Federal Court of Australia

Sandhu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1725

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellants pay the First Respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HESPE J:

1 This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Federal Circuit Court), dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review of a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 7 June 2019.  The reasons for judgment of the Federal Circuit Court are published in Sandhu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 796.  The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the first appellant a Student (Temporary) Class TU (Subclass 500) visa (Visa).

BACKGROUND

2 The first appellant is a citizen of India.  She arrived in Australia on 24 May 2008 as the holder of a Student (Subclass 573) visa.  The first appellant subsequently held three further student visas and one temporary graduate visa, the last of which expired in June 2017.  The first appellant has completed various courses including in June 2008 (Certificate IV in Spoken and Written English), July 2009 (Certificate III in Hairdressing), March 2010 (Diploma of Hairdressing Salon Management), August 2011 (Diploma of Management), August 2012 (Advanced Diploma in Management), March 2014 (Certificate III in Painting and Decorating) and April 2015 (Diploma of Building and Construction (Management)).

3 On 15 June 2017, the first appellant applied for the Visa for the purpose of studying an Advanced Diploma of Business. Her husband, the second appellant, was included in the Visa application as a dependent. The delegate refused to grant the Visa on 11 August 2017.

4 On 28 August 2017, the appellants applied for review of the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal.  In response to the Tribunal’s request for information, on 30 January 2019, the first appellant provided a completed student visa information form in which she outlined her immigration and education history, her work experience in Australia and her intentions to return to India and establish a business following the completion of her studies.

5 On 20 February 2019, the appellants appeared before the Tribunal with the assistance of an interpreter.  The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 7 June 2019 because the Tribunal was not satisfied that the first appellant met the criterion in cl 500.212(a) of Sch 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).  The Tribunal was not satisfied that the first appellant was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student.  As a result of that finding, the Tribunal was also not satisfied the second appellant satisfied cl 500.311.

6 On 4 July 2019, the appellants filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court.  On 3 June 2025, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed that application.

THE APPEAL

7 The appeal was filed on 19 June 2025.  The appellants seek an order quashing or setting aside the decision of the Federal Circuit Court and an order that the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration.

CONSIDERATION

8 The ultimate issue on appeal is whether the primary judge was correct to find that the Tribunal’s decision did not contain jurisdictional error: CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 70; (2022) 293 FCR 634 at [3] (Moshinsky, O’Bryan and Cheeseman JJ).

9 The appellants’ notice of appeal appears to be the product of artificial intelligence.  It appears to combine grounds of judicial review with submissions in a repetitive fashion.  Although setting out numerous grounds of appeal, the appellants’ essential complaint about the Tribunal’s reasons (TR) is a disagreement with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal and many of the alleged grounds are premised on a misunderstanding of the Tribunal’s reasons and the scope of judicial review.

10 As was explained at the hearing, the Court in judicial review proceedings does not consider whether it agrees with the decision of the Tribunal.  The Court is concerned with the lawfulness of the decision.  Although a ground for judicial review is a failure to accord procedural fairness, that ground of review is concerned with the process of hearing adopted by the Tribunal and is not concerned with whether the Court thinks the conclusion reached by the Tribunal was “fair” in a general sense.

11 It is apparent that many of the appellants’ grounds of appeal are no more than disagreements with the findings made by the Tribunal (Ground 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32 , 34, 37 and 40).  Of itself, disagreement with a factual finding is not a ground for judicial review and does not demonstrate jurisdictional error.  Jurisdictional error may be found if a factual finding is made that has no evidentiary foundation at all or is the product of irrational or illogical reasoning (as opposed to reasoning with which the Court does not agree).  It is not the role of the Court on judicial review to review the merits of the appellants’ application to the Tribunal.  It is not the role of this Court or of the primary judge to consider whether the Court would have come to the same view as the Tribunal based on the evidence (Grounds 35, 38 and 39).

12 Other grounds of appeal do not reflect the Tribunal’s reasons.  The Tribunal did not base its conclusion that the first appellant was not a genuine temporary entrant on the basis of the non-enrolment of the first appellant in a course or a failure by the first appellant to complete her courses (Grounds 11, 19, 26, 27 and 35).  Nor did the Tribunal make an adverse finding based on the first appellant changing from hairdressing to painting and decorating to business-related courses (Grounds 8, 17, 18, 20 and 36).  The Tribunal was not satisfied that the first appellant was seeking a visa for the primary purpose of undertaking a course of study and not for the purpose of continuing her residence in Australia because it was not satisfied that the Advanced Diploma was materially different from the management courses she had already completed.  This was a conclusion open to the Tribunal (contrary to Ground 32).

13 Some of the grounds of appeal are expressed at such a high level of generality as to be meaningless.

14 Grounds 1 to 7 are recitation of background facts.  These are not grounds of appeal.

15 Ground 8 refers to a failure to follow the rules of procedural fairness, a failure to “properly consider” all relevant information and the making of both legal and factual errors in concluding that the first appellant was not a genuine applicant for the Visa, without identifying what the particular errors or failures were.  Ground 8 also refers to the Tribunal overlooking “key aspects” of the case, with the only aspect identified as being the first appellant’s genuine interest in both hairdressing and painting and decorating.

16 At the hearing, the first appellant was invited to identify for the Court the errors upon which the appellants were seeking to rely.  The first appellant identified two “errors”:

(1) A failure by the Tribunal to recognise that the Advanced Diploma of Business the first appellant was seeking to undertake would have a marketing focus rather than general business management and therefore the Tribunal erred in finding that the Advanced Diploma would not add significantly to the first appellant’s business management qualifications.

(2) The Tribunal had asked her about some courses in which she had enrolled but not completed because the courses had been discontinued by the education provider.  The Tribunal was said to have thereby erred because she was not responsible for the actions of the education provider.

17 Neither of these so called errors constitute grounds for judicial review and are not a basis for concluding that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.

18 In relation to the first of these so-called errors (also reflected in Grounds 10, 15 and 21 of the notice of appeal), the Tribunal records the evidence of the first appellant that the courses she had completed were focussed on the management of staff whereas the Advanced Diploma would teach her how to manage a business.  The Tribunal did not accept that evidence having regard to the content of the courses the first appellant had already completed.  It was open to the Tribunal to reject the first appellant’s evidence on this basis.  The Tribunal set out the business management courses completed by the first appellant (a total of four) and examined the list of subjects she had completed.  The Tribunal was satisfied that the first appellant had obtained a range of qualifications in business knowledge and management skills.  It was on that basis that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the proposed Advanced Diploma would add significantly to the first appellant’s qualifications.  The appellants disagree with the Tribunal’s characterisation of the course, but the primary judge correctly concluded that the Tribunal reached a finding that was open to it on the evidence.  There was no jurisdictional error.

19 In relation to the second of these so-called errors (also reflected in Grounds 11, 14 and 19 of the notice of appeal), as the primary judge held, the Tribunal made no reference to the cancelled courses in its reasons and there is no basis for inferring that the Tribunal had any regard to these courses in reaching its conclusions.  There is no basis for inferring that the Tribunal made a finding adverse to the first appellant that was in any way related to her enrolment in courses that came to be cancelled.  This submission does not disclose a basis for concluding that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.

20 The only matter identified by the appellants as a matter which the Tribunal was said to have “overlooked” was the first appellant’s interest in both hairdressing and painting and decorating.  As the primary judge observed, the Tribunal expressly refers to the first appellant’s interest in both hairdressing and painting and decorating at TR [12]–[14].  The Tribunal accepted that the first appellant had a genuine reason for changing from hairdressing to painting and decorating.  The Tribunal did not overlook a critical part of the appellants’ case.  The Tribunal accepted the first appellant’s explanation for changing her interest from hairdressing (contrary to Grounds 9, 18, 20 and 36 of the notice of appeal).

21 None of these Grounds (8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 36) have any substance.

22 Grounds 12, 28, 29, 30 and 34 assert that the Tribunal failed to apply the guidelines in Direction 69.  As the primary judge correctly found, the Tribunal’s reasons disclose a methodical assessment of Direction 69 to the facts, evidence and claims made by the appellants.  There is no substance to a claim that the Tribunal failed to apply Direction 69.

23 Ground 13 appears to be a complaint that the primary judge did not understand or completely dismissed her grounds of judicial review without proper consideration.  As explained above, the ultimate issue is whether this Court is satisfied that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error.  Ground 13 does not provide a basis from which it might be concluded that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.

24 Grounds 14 and 37 are complaints that the Tribunal did not afford the appellants a meaningful chance to be heard.  As the primary judge found, the Tribunal afforded the appellants the opportunity to provide material and conducted a hearing at which the appellants were assisted by an interpreter to give evidence and to make submissions.

25 Grounds 24 and 25 are complaints that the first appellant felt compelled to pause her studies while the judicial review process was underway and the delay in that judicial review process.  Ground 24 is not a basis for identifying error in the Tribunal’s decision.  Whilst the delay in the judicial review process is unfortunate (and a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic), it is not a basis for judicial review or finding jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision.

26 Grounds 33 and 38 are a complaint about being ordered to pay costs.  The question of costs was a matter for the primary judge.  Costs are awarded to compensate a successful party, not as punishment to the unsuccessful party.  Costs were awarded at a sum that reflected the Federal Circuit Court’s scale of costs.  There was nothing about that award of costs that was punitive or a form of punishment.

DISPOSITION

27 The appellants have not demonstrated that the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error.  The appellants’ appeal is to be dismissed with costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Associate:

Dated:    13 November 2026