Federal Court of Australia
Palmer v Hartmann (Costs) [2026] FCA 1731
File number(s): | VID 1440 of 2025 |
Judgment of: | HILL J |
Date of judgment: | 16 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | COSTS – assessing the appropriate quantum of lump sum costs – originating application and statement of claim filed alleging misfeasance in public office by respondent – respondent applied for statement of claim to be struck out, and filed material in support – applicants discontinued the proceeding without filing further material – 70% of actual costs ordered |
Legislation: | Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 40.02(b) |
Cases cited: | Bitek Pty Ltd v IConnect Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 506; (2012) 290 ALR 288 Coshott v Burke (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 81 Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke (No 3) [2017] FCA 693 Palmer v Shipton [2026] FCAFC 90 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Victoria |
National Practice Area: | Other Federal Jurisdiction |
Number of paragraphs: | 12 |
Date of last submission/s: | 24 July 2026 |
Date of hearing: | Determined on the papers |
Solicitor for the Applicants: | Robinson Nielsen Legal |
Solicitor for the Respondent: | Norton Rose Fulbright |
ORDERS
VID 1440 of 2025 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | CLIVE FREDERICK PALMER First Applicant PALMER LEISURE COOLUM PTY LTD Second Applicant | |
AND: | RASHPAL HARTMANN Respondent | |
order made by: | HILL J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 16 November 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The Applicants pay the legal costs of the Respondent, fixed in the sum of $61,296.74.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HILL J:
Introduction
1 The only remaining issue in this proceeding is to determine the amount of costs that the Applicants are liable to pay the Respondent.
In October 2025, the Applicants brought these proceedings against the Respondent, an officer in the internal legal services division of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), alleging misfeasance in public office.
In December 2025, the Respondent applied to have the statement of claim struck out. The Respondent filed two affidavits and written submissions in support of the strike-out application. The Applicants did not file any materials in response and, on 31 March 2026, lodged a notice of discontinuance.
On 19 June 2026, I made consent orders pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that the Respondent’s costs be determined and paid in a lump sum, and that the quantum be determined on the papers.
2 For the following reasons, the Applicants are to pay a fixed sum of $61,296.74.
3 Materials: The Respondent relies on an affidavit of Peter Cash, her solicitor, affirmed on 3 July 2026. The Applicants rely on an affidavit of Tracey Robinson, their solicitor, sworn on 24 July 2026. Each side has filed short written submissions.
consideration
4 Rules r 40.02 (lump sum costs): Rule 40.02(b) provides that a party who is entitled to costs may apply to the Court for an order that costs be awarded in a lump sum. The intention of the lump-sum costs procedure is to streamline and expedite the determination or resolution of the quantum of costs question and not to replicate the taxation process: see Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) (25 October 2016) at [4.11].
5 In Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke (No 3) [2017] FCA 693 at [60], Markovic J stated that the Court in making a lump sum costs order is “not required to undertake a line by line analysis of the costs claimed”, and that a “broad brush approach” should be taken. On appeal, the Full Court confirmed that the primary judge was not required to go through each claimed cost in determining whether the sum was reasonable, because that would defeat the purpose of a lump sum costs procedure: Coshott v Burke (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 81 at [27].
6 Respondent’s position: Here, the Cash affidavit provides a summary of the work done by the Respondent’s solicitors (which totals $68,892.45), and records that counsels’ fees total $17,380.52. Mr Cash deposes that the Respondent is not entitled to claim input tax credits in respect of any GST relevant to the costs claims, so these costs may include at least some Goods and Services Tax (GST): see GPN-COSTS at [6.6]. In addition, the Respondent incurred other disbursements (court fees, transcript and database hosting) of $1,293.80. The total costs actually incurred was $87,566.77.
7 The Respondent seeks a lump sum of $80,677.77, a discount of 10% from total actual costs. Mr Cash states that generally the taxation of costs results in an amount that is approximately 70% of costs, but in this case the rates charged by the Respondent’s solicitors and counsel were very substantially less than the rates charged to their commercial clients.
8 Applicants’ position: Ms Robinson in her affidavit states that, in her experience, generally two-thirds of actual costs are allowed in costs awarded on a party-party basis. She states that, in her opinion, the amount of costs otherwise claimed by the Respondent for solicitors’ work is excessive, because the hours claimed are unreasonable and because some of the work done duplicated work performed by counsel. Ms Robinson objects to a number of other costs claimed (such as the cost of database hosting), and states that, in her experience, the costs of multiple counsel are not recoverable for a matter that has not proceeded to trial. The Applicants contend that the Respondent should only be entitled to recover $38,464.
9 Decision – 70% of actual costs should be awarded: The Applicants are correct that the order made is for party-party costs, whereas the amount claimed by the Respondent is close to indemnity costs. The lower rates charged for government clients is not a reason to take any different approach to discounting actual costs: on the Respondent’s argument, presumably she would have been entitled to recover more than actual costs if I had awarded indemnity costs. That cannot possibly be correct.
10 On the other hand, the Applicants’ objections merely quibble with particular items in the Respondent’s evidence. The figure proposed by the Applicants is less than half (around 44%) of actual costs incurred. As noted, the Court takes a broad brush approach in assessing the appropriate quantum of a lump sum costs order. I am satisfied that the costs incurred by the Respondent was proportionate and reasonable to the nature and complexity of the case: see Bitek Pty Ltd v IConnect Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 506; (2012) 290 ALR 288 at [18] (Kenny J). The Respondent was presented with a complex, convoluted statement of claim that made serious allegations against her. It was necessary to distil the Respondent’s objections in an affidavit and written submissions, and to prepare an affidavit and brief counsel to have the strike-out application determined before the filing of a defence, over the Applicants’ objection. Although the Applicants then discontinued the proceeding without filing any further material, that was not known at the time these costs were incurred by the Respondent.
11 I would therefore apply the standard party-party discount to the actual costs incurred. I would prefer Mr Cash’s slightly higher figure of 70% over Ms Robinson’s figure of 66%, given that this is not the first unsuccessful attempt by Mr Palmer to bring claims of misfeasance in public office against officers of ASIC: see Palmer v Shipton [2026] FCAFC 90. That is not to penalise Mr Palmer for being a well-resourced serial litigant (as the Respondent would have me do), but rather is to take into account the Applicants’ diminished prospects of success in this proceeding. 70% of the Respondent’s actual costs of $87,566.77 is $61,296.74.
conclusion
12 For these reasons, the Applicants are to pay the Respondent’s legal costs, fixed in the sum of $61,296.74.
I certify that the preceding twelve (12) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hill. |
Associate:
Dated: 16 November 2026