Federal Court of Australia

Jiao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1722

Appeal from:

Jiao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1232

File number(s):

VID 1028 of 2025

Judgment of:

MCELWAINE J

Date of judgment:

13 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – objection to competency – objection upheld – application for extension of time and leave to appeal dismissed – no issue of principle

Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 338, 476, 476A(3)(a), 477(1), 477(2), 347(2)(a), 347(3)

Cases cited:

Jiao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1232

Michael Wilson and Partners v Cronan [2025] FCA 1588

SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 26; (2012) 200 FCR 207

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579

WZASS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 19; (2021) 282 FCR 516

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

22

Date of last submission/s:

30 October 2026

Date of hearing:

Determined on the papers

Counsel for the First, Second and Third Applicants:

The first, second and third applicants were self-represented

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Clayton Utz

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The second respondent did not appear

ORDERS

VID 1028 of 2025

BETWEEN:

CANGWEN JIAO

First Applicant

GUILIAN WANG

Second Applicant

ZHIYANG JIAO

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

MCELWAINE J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The notice of objection to competency filed 1 September 2025 is upheld.

2.    The application for extension of time and leave to appeal filed 11 August 2025 is dismissed.

3.    The applicants must pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCELWAINE J:

1    Three applicants, Cangwen Jiao, Guilian Wang and Zhiyang Jiao, commenced a proceeding in this Court on 11 August 2025 in the form of an application to extend time and for leave to appeal orders made by Judge Vasta on 9 June 2025: Jiao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1232 (PJ and Circuit Court). The primary judge refused an application to extend time to commence a judicial review proceeding concerning a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 8 September 2017. The review application, pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), was required to be made within 35 days of the date of the migration decision: s 477(1). In these reasons each reference to a statutory provision is to the Act. The application to the primary judge was not filed until 31 October 2023, that is approximately six years out of time.

2    The applicants are citizens of the People’s Republic of China. On 31 January 2017, the first applicant applied for an Employer Nomination Scheme (subclass 186) visa, together with his wife and child (the second and third applicants). On 14 July 2017, a delegate of the Minister refused the application. The applicants then applied to the Tribunal on 21 July 2017. The Tribunal determined that it lacked jurisdiction in respect of the first and second applicants as neither were physically present in the migration zone when the review application was made: s 338 and s 347(2)(a) and (3). In summary, the first applicant departed Australia on 11 February 2017 and had not returned and the second applicant departed Australia on 3 May 2017 and returned on 25 July 2017. As to the third applicant, the Tribunal found she departed Australia on 18 June 2017 and returned on 19 July 2017 and accordingly it had jurisdiction to conduct a review. However, the problem for the third applicant was that she applied for the visa as a member of a family unit and did not meet the primary criteria for an Employer Nomination visa. As such, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

3    The primary judge had no difficulty in refusing the application to extend time because of the gross and unsatisfactorily explained delay and the absence of any merit.

4    The Minister filed a notice of objection to competency on 1 September 2025. The point is that this Court does not have jurisdiction by operation of s 476A(3)(a). That is an appeal may not be brought to this Court from a judgment of the Circuit Court that makes or refuses to make an order under s 477(2). Here the primary judge did not make an order dismissing the substantive application: cf. SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 26; (2012) 200 FCR 207 at [19], Keane CJ, Rares and Perram JJ.

5    The Minister’s objection is unanswerable. No appeal is competent: WZASS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 19; (2021) 282 FCR 516 at [6], Katzmann, O’Bryan and Jackson JJ. Similarly, the application for leave to appeal and for an extension of time is incompetent: Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 at [55], Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ.

6    The applicants were put on notice of this point by correspondence dated 2 September 2025. Graciously, the Minister’s solicitor further stated:

However, while the Minister considers the FCA does not have jurisdiction in respect of the Application due to the operation of s 476A(3)(a) of the Act, it may be open to you to seek judicial review of the Primary Judgment in the FCA's original jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): see, eg, CZA 19 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2021] FCAFC 57. As we represent the Minister, we cannot provide you with legal advice on this potentiality. However, we are instructed the Minister would not oppose any proposed amendment to the Application to seek judicial review of the Primary Judgment in the FCA's original jurisdiction should it be made by 16 September 2025, being two weeks from the date of this letter. However, for the avoidance of doubt, we confirm the Minister's position is that the Primary Judgment is free from error.

7    The invitation was not then taken up. The proceeding was allocated to my docket on 26 September 2026. I made orders on 28 September 2026 to the effect that the competence objection would be determined on the papers and for the filing of written submissions. The parties complied. The applicants are self-represented. They contend that their application was amended on 16 September 2025 in response to the defect identified by the Minister and that as self-represented persons a technical defect should not be held against them.

8    I reject the submission. The amended document is annexed to the affidavit of the second applicant made on 25 October 2026. It is not an application for review in accordance with s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The issue is not one of form, rather the substance of the extant application for an extension of time and leave to appeal has not altered. Whilst the grounds A-G as proposed to be amended are couched in the language of jurisdictional error: a denial of procedural fairness (A, B and G), overlooking a pre-condition to the exercise of jurisdiction (C), misunderstanding the case (D), disregarding a mandatory consideration (E), reversing the onus of proof (F) and not addressing other grounds regarding the visa application being lodged without authorisation (H), the relief application purports to be an appeal from the orders made on 9 June 2025 (which the applicant seeks have set aside) and the Circuit Court is not proposed to be joined. The whole tenor of the amended application is an appeal that s 477(2) prohibits.

9    A further informal attempt was made by the applicants in email correspondence to the courts Migration Team which was addressed to chambers between 2 and 5 November 2026. They sought an order that the Circuit Court or the primary judge be added as respondents and that the application be treated as made under s 39B of the Judiciary Act. They were told in correspondence from my chambers on 5 November 2026, that their email was inappropriate by reference to Michael Wilson and Partners v Cronan [2025] FCA 1588 at [210]-[217] and if they sought orders, they should file an interlocutory application supported by an affidavit. The second applicant emailed my chambers on 10 November 2026 stating she attached an interlocutory application and affidavit. No documents were attached. There is no point in affording any further indulgence or opportunity to apply to amend as I next explain.

10    In some circumstances those defects might be excused by allowing further amendments if there is any merit in the proposed grounds, which plainly there is not. Proposed ground A asserts that the primary judge denied procedural fairness in that he did not address a request for the provision of documents by the Minister. The request was made by email to his Honour’s chambers on 8 June 2025 sent at 10.31 pm. The documents were said to be relevant to fraudulent conduct by a migration agent to the effect that the agent was not authorised to make the visa application. The primary judge gave comprehensive consideration to the fraud contention: PJ [14]-[23]. He concluded it was not made out: PJ [24]. He did not accept the applicant’s evidence.

11    Proposed ground A does not grapple with how the request for documents, on which the very late application to adjourn was premised, would have assisted. No explanation is offered as to why the request was not made in a timely way. The applicants were told on 6 June 2025 that the Minister would not release the information relating to the nomination for privacy reasons. There had been earlier correspondence to the same effect. They then did nothing until very late in the evening preceding the day of the hearing.

12    Further, it is to be recalled that the problem was that the first and second applicants were not present in the migration zone when the review application was lodged. If it was lodged by an agent without authority, that hardly assists the applicants in their goal of having the delegate’s decision reviewed. Another hurdle is that the primary judge recorded that he “went through” the visa application at the hearing with the second applicant and she (PJ [6]):

[A]greed that everything in that application was correct, and it was information that was provided by herself, her husband and her daughter, except for one detail and that is the email address at which the department could contact the applicants.

13    On the contact email issue, the primary judge rejected her evidence: PJ [24]-[25].

14    Further, the applicants had approximately six years to address this before applying to the Circuit Court. The delay is gross and unexplained.

15    Proposed ground B asserts a denial of procedural fairness in the conduct of the hearing before the primary judge. No evidence in support has been provided; for example the applicants have not placed a transcript before this Court. There is no affidavit that sets out what occurred at the hearing beyond the assertion that the second applicant was only permitted to answer “yes” and “no” to questions from his Honour and “[o]nly after doing that, the honorable [sic] Judge Vasta let the applicant express her opinions”. On that evidence his Honour afforded procedural fairness in the context of a visa application that was bound to fail from the outset.

16    Proposed ground C asserts jurisdictional error in that the primary judge misunderstood that the applicants had made an application to extend time pursuant to s 477(2). That cannot be reconciled with the application lodged with the Circuit Court on 31 October 2023, where the applicants expressly sought an extension of time and gave as the ground that they did not receive the Tribunal decision until 21 August 2023. The problem is that time ran from the date of the Tribunal decision: s 477(1) and the primary judge was not satisfied that an adequate explanation for the delay had been provided: PJ [30].

17    Proposed ground D asserts that the primary judge misunderstood the case that the agent made the application for the visa without authority. The proposed ground is hopeless. The primary judge accepted that this was the gravamen of the case at PJ [12]-[25], [28] and [30]. He rejected it on the evidence.

18    Proposed ground E is difficult to comprehend. The primary judge is criticised for not considering the review grounds at an impressionistic level and of proceeding to a substantive interrogation. The primary judge was entitled to take that course: Katoa at [18]-[19].

19    Proposed ground F asserts that the primary judge inverted the onus of proof by requiring the applicants to prove that the visa application was made without authority. That was an orthodox application of the onus of proof by his Honour.

20    Proposed ground G asserts that the Minister denied procedural fairness by failing to provide documents the subject of an order made on 21 June 2024. That cannot be a complaint that the primary judge denied the applicants procedural fairness.

21    Proposed ground H is a repeat of the other grounds to the effect that the agent made the visa application without authority and is of no merit for the reasons above.

22    For these reasons, I uphold the notice of objection as to competency, dismiss the proceeding and there is no reason why costs do not follow the event.

I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McElwaine.

Associate:

Dated:    13 November 2026