd (Keo Developments), which holds a single property (T22.29–34).
39 The most persuasive and important contemporaneous account of the relevant corporate arrangements is Mark’s email of 28 February 2019 (DWH.0003.0007.0085), headed “Divisional Management Change Announcement”, addressed to Ken, other family members and employees associated with the two dealerships. It announced changes to management, stock, banking, property, staffing and the lending activity. The following passages are particularly material:
It has been decided by Ken and I and approved by the broader board of directors in Laos that:
…
8 It has been agreed that Ken will keep whatever is in the MM yard as stock and Warren will keep whatever is in the LMG yard as stock. Ken will remove the cars on Wadds ave and move them to MM.
9 In-house finance will be the sole responsibility of Ken and transferred to the MM location. This means any customers that come to LMG for in-house related enquiries will be re-directed to MM. Ken also agreed to get Nit to send a newsletter/email to all in-house customers informing them of the location change to MM so they go to MM to make repayments.
…
10 Ken agreed to wind down in-house finance to stop increasing risk. Ken to obtain credit licence from a friend for current in-house deals out there.
…
13 Ken and myself have agreed that all profits in LMG and MM to remain in the business bank account and at the end of each year 1st July Ken and I will make a decision to distribute the profits to shareholders or keep it back into the business for re-investment or not. A single director cannot move money around for the personal benefit. This needs to stop and things need to be treated equally and fairly.
…
Although there is a massive change this still remains a family business.
40 In the email, “MM” referred to Maureen Motors and “LMG” to Lansvale Motor Group.
41 The email plainly (and I find frankly) treated the dealerships as divisions of a common family enterprise. It recorded decisions approved by the broader family board in Laos and provided for the allocation of management, stock, staff and supplier accounts between the dealerships. Although their bank accounts were to be separated, the profits of both businesses remained subject to common decisions about distribution or reinvestment. Decisions exceeding $500,000 required board approval, and rental income from group properties was to remain available for family business expenses.
42 The stock and lending arrangements illustrate the practical effect of that arrangement. Mark accepted that the stock transferred to Ken was worth about $1 million and formed part of the family settlement (T31.44–32.10). As the quoted terms show, the lending activity, existing borrowers and associated administration were also to follow Ken to Maureen Motors. The arrangements divided functions and assets within the family business; they did not bring the existing lending book to an end. Nor, as I have explained, was there a formal assignment or novation of the contracts.
43 The distinction between winding down the lending and stopping it immediately is, to my mind, important. The email contemplated continued administration of existing loans by Ken, the redirection of inquiries to Maureen Motors and an attempt to obtain access to a credit licence. Its natural meaning was that the existing book would continue under Ken’s control while further exposure was reduced and the activity was placed, if possible, on a lawful footing.
44 That contemporaneous record is inconsistent with the contention that the family’s response was to terminate the lending activity immediately. It also accords with what followed: repayments continued to enter Diamond Wheels’ account until December 2019, when the change-of-entity arrangements redirected them to Keo Automotive. The receipts moved within the family business rather than ceasing.
E.3 The Laotian entities
45 The Laotian side of the family’s affairs appears in the evidence in three ways. First, the email to which I have referred records that the “broader” informal board of directors in Laos approved the changes announced in it. Secondly, Champa Auto, a used-car business, is run by members of the family in Laos (T30.26–32). Thirdly, Mazda Laos, a shareholder of Diamond Wheels and the source of the funds described at [17] and [19], is owned and controlled by a brother of Ken (ABF [76]; SAFA 11 at [74]).
46 Mazda Laos was one of the related entities from which Keo Automotive had received financial accommodation, and the balance owing by Keo Automotive to Mazda Laos appears to have fallen from $13.65 million at 30 June 2025 to $5.88 million at 30 June 2026, a comparison drawn from financial statements which the Referee had insufficient time to examine in detail (Report at [5.3.1.2.6]–[5.3.1.2.7]). ASIC contends that Mazda Laos provided working capital to Diamond Wheels and funds to Keo Automotive as needed (AS [189]).
E.4 A single family business and its relevance
47 The evidence establishes the close connexions with the Laotian businesses described above, but does not permit a reliable assessment of their financial resources or capacity to provide further support. In particular, the material does not establish the current profitability or liquidity of Mazda Laos, the terms upon which it advanced funds to Keo Automotive or might do so again, or its willingness to fund a penalty imposed upon an Australian company.
48 Mark’s evidence was that Mazda Laos is the sole distributor of Mazda vehicles in Laos and has perhaps four showrooms there, but he had no insight into its turnover (T39.23–40); ASIC accepts that it does not know the size of Mazda Laos and invites the inference that it is a materially profitable enterprise because it supplied working capital to Diamond Wheels and funds, as needed, to Keo Automotive (AS [189]); and Diamond Wheels points out that there is no evidence of its financial position and that the value of its assets is unknown.
49 The Referee also found no material upon which to form a concluded opinion about its capacity to provide funds, observing only that its historical support might suggest that it could be a potential source of funding (Report at [5.3.1.2.6]–[5.3.1.2.7]), and Ken acknowledged in his compulsory examination that the funds advanced had to be repaid and that Mazda Laos itself needed money (KAS [112]). As to willingness, the Referee recorded that Mazda Laos gave no response to his inquiries (Report at [5.4.1.14], Table 19); the statement in the same table that none of the entities to which Diamond Wheels’ response referred would be willing to provide financial support to Keo Automotive, irrespective of capacity, is a statement by Diamond Wheels and not a communication from anyone associated with Mazda Laos.
50 Diamond Wheels submits that there is no evidence, and that I should not infer, that Mazda Laos would be willing to advance further funds to meet a substantial penalty, and in oral argument its senior counsel put that it was very unlikely that anyone in Mazda Laos would regard such a further advance as a “good bet”. I observed that I would have been more readily persuaded had someone been called to establish the proposition, and that those who run Mazda Laos are Mark’s uncles (T22.44–23.3); counsel responded that Mark does not control Mazda Laos and that there were reasonable grounds for not calling witnesses from Laos concerning an entity of which he has no insight.
51 I accept that there may have been such grounds, but the consequence is that the proposition rests upon inference only, and Mark did not, so far as his evidence discloses, seek further funding from Mazda Laos (T56.25–30). It is therefore difficult to make any finding, one way or the other, about whether Mazda Laos would be willing or able to advance any funds to meet a penalty, and I draw no concluded inference about either matter; but that limitation does not detract from the evidence of its historical participation in funding the Australian businesses.
52 What may fairly be said is that the arrangements between the companies in the family enterprise, and the manner in which money has moved among them, are opaque: the loans from the Laotian entities to Diamond Wheels were generally not documented in writing, had no fixed terms, were classified as non-current and were usually repaid when the borrower had the capacity to do so, and Mark accepted that the group operated with relative informality and in reliance upon a high degree of trust between family members (T40–41, T57–58). That obscurity has not been lessened by the attempt of the respondents to atomise what was in truth a single family business and to have each of its constituent companies treated as a separate and unconnected unit, an approach which I wholly reject in the light of the contemporaneous records, and in particular the email of 28 February 2019 to which I have already referred.
53 It is tolerably plain that the Australian businesses were bound together by more than family ties and common directors. The Keo Finance Contracts illustrate the point. The vehicles purchased with the loans were sold by Diamond Wheels or Maureen Motors; the loan funds came from Mazda Laos; once a contract was made, Keo Automotive paid the dealership the balance owing on the vehicle; and the staff of Maureen Motors collected the borrowers’ information, submitted their applications to Keo Finance and arranged for the contracts to be executed, Ken himself signing on some occasions. In the result, funds from a Laotian company controlled by a member of the family passed through Keo Automotive to the family’s dealerships, and the staff of one of those dealerships administered the lending which made the sales possible.
54 The same is true of the Redirected Contracts. When, in late 2019, the receipt of repayments under them passed from Diamond Wheels to Keo Automotive, it did so by a change-of-entity form signed by Ken and Mark, without any orthodox written agreement between the two companies novating or assigning the contracts (ABF at [41A]; DW SABF [3]).
55 Money and property were also held and deployed through associated entities. The Referee identified Diamond Wheels, Keo Group and Mazda Laos as sources of financial accommodation to Keo Automotive. He estimated potential available equity across properties held by the collective parties at between $25.98 million and $31.57 million, subject to the qualifications discussed below. That estimate identifies a potential source of funding; it does not establish that the equity could be realised or made available to meet Keo Automotive’s penalty (Report at [5.3.1.1.2]–[5.3.1.1.4], [5.3.1.11.2]–[5.3.1.11.3], Table 12).
56 The one constant was Ken. He ran the day-to-day operations of Diamond Wheels until March 2019, when the family’s decision took him to Maureen Motors, where he managed the dealership and was, from 2017, a director of its owner, Keo Group; and from August 2019 he has had sole responsibility for managing Keo Automotive, whose lending financed sales by both dealerships.
57 I therefore find that Diamond Wheels, Maureen Motors (whether conducted by Keo Group or, since about 2024, by Keo Group Australia) and Keo Automotive were operated, in economic and practical terms, as constituent parts of one family business. That conclusion rests principally upon the contemporaneous record of common decision-making approved by the “broader board of directors in Laos”; the division and transfer of stock, staff, accounts and functions between the dealerships; the treatment of profits and property income as available for family business purposes; the undocumented and informal movement of funds among the companies; the financing supplied by Mazda Laos; the administration of the lending by Maureen Motors staff; the movement of the Diamond Wheels receipts to Keo Automotive without a documented transfer of the contracts; and Diamond Wheels’ own description, resting upon Mark’s evidence of the informality and trust within the family, of its companies as “one large family group business” (T58.1–15). The separate companies remained separate legal persons, and the economic interests of particular family members were not identical; but the business was not conducted as a collection of arm’s-length undertakings whose resources, functions and fortunes could sensibly be understood by atomising each company from the rest.
58 It follows that I reject the assertion that Keo Automotive has at all times operated independently of the other entities associated with the family, or that, because there is no formally constituted corporate group, it is to be viewed as a small and self-standing company (KAS [110]–[112]).
59 To take Keo Automotive, or Diamond Wheels, in isolation, and to measure its size and resources by its own balance sheet alone, would be to focus upon a single component of a larger whole, and would be artificial when the contraventions themselves were committed in the course of the one enterprise: the lending was funded from within the family, the vehicles were sold by the family’s dealerships, and the repayments passed from one family company to another.
60 I repeat that this finding concerns the way the enterprise was in fact conducted, notwithstanding the affidavit evidence and respondents’ submissions, which unconvincingly presented a different picture. It does not, however, carry with it any affirmative finding, one way or the other, that Mazda Laos or any other member of the family would be willing to meet a penalty imposed upon either corporate respondent, the evidence on that aspect of capacity to pay being both patchy and unsatisfactory. The consequences of these findings for the assessment of penalty, including the weight to be given to the financial position of each corporate respondent, are considered later in these reasons.
E.5 The financial position of Keo Automotive and the Referee’s report
61 As would be by now apparent, all the evidence concerning Keo Automotive’s financial capacity (and its relationship to the broader group) arose because of an assertion made that it would be unable to meet a pecuniary penalty.
62 On 25 August 2026 the Court made orders for a referral concerning Keo Automotive’s financial position and the amount of a pecuniary penalty it had the financial capacity to meet. The Referee delivered a report dated 16 October 2026, which was adopted by consent.
63 The Referee’s conclusions were subject to substantial qualifications concerning the financial information made available for the reference. In particular, the Referee considered the financial information initially provided to be incomplete and inaccurate and was unable, because of insufficient time and the absence of supporting documents, to form a view as to the accuracy and completeness of replacement financial statements subsequently provided.
64 The Report confirms Keo Automotive’s historical dependence on related-party funding. Its FY2026 statements recorded gross loans from Diamond Wheels, Keo Group and Mazda Laos totalling about $11.89 million. After offsetting related-party balances, current liabilities exceeded current assets by $319,228. The Referee assessed the company’s capacity to meet a substantive penalty without external support as nil or nominal. He also identified potential equity in properties held by associated entities and individuals, but could not determine whether that equity could be accessed to fund a penalty. These qualified findings establish financial interdependence, not that another person’s assets were available to Keo Automotive (Report at [1.1.2]–[1.1.5], [1.4.2.3]–[1.4.2.4], [5.3.1.1.4], Table 14).
65 ASIC accepts that Keo Automotive could not meet a $9 million penalty within 28 days from its own cashflow and resources (AS [204]). The distinct question is whether external financial support would be available. The Report identifies potential sources of support, but does not establish that they would be accessible or willing to fund a penalty.
66 Historical financial support does not establish that further support will be available to meet a penalty. Equally, deficiencies in the financial information do not prove the existence of undisclosed resources. I assess capacity to pay by distinguishing the company’s own resources, any demonstrated access to external support and the uncertainty remaining on the evidence.
E.6 The financial position of Diamond Wheels viewed in isolation
67 Diamond Wheels also placed before the Court evidence directed to its own financial position, and it is convenient to state what I make of that evidence before returning to the family enterprise as a whole. The evidence given by Mark was that Diamond Wheels held cash at bank of about $631,951 at 30 June 2026; that the whole of that sum was required to meet wages and other outgoings, with about $586,624 owing to creditors in the sixty days following 4 August 2026; that it has no unencumbered assets; that its real property is held as security for its financing or is used in the business or as a source of income; that its existing lender had not agreed to provide further accommodation against that property; and that it faces very difficult trading conditions, which Mark attributed to broader pressures upon the motor vehicle retail industry (DWS [88]–[91]). Its revenue rose from $20.2 million in the 2020 financial year to $56.9 million in 2024, but its net profit was $51,866 in 2023 and $107,469 in 2024, and, although it recovered to $555,323 in 2025 and $591,072 in 2026, it has not in any year since 2019 exceeded about $800,000 (DWS [81], [89]).
68 Taken by itself, Diamond Wheels is a business of large turnover and thin margin, whose liquid resources are committed to its day-to-day obligations and which is exposed, as other dealers are, to the pressures presently bearing upon the industry. An enterprise so placed has little capacity to absorb a penalty of any considerable size out of cash or earnings. A penalty of the order of $6.5 million could not be paid from either, and I accept that its imposition would put at risk the business, the employment of some 40 people, and Mark, who has given personal guarantees in respect of its lending and leases (DWS [5(d)], [91]).
69 For the reasons I have explained, the position of Diamond Wheels in isolation does not measure the resources upon which it may draw, and I am unable to treat it as though it did. This is for at least four reasons.
70 First, the statements to which Mark was taken in cross-examination for 2019 and 2020 showed a business funding its working capital from revenue, with net assets of between $4 million and $5 million and current assets of $8.5 million to $9.3 million well in excess of current liabilities (T43–44). Those were earlier years, and I do not suggest that they describe the present, but they show a business that has, within the period under consideration, been in a materially stronger position than the one now described.
71 Secondly, the same statements recorded non-current loans associated with Mazda Laos of between $5.3 million and $5.8 million, which Mark was unable to explain, and he accepted that it was quite possible that there had been a practice of Mazda Laos depositing funds with Diamond Wheels which were then distributed to other companies in the Australian business (T44–45). On his own evidence, therefore, the statements reflect a movement of funds among related entities which the records do not permit me to trace.
72 Thirdly, Diamond Wheels is the registered proprietor of nine properties which the Referee estimated to be worth about $28.1 million (Table 6) and is a partner with Keo Group in a partnership which holds four more. ASIC contends that potential equity of about $11 million exists in the former, even on the footing that the facility with National Australia Bank (NAB) is satisfied against them (a facility which, as ASIC acknowledges, is also secured against other properties), and of up to $3.91 million in the latter (AS [147]–[148]). The evidence establishes substantial existing encumbrances and that the properties are used in the business or relied upon for income. It does not, however, establish that every possible means of refinancing or realising equity has been exhausted. I neither assume that the estimated equity is readily available nor accept that the refusal of further accommodation by the existing lender establishes that no additional resources could be obtained. These figures concern different asset pools. Table 6 identifies the gross value and potential equity of the properties owned by Diamond Wheels alone; Table 12 addresses the wider collection of properties held by the associated entities and individuals. The latter range is not an estimate of equity belonging to Diamond Wheels alone.
73 Fourthly, the figure of $250,000 rests upon Mark’s own assessment (DWS [91]). I was not taken to any forecast, cash-flow analysis or expert evidence which would permit me to determine the point at which insolvency would arise. The limitations in the financial material require caution, but do not themselves establish that additional funds are available.
74 I therefore find that Diamond Wheels, considered alone, is under genuine financial pressure; that it could not meet a penalty of the magnitude ASIC seeks out of its cash or its earnings; and that a substantial penalty would place real strain upon the business and those who depend upon it. I am very far from satisfied, however, that the evidence establishes $250,000 as the limit of its capacity to pay, or that its capacity is confined to what is disclosed when it is considered in isolation from the enterprise of which, on my findings above, it forms part. I make no affirmative finding that any other member of that enterprise is obliged, or would be willing, to meet a penalty imposed upon Diamond Wheels, and I draw no inference about the resources of the businesses in Laos. The legal significance of these findings is considered in Section F.
E.7 Financial benefit
75 I turn to the benefit which was obtained by reason of the contravening conduct. The parties differ about how it is to be measured. ASIC contends that regard may be had to the benefit which the contracts were intended to yield, assessed by their face value, whether or not it was in the event received (T72.21–30; AS [124]). The respondents contend that the inquiry concerns what was actually obtained and, in the case of Diamond Wheels, that net profit is the appropriate measure, as it was treated in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v BSF Solutions Pty Ltd (Penalty) [2026] FCA 450 (DWS [73]–[75]; KAS [99]). The weight to be given to each of those measures is a matter of principle which I address in Section F. My task here is to find the primary facts and, having found in Section E.4 that the dealerships and Keo Automotive were parts of a single family business, to ask what that business obtained, and not simply what each company, viewed separately, kept for itself.
76 During argument, I identified the relevant commercial advantage as the margin on vehicle sales facilitated by the lending, together with the return from the finance. Counsel for ASIC described that as the net benefit (T72.39–47). Intended advantage and actual net gain nevertheless remain distinct, and the latter cannot be quantified reliably on the present evidence.
77 The lending was not an end in itself. As noted above, the customers to whom Diamond Wheels extended finance directly were usually customers who had applied to a mainstream lender and been declined, or who were ineligible for mainstream lending (DW SABF at [1]), and the finance was the means by which a vehicle could be sold to them. ASIC understandably invites the inference that the lending allowed cars to be sold which would not otherwise have been sold (AS [110]). Diamond Wheels accepts that the cars would not have been sold to the consumers concerned, but says that the evidence does not show that it sold more cars overall than it otherwise would have sold (DWS [83]).
78 I accept both these propositions so far as they go. I find that the sales to these customers were made possible by the finance, and that, in the form in which they were made, they would not have occurred without it. Whether the custom was replaced by sales to other buyers, or whether the dealerships would have sold the same number of vehicles in any event, was not the subject of evidence and I am somewhat sceptical of it. On any view, what the enterprise stood to gain was the commercial margin on the vehicles sold and the return associated with the lending, including interest and fees. The payment by Keo Automotive to a dealership of the balance owing on a vehicle was part of the movement of funds within the enterprise. It is not an additional enterprise gain to be counted on top of the margin earned on the sale.
79 The flat rate of interest described at [12] was typically between 8.95% and 10.95% per annum (SAFA 10 at [33]). The establishment fee, typically between $550 and $990, was added to the amount advanced (SAFA 10 at [32]), and, in all but 28 of the contracts, a loan administration charge was payable with each repayment (SAFA 10 at [30(h)], [34]).
80 ASIC puts the total contract value of the Diamond Wheels Contracts, comprising principal, establishment fees, interest and administration charges on the face of the contracts, at something north of $5.8 million (T72.21–30; AS [22]), and says that this is the benefit which Diamond Wheels intended to obtain (T73.21–39; AS [124]). That figure measures what the contracts promised, but what was actually received is a separate matter, to which I come shortly. ASIC also put that flat-rate repayments over the life of a contract exceeded the interest permitted by the Code, calculated on a reducing balance, by about 85% (T75.1–25), and estimated that consumers paid $150,782 in interest above the amortised amount in the period from 13 March 2019 (AS [24]), to which it adds $170,811 in establishment fees and $108,245 in administration charges, a total of $429,839 (AS [118]; the three components sum to $429,838, and the difference of $1 is immaterial). The interest figure is an estimate, as counsel for ASIC acknowledged (T75.1–25), and it is disputed by Diamond Wheels and Keo Automotive, who say that it treats the amortised-interest component as constant when it falls as the principal is reduced (KAS [16]–[18]). The fees and charges are said by ASIC to be amounts which an unlicensed credit provider was not permitted to impose (AS [118]).
81 Diamond Wheels submits that the principal advanced was $3,897,487.25 and that its receipts fell short of that amount by $2,717,704.65. It seeks to reduce the shortfall by estimated deposits and the anticipated margin on the vehicles sold, and contends that it obtained no net benefit (DWS [51]–[56], [74]–[75]). The deposit figures are not internally consistent: DWS [52] gives $393,726.92, whereas the components stated at [53]–[55] total $393,276.92. There is no need to resolve that discrepancy, which I assume is typographical in nature.
82 What matters is that the analysis speaks to Diamond Wheels alone, and leaves to one side the practical reality of the family business. Further, ASIC points out that it leaves out at least $934,969 received on the contracts before 24 September 2018, a figure which ASIC says is likely to be greater because records are lacking for about a quarter of those loans, and that the Ezidebit data on which it rests do not capture direct deposits or cash payments (AS [112], [128]). Diamond Wheels accepted in oral argument that those receipts, which it put at about $900,000, cannot be ignored and must reduce its asserted loss; the difference between the two figures is immaterial.
83 Moreover, it excludes the repayments which, from 6 December 2019, were directed to Keo Automotive, a company which I have found to be part of the same family business, and which collected under the Redirected Contracts, on figures that counsel for ASIC described as agreed, somewhat more than $1.9 million and, more precisely, $1,987,275 (see [116]; T77.28–35; AS [117]), including interest of $615,051.68 and administration charges of not more than $34,178.70 (KAS [98]).
84 Diamond Wheels also submits that Ken transferred the repayments received into its account between March and December 2019 to accounts he controlled. It identifies those transfers as $1,773,960 and disputes any connexion between them and the separate net transfers of $181,000 into its Lansvale account (DWS [31]–[32]). I make no finding that the latter amount represented retained loan proceeds. Nor can the $1,773,960 be reconciled on the present material with the $1,179,782 attributed to collections under the 205 contracts during the penalty period. These limitations reinforce why the amounts retained by Diamond Wheels cannot, without further reconciliation, measure the economic result of the lending across the family business.
85 I accept that what Diamond Wheels itself received fell short of the principal it advanced. I do not find that the family business made a net profit on the contracts, because the evidence does not permit it. But it is wholly unrealistic to find that it suffered the net loss of more than $2 million which is asserted, a figure which, in any event, Diamond Wheels accepted in oral argument must be reduced once the amounts received before 24 September 2018 are taken into account.
86 The Keo Finance Contracts present the benefit differently, because the vehicles were sold by Diamond Wheels or Maureen Motors, the funds came from Mazda Laos, and the return on the loans accrued to Keo Automotive. The principal advanced under the 119 contracts ranged from $8,000 to $48,123, inclusive of an establishment fee of $990, and each contract provided for an account-keeping fee of $2.50 for each attempted direct debit (SAFA 11 at [80]–[81]). On the making of each contract Keo Automotive paid the dealership the balance owing on the vehicle, bore the credit risk, received the borrowers’ repayments (less Ezidebit’s charges), and paid a commission per loan to Keo Finance or DCP Partners (SAFA 11 at [74], [77]). ASIC puts the interest paid in excess of that permitted by the Code under those contracts at $190,714, an estimate which Keo Automotive says is overstated, both because it holds the amortised-interest component constant and because only 23 of the 119 contracts yielded interest actually received in excess of what would have been permissible (KAS [16]–[18], [73(c)], [118]). Keo Automotive also relies upon its gross and net profit figures as showing that the benefit was modest (KAS [94]–[100]).
87 In short, the evidence does not permit a reliable calculation of net gain across the family business. There is no evidence of the margins earned on vehicles sold under the Keo Finance Contracts, and I do not extrapolate Diamond Wheels’ margin on the earlier contracts to those sales. The cost of the funds supplied by Mazda Laos is also unknown. Further, the Referee found the initial financial statements incomplete and inaccurate and could not verify the replacement statements.
88 In summary:
(1) I find the family business obtained a benefit from the contravening conduct, consisting of the margin on vehicles which, in the form in which the sales were made, would not have been sold without the finance, and the interest, establishment fees and administration charges paid by the borrowers, of which $615,051.68 in interest was received by Keo Automotive under the Redirected Contracts, quite apart from the Keo Finance Contracts;
(2) I am unable to quantify the net benefit, because the receipts of the several companies cannot be reconciled on the material before me, because the financial material contains identified discrepancies and is not supported in all material respects by contemporaneous documents, because the cost of the funds supplied by Mazda Laos is unknown, and because there is no evidence of the margin earned by Maureen Motors;
(3) I do not accept that the face value of the Diamond Wheels Contracts measures what the family business obtained, since the evidence does not show that the contracts were paid in full; nor do I accept that, because Diamond Wheels itself did not recover the principal it advanced, the business as a whole obtained nothing;
(4) I distinguish between what the enterprise obtained from the lending as a whole, which could not lawfully be carried on without a licence, and the part of it attributable to the method by which interest was calculated, which ASIC estimates at $150,782 for the Diamond Wheels Contracts and $190,714 for the Keo Finance Contracts and which is the subject of dispute (the limited extent to which the benefit, whether intended or actual, gross or net, is to be weighed in fixing the penalties is explained in Section F).
F APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES
F.1 Civil penalties
89 The principles are well known, but it is convenient to restate them shortly.
90 The power to impose a pecuniary penalty is conferred by s 167 of the Act and s 167(3) provides:
In determining the pecuniary penalty, the court must take into account all relevant matters, including:
(a) the nature and extent of the contravention; and
(b) the nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered because of the contravention; and
(c) the circumstances in which the contravention took place; and
(d) whether the person has previously been found by a court (including a court in a foreign country) to have engaged in similar conduct.
91 Of course, the primary, if not sole, purpose of a civil penalty is deterrence, both specific and general. As the High Court explained in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson [2022] HCA 13; (2022) 274 CLR 450 (at 457 [9] and 459–460 [15]–[17] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ), the penalty must be sufficient to secure compliance with the statutory norm and must not be such as may be regarded by the contravener, or others, as merely an acceptable cost of doing business. The task is not retributive. Nor is it an arithmetical exercise in which aggravating and mitigating matters are assigned numerical values. The Court is required to arrive at an appropriate penalty by an evaluative judgment directed to deterrence.
92 It follows that such matters as the duration and scale of the conduct, the contravener’s state of mind, the benefit sought or obtained, loss occasioned to others, the size and resources of the contravener, cooperation, corrective action, previous contraventions and the need for both specific and general deterrence may all bear upon the instinctive synthesis required. Their significance will vary according to the circumstances. The parties also referred to penalties imposed in other proceedings, including BSF Solutions (see [75]; KAS [92]). Penalties fixed in other cases may show the range within which courts have operated, but they are not a tariff, and because each reflects its own combination of contraventions, benefit, harm, financial circumstances and manner of resolution, I have not found a comparison with them to be a safe guide to the amount here. I have used them only as a check against an outcome out of line with penalties imposed for broadly comparable conduct, and I am satisfied that the penalties I propose are not out of line.
F.1.1 Financial benefit
93 The commercial advantage sought by a contravener may be relevant to deterrence even where the venture ultimately proves unsuccessful. Actual receipts, intended advantage and net economic gain are nevertheless different matters. The face value of a loan contract includes the return of principal and is not, without more, a measure of profit. Equally, an asserted accounting loss does not eliminate the need for a penalty sufficient to deter the conduct.
94 The statutory calculation of benefit derived and detriment avoided is a distinct inquiry. Section 167D provides:
The benefit derived and detriment avoided because of a contravention of a civil penalty provision is the sum of:
(a) the total value of all benefits that one or more persons obtained that are reasonably attributable to the contravention; and
(b) the total value of all detriments that one or more persons avoided that are reasonably attributable to the contravention.
95 That definition informs the statutory provisions which employ it. It does not require the Court, in assessing all relevant circumstances for penalty, to disregard the commercial advantage intended to be obtained. Conversely, consideration of intended advantage does not justify treating every dollar promised under a contract as an actual gain. In this case, I take account of the commercial purpose and the benefits established (at [75]–[88]), without treating the face value of the contracts as quantified net profit.
F.2 Multiple contraventions
96 This proceeding involves an unusually large number of contraventions. The identification of each statutory contravention remains necessary, not least because the legislative maximum is fixed by reference to contraventions. But the ultimate penalty exercise must avoid imposing punishment twice for what is, in substance, the same wrongdoing.
97 Section 175(1), headed “Civil double jeopardy”, provides:
If a person is ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty under a civil penalty provision in relation to particular conduct, the person is not liable to be ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty under some other provision of a law of the Commonwealth in relation to that conduct.
98 The course of conduct “principle” is, of course, distinct from s 175. Related contraventions arising from substantially the same acts or factual matrix may be considered together for penalty purposes, because care must be taken that a contravener is not punished twice for what is essentially the same wrongdoing: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39; (2010) 194 IR 461 (at [39] per Middleton and Gordon JJ). This is no more than an analytical tool, directed to the avoidance of punishing a contravener twice for what is in substance the one wrong, and it does not reduce the number of maximum penalties applicable to distinct contraventions: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation [2018] FCAFC 73; (2018) 262 FCR 243.
99 Finally, whatever approach is taken to grouping the contraventions, the Court must finally stand back and consider whether the aggregate penalty is appropriate for the entirety of the contravening conduct.
F.3 Maximum penalties
100 The statutory maximums changed during the contravening period. Before 13 March 2019, a contravention of ss 29 or 32 attracted a maximum of 2,000 penalty units for an individual and, by operation of the then s 167, 10,000 penalty units for a corporation. From 13 March 2019, s 167B materially increased the maximum penalties available.
101 Section 167B(2) provides:
The pecuniary penalty applicable to the contravention of a civil penalty provision by a body corporate is the greatest of:
(a) the penalty specified for the civil penalty provision, multiplied by 10; and
(b) if the court can determine the benefit derived and detriment avoided because of the contravention—that amount multiplied by 3; and
(c) either:
(i) 10% of the annual turnover of the body corporate for the 12-month period ending at the end of the month in which the body corporate contravened, or began to contravene, the civil penalty provision; or
(ii) if the amount worked out under subparagraph (i) is greater than an amount equal to 2.5 million penalty units—2.5 million penalty units.
102 Applying those provisions separately to the thousands of contraventions produces theoretical aggregate maximums measured in tens, and in some instances hundreds, of billions of dollars. ASIC calculates, for example, aggregate theoretical maximums of approximately $42.029 billion for Diamond Wheels’ payment contraventions and $213.756 billion for Keo Automotive’s payment contraventions. Those figures demonstrate the seriousness with which the legislature regarded the statutory norms but are of little practical assistance.
103 That said, as Pattinson makes clear, the maximum remains relevant because it represents the legislature’s specification of the strongest deterrent response available. But where the sheer number of repeated transactions produces a theoretical maximum vastly removed from any realistically appropriate penalty, the Court must take care not to allow the arithmetic to overwhelm the evaluative task of fixing the amount sufficient to provide appropriate general and specific deterrence (and not some greater amount).
F.4 Capacity to pay
104 Capacity to pay is relevant because the question remains what penalty is required to achieve the statutory purpose of deterrence, including specific deterrence. Having noted that, a penalty does not cease to be appropriate merely because payment would occasion significant financial consequences to the contravener.
105 Equally, capacity to pay is not assessed in a vacuum. Where the evidence establishes that a corporate contravener operates within an economically coordinated group and has historically enjoyed access to funding or assets from related persons or entities, those circumstances may bear upon the practical significance of its asserted inability to pay. ASIC relies in this respect upon my decision in Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre v Castra Licensee Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 709.
106 Care is, however, required. A civil penalty against one corporation is not converted into a penalty against its shareholders, relatives or associated companies. The resources of another legal person cannot simply be attributed to the contravener because the persons controlling the entities are related. What matters is what the evidence establishes concerning the contravener’s practical access to resources and the likelihood of such financial support being available.
F.5 Parity
107 Where several persons are concerned in the one course of wrongdoing and fall to be dealt with together, justice requires that there be a rational connexion between the penalties imposed upon each, so that the differences in outcome can be explained by the differences in culpability, in the statutory maximums to which they are exposed and in their personal circumstances: see, in the criminal context, Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295 (at 301–302 per Dawson and Gaudron JJ). The principle does not call for equality of result, and it is applied with care in a proceeding in which the contraveners include both corporations and an individual, because their deterrent needs differ and because Parliament has prescribed maxima which differ in kind. It is nonetheless an aspect of the fairness which attends the evaluative judgment, and it has particular relevance where, as here, Ken was the human actor through whom each corporate respondent contravened and his own penalty has been agreed with ASIC.
108 A rational connexion of that kind cannot be established by reasoning mechanically from the agreed figure to the corporate penalties, or from the corporate penalties to the agreed figure. The penalty agreed for Ken is a matter upon which ASIC and Ken are at one, and is within what I consider to be the range of appropriate penalties. Accordingly, I proceed on the footing that it stands as some form of reference point in the sense that I should be slow to arrive at corporate penalties so out of proportion to it that the two could not be reconciled by reference to the differences in culpability and deterrence which I identify below.
G KEN – DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY
109 I begin with Ken, because the approach which the Court takes to a penalty agreed between the parties differs from the approach it takes to penalties which remain in contest.
110 The Court is not bound to accept an agreed penalty, but must ask whether the proposal can be accepted as fixing an appropriate amount and, for that purpose, must satisfy itself that the penalty submitted is appropriate: Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482 (Agreed Penalties case) (at 503–504 [46], 504 [48] and 507 [58] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ); (AS [216]). Once the Court is satisfied that it has the power to make the orders and that they are appropriate, it should exercise restraint in scrutinising a proposed settlement, and that is so particularly where, as here, the consenting parties are legally represented and able to understand and evaluate its desirability (Agreed Penalties case (at 507–508 [58]–[59] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ); (AS [217])). An agreed penalty may be adopted even though the Court might otherwise have been disposed to select some other figure (Agreed Penalties case (at 504 [47] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ); (AS [218])), so that the question is whether $750,000 falls within the permissible range of penalties which could properly be imposed, an inquiry which is independent of the figure I might have selected had the matter been contested.
111 Ken was the managing director and dealer principal of Diamond Wheels from 2009 until March 2019 and has had sole responsibility for the management of Keo Automotive since he caused it to be incorporated in August 2019; he executed or approved the execution of the consumer credit contracts of the former and was instrumental in the arrangements by which Keo Finance was nominated as the lender under the Keo Finance Contracts. By reason of s 169 of the Act, his involvement in the contraventions of both companies means that he is taken to have contravened the same provisions as they did, so that his contraventions equate in number to the cumulative total of the corporate respondents’ contraventions.
112 ASIC draws attention to the circumstance that Ken was a shareholder of both corporate respondents and so had a personal interest in the benefits which they obtained, to net transfers to him during the relevant period of $126,974 from an account held by Diamond Wheels and $259,056 from an account held by Keo Automotive, to his record of unlicensed lending going back to 2009, and to what it describes as his lack of insight into his conduct (AS [221], [224]). Ken, for his part, relies upon his compliance with the notices which ASIC issued, upon the admissions which he made, without claiming privilege, at his compulsory examination on 4 June 2024, and upon his early admission of involvement in the contraventions of Diamond Wheels and his agreement to liability and to the amount of the penalty (KAS [121]–[125]).
113 The agreed penalty is (in a relative sense) considerably less than the penalties which ASIC seeks against the corporate respondents, and the disparity, which I raised with counsel at the commencement of the hearing, requires attention given that Ken was the central human actor in both of them. The comparison cannot, however, be approached mechanically. Parliament has prescribed materially different maxima for individuals and corporations; the corporations were the vehicles through which, and for whose benefit, the lending was carried on; and Ken admitted his involvement. I have also found, for reasons given in Section I, that his belief in the lawfulness of the Keo Finance arrangements was held in good faith, although, by no later than 2018, he knew that a licence was required for consumer lending (SAFA 11 at [55]) and, as I infer, that the Diamond Wheels Contracts were unlawful.
114 Having regard to the objective seriousness of his conduct, his knowledge of the unlawfulness of the Diamond Wheels Contracts, the steps he later took to regularise the lending, the modest financial harm to consumers, his admissions and cooperation, the need for both specific and general deterrence, I am satisfied that $750,000 falls within the range of appropriate penalties for his involvement in the contraventions of both corporate respondents, and I therefore determine that the appropriate pecuniary penalty is $750,000. As will appear, the penalties which I would impose upon the companies are of the order of a little over three times and a little under five times that figure, and the difference is explicable by the matters identified in Section F.5 and in the preceding paragraph.
H DIAMOND WHEELS – DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY
H.1 Nature and extent of the conduct
115 The offending by Diamond Wheels was substantial. It was the credit provider under the 205 Diamond Wheels Contracts described at [25], which had a total contractual value of $5,800,447, comprising approximately $3,897,487 in principal, $1,623,902 in contractual interest, $170,811 in establishment fees and $108,245 in administration charges. The components, as rounded, sum to $5,800,445, but the $2 difference from ASIC’s stated total is immaterial, as is the fact that the principal advanced in most cases itself included the establishment fee (SAFA 10 at [32]), so that the total may count those fees twice. The payments sought or accepted on the 5,890 occasions described at [25] totalled $1,179,782, and the 3,531 occasions of flat-rate interest described at [26] are the subject of the disputed estimate of excess interest discussed at [80].
116 Diamond Wheels had also received repayments before 24 September 2018 and, after the payment arrangements were “redirected” in December 2019, Keo Automotive received a further $1,987,275 under the Redirected Contracts. It is therefore artificial, in considering the economic consequences of the lending, to set the approximately $3.897 million of principal advanced against only the $1.180 million received by Diamond Wheels during the penalty period, without accounting for the payments received before that period or the substantial payments later received by Keo Automotive. The contractual populations are not identical: the Redirected Contracts include 27 later DW Contracts as well as 144 of the Diamond Wheels Contracts. The subsequent collections therefore cannot simply be deducted in full from the asserted shortfall on the 205 Diamond Wheels Contracts. They nevertheless demonstrate why Diamond Wheels’ receipts during the penalty period alone do not describe the economic consequences of the lending.
H.2 The period before 24 September 2018
117 The first matter requiring some care is the significance of the lending which preceded the penalty period. It is agreed that no declaration, penalty or other relief is available in respect of conduct occurring before 24 September 2018. Diamond Wheels is not, of course, to be penalised for contraventions which occurred before that date, nor would it be permissible to achieve the same result indirectly by treating earlier conduct as though it constituted additional penalised contraventions.
118 That does not mean, however, that the history before 24 September 2018 must be disregarded. I am to have regard to all relevant contextual circumstances. The conduct occurring within the penalty period did not arise in a vacuum. By that time, the direct lending described above had been undertaken by Diamond Wheels for several years. The earlier activity assists in understanding the character of the conduct within the penalty period. ASIC expressly relied upon the history in that more limited way, as part of the circumstances of the offending rather than as an independent basis for punishment.
119 Diamond Wheels objects that it would be unfair to have regard to the earlier history, and puts the conduct as confined primarily to the period from 24 September 2018 to 5 March 2019, a little over five months (DWS [4], [5(a)]). I do not accept that it is unfair to take into account the setting in which the contraventions within the penalty period occurred, since, for the reasons given above, no increase in the penalty is made on account of the earlier lending. As to duration, entry into the contracts forming part of ASIC’s case against Diamond Wheels ended on 22 February 2019 (see [125]), but receipts under the existing contracts continued until 5 December 2019, and the contraventions of Keo Automotive in respect of the Redirected Contracts continued until April 2024 (SAFA 11 [30]). The duration of the conduct is therefore to be measured over the whole of the period in which the contraventions occurred, which is longer than the period in which new loans were made.
H.3 Culpability and the role of Ken
120 The conduct of Diamond Wheels must next be considered in light of the person through whom the company acted. Ken was the managing director and dealer principal and had practical responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of the business.
121 This was therefore not a case in which the contraventions resulted merely from an isolated administrative error by a junior employee. Consumer lending had become an established feature of the dealership’s operations and was directed by the person having day-to-day control of the company. That circumstance materially aggravates the objective seriousness of the contraventions.
122 There is, however, another side to the matter. The evidence does not establish that the other persons interested in Diamond Wheels had collectively resolved to operate an unlicensed consumer-finance business or that the company continued deliberately to enter new consumer loans once the problem was discovered by Mark. The evidence concerning what then occurred is relevant both to the proper characterisation of the company’s culpability and to specific deterrence.
H.4 Culpability and the role of Mark
123 Mark first became aware in about October or November 2018 that Diamond Wheels had been providing consumer credit without a licence. He understood that the activity was unlawful, told Ken that it must stop, instructed the general manager, Mr Warren Cook, and the sales staff not to offer or accept finance applications on Diamond Wheels’ behalf, and discussed Ken’s position with members of the family (T25–26, 34, 36; Mark 1 at [34]–[36]). In early February 2019 it was discovered that Ken had continued to make loans (Mark 1 at [43]), and the family then considered how Ken and the lending were to be separated from Diamond Wheels (Mark 1 at [50]). I accept that Mark disapproved of the unlicensed lending and wished to remove the risk from Diamond Wheels. For reasons I have explained, I do not accept the broader submission that the family then caused the lending activity to cease immediately throughout the businesses with which the family were associated.
124 As I have said, the best evidence of the decision actually made is the 28 February 2019 email, rather than later rationalisations. As explained above, the contemporaneous language records an intended reduction and attempted regularisation of the activity, accompanied by a transfer of its practical operation and benefit, not its immediate extinction.
125 Diamond Wheels did not enter further contracts forming part of ASIC’s case against it after 22 February 2019. The continuing contraventions through to 5 December 2019 principally resulted from the receipt of repayments upon contracts already in existence. Ken did, while still a director of Diamond Wheels, arrange for a further 33 contracts (the DW Contracts) to be entered into on the Diamond Wheels template between 12 March and 17 November 2019 (SAFA 11 at [22]; ABF [45]), but ASIC did not put those later contracts against Diamond Wheels (SAFA 10 at [19]), and so far as contraventions are concerned they bear only upon Keo Automotive’s collections (SAFA 11 at [30], [48]). The agreed material gives slightly different end dates for the contracts entered into after 24 September 2018, ABF [23] defining that period as ending on 5 March 2019 and SAFA 10 at [19] recording the last of them as entered into on 22 February 2019, and the difference is immaterial to the matters now in issue.
126 That distinction assists Diamond Wheels only to a point. I do not find that Mark knowingly participated in the origination of new unlicensed consumer loans. But the family’s chosen response left the existing book alive, contemplated its continued administration by Ken at Maureen Motors, and depended upon him obtaining access to a licence. Mark knew that Ezidebit receipts continued to enter Diamond Wheels’ account, told Ken to redirect them, but did not himself contact Ezidebit, remove Ken’s access to the bank accounts (which, on the agreed facts, Ken retained until 5 December 2019: SAFA 10 at [26]), monitor the statements or otherwise ensure that the receipts stopped until the change-of-entity form was signed in November 2019 (T35–38). Mark did remove Ken’s access to the accounting systems (Mark 1 at [57]), but that step did not stop the receipts.
H.5 Consumer harm
127 ASIC submits that the conduct caused harm of a kind extending beyond dollars and cents. Consumers who dealt with an unlicensed credit provider were deprived of the protections associated with the statutory licensing regime. Many of the direct-finance customers had been unable to obtain finance from a mainstream lender. The legislation was designed to regulate the provision of credit to precisely such consumers.
128 That is a real form of regulatory harm and should not be understated. On the other hand, the evidence does not establish that the gross amount paid under the contracts represents financial loss to all the consumers. The borrowers obtained motor vehicles and the benefit of the principal advanced to acquire them. As I have explained at [75]–[88], neither the face value of the contracts nor the total repayments can simply be equated with loss to the borrowers or benefit to Diamond Wheels.
129 There was, however, a distinct financial consequence for some associated with the flat-rate interest methodology. ASIC estimated that, from 13 March 2019, approximately $150,782 more interest was received than would have been payable under a Code-compliant amortised rate; for the reasons given at [80], that estimate is disputed. Mr Kidd SC, who appeared for Keo Automotive and Ken, noted in his oral submissions that ASIC had accepted that its calculations rested upon an averaging exercise and were not accurate, and he put his own case in three parts.
130 First, he submitted that neither the Diamond Wheels Contracts nor the Keo Finance Contracts contained prohibited fees or charges or exceeded the statutory cap on the annual cost rate; that the total amount of interest charged was not itself prohibited, the contravention lying in the method by which it was calculated from the stated rate; and that the borrowers received the loan for which they had contracted, at the rate disclosed to them, with the amount of each repayment and the term specified, and used it to buy a vehicle.
131 Secondly, he took me to the calculations in KAS [73(c)], which are drawn from ASIC’s own contract summary and involve no averaging at all: interest payable under the Keo Finance Contracts of $1,255,242.76, as against $679,573.10 which would have been payable had the interest been calculated in compliance with the Code at an unchanged rate, a difference of $575,669.66, which he described as the intended or effective excess. He submitted that the figures relevant to consumer harm were those showing what was actually received, and that on that footing only 23 of the 119 contracts yielded interest above what the Code would have permitted, so that the overwhelming majority of borrowers had paid less than they could lawfully have been charged.
132 Thirdly, he submitted that the harm had in any event been reduced considerably by the remediation which followed the undertakings given by Keo Automotive on 16 February and 6 May 2024, before this proceeding was commenced on 23 September 2024, under which Keo Automotive undertook not to demand, receive or accept any payment that would take a debtor’s aggregate payments above the principal borrowed, under a Diamond Wheels Contract in the first case and a ‘Loan Contract’ in the second (ABF [95]–[96]), although he did not say that every affected consumer had been remediated. I accept the distinction drawn between contractual interest and interest actually received. The comparison with compliant interest over the full contractual term does not, however, itself quantify any excess interest paid by individual borrowers during the relevant period. ASIC’s estimates remain disputed, and I do not adopt them as precise measures of consumer loss.
133 I also accept that the harm to consumers must be assessed in light of the undertakings. By the undertaking given on 17 January 2024, Diamond Wheels bound itself, in effect, to receive no more than the principal from those borrowers who had not already repaid it. That undertaking was given after ASIC’s engagement with Diamond Wheels had begun, and before this proceeding was commenced on 23 September 2024. Its effect was to remove, for those borrowers, the continuing exposure to interest, fees and charges which the licensing regime and the Code were designed to prevent, and the damage which consumers suffered is therefore probably fairly slight rather than substantial.
134 Indeed, curiously, it was not disputed that some borrowers will be better off than if the contracts had been carried through to their ends, since they have had the use of a vehicle upon what has become, in respect of the unpaid balance, interest-free credit. I find that the financial harm to consumers was, in the scheme of things, relatively modest and that the regulatory harm, while real, was reduced by the giving of the undertakings, although the position of those who paid more than the principal before the undertaking was given remains unremedied, as the next section explains.
H.6 Remediation and subsequent conduct
135 The problem had been identified by late 2018 (see [123]), and the directors’ resolution of 14 April 2022 records that Ken had been directed in 2019 to cease the unlicensed lending (ABF [14(a)]); the customers who were affected have, however, not been remediated. The agreed material records an extended engagement between Diamond Wheels and ASIC concerning possible remediation, commencing by June 2022. ASIC indicated on 3 March 2023 that it was unlikely to approve a proposal under which interest was retained; Diamond Wheels wrote on 24 April 2023, raising its concern that, if no market rate of return were included, borrowers would receive a windfall, and ASIC acknowledged that letter on 26 April 2023 without then responding to it; on 1 September 2023 ASIC said that it could not agree to a remediation plan which allowed interest, fees or charges to continue to be accepted; Diamond Wheels provided a draft remediation plan on 22 September 2023; ASIC wrote on 26 September 2023 that it was unable to consider the appropriateness of any plan until its investigation had concluded; and on 30 May 2024 ASIC told Diamond Wheels that it did not require ASIC’s approval in order to proceed (DW SABF [5(g)], [5(i)]–[5(o)]).
136 That history is more complicated than a simple refusal to remediate. There was engagement about the appropriate basis upon which remediation ought to occur and a genuine issue concerning what should happen to the principal advanced, and some of the delay is attributable to ASIC’s own position that it could not consider a plan while its investigation continued. Even so, ASIC’s statement of 30 May 2024 left Diamond Wheels free to proceed without its approval, and the evidence does not establish that affected consumers have all been remediated. That circumstance weighs against Diamond Wheels, although it weighs less heavily than it might in other cases because of the limited extent and uneven nature of the financial detriment.
H.7 Cooperation and absence of previous contraventions
137 Diamond Wheels ultimately admitted the contraventions and joined with ASIC in placing agreed facts before the Court. That course avoided the need for the anticipated five-day contested liability hearing. It is appropriate to recognise the resulting saving of public and private resources.
138 There is no suggestion that Diamond Wheels has previously been found by a court to have engaged in similar contravening conduct. Nor does the evidence suggest that it now conducts an unlicensed consumer-lending business. Those matters reduce the degree of specific deterrence required, although they do not diminish the importance of general deterrence.
139 One matter tells the other way. The affidavit evidence placed before the Court on behalf of Diamond Wheels expresses no contrition, and its tenor throughout is to attribute the whole of the unlawful lending to Ken. That course is artificial. This was a family business, and when the lending was discovered those who were responsible for the company did not bring it to an end immediately but agreed upon a wind-down and the transfer of the activity, as I have found above. A company is answerable for what is done in its name by those who direct it, and it is surprising that, although Diamond Wheels accepts in its submissions that it should have taken further steps to stop the Ezidebit payments, to shut Ken out of its bank accounts and to novate the contracts formally (DWS [43]–[44]), and Mark accepted in cross-examination that he should have taken firmer steps (T35–36, 38), no acknowledgement of the company’s own responsibility for the lending, and no expression of regret to the borrowers, appears in the evidence given on its behalf. The absence of contrition somewhat weakens the force of Diamond Wheels’ submissions concerning the need for specific deterrence.
H.8 Capacity to pay
140 I have found at [72]–[74] that the evidence does not establish $250,000 as the limit of Diamond Wheels’ capacity to pay, and a further matter reinforces that conclusion. Ms Shepard SC drew attention to the evidence, given on the first day of the hearing, that the NAB facilities which had previously been spread among several entities in the family’s businesses were consolidated in about February 2026, so that Diamond Wheels became liable for the indebtedness of other entities in the group (T54.1–15). Diamond Wheels thus carries debt which arose elsewhere in the family business, and any suggestion that its present debt position should be regarded as separate from the other parts of that business is artificial. The enterprise is to be looked at as a whole, and the debt now borne by Diamond Wheels is a consequence of the way in which the family chose to arrange its affairs. I do not thereby treat the resources of any other entity as those of Diamond Wheels. The commercial reality of the enterprise is simply a matter to be weighed in assessing the burden which a penalty of the order I propose would impose.
H.9 General and specific deterrence
141 General deterrence assumes especial importance in this case. The penalty must communicate to vehicle dealers and others who facilitate consumer finance that the regulatory requirements are not optional and that a penalty is not to be regarded as an acceptable cost of doing business (see [91]). Diamond Wheels’ scale is relevant to the deterrent effect of the penalty, but turnover is not a substitute for an assessment of its financial resources and the burden of payment. It is a dealership of large turnover, which rose from $20.2 million in 2020 to $56.9 million in 2024 (see [67]), and a penalty which a business of that scale could readily absorb would fail to communicate the required message to others in the industry; but the thin margins described at [68] mean that scale alone carries only modest weight in the overall assessment.
142 As to specific deterrence, Ken, who was centrally responsible for the lending, ceased to manage Diamond Wheels in March 2019, although the agreed facts record that he retained access to its bank accounts until 5 December 2019, signed banking and property documents at its request after that time, and remained on the register as a director until 30 July 2024 (see [29]; SAFA 10 at [26]; SAFA 11 at [17], [19]). New lending ceased to form part of ASIC’s case against the company after February 2019. Those matters, together with the admissions and the absence of earlier findings noted at [137]–[138], substantially reduce, but do not eliminate, the need for specific deterrence.
H.10 Course of conduct
143 It would, of course, be artificial to determine the penalty by treating each of the 5,890 receipts, or each of the 3,531 receipts of impermissibly calculated interest, as warranting a separately accumulated penalty. Those contraventions were repeated manifestations of the same systems and contractual arrangements, and ASIC accepts that the acceptance of payments and the receipt of flat-rate interest may respectively be treated as courses of conduct. The conduct was very similar from one contravention to the next, but, as I have explained, the course of conduct principle is only an analytical tool, and its application here makes no practical difference to the identification of how many contraventions there were, which the declarations have settled, to the statutory maximums, or to the outcome, because the penalty I arrive at results from an evaluative judgment about the whole of the offending, with no multiplication of separately assessed amounts.
144 The 205 instances of acting as credit provider nevertheless involved separate consumer contracts and separate borrowers. I take account of that fact when assessing the scale of the conduct. But the ultimate penalty must be sufficient, and no greater than reasonably necessary, to achieve deterrence and must avoid double counting the same underlying features of the lending arrangements under different statutory provisions.
H.11 The appropriate penalty
145 I therefore approach the appropriate penalty recognising the substantial scale and duration of the offending (duration being understood as explained at [119]), the senior position occupied by Ken, the number of consumers affected, the commercial context in which the lending occurred, the benefit discussed at [75]–[88], the absence of completed remediation and the strong need for general deterrence.
146 I balance those matters against other relevant matters, including: the steps taken after Mark discovered the lending; the cessation of new lending by Diamond Wheels; the cessation of Ken’s management of the company; the eventual admissions and consequent saving of a contested liability hearing; the absence of previous similar findings; the real financial constraints identified at [67]–[74]; and the requirements of course of conduct and proportionality.
147 The penalty imposed upon Ken must also be borne in mind. As explained in Section F.5, there should be a rational connexion between the penalties imposed upon the several respondents, and Ken was the individual through whom each company acted, and I have determined that the appropriate penalty for his involvement is $750,000, for the reasons given in Section G. That sum, although it relates to his own conduct, reflects his involvement in the contraventions of both corporate respondents and not merely those of Diamond Wheels, so that it is the penalty for his part in the wrongdoing of the two companies taken together, and it cannot be set against the penalty to be imposed upon Diamond Wheels as though each answered to the same conduct. Diamond Wheels submits that, because Ken has been penalised in that sum, a substantial further penalty upon the company is unnecessary (DWS [60]–[61], [92]). I do not accept that the personal penalty displaces the deterrence which the corporate penalty must supply. The company was the credit provider, its contraventions are the subject of the declarations made against it, and general deterrence of dealers who might be tempted to finance sales through an unlicensed entity requires that a corporate contravener bear its own penalty, even where the individual who directed it has also been penalised. A corporate penalty for Diamond Wheels well above that figure is nonetheless explicable by the different statutory maximums, by the circumstance that the companies were the vehicles through which, and for whose benefit, the lending was carried on, and by the greater deterrent weight which a corporate penalty must carry. His penalty does not supply a mathematical ceiling or multiple for the corporate penalties, and each of those penalties must reflect the deterrence required in the circumstances of the particular respondent.
148 Taking all those matters together, and bearing in mind my findings that the financial harm to consumers was modest, that the undertakings were given after ASIC’s inquiries had begun and before this proceeding was commenced, that no contrition has been shown, that the enterprise must be considered as a whole, and that there must be a rational connexion with the penalty agreed for Ken, I consider that a pecuniary penalty of $2.5 million is appropriate in respect of Diamond Wheels’ contraventions.
149 That figure is the product of an evaluative judgment and not a calculus. The net benefit of the lending cannot be quantified (see [88]), and I have not derived the penalty from any measure of benefit. I have asked instead what sum is required to ensure that neither Diamond Wheels nor any other dealer could regard the penalty as an acceptable cost of doing business, and I have tested my answer against three sets of figures.
150 First, there is ASIC’s estimate of the amounts which an unlicensed provider could not lawfully have exacted, namely $429,839, made up of $150,782 in interest above the amortised amount, $170,811 in establishment fees and $108,245 in administration charges (see [80]). That estimate is disputed in part, and I therefore treat it as indicative only of the order of the unlawful charges, rather than as a precisely established measure of loss or benefit.
151 Secondly, there is the $1,623,902 in interest which the contracts promised over their terms (see [115]), representing the contractual interest return had every borrower paid in full, apart from fees and charges.
152 Thirdly, there is the $1,179,782 collected during the penalty period (see [115]), which includes the return of principal and which I mention only to show the scale of the dealings, and not as a measure of benefit or gain (see [93]).
153 A penalty of $2.5 million is almost six times ASIC’s estimate of the unlawful charges, exceeds the whole of the interest which the contracts promised, and is a little more than twice the sums collected in the penalty period. A figure at or near the unlawful charges would do no more than deprive Diamond Wheels of what it could not lawfully have exacted, and would leave untouched the margin on the vehicle sales which the lending made possible. That margin cannot be quantified, but it was a real part of the commercial advantage sought, and I weigh it once, in this penalty, in respect of the sales made by Diamond Wheels.
154 Within the range of outcomes which I considered open, the following matters carry the figure towards its upper part: the senior position occupied by Ken and his knowledge that the Diamond Wheels Contracts were unlawful; the number of borrowers and the duration of the conduct as explained at [119]; the absence of contrition; the continuing failure to remediate those borrowers who paid more than the principal before the undertaking was given; and the strong need for general deterrence. The matters which restrain it include the modest financial harm, the undertakings, the cessation of new lending after February 2019, the admissions and the saving of a contested liability hearing, the absence of previous findings, the real financial constraints identified at [67]–[74] and the rational connexion with the penalty agreed for Ken.
155 I recognise that $2.5 million is about four times both Diamond Wheels’ net profit for the 2026 financial year ($591,072) and its cash at bank at 30 June 2026 ($631,951), and that it could not be met from either (see [67]–[68]). Capacity to pay therefore moderates the amount, as does the thin margin on which the dealership trades, but it does not determine it, because, for the reasons given at [72]–[74] and [140], I am not satisfied that $250,000 marks the limit of what Diamond Wheels could raise when it is considered as part of the enterprise to which it belongs. In saying that, I do not attribute to Diamond Wheels the resources of any other entity, and I make no finding that any associated person would be willing to meet the penalty.
156 The method and time of payment are distinct questions upon which the parties are to be heard in accordance with the orders accompanying these reasons, as I have indicated in respect of Keo Automotive at [185]. The amount is very substantial in the context of Diamond Wheels’ present financial circumstances; in fixing it I have not treated the theoretical aggregate maximums as a mathematical starting point, and it reflects the objective seriousness of the contraventions while recognising the matters which materially reduce the need for specific deterrence.
157 Standing back and looking at the penalty which I propose against Diamond Wheels, I regard $2.5 million as an appropriate penalty for the whole of its contravening conduct. The principle of totality, which requires that the aggregate of the penalties imposed for related contraventions be appropriate to the entirety of the wrongdoing and no greater than is necessary to achieve deterrence, does not require a different result, whether I have regard to the number and repetitive character of the contraventions or to the penalties imposed upon Ken and Keo Automotive in respect of the same underlying lending.
I KEO AUTOMOTIVE – DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY
I.1 General
158 Keo Automotive’s contraventions were extensive and prolonged. They arose from the two streams identified above and must be assessed in their commercial setting, including the benefits of the lending and the financial interconnections within the family business.
159 The agreed good-faith reliance concerns the Keo Finance arrangements and the period ending in September 2023. ASIC nevertheless alleges that the reliance was objectively reckless, having regard to Ken’s earlier knowledge of the licensing requirement, the advice previously received, his failure to examine the scope of the licence and authorisation of Mr Slarke, whose Australian credit licence the arrangements relied upon (SAFA 11 at [71]), and the absence of independent legal advice.
160 One must be careful not to allow the use of labels of that kind to distract from the task in which I am engaged, which is to fix upon an appropriate remedial response directed to specific and general deterrence, and I do not think it necessary to decide the precise metes and bounds of the word “reckless”. What is required is that Ken’s conduct be characterised properly, and in substance I broadly accept what Mr Kidd SC submitted about it. The agreed facts record ASIC’s position that the belief was not reasonably based because Ken did not read Mr Slarke’s licence or the Sub-Introducer Agreement and did not obtain independent professional legal advice (SAFA 11 [71]). ASIC develops that contention in AS [174]–[177]. Regardless of the use of the label “reckless”, these omissions do remain relevant to the weight to be given to the belief in mitigation, and I take them into account by weighing them against the matters which follow.
161 What is also relevant is that the agreed facts describe arrangements expressly directed to compliant consumer lending, the involvement of an actual licence holder, written arrangements for the provision of the relevant services, registration as credit representatives, and the approval and issue of loan contracts by the separate entity trading as Keo Finance. Those matters must be weighed against the deficiencies identified by ASIC. Registration did not establish that the activities were legally authorised, but its occurrence is relevant to the explanation for the belief held.
162 Ken’s conduct, as I characterise it, was that of a person who had some regard to the lawfulness of what he was doing, as the following three matters show, notwithstanding that it might be concluded that he ought to have done more to satisfy himself that the arrangements were lawful.
163 First, and importantly, Ken acted in good faith in believing the arrangements were lawful.
164 Secondly, as I put to counsel in the course of the hearing, once the difficulty was appreciated Ken took steps to regularise the position: he arranged for the involvement of a licence holder, put written arrangements in place, caused credit representatives to be registered, and left the approval and issue of the loan contracts to a separate entity; it would jar to treat a person who takes good faith steps of that kind in an endeavour to place his lending upon a lawful footing as the same as a person who had no regard to legality, even if the steps taken proved inadequate.
165 Thirdly, Ken’s earlier knowledge that a licence was required, upon which ASIC relies, is just as consistent with an attempt to comply as it is with indifference, and the weight of the evidence favours the former. That Ken might well have done more, particularly by examining the scope of Mr Slarke’s licence and by reading the Sub-Introducer Agreement, is a matter I have already weighed in assessing the mitigating significance of his belief, and it goes to the degree of culpability and to the measure of specific deterrence required, without displacing the three matters which I have identified.
166 The collection of payments under the Redirected Contracts requires separate consideration, because the agreed belief concerning the Keo Finance arrangements cannot be extended to those collections. I infer that Ken knew that the initial receipt of principal and interest under those contracts was unlawful, because he knew that the contracts themselves had been made without a licence, and that knowledge continued when, from December 2019, Keo Automotive collected the repayments. The position is different in respect of the Keo Finance Contracts. Once Ken believed that he had put a lawful basis in place for the making of those contracts, the receipts under them are to be regarded as received in good faith. That distinction bears upon culpability and is reflected in the penalty which I propose.
167 The period after September 2023 also requires separate consideration. The agreed belief in the lawfulness of the Keo Finance arrangements did not extend beyond that date, although repayments continued until April 2024. The agreed facts record that Mr Slarke signed the cessation form in May 2023, but that Keo Automotive and Ken did not learn that the authorisation had ended until September 2023 (SAFA 11 [97]–[99]). The mitigating weight of the earlier belief therefore does not extend to subsequent collections under the Keo Finance Contracts. Collections under the Redirected Contracts remain subject to the separate assessment in the preceding paragraph.
I.2 Benefit and harm
168 I have found at [75]–[88] that the family business obtained a benefit from the lending, which I am unable to quantify net. Keo Automotive received $615,051.68 in interest under the Redirected Contracts (see [83]); the excess interest said to have been charged under the Keo Finance Contracts, the dispute about it, and Keo Automotive’s reliance upon its gross and net profit figures, are dealt with at [86]–[87]. For the reasons given at [129]–[134], which apply to Keo Automotive with equal force, I accept that the financial harm to consumers was modest, although the regulatory harm of dealing with an unlicensed provider remains.
I.3 Cooperation
169 Keo Automotive and Ken rely upon their compliance with ASIC’s notices, the admissions made at Ken’s compulsory examination without claiming privilege, and the early agreement to liability, which avoided a contested hearing (KAS [121]–[125]). Those matters are entitled to weight, for the reasons given at [137] in respect of Diamond Wheels, and there is no suggestion that Keo Automotive has previously been found to have engaged in similar conduct (KAS [126]). The undertakings of 16 February and 6 May 2024, by which Keo Automotive undertook not to receive payments taking a debtor’s aggregate payments above the principal borrowed (ABF [95]–[96]), are also to be weighed in its favour.
I.4 Course of conduct
170 Keo Automotive submits that its contraventions formed a single course of conduct, including the 7,668 acceptances of interest under the Keo Finance Contracts (KAS [127]–[138]). I approach that submission as I approached the similar submission for Diamond Wheels at [143]–[144]. The two streams were related through the family enterprise but are distinct and I have assessed them separately where their differing circumstances bear upon culpability (while ensuring that the penalty does not count the same wrongdoing twice).
171 The Referee’s findings must be considered with the qualifications described above. ASIC also contends that the condition of Keo Automotive’s financial statements, and Ken’s declarations upon them, disclose a disregard for governance which bears upon specific deterrence (AS [192], [236]). That the Referee found the initial financial information to be incomplete and inaccurate is a matter of concern, but, on the material before me, I am unable to attribute the deficiencies to any particular decision of Ken, and I give the point limited weight.
I.5 Capacity to pay, deterrence and fixing the penalty
172 Keo Automotive’s principal answer to ASIC’s case is that it cannot pay, and that contention is to be weighed as Section F.4 directs. ASIC accepted that it could not meet $9 million from its own resources (see [63] and [65]); I accept that a penalty of the order which I propose is beyond what it could meet immediately and unaided. That acceptance does not oblige me to reduce the penalty to a sum which the company could pay from its own balance sheet, because its lending was funded throughout by related entities and its contraventions were committed in the course of the one enterprise (see [53] and [57]–[58]), so that to measure the amount by focusing on a single component would reward the choice to conduct the lending through a company of modest means. Equally, since the evidence does not show that the apparent equity in the properties of the wider family group is accessible, or that any associated person would be willing to apply it to a penalty (see [47]–[51], [55] and [63]), I do not fix the amount upon the assumption that either is so.
173 The need for general deterrence is as strong where a company financed consumer sales without a licence as it is in the case of Diamond Wheels (see [141]). The need for specific deterrence is reduced, but not removed, by the matters weighed in Sections I.1 and I.3, because Ken remains in sole control of the company. I give the condition of the company’s financial statements only the limited weight explained at [171].
174 The penalty which I fix for Keo Automotive is higher than that fixed for Diamond Wheels, and the reasons for the difference lie in the extent and duration of its contraventions and in the part which it played in the lending. Its contraventions ran for more than four years, against the 14 months or so of Diamond Wheels’ penalty period, and were more numerous (see [27]–[28]); and Keo Automotive, whose sole manager I have inferred knew that the Redirected Contracts had been made unlawfully, received interest under the Redirected Contracts (see [168]), supplied the capital for and bore the credit risk of the Keo Finance Contracts, and continued to collect repayments after September 2023, beyond which the agreed belief in compliance did not extend.
175 Those features are offset only in part by the good faith which attended the making of the Keo Finance Contracts, by the modest financial harm to consumers, by the undertakings of 16 February and 6 May 2024 and by the cooperation of Keo Automotive and Ken, and they explain why a figure above that fixed for Diamond Wheels is warranted, while the same mitigating matters explain why I do not accept ASIC’s proposal of $9 million.
176 Having considered the separate streams of conduct, culpability, benefit, harm, cooperation, financial circumstances, parity and totality, I consider that a pecuniary penalty of $3.5 million is appropriate in respect of Keo Automotive’s contraventions.
177 As with Diamond Wheels, that figure is the product of an evaluative judgment and not of any calculation. I have also tested it against the following figures, which concern what Keo Automotive itself received as an unlicensed recipient of the return on the lending.
178 First, it received $615,051.68 in interest under the Redirected Contracts (see [83]), which represents interest receipts rather than repayment of principal.
179 Secondly, ASIC estimates the interest paid in excess of that permitted by the Code under the Keo Finance Contracts at $190,714, an estimate which Keo Automotive disputes, in part on the footing that only 23 of the 119 contracts yielded interest actually received in excess of what the Code would have allowed (see [86]).
180 Thirdly, Keo Automotive collected $1,987,275 in all under the Redirected Contracts (see [116]), a sum which includes the return of principal and which I mention only to show the scale of the dealings.
181 I add nothing to those figures for the margin on the vehicle sales which the lending enabled: that margin accrued to the dealerships and not to Keo Automotive; there is no evidence of what it was in respect of the Keo Finance Contracts (see [87]); and, so far as Diamond Wheels earned it on the contracts considered in Section H, I have weighed it once, in the penalty fixed for that company.
182 A penalty of $3.5 million is more than five and a half times the interest which Keo Automotive received under the Redirected Contracts, more than four times that interest and ASIC’s disputed estimate for the Keo Finance Contracts taken together, and about one and three-quarter times the whole of what it collected under the Redirected Contracts, so that it could not be regarded by Keo Automotive, or by anyone in a like position, as a cost of doing business.
183 I have fixed it at a figure $1 million above that for Diamond Wheels because of the matters identified at [174]: the four years and more over which the contraventions continued, the capital which Keo Automotive supplied and the credit risk which it bore under the Keo Finance Contracts, its collections after September 2023, and the knowledge of its sole manager that the Redirected Contracts were unlawful. The good faith which attended the making of the Keo Finance Contracts, the modest financial harm, the undertakings of 16 February and 6 May 2024, the cooperation of Keo Automotive and Ken, and the limits upon the company’s own capacity to pay explained at [172] restrain the figure and are the reasons why I do not go higher.
184 I am satisfied that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between this penalty and the penalties imposed upon Diamond Wheels and upon Ken, the differences between them being explicable by the matters addressed at [174], in Section F.5 and in Sections G and H.
185 Standing back and looking at the penalty which I propose against Keo Automotive, I am satisfied that the principle of totality does not require a different result. Keo Automotive proposed payment in two equal instalments, nine and 18 months after the making of the orders (KAS [142]). ASIC submits that, assuming financial support from associated entities and Ken, Keo Automotive could meet a $9 million penalty with an extension of time to pay (AS [205]). I defer the terms of payment so that the parties may be heard upon them once the amount is known.
J INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
186 Section 177(1) provides that, upon satisfaction of its specified conditions, “the court may grant an injunction on such terms as the court considers appropriate”.
187 The injunctions sought against Diamond Wheels and Keo Automotive are not opposed (DWS [7]; KAS [143]), and nor are the restraints which Ken accepts (KAS [143]–[146]). In light of the nature and duration of the contraventions, I am satisfied that each of those orders is appropriate.
188 The remaining question is the scope and duration of the restraint upon Ken’s participation in the provision of consumer credit. As to scope, Ken asks that the restraint be confined to credit regulated by the Act and the Code (KAS [144]–[146]); as to duration, ASIC, in the alternative to a permanent restraint, accepts that the Court may fix a period (ASIC’s proposed order 6(c)). A restraint reaching beyond the regulated consumer credit with which these reasons are concerned would go further than the protective purpose requires, and I would confine the injunction to the provision of, and involvement in, consumer credit regulated by the Act and the Code. Even so confined, a restraint of this kind is a serious one, and it must be justified by the risk of repetition and the protective purpose for which the power to grant an injunction exists.
189 I do not consider a permanent injunction to be necessary, and I would restrain Ken for a period of five years. ASIC relies upon Ken’s history of unlicensed lending, the deficiencies in his attempts to secure lawful authorisation, continued collections after he learned that the authorisation had ceased, and the financial-reporting matters already discussed (AS [235]–[236]). I have taken those matters into account, but, for the reasons given in Section I, I do not find them sufficient to establish the continuing risk which a permanent restraint would require.
190 Ken is 58 years old, and a restraint without limit of time would exclude him from an activity in which he might lawfully engage, were he to hold an appropriate licence, for the remainder of his working life, which would be unreasonable when the purpose of the injunction is protective and not punitive. His conduct also changed over time: whatever the origins of the lending, he took deliberate steps to make the arrangements compliant, and I have found that he acted in good faith in respect of the Keo Finance arrangements. Against those matters must be set his central involvement in the contraventions, the lengthy period over which they occurred and the need for protection against repetition, and I am satisfied that five years is sufficient to provide it.
K CONCLUSION
191 The orders of the Court will therefore impose pecuniary penalties of $750,000 upon Ken, $2.5 million upon Diamond Wheels and $3.5 million upon Keo Automotive, together with an injunction restraining Ken’s participation in the provision of consumer credit for five years, and the other injunctive and consequential relief reflected in the orders. I will hear the parties about the terms of payment, the form of the declarations and costs.
I certify that the preceding one-hundred-and-ninety-one (191) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Lee. |
Associate:
Dated: 17 November 2026