Federal Court of Australia

Riel v Mineral Resources Limited [2026] FCA 1727

File number:

WAD 418 of 2026

Judgment of:

MCDONALD J

Date of judgment:

16 November 2026

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – suppression and non-publication orders – where evidence that second respondent would be at high risk of suicide or self-harm if publicly identified – whether order necessary to protect safety – whether order necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice – suppression order not shown to be necessary – non-publication order made prohibiting publication of second respondent’s name and specified information – ancillary orders made in relation to inspection of documents on court file

Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AA, 37AE, 37AF, 37AG, 37AH, 37AJ

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.32

Cases cited:

AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) (2019) 93 ALJR 321; [2019] HCA 6

Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377; [2020] FCAFC 44

D1 v P1 [2012] NSWCA 314

EOF25 v Talbot [2025] FCA 1091

Falco v Zscaler Australia Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 22

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21

Koulouris v Sourasis (Confidentiality Application) [2025] FCA 452

McGrane v Seven Network (Operations) Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 944

Neve v LVMH Perfume & Cosmetics Group Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 108

Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] FCA 629

Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863

PPT v Independent Television News Ltd [2026] EWHC 2818

Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311; [2011] NSWCA 403

Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 36

RST v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (NT) [2026] FCA 990

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2018) 359 ALR 473; [2018] FCA 357

Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd (2024) 305 FCR 340; [2024] FCA 1210

Sharma v Northern Territory [2026] FCA 315

White v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCA 185

Zaydan v Experian Australia Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 1318

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Western Australia

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

61

Date of hearing:

12 November 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

The Applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr M J Stutley

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Kingston Reid

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

Mr R A Coffey

Solicitor for the Second Respondent:

Modern Legal

ORDERS

WAD 418 of 2026

BETWEEN:

ELICIA RIEL

Applicant

AND:

MINERAL RESOURCES LIMITED (ACN 118 549 910)

First Respondent

ODB26

Second Respondent

order made by:

MCDONALD J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The second respondent be identified by a pseudonym in further documents filed in the proceeding and in Court lists, orders and judgments, and on the Commonwealth Courts Portal, until further order.

2.    Pursuant to ss 37AF(1) and 37AG(1)(c) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that the order is necessary to protect the safety of the second respondent, the publication (within the meaning of the definition of “publish” in s 37AA of the Federal Court of Australia Act) of the second respondent’s name, the position he held with the first respondent, and the dates of his employment in that position, in connection with this proceeding, or Australian Human Rights Commission complaint 2025-02-473, or as the person who is alleged to have engaged in conduct the subject of the proceeding, be prohibited.

3.    Pursuant to s 37AJ of the Federal Court of Australia Act, order 2 above operate (subject to any further order of the Court) until the conclusion of the first case management hearing in this proceeding.

4.    Order 2 above does not prohibit the further publication or re-publication of any information that was published prior to 11.30am (AWST) on 10 November 2026.

5.    Pursuant to r 2.32(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the affidavits (including all annexures and exhibits) and psychological report filed in support of the interlocutory application of the second respondent filed on 2 November 2026, and any transcript of the hearings in the proceeding held on 10 and 12 November 2026, be confidential, such that any person who is not a party to the proceeding not be permitted to inspect or receive a copy of those documents, unless leave is granted by a judge, after the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

6.    By 23 November 2026, the second respondent prepare copies of each document filed in the proceeding to date (other than the affidavits and psychological report filed in support of the interlocutory application of the second respondent filed on 2 November 2026), in which all information of the kinds referred to in order 2 above is redacted, and provide them by email to the Western Australia registry of the Court, to be held on the court file.

7.    Pursuant to r 2.32(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules, the unredacted versions of the documents referred to in order 6 be confidential, such that any person who is not a party to the proceeding not be permitted to inspect or be given a copy of those documents, unless leave is granted by a judge, after the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

8.    The interlocutory application filed by the second respondent on 2 November 2026 otherwise be dismissed.

9.    There be no order as to the costs of the interlocutory application filed by the second respondent on 2 November 2026.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.    The applicant undertakes not to provide copies of the affidavits and psychological report filed in support of the second respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 2 November 2026 to any person except her legal representatives or prospective legal representatives.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCDONALD J:

Introduction

1    On 23 October 2026, the applicant, Elicia Riel, filed an originating application under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act). The first respondent, Mineral Resources Ltd (MinRes), is her former employer. The second respondent (ODB26) is another person who was employed by MinRes at the same time as Ms Riel.

2    Ms Riel claims that, during her employment, she was subjected to a persistent and escalating course of unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature engaged in by ODB26. She also claims that she was subjected to sex discrimination, harassment on the ground of sex and workplace hostility by other employees, contractors and management personnel of MinRes. She claims that each of the respondents contravened provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), and seeks declarations and orders under s 46PO(4) of the AHRC Act. The matter has been allocated to a docket judge and is listed for first case management hearing on 9 December 2026.

3    On 2 November 2026, ODB26 filed an interlocutory application, seeking the making of suppression or non-publication orders of various kinds. However, the interlocutory application was not served on Ms Riel at that time.

4    On 9 November 2026, an article was published in the Australian Financial Review (AFR), which identified MinRes as a respondent to the proceeding. The article contained descriptions of the nature of some of the allegations made by Ms Riel, including in respect of the conduct allegedly engaged in by ODB26 and other employees of MinRes. The article did not identify ODB26 by name.

5    On 9 November 2026, ODB26 requested that his interlocutory application be heard and determined urgently, in light of the fact the article had been published in the AFR. The interlocutory application was referred to me to consider as the duty judge. ODB26 sought an interim suppression order over the interlocutory application and the evidence filed in support of it, prior to service on Ms Riel being effected. On 10 November 2026, after hearing from Ms Riel and ODB26, I made an interim suppression order, after which the interlocutory application and supporting evidence were served on Ms Riel.

6    The interlocutory application was listed for hearing before me on 12 November 2026. Ms Riel opposed the interlocutory application. She made thoughtful and appropriate submissions and concessions. MinRes took no position on the interlocutory application, but made brief submissions with a view to assisting the Court.

7    For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that it is appropriate, at this stage of the proceeding, to make a non-publication order on the basis that the order is necessary to protect the safety of ODB26. The non-publication order is more limited in scope than the orders sought by ODB26. A suppression order (preventing any form of disclosure by any person) should not be made. Further orders restricting access to documents on the court file should also be made. The orders should operate until the end of the first case management hearing, at which time their continuation, variation or discharge may be considered by the docket judge.

Relevant legislative provisions

8    The making of “suppression and non-publication orders” is dealt with in Pt VAA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). In s 37AA, a “suppression order” is defined for the purposes of Pt VAA to mean “an order that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of information (by publication or otherwise)”. A “non-publication order” is defined to mean “an order that prohibits or restricts the publication of information (but that does not otherwise prohibit or restrict the disclosure of information)”. “Information” is defined to include “any document”. “Publish” is defined as follows:

publish means disseminate or provide access to the public or a section of the public by any means, including by:

(a)    publication in a book, newspaper, magazine or other written publication; or

(b)    broadcast by radio or television; or

(c)    public exhibition; or

(d)    broadcast or publication by means of the internet.

9    Section 37AE of the FCA Act provides:

37AE Safeguarding public interest in open justice

In deciding whether to make a suppression order or non-publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice.

10    Section 37AF of the FCA Act confers power on the Court to make suppression orders and non-publication orders. It provides:

37AF Power to make orders

(1)    The Court may, by making a suppression order or non-publication order on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:

(a)    information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court; or

(b)    information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is:

(i)    information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or

(ii)    information obtained by the process of discovery; or

(iii)    information produced under a subpoena; or

(iv)    information lodged with or filed in the Court.

(2)    The Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1).

11    The grounds on which a suppression or non-publication order may be made are identified in s 37AG of the FCA Act, which provides:

37AG Grounds for making an order

(1)    The Court may make a suppression order or non-publication order on one or more of the following grounds:

(a)    the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice;

(b)    the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security;

(c)    the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person;

(d)    the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in a criminal proceeding involving an offence of a sexual nature (including an act of indecency).

(2)    A suppression order or non-publication order must specify the ground or grounds on which the order is made.

12    In the present case, ODB26 relies on the grounds set out in each of pars (a) and (c) of s 37AG(1). Before the Court can make a suppression or non-publication order, therefore, it is necessary for ODB26 to establish that the order sought is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”, or that the order is “necessary to protect the safety of any person”.

13    Section 37AH(5) of the FCA Act provides:

(5)    A suppression order or non-publication order must specify the information to which the order applies with sufficient particularity to ensure that the court order is limited to achieving the purpose for which the order is made.

14    Section 37AJ addresses the duration of suppression and non-publication orders. It provides:

37AJ Duration of orders

(1)    A suppression order or non‑publication order operates for the period decided by the Court and specified in the order.

(2)    In deciding the period for which an order is to operate, the Court is to ensure that the order operates for no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is made.

(3)    The period for which an order operates may be specified by reference to a fixed or ascertainable period or by reference to the occurrence of a specified future event.

Relevant legal principles

15    In Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 (Hogan), the High Court accepted (at 664 [30]) that, in enacting the predecessor to s 37AG(1), “Parliament was not dealing with trivialities” and emphasised that “‘necessary’ is a strong word”. The Court then said (at 664 [31]):

It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order under [the predecessor to s 37AF] appears to the Federal Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some “balancing exercise”, the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics.

(Footnote omitted.)

16    The assessment of whether an order is “necessary” is made in a context where, as Bathurst CJ and McColl JA said in Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311; [2011] NSWCA 403 (Rinehart v Welker) at 326 [54]:

… [i]n general … parties and witnesses have to accept the embarrassment and damage to their reputation, and the possibility of consequential loss, which can be inherent in being involved in litigation … It is the price of open justice that allegations about individuals are aired in open court. Such individuals, particularly if they are parties, can make their response to such allegations public in the same forum. The media, the vehicle by which such allegations are usually published to the world would be obliged to publish any response …

17    Because a suppression or non-publication order should only be made where it is “necessary” for one or more of the purposes identified in s 37AG(1) of the FCA Act, it has been said to follow that they should only be made in “exceptional circumstances”: see, eg, Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377; [2020] FCAFC 44 (Country Care) at 379 [8]; Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2018) 359 ALR 473; [2018] FCA 357 at 514 [186], citing Rinehart v Welker at 320 [27] (Bathurst CJ and McColl JA). Ultimately, the Court must determine the application by considering whether the relevant requirements stated in s 37AG(1) are satisfied. The accepted position is that the Court is not to exercise a “discretion” or engage in a “balancing” process, and should make an order if, but only if, satisfied that it is “necessary” to achieve one of the purposes identified in s 37AG(1): Hogan at 664 [33]; Country Care at 379 [9]; White v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCA 185 at [36].

18    As I said in Sharma v Northern Territory [2026] FCA 315 (Sharma) at [34], I find it somewhat difficult to understand how the requirement in s 37AE of the FCA Act, that the Court “take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice”, is to be given effect where there is no occasion for balancing or discretion. Where an order is sought on the ground in s 37AG(1)(a), it may be that the public interest in open justice can properly be brought to bear as a factor in deciding whether a suppression or non-publication order is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. In cases where an order is sought on the ground in s 37AG(1)(c), however, it is harder to see how the assessment of whether an order is “necessary to protect the safety of any person” can take into account the primary objective of safeguarding the public interest in open justice, except by bearing in mind that the requirement of necessity presents a high threshold.

19    In the community, opinions will differ on whether, as a matter of policy, it is desirable that suppression or non-publication orders should be made to protect the identity of a respondent to a claim of sexual harassment or other misconduct who claims to be at risk of self-harm or suicide if their identity is revealed. However, the authorities establish that s 37AG(1)(c) requires that such orders be made if, but only if, they are necessary to protect the safety of the person, in the sense described above. In a case where that necessity is established, there is no evident basis in the provisions of Pt VAA to apply a different approach where orders are sought by a respondent to a proceeding, where a risk to safety arises because of a person’s individual reaction to the possibility of allegations against them becoming more widely known, or where the particular risk to safety includes a risk that a person may inflict harm upon themselves.

20    The construction of s 37AG(1)(c) of the FCA Act was addressed by Besanko J in Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 36. Quoting from D1 v P1 [2012] NSWCA 314 at [51], his Honour accepted (at [16]-[17]) that, on the proper construction of s 37AG(1)(c):

… proof of the probability of harm is not a precondition. The necessity for such an order will be informed by the nature, imminence and degree of the likelihood of harm occurring to the relevant person. If the prospective harm is very severe, it may be more readily concluded that the order is necessary even if the risk is a possibility as opposed to a probability.

21    The same view was taken by Nettle J in AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) (2019) 93 ALJR 321; [2019] HCA 6 at 324 [14]. In that case, his Honour further explained the criterion of “necessary to protect the safety of any person” as follows (at 324 [15]):

The criterion is not one of necessity to prevent harm to a person but of necessity to protect the safety of a person. And safety is a protean conception which is certainly informed by the nature and gravity of apprehended harm and the risk of its occurrence. To take but one, prosaic example, no one today rationally doubts that the wearing of seat belts while travelling in a motor car is necessary to protect the safety of drivers and passengers. At the same time, it is certainly not the case that, but for wearing a seat belt, it is more probable than not that an occupant of a moving motor car will suffer harm. That is not to suggest that just any risk of harm will suffice. To repeat, the provision is not concerned with trivialities. But what it is intended to convey is that, because the idea of safety invariably entails the assessment of risk, it should be regarded as sufficient to satisfy the test of “necessary to protect the safety of any person” that, upon the evidence, the court is satisfied of the existence of a possibility of harm of such gravity and likelihood that, without the order sought, the risk of prejudice to the safety of the person would range above the level that can reasonably be regarded as acceptable.

22    In circumstances where a suppression or non-publication order is sought on the basis that it is necessary to protect the safety of a person, the Court must generally be satisfied of the existence of a possibility of harm of such gravity or likelihood that, without the order, the risk of harm to the person could not reasonably be regarded as acceptable. There must be a demonstrable or real risk of harm: EOF25 v Talbot [2025] FCA 1091 (EOF25) at [17]. In EOF25, the applicant had sought judicial review of a decision to the effect that he had engaged in conduct in breach of the APS Code of Conduct. The decision under review was described as concerning “highly personal and sensitive information about the applicant and another person”. Justice Wigney found (at [19]) that he was satisfied, based on the evidence of a psychiatrist, that disclosure of the applicant’s name would have an adverse impact on his mental health and would aggravate his existing symptoms, and that, unless the suppression and non-publication orders sought were made, there was a demonstrable and real risk the applicant would suffer serious harm to his mental health.

23    In several cases, the Court has considered applications for suppression or non-publication orders in relation to pleadings and other filed documents in circumstances where the parties have been seeking to explore the possibility of an early resolution through mediation: see, eg, Neve v LVMH Perfume & Cosmetics Group Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 108; Falco v Zscaler Australia Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 22; Zaydan v Experian Australia Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 1318; McGrane v Seven Network (Operations) Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 944; Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd (2024) 305 FCR 340; [2024] FCA 1210; Patterson v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] FCA 629. These cases establish that, depending on the circumstances, the effect of disclosure of information on a mediation or settlement negotiations, particularly at an early stage of a proceeding, may support a conclusion that a non-publication or suppression order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. However, before making an order on this basis, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence establishes a real risk of prejudice to settlement if the order sought is not made: see Sharma at [42]; Koulouris v Sourasis (Confidentiality Application) [2025] FCA 452 at [17], [21].

ODB26’s interlocutory application

24    In his interlocutory application, ODB26 seeks a range of suppression and non-publication orders. The kinds of orders set out by ODB26 in the amended minute of the orders he seeks, filed together with his written submissions, may be summarised as follows:

(1)    An order that ODB26 be identified by a pseudonym in all further documents filed in the proceeding and in all Court lists, orders and judgments.

(2)    An order prohibiting any publication or other disclosure of information identifying or tending to identify ODB26 as a party to this proceeding, whether alone or in combination with other information.

(3)    An order prohibiting any publication or other disclosure of information identifying or tending to identify ODB26 in connection with the related complaint filed by Ms Riel with the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC).

(4)    An order prohibiting any publication or other disclosure of information contained in documents filed or evidence given in this proceeding identifying or tending to identify any child of ODB26, including their name, image, address, school or medical or psychological information.

(5)    An order prohibiting any publication or other disclosure of identifying information concerning ODB26 or his children, or their medical or psychological information, contained in the expert report and the affidavits (including their annexures and exhibits) filed in support of the application for suppression and/or non-publication orders.

25    ODB26 proposes that the suppression orders which he seeks would be tailored so that they would not prohibit disclosure in certain identified circumstances, namely:

(a)    disclosure by any party “for purposes connected with the conduct or resolution of the proceeding to the Court, parties, legal representatives or mediator”;

(b)    disclosure by Ms Riel or by ODB26 or his wife “to the extent reasonably necessary for medical or psychological treatment, legal or financial advice, or personal or pastoral support, including disclosure to treating practitioners, lawyers, financial advisers, accountants, family members or other support persons”;

(c)    disclosure by Ms Riel or by ODB26 or by their legal representatives “to [their] current employer or a professional regulatory authority, to the extent reasonably necessary for employment-related advice or assistance, compliance with professional obligations or the exercise of statutory functions”; and

(d)    disclosure that is “required by law, … reasonably necessary for emergency medical assistance, or … authorised by further order”.

26    Additionally, ODB26 seeks an order pursuant to r 2.32(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), that certain identified documents be treated as confidential in their unredacted form and not made available for inspection by persons other than the parties and their legal representatives. ODB26 also seeks an order that any request by a non-party to inspect documents protected by the suppression or non-publication orders, pursuant to r 2.32 of the Federal Court Rules, including a document otherwise available for inspection without leave, be referred to a judge for determination before access is granted, and that the parties be given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before access is granted.

27    ODB26 seeks that all these orders should operate until the first case management hearing held following the conduct of a mediation.

28    In the course of the hearing of the interlocutory application, the possible terms of any suppression or non-publication orders, and possible exclusions from them, were further discussed and refined.

The evidence relied upon in support of ODB26’s interlocutory application

29    In support of his interlocutory application, ODB26 relies on affidavits made by himself and his wife, affidavits made by his solicitor, and a psychological report prepared by his treating clinical and counselling psychologist (P) on 6 November 2026. I accept that P has expertise in the field of clinical psychology and that the opinions expressed in his report are within the area of his expertise.

30    ODB26 was referred to P for treatment. P was asked to provide his opinion on the likely impact on ODB26’s mental health and wellbeing “if his name is published in connection with” the present proceeding. P has seen ODB26 on four occasions since September 2026 and, in late October 2026, had two lengthy telephone conversations with ODB26 and his wife on successive days. P’s report states that he assessed ODB26’s “risk for suicide/self-harm” at the time of these calls as high because “he had a plan, intent, access to lethal means and [P] had concerns regarding impulse control”. P assesses ODB26’s current suicide/self-harm risk as “moderate owing to him making use of coping strategies and safety measures”. I note that P’s report pre-dates the recent publication of the AFR article, and therefore does not specifically address the impact, if any, of its publication on ODB26’s mental health. Further clinical sessions are booked into the future and P states that (as at the date of his report) he “remains in contact with [ODB26] daily between sessions”.

31    P’s opinion is that ODB26 currently meets the diagnostic criteria for “single episode depressive disorder, moderate, without psychotic symptoms, with prominent anxiety symptoms” in the International Classification of Diseases, 11th Revision, which is equivalent to “major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate, with anxious distress” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition, Text Revision. P’s diagnosis is based on symptoms reported by ODB26, most of which P says he has observed directly. P states that ODB26’s psychological and emotional condition has significantly deteriorated since he received news of his name “being put on the Federal Court listing” on 28 October 2026. This is a reference to information about the present proceeding becoming available on the Commonwealth Courts Portal. After receiving this information, ODB26 “disclosed suicide/self-harm ideation, a plan to carry out his ideation and a means to do so, which indicated a severe risk of suicide”. P’s report explains the basis for his assessment of ODB26’s suicide/self-harm risk as “high”.

32    On the date of the report, P considered that ODB26’s risk of suicide or self-harm was no longer as acute, but stated that he considered that the risk would again become “high” if ODB26’s identity were not suppressed. Specifically, P stated that, if ODB26’s name was published in connection with the proceeding, this would be likely to cause significant deterioration in his mental state and expose him to a high and imminent risk of suicide or self-harm.

33    P also considers that, if ODB26 was publicly identified, it may impair his ability to instruct his solicitors and participate in the proceedings. P assesses that despite being affected by depressive and anxious symptoms, ODB26 “currently retains the ability to understand, retain, weigh and communicate information given to him”.

34    P’s report concludes by considering two scenarios – ODB26 receiving psychological treatment and social support with, and without, identity protection. If ODB26’s identity is not protected, P assesses the risk of significant deterioration in his mental health as moderate to high, with an elevated risk of suicide that could be acute following identification. If his identity is protected, P assesses the risk of significant deterioration as low to moderate, with the risk of suicide elevated at key dates, but manageable.

Orders sought to restrict publication or disclosure revealing the identity of ODB26

35    Principally on the basis of P’s report, I am satisfied that there is a risk to ODB26’s safety associated with the publication of his name to the general public, in a way that connects him with the allegations of sexual harassment. In this case, the risk of ODB26 committing suicide or self-harm has been described by P as both “severe” and “high”. The nature of the possible harm is serious. A suppression or non-publication order may therefore be “necessary” even if it is not established that it is “probable” that the harm would occur if the order were not made.

36    ODB26 rightly submits that, as the decision of Moshinsky J in RST v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (NT) [2026] FCA 990 at [103]-[109] illustrates, continued protection of a person’s identity may coexist with prior public reporting of the allegations and of the existence of proceedings, where that reporting has not already identified the person. ODB26 emphasises that he does not seek to prevent reporting of the existence or nature of the proceeding, or the substance of the allegations, independently of his identity, and that the proposed restrictions are directed to preventing his identification in connection with those matters.

37    ODB26 submits that his concern is not confined to media reporting or publicly available court records, and that disclosure of his identity in connection with the allegations to persons within his professional, social or community networks may also give rise to the consequences identified in the evidence. However, the psychological evidence is principally addressed to the publication of ODB26’s name in the public domain in connection with the allegations against him. In particular, P has expressed the opinion that preventing public identification of ODB26 would significantly reduce the risk of his committing suicide or self-harm.

38    I am not satisfied that it has been established that it is necessary to make a suppression order (as opposed to a non-publication order), which would impose a much more significant restriction on communication, including communication by Ms Riel about the experience of sexual harassment which she claims to have endured. Moreover, it is the availability of information to the general public, through the Commonwealth Courts Portal, that previously led to the demonstrated heightened risk to ODB26’s safety. I am not satisfied that it is necessary to make a suppression order with respect to ODB26’s name, either to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (s 37AG(1)(a)) or to protect his safety (s 37AG(1)(c)).

39    The relevant alleged conduct of ODB26 occurred some years ago, and there has been nothing in the time since then which has prevented Ms Riel from identifying ODB26 in connection with the allegations. It is only the increased prospect of public reporting of the allegations due to the commencement of the proceeding which has really changed. There is also no evidence to suggest that Ms Riel moves in the same social or professional circles as ODB26. Moreover, while I accept that contemplation of the prospect of ODB26’s identity being disclosed in any form may cause him distress or embarrassment, P’s evidence and common sense both suggest that it is the prospect of his identity in connection with the allegations being “common knowledge” that is likely to have the greatest psychological impact on ODB26.

40    I turn to consider whether a non-publication order should be made. On the evidence currently before me, I am satisfied that it is necessary, to protect the safety of ODB26, to make a non-publication order, preventing the publication (as defined in s 37AA of the FCA Act) of specific kinds of information that would allow him to be readily identified as the person who is alleged to have engaged in conduct the subject of the proceeding.

41    Section 37AH(5) of the FCA Act requires that the information to which any suppression or non-publication order applies be specified with particularity to “ensure that the order is limited to achieving the purpose for which the order is made”. In relation to the safety of ODB26, and having regard to the publication of information about the case that has already occurred, the purpose of protecting his safety would be served by a non-publication order that prohibits the publication of ODB26’s name, his position at MinRes, and the dates of his employment in that position, in connection with the allegations against him. The effect of such an order, while it remains in force, will be to prevent ODB26 being identified by name or by specific details that would allow members of the public who may read about the proceeding on the internet or in the media readily to ascertain his identity. I do not think it is necessary or appropriate in this case to frame the order in broader, more evaluative terms, which could create significant doubt about what is required to comply with it (for example, by prohibiting the publication of any information “tending to identify” ODB26 “in combination with other information”).

42    Section 37AJ of the FCA Act requires that any non-publication order be expressed to operate for a specified period, and that the Court ensure that the period is no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was made. The evidence before me relates only to the present circumstances of ODB26 and his circumstances in the immediately foreseeable future. Moreover, the order has been made at short notice, and the opportunity for any party to oppose it has been limited. It is appropriate to limit the duration of the order so that it operates until the end of the first case management hearing, at which time consideration can be given to whether the order should be continued or varied, based on the evidence then available. (ODB26’s submission that any non-publication order should operate until the first case management hearing after mediation is further addressed at [53]-[54] below.)

43    The present proceeding is connected with a complaint to the AHRC, such that identification of ODB26 in connection with that complaint would also undermine the object of the protection of his identity. For that reason, the non-publication order should prohibit publication of ODB26’s identity in connection with this proceeding and the AHRC complaint.

44    Ms Riel submits that the Court should consider whether the risks identified in the psychological evidence can be adequately addressed by less restrictive measures, including treatment: cf, eg, PPT v Independent Television News Ltd [2026] EWHC 2818 (PPT) at [36], [279]. While the statutory and legal context, as well as the evidence and the issues for determination, in PPT were different, I accept that this is a relevant consideration in assessing whether the making of the order is necessary to protect the safety of ODB26. The evidence currently before me indicates that ODB26 has sought treatment, including referral to a specialist psychiatrist, in immediate response to the commencement of the proceeding, and the effectiveness of that treatment in reducing the risk to his safety is not yet apparent. I am satisfied that, at the present time, a non-publication order is necessary to protect ODB26’s safety. The treatment that is available to him, as well as the lapse of a further period of time during which he may come to terms with the reality of the proceeding and his being associated with it, may well affect the risk to his safety. These are, in my view, strong reasons why the non-publication order that I will make should operate only for a relatively short period of time. If ODB26 seeks an extension of the orders, the management of his psychological condition, and the capacity for the risk to be reduced by other means, might well bear significantly on the question of whether a non-publication order should be found to be necessary.

45    Ms Riel also submits that, by investigating and carefully triangulating the information available in media reports as well as other sources (including an earlier article published in The Australian), it may well already be possible for a member of the public with sufficient ingenuity and determination to identify ODB26. Without deciding whether that is so, I am satisfied that most ordinary members of the public, without independent knowledge of the subject matter of the proceeding or the allegations, would not identify ODB26 as the person associated with this proceeding by reason of the reporting that has occurred to date, or other reporting that is consistent with the terms of the non-publication order I have identified above. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the non-publication order would substantially reduce the risk to ODB26’s safety and is necessary to protect his safety in the immediate future.

46    To avoid doubt, these orders are not intended to prohibit the further disclosure or publication of information which has already been the subject of media reports published before the making of the interim suppression order on 10 November 2026.

Further orders to prevent the public identification of ODB26 by name in connection with the proceeding

47    I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to make an order that ODB26 be identified by a pseudonym in further documents filed in the proceeding, in Court lists, orders and judgments, and on the Commonwealth Courts Portal. That will enable information about the proceeding to be made accessible by members of the public on the Commonwealth Courts Portal to the greatest extent possible, without identifying ODB26 by name. If these steps are not taken, the recent publication of information in the AFR, or further publications identifying MinRes as a respondent in the proceeding, may lead members of the public to access information about the proceeding on the court system, and thereby to ascertain the identity of ODB26 as the second respondent by relatively straightforward means. Based on the evidence before me, I accept that the risk to ODB26’s mental health will be heightened substantially if his name is accessible on the Commonwealth Courts Portal in connection with the proceeding, noting that that state of affairs is what led P to conclude that ODB26 was at a high risk of self-harm or suicide in late October 2026.

48    I also accept ODB26’s submission that it is appropriate that copies of documents already on the court file, which would otherwise be available for inspection by non-parties (including any member of the public), should be replaced by copies in which the specific information referred to in the non-publication order is redacted. Given the terms of the non-publication order which I will make, identifying the necessary redactions should not be controversial, and this should be the responsibility of ODB26.

49    These arrangements should continue to apply until further order; it may be that they should operate only for so long as the non-publication order (or any extended or further order) remains in effect.

Orders sought on the basis of preventing prejudice to a possible mediation

50    The effect of the orders which I have decided to make is to prohibit the publication to the general public of certain specific information that is reasonably capable of identifying ODB26 in connection with this proceeding and the allegations concerning his conduct. I will make those orders on the ground that they are necessary to protect the safety of ODB26.

51    As summarised at [22] above, the Court has considered applications for suppression and non-publication orders in circumstances where parties have not yet sought to resolve proceedings through mediation. For so long as the orders that I have made remain in place, and assuming they are complied with, the identity of ODB26 will not be generally known by members of the public in connection with the proceeding or the alleged conduct. Thus, the potential for the parties to negotiate a settlement of the proceedings, including on terms which preserve the general anonymity of ODB26, or otherwise restrict the further disclosure of his identity, should remain open. There is no evidence before the Court that the parties have, at this stage, made any concrete arrangement with respect to mediation, but I was informed that the parties are in discussions about conducting a mediation in the near future. I also note that, before the proceeding was commenced, the parties had already had an opportunity to participate in a conciliation process under Pt IIB of the AHRC Act, which did not result in a resolution.

52    In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the prospect of a future mediation has the consequence that a suppression order (ie, preventing not only publication but any disclosure) is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, or that there is a basis to conclude that the proceeding would be materially less likely to resolve at any future mediation if a suppression order is not made.

53    This interlocutory application came to me as the duty judge following the AFR publication, on the basis that it was urgent, and has been dealt with expeditiously. This has occurred in circumstances where Ms Riel has not yet been able to obtain legal representation, but has indicated that she is looking to do so. Witnesses have not been cross-examined. I am conscious that, for these reasons, the capacity of Ms Riel and the Court to test the evidence relied upon by ODB26 to this point has been limited. Similarly, the practical opportunity for any representative of the media to become aware of the application and to be heard has been limited.

54    In these circumstances, I am wary of making orders that will operate for longer than is strictly necessary to resolve the urgent aspects of ODB26’s interlocutory application. The orders which I propose to make will operate until the first case management hearing. ODB26 will not be prevented from seeking an extension of the operation of the orders, or similar orders, for a longer period, including up until a possible future mediation. I am not satisfied that it is necessary, at this time, to make orders that will operate beyond the first case management hearing. If the docket judge considers it appropriate, the present orders can be extended or, if that is not convenient, a new interim order could be made at the first case management hearing.

55    To summarise what I have decided in relation to this aspect of ODB26’s interlocutory application: I am not satisfied that it is necessary to make a suppression order on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice because of a possible effect on the prospects of settlement at mediation. I have not found it necessary to decide, in the present circumstances of urgency, whether this is a case where it would be appropriate to make a non-publication order on that basis. That remains an issue which ODB26 may choose to pursue further in due course, and his position is protected in the meantime by a non-publication order that will operate until the end of the first case management hearing.

Orders sought to restrict publication or disclosure of evidence filed in support of the interlocutory application, and in relation to ODB26’s children

56    ODB26’s interlocutory application also seeks suppression orders in relation to the evidence that was filed in support of the interlocutory application, and in relation to the identity of, and certain personal information relating to, ODB26’s children. Although these orders were expressed in different ways, there was significant overlap between them, because all of the evidence in the proceeding relating to ODB26’s children is contained in the evidence filed in support of the interlocutory application.

57    In order to explain the evidence on which my decision is based, it has been necessary to refer to aspects of the evidence of ODB26, his wife, and P. I have done so in a way that does not identify ODB26 or his family members. I do not consider that a prohibition on the disclosure or publication of that information is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

58    In the course of the hearing, Ms Riel made it clear that she had no interest in disseminating personal information relating to ODB26’s family, or in providing to any person, other than possible prospective legal representatives, copies of the evidence filed in support of the interlocutory application. Ms Riel provided an undertaking to the Court that she would not provide copies of the affidavits and psychological report to any person except her legal representatives or prospective legal representatives. Ms Riel will be at liberty to apply to the Court should she wish to vary the terms of the undertaking for any reason in the future.

59    In light of Ms Riel’s undertaking, the concerns on which this aspect of ODB26’s interlocutory application is based can be adequately addressed by orders to the effect that the affidavits and the psychological report be confidential, as contemplated by r 2.32(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules, and that any person who is not a party to the proceeding not be permitted to inspect or receive a copy of the documents, unless leave is granted by a judge, after the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. I note that this approach was canvassed at the hearing. If those orders are made, it is not necessary to make a suppression or non-publication order with respect to the evidence filed in support of the interlocutory application, or a separate order specifically with respect to the personal information about ODB26’s children.

60    However, I record that, if ODB26’s concerns with respect to the evidence relied upon in support of the interlocutory application had not been able to be addressed in this way, I would have determined that it was necessary to make at least a non-publication order with respect to the evidence filed in support of the interlocutory application, in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. That is because the evidence consists of personal, sensitive and otherwise confidential information relating to ODB26 and his children (much of which could have no relevance to the issues in the proceeding generally), and the publication of such information would give rise to a real prospect that litigants may be deterred either from making an application for suppression or non-publication orders or from advancing potentially relevant sensitive evidence in support of such an application: cf, eg, Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863 at [84].

Conclusion

61    For the reasons given above, I will make the orders set out at the beginning of these reasons. Given that I would only make a non-publication order and not a suppression order, it does not seem to me to be necessary to incorporate the exceptions proposed by ODB26, to which reference has been made at [25] above, because the non-publication order will not prohibit the parties from disclosing information as contemplated by those proposed exceptions. It is appropriate that each party should bear its own costs of the interlocutory application.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McDonald.

Associate:

Dated:    16 November 2026