Federal Court of Australia
Goldmate Group Pty Ltd v Yang (Contempt) [2026] FCA 1733
File number(s): | NSD 503 of 2024 |
Judgment of: | LEE J |
Date of judgment: | 17 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | CONTEMPT OF COURT – disobedience of freezing orders – knowledge of orders – borrowed funds applied to expenses of corporate liquidations – extended definition of assets – distinction between right to borrow and control of loan proceeds – funds held in third-party trust account – ordinary and proper course of business exception – inference concerning unencumbered value of Australian assets – proof beyond reasonable doubt – Charges 2 and 3 proved – penalty and consequential relief reserved CONTEMPT OF COURT – alleged failure to produce documents in answer to notice to produce – amendment of charge – distinction between notice to produce and order requiring production – coercive effect of notice under Rules – amended Charge 4 not established and dismissed PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – bankruptcy of respondent and liquidation of companies – statutory stay of substantive claims – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 58(3)(b) – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 471B – whether leave required to pursue contempt application – leave granted – documents produced on subpoena – claim of legal professional privilege – whether determination of claim necessary |
Legislation: | Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 58(3)(b) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 471B Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 5.23(2)(a), 30.28 |
Cases cited: | Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 21; (2015) 256 CLR 375 DC Rd DC Pty Ltd v Zhang (No 3) [2024] FCA 221 Hillier v The Queen [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618 JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2015] UKSC 64 Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573 Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad [2011] FCA 1152; (2011) 198 FCR 1 Witham v Holloway [1995] HCA 3; (1995) 183 CLR 525 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | New South Wales |
National Practice Area: | Commercial and Corporations |
Sub-area: | Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance |
Number of paragraphs: | 65 |
Date of hearing: | 5 November 2026 |
Date of last submissions: | 11 November 2026 |
Counsel for the applicants: | Mr M R Pesman SC with Mr T Bors |
Solicitor for the applicants: | Colin Biggers & Paisley |
Counsel for the first respondent: | Mr E A Walker |
Solicitor for the first respondent: | Armstrong Legal |
Counsel for the second, sixth and seventh respondents: | Mr M Condon SC |
Solicitor for the second, sixth and seventh respondents: | SNA Lawyers Pty Ltd |
ORDERS
NSD 503 of 2024 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | GOLDMATE GROUP PTY LTD First Applicant GRM RIVERSTONE PTY LTD Second Applicant GOLDMATE PROPERTY RIVERSTONE NO 5 PTY LTD (and others named in the Schedule) Third Applicant | |
AND: | YUCHEN YANG First Respondent ANMING (ADAM) YANG Second Respondent BALMORAL STREET AGRI INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (and others named in the Schedule) Third Respondent | |
order made by: | LEE J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 17 November 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The hearing of the interlocutory application dated 13 July 2026 be adjourned to a date to be fixed for the making of declaratory relief and for the hearing of submissions as to the making of further orders as a consequence of the reasons for judgment.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEE J:
A INTRODUCTION
1 This judgment concerns an interlocutory application by the applicants seeking a finding that the first respondent, Mr Yuchen Yang, is guilty of contempt of Court by reason of his alleged disobedience of freezing orders made in this proceeding and his alleged deliberate refusal, or alternatively failure, to produce documents.
2 Following the finalisation of the resumed oral hearing on 5 November 2026, the applicants pursue three charges against the first respondent: Charge 2, concerning a payment of $22,000 in connexion with the liquidation of Balmoral Street Family Pty Ltd; Charge 3, concerning a payment of $5,500 in connexion with the liquidation of Dre Capital Pty Ltd; and Charge 4, concerning the allegation that he deliberately refused, or alternatively failed, to produce documents. The application against the second, sixth and seventh respondents has been dismissed. Accordingly, these reasons concern only the charges maintained against the first respondent.
3 The contempt application arises within a proceeding commenced in 2024 in which the applicants advance contested substantive claims against the first respondent and others. Those claims are not, of course, canvassed here. The present controversy concerns compliance with the Court’s orders. The consequences of the first respondent’s bankruptcy and the companies’ liquidations for the substantive proceeding are addressed in Section B.
4 It is trite that proceedings for contempt constituted by disobedience of an order made in civil proceedings remain proceedings in the civil jurisdiction, but the facts necessary to establish the contempt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; and although the distinction historically drawn between civil and criminal contempt survives for some purposes, it is, as the authorities make plain, in other respects an artificial one, disobedience of an order being ordinarily a civil contempt unless the conduct involves deliberate defiance or is contumacious: see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 and Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375.
5 More particularly, the applicants relied upon the familiar requirements that an order must have been made, that its terms be clear, unambiguous and capable of compliance, that service have occurred or be otherwise sufficiently dealt with, that the alleged contemnor have known of the order, and that there has been a breach of it; and they accepted, as they were bound to do, that the criminal standard of proof applies.
6 The mental element may be briefly stated. Where disobedience of an order is alleged, the applicants must establish that the respondent knew of the terms of the order and that he intentionally did the act said to infringe it, which is to say that he acted deliberately and with knowledge of the facts that rendered the act a breach, rather than accidentally or inadvertently. It is unnecessary to prove that he intended to defy the Court or appreciated that what he did contravened the order, a mistaken view of the legal effect of an order being no answer to liability although it may bear upon penalty; and deliberate defiance of that kind, which is the mark of contumacy, goes to the classification of the contempt and to the punishment to be imposed once it is established. Each of these matters must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and I have approached the evidence on that footing.
7 That standard assumes some importance in the present case, for there are aspects of the evidence from which fairly compelling inferences may be drawn and others in respect of which the Court is, in substance, invited to bridge a gap in proof, and the line between the two cannot be blurred merely because some features of the broader factual history may invite a measure of scepticism. Any intermediate findings of fact I make below are made with the requisite standard of proof in mind.
8 For the reasons which follow, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Charges 2 and 3 against the first respondent are proved. Charge 4 has not been established and must be dismissed. The application will stand over for the making of declaratory relief and for submissions concerning penalty, costs and any other consequential orders.
B BACKGROUND
9 The substantive proceeding was commenced in 2024. The applicants’ case, in summary, is that after their evidence in chief had been served in July 2025, activities occurred which had the effect of extracting the available equity from five properties, four of which had been sold by November 2025, and that they first became aware of these matters in April 2026, whereupon they sought asset-preservation relief. The explanation advanced by the respondents in May 2026 was associated with a fruit-trading venture: the first respondent had caused RX Square Pty Ltd (formerly RX Capital Pty Ltd) and Dre Capital Pty Ltd to borrow substantial sums, secured over residential properties owned by him and his wife; $4.2 million had been paid in connexion with the fruit-trading arrangement by 14 July 2025; the arrangement had ceased by late July 2025; and properties were thereafter sold, or sought to be sold, to repay the lenders. Those accounts explain the circumstances in which the Freezing Orders were sought.
10 On 1 May 2026, freezing orders were made by consent against, among others, the first respondent (Freezing Orders). On 21 May 2026, their operation was extended until 4.15 pm on 15 June 2026. The first respondent was represented by counsel and solicitors when the original orders were made and was himself present in Court on 21 May when they were extended, and no issue was ultimately advanced that he lacked knowledge of the Freezing Orders so far as concerns Charges 2 and 3. No contention was advanced that the terms of the Freezing Orders were uncertain or incapable of compliance, or that they had not been brought to the first respondent’s attention.
11 The Freezing Orders relevantly restrained the first respondent from removing from Australia, disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of his Australian assets up to an unencumbered value of $2,516,162, and for that purpose assets extended to any asset which he had the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were his own, including where a third party held or controlled the asset in accordance with his direct or indirect instructions.
12 Charges 2 and 3 each allege that the first respondent disobeyed Order 2 of the orders made by me on 1 May 2026, as extended and varied on 21 May 2026, whereas the particulars to each charge identify the orders made by consent on 1 May 2026 as Orders 6, 7 and 10 to 12 set out in the penal notice annexed to the interlocutory application dated 29 April 2026, which together are defined in the particulars as the Freezing Orders. It is evident from the terms of each charge, which turns upon the unencumbered value of the first respondent’s Australian assets in relation to the Relevant Amount of $2,516,162, that the order said to have been disobeyed is the restraint upon disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of those assets, and that the other orders identified in the particulars are those which define the assets caught by that restraint and its exceptions. The difference in the numbering was not the subject of any submission, no contention was advanced that the first respondent was uncertain as to the order upon which the applicants relied, and nothing suggests that he was prejudiced in meeting the charges by it. Because the contempt alleged is penal, however, I record that I have treated each of Charges 2 and 3 as alleging disobedience of that restraint, as contained in the orders made on 1 May 2026 and extended and varied on 21 May 2026.
13 On 27 May 2026, loan agreements were entered into with four lenders for $20,000, $25,000, $2,000 and $2,000 respectively; a further $500 was paid on 28 May; and the monies, totalling $49,500, were paid into the trust account of Byrons Recovery (Byrons), the liquidators of the companies referred to below.
14 The first respondent was a borrower under each of the loan agreements, executed copies of which are in evidence. Clause 2.2 permitted advances directly to nominated liquidators, trustees or professional advisers, or to nominated accounts. The borrowers’ repayment obligations were joint and several. The relevant question is not whether the first respondent’s ability to incur further indebtedness was itself a frozen asset, but whether the proceeds were subject to his direct or indirect control and whether he dealt with them in a manner prohibited by the Freezing Orders.
15 On 3 June 2026, the respondents and the lenders gave Byrons authority concerning the disposition of the $49,500 held in trust, of which $22,000 was to go in connexion with Balmoral Street Family Pty Ltd and $5,500 in relation to Dre Capital Pty Ltd, and the banking records subsequently recorded transfers of those sums to Mr Desmond Wei Liang Teng of Byrons, as liquidator of each of those companies. The companies concerned had been placed in liquidation on 27 May 2026, Byrons being appointed liquidator, and within days of the transfers, which the charges allege were made on or about 4 June 2026, the first respondent became bankrupt, trustees being appointed on 9 June 2026.
16 There had also been substantial argument on 21 May 2026 about a notice to produce. The applicants allege that on that day the Court made a specific order requiring production of specified documents and that no documents were produced on 3 June 2026 or subsequently. As will appear, the existence and terms of the order said to have been disobeyed became the decisive question on Charge 4.
17 The interlocutory application dated 13 July 2026 was accompanied by a statement containing four charges. Charge 1 did not name the first respondent. As noted above, the applicants’ revised submissions make clear that the case now advanced is confined to Charges 2, 3 and 4 against the first respondent.
18 The bankruptcy of the first respondent and the liquidation of the companies bear upon this litigation in two ways.
19 The first concerns the substantive claims. By s 58(3)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), after a debtor has become a bankrupt it is not competent for a creditor, except with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court thinks fit, to commence any legal proceeding in respect of a provable debt or take any fresh step in such a proceeding, so that the applicants’ claims against the first respondent, to the extent that they are claims in respect of a provable debt, are stayed unless and until leave is given; and, in so far as any respondent is a company being wound up in insolvency, s 471B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that a person cannot begin or proceed with a proceeding in a court against the company or in relation to its property except with the leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms (if any) as the Court imposes. No leave to proceed with the substantive case has been sought.
20 The second concerns the contempt application, which does not seek to establish or enforce a debt but invokes the authority of the Court to punish disobedience of its own orders. For the avoidance of doubt, to the extent that leave under s 58(3)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act is required in order to pursue the present application, I grant it, given the purpose of the application, which is to vindicate the authority of the Court by seeking to secure obedience to orders which it has made, and not to advance a claim in respect of a provable debt. Nothing in these reasons lifts any stay upon, or expresses any view about the merits of, the substantive claims.
21 Documents produced by the respondents’ former solicitors were marked for identification as MFI 1 and were the subject of the first respondent’s claim of legal professional privilege. I have not relied upon those documents in determining the charges against him. It is therefore unnecessary to determine the privilege claim for the purposes of this judgment.
C THE CHARGES AND THE WAY THE CASE DEVELOPED
22 At the hearing, the first respondent initially took a pleading point arising from the collective references to several respondents in Charges 2 and 3. That objection was not maintained, and leave to amend was given.
23 Once that point had fallen away, the substantive resistance to Charges 2 and 3 resolved itself into three propositions, which the Court summarised in argument and which counsel for the first respondent accepted accurately reflected the entirety of his defence case. First, it was said that the evidence did not establish the transfers alleged in the charges as transfers to Mr Desmond Wei Liang Teng, a liquidator of Byrons Recovery and the person named in the charges as the transferee, because the money was paid through the Byrons trust account and ultimately to the companies. Secondly, if there was a relevant dealing, it was said to fall within the ordinary-and-proper-course-of-business exception to the Freezing Orders. Thirdly, it was submitted that there was no evidence proving that, as at the time of the impugned dealings, the unencumbered value of the first respondent’s Australian assets was less than $2,516,162.
24 Those propositions can conveniently be dealt with in turn, after which I will turn to Charge 4, which stands in a different position.
D CHARGES 2 AND 3
D.1 The character of the payments
25 I am unable to accept the first of the submissions. Each of Charges 2 and 3 alleges that the first respondent intentionally caused the transfer of the sum in question to Mr Teng, as liquidator of the relevant company. The particulars describe the conduct in Charge 2 as a direction that money be paid to Mr Teng and, in Charge 3, as the payment of the money to him, but the act charged is in each case the causing of the transfer, and it is that act which the applicants were required to prove. The evidence identified the payments into the Byrons trust account, the direction dated 3 June 2026, and the subsequent transfers of $22,000 (the subject of Charge 2) and $5,500 (the subject of Charge 3). A person who, by participating in a direction to the holder of funds, causes them to be paid to another causes the transfer, whether or not the money passes through his own hands; and the circumstance that the monies passed through a trust account before their ultimate application does not answer the applicants’ case, the more especially because the first respondent’s own account of the transaction involved an anterior payment to the trust account followed by a direction concerning the use of those funds.
26 The extended definition is important. The Freezing Orders applied to assets which the first respondent had power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if they were his own, including assets held or controlled by a third party in accordance with his instructions. Legal or beneficial ownership was therefore not the only relevant inquiry.
27 In their supplementary submissions, the applicants drew attention to JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2015] UKSC 64. The distinction between a right to draw down a loan and control of its proceeds is explained by Lord Clarke, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr and Lord Hodge agreed (at [38]–[39]):
38 None of the cases relied upon by the Bank seems to me to support its case in so far as it relies upon the standard form of freezing order. The authorities do not support the proposition that the respondent's right to draw down the loans was an asset within the meaning of the freezing orders as originally drafted. While it would be open to this court to reverse those decisions, I do not think that it would be appropriate to do so. They have stood for many years and have been accepted both by the courts and the legal writers. Clarity is important and so is certainty in the context of penal orders. I would therefore answer the question posed by issue 1 in the statement of facts and issues in the negative. I would hold that the respondent's right to draw down under the Loan Agreements does not qualify as an 'asset' within the meaning of the Freezing Order if it is construed without reference to the extended definition in the second sentence of para 5. If that is correct, I do not think that anything the respondent had done amounts to disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of 'assets' as that word has been construed in the original forms of freezing injunction; that is without reference to the extended definition in the second sentence of para 5. I would therefore also answer the question posed by issue 2 in the negative. It follows that I would dismiss the Bank's appeal on those issues.
39 I have however reached a different conclusion on issue 3. The position seems to me to be different in the more recent forms, which were used in this case and in Solodchenko. I would hold that the proceeds of the Loan Agreements were 'assets' within the meaning of the extended definition in para 5 of the Freezing Order in this case and would allow the appeal on this ground. For convenience I repeat para 5, which I have already set out in para [4], above. It reads:
'5. Paragraph 4 applies to all the respondents' assets whether or not they are in their own name and whether they are solely or jointly owned and whether or not the respondent asserts a beneficial interest in them. For the purpose of this Order the respondents' assets include any asset which they have power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of, or deal with as if it were their own. The respondents are to be regarded as having such power if a third party holds or controls the assets in accordance with their direct or indirect instructions.'
28 The significance of that distinction here is that the inquiry concerns the first respondent’s control of the loan proceeds, rather than whether his right to borrow was itself an asset caught by the Freezing Orders.
29 The interposition of a trust account does not, by itself, answer that inquiry. Nor does the fact that the money was ultimately applied for a company’s benefit. What must be established is the first respondent’s power over the particular funds and his participation in the direction by which they were applied. The loan agreements and the written authority of 3 June 2026 must be considered together for that purpose.
30 Applying those principles, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the first respondent had power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with the proceeds of the loans as if they were his own. He was a borrower under each of the loan agreements, as the executed copies in evidence establish, and was jointly and severally liable for repayment; the monies were advanced, in accordance with cl 2.2, to the trust account of Byrons, a third party which held them in accordance with the directions of the borrowers; and the authority of 3 June 2026, by which the application of $22,000 and $5,500 to the liquidations of Balmoral Street Family Pty Ltd and Dre Capital Pty Ltd respectively was directed, was given by the respondents, of whom the first respondent was one, together with the lenders. By that authority he participated in directing the manner in which the funds were applied, and the banking records show that transfers in those amounts were thereafter made to Mr Teng, as liquidator of the respective companies, on or about 4 June 2026, as the charges allege. In so participating, he intentionally caused those transfers, which is the act charged in each case.
31 I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the relevant dealings occurred and that the first respondent intentionally caused them, and the first answer to Charges 2 and 3 therefore lacks substance.
D.2 The ordinary and proper course of business exception
32 The second argument relied upon the exception permitting the first respondent to deal with assets in the ordinary and proper course of business, including by the payment of business expenses bona fide and properly incurred. Counsel relied upon DC Rd DC Pty Ltd v Zhang (No 3) [2024] FCA 221 and, in particular, the proposition that a transaction need not be commonplace to fall within the ordinary course of a business, an exceptional or even unprecedented transaction being capable, in some circumstances, of answering that description.
33 A transaction need not be routine to occur in the ordinary and proper course of business. The question remains whether the particular dealing answers that description in the business relevant to the exception. The fact that the expenditure funded a company’s liquidation neither establishes nor necessarily excludes the exception. Its purpose and relationship to the first respondent’s business must be examined.
34 The charge is laid against the first respondent, and it is plain that the relevant dealing is his dealing with an asset over which he had the requisite power. The purpose for which the money was directed was the funding of the external administrations of companies and, as the applicants submitted, even if the funding of liquidation expenses could be described as occurring in the ordinary and proper course of the affairs of those companies, it does not follow that it was a dealing in the ordinary and proper course of the first respondent’s business.
35 The legal burden of establishing each element of the contempt beyond reasonable doubt rests upon the applicants from first to last and does not shift to the first respondent; but a respondent who contends that a dealing fell within an exception to the Freezing Orders must point to some evidence, whether emanating from his own case or from that of the applicants, which gives the contention a footing in the facts, whereupon it falls to the applicants to negative the exception beyond reasonable doubt. It is unnecessary to decide whether the exception is better characterised as a matter of defence or as a qualification upon the scope of the restraint, because on either footing the question is whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that his own dealing was one made in the ordinary and proper course of his business, or was the payment of a business expense bona fide and properly incurred by him. I am so satisfied, for there is no evidence of any kind from which it could be thought that the exception applied to him, the point having been advanced as an argument about the character of the banking and liquidation transactions, and a submission of that kind cannot supply a factual foundation which the evidence does not provide.
36 There is accordingly no reasonable possibility that the ordinary-course exception was engaged.
D.3 The $2,516,162 threshold
37 The question is whether, as at 4 June 2026, the unencumbered value of the first respondent’s Australian assets was less than $2,516,162. That is the condition pleaded in each charge, which the applicants were required to prove beyond reasonable doubt. Charge 2 expressly pleads the value “as at 4 June 2026”. The charging paragraph of Charge 3 omits those words, but it alleges a payment made on or about 4 June 2026, and the particulars plead the condition as one existing when that payment was made. The two payments are alleged to have occurred on the same date, and I have therefore treated 4 June 2026 as the relevant date under each charge. That question is not answered by the fact of his subsequent bankruptcy alone. It requires consideration of the contemporaneous financial evidence and the sequence of events preceding the dealings.
38 In his affidavit affirmed on 14 May 2026, the first respondent described the failure of the anticipated receipts from the fruit-trading venture and the consequent inability to repay the short-term facilities from that source (at [28]–[31]). He identified net proceeds of $2,645,153.47, $2,248,324.18, $50,112.77 and $578,339.56 from property sales, which he said were applied towards repayment of the lenders (at [33], [38], [41], [45]). He further stated that the remaining property had not been sold and that approximately $2.36 million remained owing to the relevant lender as at 1 May 2026, with interest accruing at 42% per annum (at [49]–[51]). There was no evidence of the value of the remaining property, but on the first respondent’s own account the proceeds of the other sales had been consumed in repaying the lenders, a very large indebtedness remained, and interest was accruing upon it at that extraordinary rate. If the whole of that indebtedness was secured upon the remaining property, its value would have had to exceed approximately $4.88 million (the $2.36 million owing, together with the $2,516,162 of the restraint) before the unencumbered value of the first respondent’s Australian assets could reach the threshold, even if no other liability were taken into account, and, the property having been held with his wife, only his share of any surplus could be counted; and no other asset of any substance was identified in the evidence. This was evidence of the realisation of property equity and its application to substantial secured indebtedness, not merely a general assertion of difficulty meeting current expenses.
39 The loan documentation provides a further contemporaneous acknowledgment. Clause 1.2 of the executed agreements, to which the first respondent was a party as a borrower, recorded that the borrowers, including him, were experiencing financial distress and required short-term funding assistance. That statement was made on 27 May 2026, before the dealings charged, and I treat it as his own acknowledgment of his position at that time. The funds were obtained to meet the expenses of external administrations. The impugned directions followed on 3 June 2026, and trustees of the first respondent’s bankrupt estate were appointed on 9 June 2026, as recorded in the affidavit of James Andrew Neal sworn on 13 July 2026 (at [23]). The proximity of those events is relevant when considered with the first respondent’s own account of the preceding disposals and indebtedness.
40 I have also considered the limitations of the corporate insolvency material. The report concerning the fifth respondent recorded $197.62 in an identified bank account, but described its total estimated assets and overall surplus or deficiency as unknown. It recorded a claimed related-party debt of $2.61 million to the first and sixth respondents, without adjudicating that claim. I do not treat the report as a valuation of the first respondent’s personal assets, assume that the claimed debt was recoverable at face value, or assume that it was worthless. Those qualifications form part of the evidence to be assessed, rather than matters to be disregarded.
41 Considering the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, as at 4 June 2026, the unencumbered value of the first respondent’s Australian assets was less than $2,516,162. That conclusion is one of irresistible inference, and I have drawn it only because, having regard to the combined effect of his account of the property disposals and application of their proceeds, the substantial secured indebtedness remaining, the contemporaneous acknowledgment of financial distress, and the closely following liquidations and bankruptcy, it is the only reasonable inference open on the evidence, no reasonable hypothesis consistent with the absence of a breach remaining: see Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 and Hillier v The Queen (2007) 228 CLR 618.
42 I have taken into account the debt of $2.61 million claimed by the first and sixth respondents against the fifth respondent. The onus remains upon the applicants throughout, and I do not reason from the absence of evidence of recoverability as though it were for the first respondent to establish that the claim had value. My conclusion rests upon matters which appear affirmatively from the evidence. The claim is advanced jointly by the first and sixth respondents, so that, whatever its worth, only the first respondent’s share could be counted among his assets. It is a related-party claim against a company in liquidation, which has not been adjudicated, and the only affirmative evidence of that company’s assets is the liquidators’ report, which records $197.62 in an identified bank account and describes its total estimated assets, and any surplus or deficiency, as unknown.
43 For the same reasons, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the first respondent knew, when he participated in the impugned dealings, that the unencumbered value of his Australian assets was less than that sum, so that what he did was done with knowledge of the facts which made it a breach of the Freezing Orders; his own account of the disposals and of the indebtedness which remained was the foundation of that knowledge, and nothing in the evidence suggests that he laboured under any mistaken belief to the contrary. I have considered all the evidence in reaching that conclusion and I do not use the first respondent’s decision not to give evidence to supply any deficiency in the applicants’ proof.
D.4 Other matters and conclusion on Charges 2 and 3
44 The particulars to each of Charges 2 and 3 identify that the dealing was in breach of the Freezing Orders, that it was not of a type within the exceptions to them, and that it was not consented to by the applicants; and they further allege that it was made for the purpose of, or alternatively had the effect of, disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the first respondent’s Australian assets at a time when their unencumbered value was less than $2,516,162. The only exception upon which the first respondent relied was the ordinary and proper course of business exception, which I have rejected, and no contention was advanced that the applicants had consented to either dealing, nor does anything in the evidence suggest that they did. As to the remaining matter, purpose and effect are pleaded in the alternative, so that it is sufficient if the effect is made out. The funds applied in each case were, for the reasons given in Section D.1, assets of the first respondent within the extended definition, and their application, by a direction in which he participated, in payment to Mr Teng as liquidator was a disposal of those assets, the effect of which was to deal with and to diminish them at a time when, as I have found, their unencumbered value stood below the amount of the restraint. Because that effect is established, it is unnecessary to make any finding about the purpose with which the first respondent acted, and I make none.
45 The final particular in each charge alleges that the deliberate disobedience of the Freezing Orders was for the purpose of, or alternatively had the effect of, interfering with the effective administration of justice. Here again the alternatives are pleaded disjunctively, and it is the effect which is decisive. A freezing order is made to prevent the frustration of the Court’s processes by preserving, pending the determination of the claims made, the position of assets which may be available to satisfy any judgment; and the deliberate disobedience of such an order, by dealing with assets which it restrains, has of necessity the effect of impeding the capacity of the Court to do justice between the parties, as has the deliberate disobedience of any order of the Court. I am accordingly satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct the subject of Charges 2 and 3 had that effect. That finding follows from the character of the order and of the conduct, and it says nothing about whether the first respondent acted with defiant intent, which goes to whether the contempt is contumacious and is a matter reserved for the hearing on penalty (see Section E).
46 For the reasons given above, Charges 2 and 3 are proved.
E DELIBERATE DISOBEDIENCE AND CONTUMACY
47 The applicants went further and submitted that the conduct should be described as contumacious. They relied upon communications said to concern the use of loan agreements in the face of the Freezing Orders and upon material referred to as the respondents’ “Litigation Containment Objectives”, from which they submitted that the payments represented deliberate steps forming part of a preconceived plan to frustrate the litigation after assets had been moved offshore.
48 I am satisfied that the conduct constituting Charges 2 and 3 was deliberate rather than inadvertent. The transactions involved documented borrowing arrangements and a written authority concerning the destination of the funds, and occurred while the first respondent knew of the Freezing Orders. Although my preliminary view, without the benefit of submissions directed to that question, is that in all the circumstances the conduct should not be characterised as contumacious, whether it was, and the significance of that characterisation for penalty, will be considered after the parties have been heard. No question of punishment is determined in these reasons.
F CHARGE 4: NON-PRODUCTION
49 Charge 4 is of a different character. There had been substantial argument before me on 21 May 2026 about a notice to produce, and the applicants’ later version of events was that the notice had originally required production on 21 May and that objections to categories were argued. What was intended thereafter, as I thought I had made plain, was that the Court make an order requiring production in terms of documents referred to in an amended notice by 3 June.
50 What was intended and what the sealed order (proposed by the applicants) ultimately recorded were, however, different things. That became apparent during the hearing on 5 November 2026, when I observed that what I had said on 21 May was that, rather than remit matters through the ordinary process of making a notice returnable and requiring it to be called upon, a specific order for production should be made (whereas the order which was subsequently taken out did not reflect that intention and instead made the notice to produce returnable before a Registrar).
51 The distinction is not a mere technicality where contempt is alleged. A person may be punished only for disobedience of an order whose operative terms impose the obligation said to have been breached; the order must be clear and unambiguous and capable of compliance; the proper construction of the order is a question of law; and the facts constituting the contempt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
52 What the Court intended on 21 May cannot of itself alter the order which was in fact entered, whatever power may exist to correct an order which does not reflect the Court’s intention in accordance with the usual principles. The point was squarely identified during argument, when I observed that the operative order merely fixed a return date and that the obligation to produce under the notice became extant once the notice was called upon and, more importantly, that the then charge alleged an obligation arising “in accordance with” the order made on 21 May when that order did not itself say what the charge attributed to it.
53 The applicants then sought leave to amend Charge 4. The first respondent initially objected but withdrew that objection, and leave was ultimately given to amend.
54 The amendment removes the allegation that the obligation to produce arose under Order 1 of 21 May 2026. Charge 4 must therefore be considered as an allegation of failure to produce documents in answer to the notice to produce. The deficiency in the entered order does not, by itself, dispose of that amended allegation.
55 The notice imposed an obligation to produce under r 30.28 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), for, where a notice specifies a date for production and is served five days or more before that date, r 30.28(3) provides that the party served “must produce the document or thing in accordance with the notice, without the need for a subpoena for production”. That obligation must nonetheless be distinguished from an order of the Court directing production. The Rules themselves prescribe what follows from a failure to comply: the party serving the notice may lead secondary evidence of the contents or nature of the document or thing (r 30.28(2)), and a note to the rule records that a party who fails to comply may be liable to pay any costs incurred because of the failure.
56 The contempt alleged is a penal one, and I am not persuaded that the existence of an obligation under the Rules, however firmly expressed, carries with it, without more, liability to be punished for contempt, when the Rules provide their own consequences for default and it was open to the applicants to obtain a proper sealed order of the Court compelling production, disobedience of which would have supplied a clear foundation for a charge: see rr 1.32 and 5.23(2)(a). The amendment changes the source of the obligation relied upon; but it does not establish disobedience of a court order. Non-compliance may attract the procedural consequences provided by the Rules, but, for the reasons given in the following paragraphs, Charge 4, as amended, has not been established.
57 The applicants’ supplementary submissions fairly accept an important part of this distinction. They refer to Suzlon Energy Ltd v Bangad [2011] FCA 1152; (2011) 198 FCR 1 (at 6 [13]–[14] per Rares J), which explains that a notice to produce is not itself a subpoena or an order of the Court, although r 30.28 of the Rules gives it coercive force, non-compliance constituting a default capable of attracting substantial procedural consequences. It may be said, on the strength of the observation in that case that a notice to produce has the same coercive effect as a subpoena, that non-compliance with a notice should be treated as a contempt in the same way as disobedience of a subpoena, which is process of the Court. But similarity in coercive effect, however close, neither supplies the order which Charge 4 originally attributed to 21 May nor relieves the applicants of the need to prove beyond reasonable doubt a contempt of the kind, and in the circumstances, charged; and, for the reasons given in the paragraphs which follow, they have not done so.
58 The applicants seek to meet the difficulty by describing what occurred on 21 May as the making of an order under r 5.23(2)(a) of the Rules requiring compliance with the amended notice by 3 June, but I cannot accept that description consistently with the form of the operative order. There is no doubt that the first respondent was aware of the notice and, on the applicants’ case, that it was called upon and that production did not occur, and I do not doubt that non-compliance with a notice to produce may attract procedural consequences under the Rules; but those propositions, even when taken together, do not establish the contempt charged.
59 There is, moreover, a difficulty of a more elementary kind, which would prevent me from finding Charge 4 proved even if I were wrong about the legal character of the obligation upon which the applicants now rely. To establish the charge in its amended form, the applicants must satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt of far more than that a notice to produce was served and that documents were not forthcoming: they must show that the notice was in fact called upon in such a way as to render the obligation to produce extant at a particular time; that the documents described in the amended notice were within the first respondent’s possession, custody or power; that they were not produced when production was required of him; and that his failure to produce them was a deliberate refusal or, alternatively, a failure for which he is properly answerable. The particulars to the charge do not leave the first of those matters at large. They identify that on 3 June 2026 Registrar White adjourned the notice to 10 June 2026; that on 5 June 2026 the applicants’ solicitors informed the respondents by email and text message that the notice had been called upon at the hearing on 3 June 2026 and adjourned, attaching the orders made on that day; and that on 10 June 2026 Registrar Young adjourned the notice to 15 June 2026.
60 I have considered those particulars and the evidence relied upon to prove them. They show, at their highest, that the notice came before the Registrars on 3 and 10 June 2026 and was adjourned on each occasion. I was taken to no transcript as to what was said and done on either occasion, by whom, or in what terms the notice was called upon: an order adjourning a notice to produce is not, without more, proof that production was then required of the first respondent, and a statement by the applicants’ solicitors, made two days afterwards, that the notice had been called upon is, without more, a less than complete record about what occurred before the Registrar. Upon each of the matters which I have identified the evidence therefore leaves me in doubt, because what occurred before the Registrars, to whom the notice was made returnable, is on the material before me opaque. I do not know, with the confidence which a finding of contempt demands, what was said on either of the return dates, whether and in what terms the notice was called upon, what directions or indications (if any) the Registrars gave, or what the first respondent, or those then acting for him, understood to be required of him in consequence.
61 That obscurity bears with particular force upon the mental element. Whether the charge be put as a deliberate refusal or as a mere failure to produce, it is necessary to know what the first respondent knew of the obligation said to have been imposed upon him and what he did, or omitted to do, in response to it; and upon those questions the evidence leaves me simply unsure. I accept that he was aware of the notice, but from that awareness, and from the bare circumstance that production did not occur, I am asked to infer that he knew production was then required of him, that he held the documents or had the means of obtaining them, and that he chose to withhold them. Nor can I draw the inference as to possession, custody or power for the whole of the period charged, which is expressed to continue “at all material times after 3 June 2026”: on 9 June 2026 the first respondent became bankrupt and his property vested in his trustees by operation of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and what documents remained within his possession, custody or power after that date is not a matter which can be inferred from the bare fact of non-production. Inferences of that kind might be open upon a fuller record; on this one they are not the only reasonable inferences available, and I cannot bridge the gap by suspicion, however much other features of the broader history may invite scepticism. There are accordingly a number of facts of which I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt before Charge 4 can be made out and of which I am not satisfied, and the doubt which results must be resolved in the first respondent’s favour.
62 It is perhaps understandable that the applicants brought this charge, for the first respondent’s production in answer to compulsory process has been less than satisfactory, but the contempt charged has not been proved.
63 Charge 4 fails in its amended form.
G DISPOSITION
64 For these reasons, I find Charges 2 and 3 against the first respondent proved beyond reasonable doubt. Charge 4 has not been proved and is dismissed.
65 The hearing of the interlocutory application will be adjourned to a date to be fixed for the making of declaratory relief giving effect to those findings and for submissions concerning penalty, costs and any other consequential orders.
I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Lee. |
Associate:
Dated: 17 November 2026
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
NSD 503 of 2024 | |
Applicants | |
Fourth Applicant: | GMR INVESTMENT NO 4 PTY LTD |
Fifth Applicant: | GOLDMATE PROPERTY BOX HILL NO 5 PTY LTD |
Sixth Applicant: | GOLDMATE PROPERTY BOX HILL NO 6 PTY LTD |
Seventh Applicant: | GOLDMATE PROPERTY PTY LTD |
Eighth Applicant: | GMR BOX HILL 02 PTY LTD |
Ninth Applicant: | GOLDMATE PROPERTY LUDDENHAM NO.1 PTY LTD |
Tenth Applicant: | GMR RIVERSTONE 02 PTY LTD |
Respondents | |
Fourth Respondent: | BALMORAL STREET FAMILY PTY LTD |
Fifth Respondent: | RX CAPITAL (NOW RX SQUARE) PTY LTD |
Sixth Respondent: | LIJUE WANG |
Seventh Respondent: | XIN GU |