Federal Court of Australia

KLJM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1721

Review of:

KLJM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] ARTA 87

File number(s):

VID 7 of 2026

Judgment of:

HESPE J

Date of judgment:

13 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for an extension of time – where the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the applicant’s permanent visa – where delay is over nine months and not adequately explained – whether extension is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice – consideration of the strength of the proposed grounds of review – application dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 197C(3), 476A, 477A, 499, 501(1)

Cases cited:

Asad v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1477

BQNZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 857

EGH19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] HCA 33

Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2; (2024) 280 CLR 265

Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929; (2001) 192 ALR 71

KLJM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] ARTA 87

LPDT v Minister for Immigration [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v DVRL [2026] FCAFC 73; (2026) 316 FCR 477

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259

NDMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1572

Plaintiff M27/2025 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] HCA 40; (2025) 99 ALJR 1495

Plaintiff S22/2025 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] HCA 36; (2026) 99 ALJR 1378

Snedden v Minister for Justice for the Commonwealth [2014] FCAFC 156; (2014) FCR 82

Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 52; (2016) 243 FCR 220

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

79

Date of hearing:

23 September 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr A Aleksov

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr J Barrington

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Mills Oakley

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 7 of 2026

BETWEEN:

KLJM

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

HESPE J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2.    The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HESPE J:

Introduction

1    The applicant applies for an extension of time for the making of an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal made on 5 February 2025. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister made under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), refusing the applicant’s application for a combined Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) and Partner (Residence) (Class BB) visa (Partner Visa). The Tribunal’s reasons (TR) are published in KLJM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] ARTA 87.

2    Section 477A(1) requires an application to this Court for review of a decision of the Tribunal under s 476A(1)(b) to be made within 35 days of the date of the decision. Section 477A(2) empowers the Court to extend that period in certain circumstances.

3    The applicant’s delay in making this application is very lengthy, having been made over nine months after the last date on which it was required to be made.

Background

4    The applicant is a Pakistani citizen. He arrived in Australia on 5 December 2007 on a student visa which was subsequently cancelled.

5    On 17 September 2012, the applicant applied for a protection visa. A refusal of that application by a delegate of the Minister was set aside by the former Refugee Review Tribunal on 13 December 2013. On a reconsideration of that visa application, a “protection finding” as defined in s 197C(3) of the Act was made in relation to the applicant with respect to Pakistan.

6    On 16 November 2016, the applicant’s protection visa was cancelled under s 109 on the basis that the applicant had provided bogus Pakistani police documents. This cancellation was affirmed by the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 28 November 2017.

7    On 13 June 2017, the applicant was convicted of “sexual intercourse without consent-SI” in the District Court of New South Wales and was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment.

8    On 16 May 2023, the applicant applied for the Partner Visa, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 14 November 2024.

9    On 21 November 2024, the applicant applied to the Tribunal to review the delegate’s decision. Following a hearing at which the applicant was self-represented, by a decision dated 5 February 2025, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.

10    On 8 January 2026, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time to lodge an application to review the Tribunal’s refusal decision in this Court.

11    It was accepted for the purposes of these proceedings, and before the Tribunal, that a protection finding has been made in respect of the applicant and that there is no real prospect of his removal to Pakistan. The applicant cannot be indefinitely detained and was issued a Bridging R (Class WR) (Removal Pending) (Subclass 070) visa (BVR) on 14 November 2024.

Tribunal’s reasons

12    In making its decision, the Tribunal was required to comply with “Direction No. 110 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA”, made under s 499 of the Act. The Tribunal made the following findings with respect to the considerations set out in that Ministerial direction.

13    In relation to Primary Consideration 1 – “Protection of the Australian community”, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s sexual offence was “very serious”: TR [50]. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s disregard for Australian laws was also evidenced by the provision of false documents in support of his protection visa application: TR [50]. The Tribunal considered that any risk that the applicant’s conduct may be repeated is unacceptable given that the applicant had applied for a Partner Visa, which would enable him to stay in Australia, the nature of harm to the Australian community if the applicant’s conduct were to be repeated, the limited evidence of rehabilitation achieved and the little time the applicant had spent in the community since his last offence: TR [71]. The Tribunal concluded that this primary consideration weighed significantly in favour of refusing the applicant’s Partner Visa: TR [72].

14    In respect of Primary Consideration 2 – “Family violence”, the Tribunal gave this consideration neutral weight because there was no evidence that the applicant had committed any family violence: TR [74].

15    Regarding Primary Consideration 3 – “The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia”, the Tribunal accepted that if the applicant’s removal resulted in his separation from his family, it would have a great impact on each of his immediate family members: TR [82]. The Tribunal found that if the applicant were removed, his wife and children would accompany him, but relocation would create readjustment challenges for these family members: TR [82]. While the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had social links and had made limited positive contribution to the community, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant’s friends or the broader community would be adversely impacted if the applicant’s Partner Visa was refused, and he was removed from Australia: TR [83]. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant’s removal from Australia would adversely impact members of his immediate family, and this weighed heavily against the refusal of the Partner Visa: TR [83]. However, because the prospect of the applicant’s removal, even if his visa application were refused, was uncertain and contingent and the applicant would remain in Australia for the foreseeable future, the Tribunal attached moderate weight to this primary consideration as weighing against the refusal of the Partner Visa application: TR [83].

16    In relation to Primary Consideration 4 – “The best interests of minor children in Australia”, the Tribunal had regard to the best interests of the applicant’s then nine year old son. Having regard to the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s criminal offending and conduct, the Tribunal did not consider that the applicant would be a good role model for his son, but the Tribunal also accepted that the applicant had been a loving father to his son and that the applicant’s closer involvement in his son’s life may assist in alleviating some of the behavioural issues his son had been displaying: TR [88]. The Tribunal also observed that separating the son from the applicant would not be in the best interests of the applicant’s son: TR [90]. The Tribunal found that if the applicant were removed from Australia, his son would accompany him, but it would not be in the son’s best interests to be uprooted from Australia: TR [91]. Because the applicant’s removal from Australia (in the event his application was refused) was only a contingent possibility and the applicant would likely remain in Australia on a BVR for an undetermined period, the Tribunal concluded that this consideration weighed moderately against the refusal of the applicant’s Partner Visa: TR [91]–[92].

17    In relation to Primary Consideration 5 – “The expectations of the Australian community”, the Tribunal found that because the applicant committed a “very serious” offence, the Australian community would expect the government to not allow the applicant to remain in Australia by granting him a visa: TR [97]. The Tribunal gave this consideration significant weight in favour of refusing the applicant’s Partner Visa: TR [98].

18    The Tribunal considered the Other Considerations set out in para 9(1) of Direction 110.

19    In relation to Other Consideration (a) the “legal consequences of the decision”, the Tribunal found that the applicant could not be removed to Pakistan if his application were refused and could not be detained indefinitely: TR [103]–[105]. The applicant had been granted a BVR and had been able to remain in the community with work rights, reside with his family, participate in community or religious activities and engage in his intended entrepreneurial pursuits: TR [110]. Conditions imposed in connection with the applicant’s BVR, if any, were not onerous nor would become onerous over time: TR [110]. Although the government could arrange for the applicant to be received by a third country at some unspecified future time, the Tribunal considered that that possibility was subject to several contingencies and could ultimately never materialise: TR [109]. The Tribunal concluded that the legal consequences of the decision weighed only slightly against the exercise of the discretion: TR [111].

20    In relation to Other Consideration (b) “extent of impediments if removed”, the Tribunal found that because of the protection finding in favour of the applicant, there was no current prospect that the applicant would be removed from Australia to Pakistan: TR [113]. The Tribunal considered this consideration to carry neutral weight in relation to Pakistan: TR [113]. The Tribunal considered that it was not possible to ascertain the extent of any impediments the applicant might face if he were removed to a third country, because at the date of the Tribunal decision, it was not known to which country the applicant could or would be removed to: TR [114]. The Tribunal placed only slight weight on this consideration against refusal of the applicant’s Partner Visa: TR [115].

21    Neutral weight was placed on Other Consideration (c) “impact on Australian business interests”, because there was no evidence that the refusal of the Partner Visa would disrupt any business interests: TR [116].

22    Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that Primary Considerations 1 and 5 significantly outweighed all other considerations that weighed against the discretion to refuse to grant the Partner Visa, and the discretion to refuse the grant of the Partner Visa should be exercised: TR [120].

Proposed grounds of review

23    By a draft further amended originating application, the applicant seeks orders quashing the decision of the Tribunal and directing the Tribunal to redetermine the applicant’s application according to law.

24    The applicant relies upon the following proposed grounds (abandoning one of the grounds in the draft amended originating application):

(1)    Ground 1 – The Tribunal failed to comply with para 8.4(1) of Direction 110 by failing to make a determination about what decision (affirm or set aside) was in the best interests of minor children, and then determine what weight to give to the outcome of that determination.

(2)    Ground 2 – The Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by failing to notify the applicant of an adverse conclusion which had been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material, being that the applicant’s BVR and continued presence in Australia might lead to less weight being placed on the considerations of “ties to Australia” and “best interests of minor children”.

(3)    Ground 3 – The Tribunal failed to comply with para 8.1.2 of Direction 110.

Submissions of the parties

25    The applicant contends that the extension of time should be granted for the following reasons:

(a)    There is no relevant prejudice to the Minister or any other person.

(b)    This is a meritorious case.

(c)    The stakes for the applicant are very high, including that if the applicant were not granted an extension of time, the applicant would not have a right to appeal to the Full Court.

26    The Minister submits that the extension of time application should be refused for the following reasons:

(a)    The explanation for the delay of over nine months is unsatisfactory.

(b)    The applicant has not identified any prejudice to him which would result from a refusal of the extension of time.

(c)    There is a public interest in public law matters being resolved in a timely and efficient manner, and it is not in the public interest for applications for review to be delayed by more than nine months.

(d)    The merits of the grounds are not very strong.

Consideration

Applicable principles

27    Section 476A of the Act confers original jurisdiction on this Court to review the Tribunal’s decision made under s 500 of the Act: s 476A(1)(b).

28    Section 477A imposes a time limit within which applications to the Court must be made. That section provides:

Section 477A Time limits on applications to the Federal Court

(1)    An application to the Federal Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction under paragraph 476A(1)(b) or (c) in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.

(2)    The Federal Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Court considers appropriate if:

(a)    an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and

(b)    the Federal Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.

…

29    The Court thus has power to extend the time in which an application must be filed provided that two conditions are met. The first is that an application has been made in writing to the Court and the second is that the Court is satisfied that an extension is necessary “in the interests of the administration of justice”.

30    In the present case, the first condition has been satisfied.

31    In relation to the second condition:

    The Court must form a state of satisfaction that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order to extend the time limit in s 477A(1). The Court must be satisfied not just that an extension is desirable but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice: Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 at [12] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ).

    Although at a high level of generality, the purpose of a power to extend time is to eliminate the injustice a prospective applicant might suffer by reason of the imposition of a rigid time limit: Katoa at [11].

    The interests of the administration of justice are broader than the interests of the applicant. It allows the Court to consider circumstances such as the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the underlying merits of the application: Katoa at [12].

    In determining whether it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time, it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a “reasonably impressionistic level”: Katoa at [17]. However, there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits.

    If the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that their case is “strong” or even “exceptional”: Katoa at [18]. In such a case, the Court is not confined to a consideration of whether a case is reasonably arguable or has reasonable prospects of success.

    The Court is entitled to have regard to the merits of the proposed application in such manner as it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

32    An extension of many months in circumstances where the delay is largely unexplained has been said to require more than the existence of an arguable case before the extension should be regarded as necessary in the interests of the administration of justice. In BQNZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 857, where the delay was some four years, Kennett J expressed the view at [30] that:

… in order to justify an extension of time where the delay in commencing proceedings is “lengthy and unexplained”, more is needed than a strong case on the merits. A party who has a strong case, but sits on their hands for many months for no good reason, should normally not be entitled to expect an extension of time…An “exceptional” case in this context should therefore be understood to involve something more than substantive merit: for example, particularly egregious conduct by the respondent, or particularly serious consequences for the applicant if the claim cannot be pursued.

33    The extension sought by the applicant is over nine months past the prescribed time limit for bringing an application. An extension of that length has been described by the High Court as “exceptional”: Plaintiff M27/2025 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] HCA 40; (2025) 99 ALJR 1495 at [31] (Gageler CJ, Gordon and Beech-Jones JJ).

Explanation for the delay

34    The applicant relied upon an affidavit of Ms Carina Ford of Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers, affirmed on 7 January 2026, in support of his explanation for the delay. According to that affidavit:

(a)    On 13 March 2025, the applicant received advice from Victoria Legal Aid on his review rights, including the time frame within a review must be sought.

(b)    Between 13 March 2025 and 13 November 2025, the applicant was “collating funds to seek an opinion from a private lawyer”.

(c)    On 13 November 2025, the applicant organised an initial consultation with Carina Ford Immigraton Lawyers and on 14 November 2025, the applicant provided instructions to obtain an opinion on prospects. Counsel opinion was obtained on 2 December 2025.

(d)    The applicant provided instructions to that law firm to file an application in this Court on 4 December 2025.

(e)    The solicitors’ office was closed between 23 December 2025 and 6 January 2026.

35    At hearing, the applicant conceded that there was no satisfactory explanation for a large portion of the delay (from March 2025 to November 2025).

36    The applicant’s explanation for the delay is unsatisfactory. The applicant has been aware from at least 13 March 2025 of the time frame within which an application must be filed and would have been aware that as of 13 March 2025, he was already out of time by a day. No application was filed for another nine months.

37    In the present case, where there is an unexplained delay of many months, I consider that there must be more than an arguable case before I could be satisfied that an extension was in the interests of the administration of justice.

Interests of the applicant

38    As the High Court observed in Katoa, the state of satisfaction that must be reached is whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice for the extension to be granted. The test is not whether it is in the interests of the applicant for the extension to be granted. The interests of the applicant may form part of the consideration but do not dictate the outcome.

39    By his written submissions, the applicant submits that there were “very high stakes” for him, without further elaboration.

40    It is common ground that the applicant currently resides in the community on a BVR. A consequence of the applicant having that status is that he remains on a pathway to removal and his right to remain in Australia will cease upon being given notice by the Minister that his removal from Australia is reasonably practicable or if he is granted permission by a third country, being a party to third country reception arrangement, to enter and remain in that country. It can be accepted that if time is not extended, the applicant will lose the opportunity to advance his case which might otherwise confer upon him a permanent entitlement to live in Australia.

41    Particularly where what is lost to the applicant by a refusal to grant an extension of time is the loss of an opportunity to present a case, the merits of the applicant’s proposed case will form part of the evaluation of the interests of justice.

42    The applicant also contends that if an extension were not granted, he would lose a right to appeal to the Full Court and that he should not be denied such a right if he has an arguable case. I do not consider the fact that the applicant does not have the same rights of appeal as an applicant who makes an application within time to be a reason to grant an extension of time if the merits of the proposed grounds of review do not otherwise support the granting of an extension in the interests of the administration of justice. By imposing a statutory time limit, Parliament has evinced a clear intention to place an applicant who fails to comply with the time limit in a different position to applicants who have complied: Katoa at [52]. As the High Court explained in Katoa at [55]:

… Parliament has evinced a clear intention to prevent appellate review of extension of time decisions in s 476A(3) and (4) of the Migration Act. It is simply a consequence of the legislative scheme that some applicants for an extension of time will be successful, so that their substantive application goes on to be determined with the consequence that they have an entitlement to appeal an unsuccessful outcome, while other applicants will be unsuccessful and not able to appeal the decision.

Public Interest

43    In assessing what is in the interests of the administration of justice, it may be accepted that it is in the broader public interest for public law matters to be resolved in a timely manner, which Parliament has assessed as generally being 35 days. There is a public interest in finality. As Lee J explained most recently in NDMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1572 at [58]:

… As McHugh J explained in Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491 (at 495–496 [15]–[17] per McHugh J), there must be an end to litigation concerning the efficacy of acts and decisions of public bodies and officials, and that interest cannot be held hostage to an applicant’s search for favourable legal advice. The absence of demonstrated forensic prejudice to a respondent remains relevant, but is not sufficient: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 (at [6]). It does not explain the delay or exhaust the public interests served by the statutory time limit.

44    It is not in the public interest in the administration of justice for applications for review to be delayed by more than nine months. The Minister has a legitimate interest in the timely disposal of applications for visas and decisions concerning the cancellation of visas: Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 52; (2016) 243 FCR 220 at [89] (Flick and Rangiah JJ, Logan J agreeing); Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929; (2001) 192 ALR 71 at [62] (Gyles J).

45    The apparent merits of the proposed grounds of review are relevant because it would ordinarily be contrary to the administration of justice to extend time for a proceeding which is bound to fail. However, as Lee J explained in NDMS at [61], the converse does not follow:

… The identification of an arguable, or even a strong, ground does not of itself establish that an extension is necessary. Were it otherwise, the statutory limitation period would have little work to do whenever a proposed applicant could disclose a serious question for determination.

46    Given the length of the delay and the lack of satisfactory explanation for it, I consider it necessary to evaluate the strength of those grounds in order to be satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice for an extension to be granted. In order to grant an extension of time in the circumstances of the length of the delay and inadequate explanation for the delay, I consider it appropriate to adopt the approach of Kennett J in BQNZ and consider whether the applicant’s substantive case is clearly very strong, to the extent that an obvious injustice would be perpetuated if the Tribunal’s decision were not set aside.

Strength of the proposed grounds

Ground 1 (Best interests of minor children)

47    Paragraph 8.4(1) of Direction 110 provides:

Decision-makers must make a determination about whether cancellation or refusal under section 501, or non-revocation under section 501CA is, or is not, in the best interests of a child affected by the decision.

48    The Tribunal found that the applicant has one minor child. The Tribunal recorded its conclusions concerning the best interests of that minor child in the following terms:

[91]    The evidence given to the Tribunal strongly suggests that if the applicant were to be removed from Australia, his wife, and children, including MN, would accompany him, regardless of the destination. While this would alleviate any concerns arising as a consequence of a potential separation, I also consider that it would not be in the best interests of MN, who has resided in Australia all his life and is about to enter his fifth year of schooling, to be uprooted. This would weigh heavily against exercising the discretion to refuse applicant’s visa. On the other hand, as I have noted above and further below, at present, the applicant’s removal to a third country is only a contingent possibility and he is likely to remain in Australia with his family on his BVR for an undetermined period.

[92]    Overall, I find that the primary consideration in paragraph 8.4 of the Direction weighs against the discretion to refuse the applicant’s visa, but only moderately.

49    By proposed ground 1, the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to make a determination about whether refusal of the applicant’s Partner Visa was in the best interests of the minor child. The applicant submits that instead of making the required determination, the Tribunal surveyed the evidence relating to the interests of the child in applying para 8.4(4) of Direction 110, “conflated” its position and concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to remain with his father. The applicant further contends that the Tribunal conflated its assessment of weight with its evaluation of what decision was in the best interests of the minor child.

50    The applicant’s contention is weak. The applicant’s contention rests upon the Tribunal’s phraseology of “weighs against”. Read in context, the Tribunal was saying no more than that the best interests of the minor child did not support a refusal of the Partner Visa. Accordingly, the Tribunal made the assessment required by para 8.4. The Tribunal considered that it was in the best interests of the child to remain with his father in Australia. Because there was a possibility (even though not a reasonably foreseeable one at present) that if the Partner Visa were not granted, the applicant might be removed from Australia, the Tribunal considered that it was in the best interests of the minor child for the applicant to be granted a permanent visa. However, because the prospect of the applicant being removed from Australia was no more than a contingent possibility, the Tribunal attached moderate weight to this factor (as weighing against a refusal decision).

51    Proposed ground 1 is not sufficiently meritorious to warrant the grant of an extension of time to make an application to the Court for review.

Ground 2 (Denial of procedural fairness)

52    By proposed ground 2, the applicant contends that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by diminishing the weight the Tribunal accorded to the considerations of “ties to the community” and “best interests of minor children in Australia”, by reason of the fact that the applicant would remain in Australia for the foreseeable future even if his application for a Partner Visa was refused, without informing the applicant that such reasoning might be applied. The applicant contends that the Tribunal reached an adverse conclusion which would not have been obvious on the material. This was said to be procedurally unfair, particularly because the applicant was self-represented before the Tribunal. The denial of procedural fairness was said to be a denial of an opportunity to persuade the Tribunal that it ought not to reason in this way in relation to weight.

53    The Tribunal was under an obligation to ensure that the applicant was informed of the case against him and have the opportunity to address that case. For example, this required the Tribunal to put adverse information which would not be obvious to the applicant and which was credible, relevant and significant to the decision to be made: Snedden v Minister for Justice for the Commonwealth [2014] FCAFC 156; (2014) FCR 82 at [175]–[176] (Middleton and Wigney JJ). But the obligation to accord procedural fairness does not require the Tribunal to provide a running commentary on its process of reasoning as that reasoning develops.

54    This proposed ground of review is weak. The weight to be attached to the considerations in Direction 110 are matters for the Tribunal. The Tribunal was not required to discuss its reasoning process in relation to how it proposed to weigh the considerations with the applicant in advance of making its decision. The Tribunal’s reasoning is consistent with the uncontroversial fact that the decision to refuse the grant of a visa ordinarily affects those considerations by reason of the fact that refusal usually results in the separation of the non-citizen from the Australian community. The Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to the weight to be accorded to the best interests of minor children and ties to the Australian community considerations in this case were premised on factual findings (about the risk of removal, that the applicant was the holder of a BVR and residing in the community) that the applicant does not seek to contest.

55    The merits of proposed ground 2 are not of sufficient strength so as to warrant an extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice in the circumstances of the inordinate delay and the absence of a satisfactory explanation for that delay.

Ground 3 (Failure to comply with para 8.1.2)

56    Paragraph 8.1.2 of Direction 110 requires the Tribunal to consider the risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.

57    By proposed ground 3, the applicant contends that the Tribunal erred in considering the risk to the Australian community by failing to undertake a comparative risk assessment if the applicant was granted the Partner Visa with if the applicant was refused that visa, given that the applicant would remain in the Australian community irrespective of whether the Partner Visa was granted.

58    By his written submissions, the applicant contended that:

(1)    Paragraph 8.1.2 required a comparative risk assessment to be undertaken. The Tribunal failed to undertake this task by failing to consider the risk to the community from the grant of the Partner Visa as compared to the risk to the community of the applicant remaining on a BVR if the Partner Visa was refused.

(2)    If there is little or no difference to the risk to the community between those two scenarios, “the weight to be given to the “risk” consideration needs to be examined accordingly”. By written submissions, the applicant contended that it was “difficult to understand what distinction could properly have been drawn between the permanence of the [P]artner [V]isa, and the non-permanent/transience of the BVR” where the BVR might result in the applicant remaining in the community “well beyond the reasonably foreseeable future”. It was submitted that if a person holds a BVR and there is not any reasonably foreseeable possibility of removal, the person will remain in the community and refusing to grant some other visa “will not do much to protect the community from that person”.

59    Although not expressed in the following terms, the import conveyed by this second contention is that if the Tribunal had undertaken the risk assessment, it could not have logically reached the conclusion that the consideration of risk (and protection of the Australian community) weighed in favour of refusal to grant the Partner Visa in circumstances where the applicant would remain in the community in any event. The implication of the second contention is that the only logical conclusion that could be reached was that this consideration of risk weighed neutrally. The applicant referenced the observations of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v DVRL [2026] FCAFC 73; (2026) 316 FCR 477 at [88] (Lenehan J, Perry and Stellios JJ agreeing).

60    The applicant did not develop the second contention at hearing. The import of the second contention appears inconsistent with the High Court’s decision in EGH19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] HCA 33 (Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ). Although the High Court was there concerned with a decision to refuse to revoke the cancellation of a visa, the statements by the High Court apply equally to a decision to refuse to grant a visa. Relevantly, the High Court stated (emphasis added, footnotes omitted):

[67]    First, contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, cancellation of a visa may serve the purpose of protecting the Australian community even though removal from Australia may not be reasonably practicable at the time the decision is made. The Act creates an enforceable duty to remove an unlawful non-citizen from Australia “as soon as reasonably practicable” in a range of specified circumstances, and a duty to detain such persons pending removal. As this Court held in NZYQ, executive detention of an alien who has failed to obtain permission to remain in Australia ceases to be lawful when there is “no real prospect of removal of the alien from Australia becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future”. However, the power to detain will be re-enlivened if and when a state of facts comes to exist giving rise to a real prospect of the alien’s removal from Australia becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future. Visa cancellation ensures that such persons are available for removal if it becomes reasonably practicable and may therefore serve the purpose of protecting the Australian community, even though removal from Australia may not be reasonably practicable at the time the decision is made. In the interim, a bridging visa such as a BVR may be granted subject to conditions aimed at protecting the Australian community.

[68]    Second, and in any event, there was nothing illogical, irrational or unreasonable in the delegate’s assessment of protection of the Australian community as a primary consideration…

…

[70]    In sum, it can be readily inferred that the delegate made the Non-revocation Decision (including the assessment of the protection of the Australian community for the purposes of para 8.1 of Direction No 110) on the understanding and basis that, if the plaintiff’s visa remained cancelled, the plaintiff would be released into the Australian community as the holder of a BVR, which would be subject to conditions.

[71]    Indeed, conditions imposed on a BVR regulate the holder’s conduct in Australia and are designed to offer protection to the Australian community. Those conditions do not apply to the Protection Visa previously held by the plaintiff (which would have been reinstated if a decision to revoke the cancellation had been made). By operation of s 76AAA of the Act, a BVR ceases to be in effect once removal of the plaintiff becomes reasonably practicable because of a third country granting the plaintiff a right to enter and remain in that country. The grant of a BVR made the plaintiff available for removal from Australia, should removal to a third country become reasonably practicable at some future point in time.

61    See also Plaintiff S22/2025 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] HCA 36; (2026) 99 ALJR 1378 at [27] (Gageler CJ, Edelman and Jagot JJ) in relation to an evaluation of the expectations of the Australian community.

62    The applicant appeared to accept, correctly, that the decision of the High Court in EGH19 was contrary to the observations in DVRL at [121] that if there was no difference in risk between the grant of the permanent visa and the BVR, “then (logically) this consideration could not weigh either for or against refusal”. This observation in DVRL at [121] is based on a hypothetical scenario and does not express a principle of law.

63    In support of his first contention, the applicant relies upon the decision of the Full Court in DVRL.

64    The Full Court in DVRL held that the Tribunal in that case had erred in failing to consider the risk to the Australian community if the applicant remained on a BVR as compared to the risk if the applicant was granted a permanent visa. This was in a factual context in which the visa applicant in that case had presented evidence and submissions that the grant of the permanent protection visa would confer benefits on the applicant that would have the effect of reducing his risk of re-offending and that accordingly, the grant of the permanent protection visa would better protect the Australian community than the refusal of that visa and the applicant remaining on a BVR.

65    In the course of reasoning, Lenehan J (with whom Perry and Stellios JJ agreed) considered that:

(1)    DVRL’s preferred case concerned the obligations imposed on the Tribunal by Direction 110. A failure to follow the process of reasoning required by Direction 110 is a species of jurisdictional error as identified by the High Court in LPDT v Minister for Immigration [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 at [34] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ): DVRL at [27]. Direction 110 requires the Tribunal to take into account, as mandatory considerations, the “primary considerations” in para 8 and the “other considerations” in para 9, where those considerations are relevant to the decision. To comply with the Direction, the Tribunal was required to identify which of the considerations were relevant to the particular circumstances of the applicant and to undertake an evaluative assessment weighing those considerations: DVRL at [34].

(2)    In at least some cases, the exercise of the powers conferred by ss 501(1), 501(2) and 501CA of the Act may result in a non-citizen remaining in the Australian community, notwithstanding the fact that the relevant power was exercised “unfavourably” from the perspective of the non-citizen: DVRL at [48]. Although Direction 110 did not expressly address that situation, the text of the Direction is sufficiently open-textured so as to accommodate those circumstances.

(3)    It follows that the evaluative assessment of risk may require attention to more than one scenario. In those circumstances, the decision-maker’s task is to assess the non-citizen’s risk profile by reference to the statutory outcomes that are realistically available: DVRL at [54].

(4)    The Direction must be applied having regard to the circumstances of the particular case: DVRL at [60]–[62]. The assessment of risk to the Australian community must be grounded in evidence dealing with the particular circumstances: DVRL at [63]–[65]. The risk of future harm may be affected by the type of visa being applied for: Direction 110 at para 8.1.2(c); DVRL at [70]. Decision makers must have regard to any risk that may be posed by the non-citizen to the Australian community regardless of whether the risk flows from the grant or refusal to grant the visa applied for: DVRL at [71]. It is not open to decision makers to ignore the risk that arises from refusal of the grant of the visa. However, where the result of the refusal of the visa is that the non-citizen will be removed from the Australian community, the risk associated with refusal may be put to one side: DVRL [73]. Direction 110 does require the evaluation of risk by the Tribunal in a particular way (where that matter is relevant).

(5)    The Tribunal expressly refused to undertake the analysis required by Direction 110, notwithstanding the fact that the case advanced by DVRL made such an analysis centrally relevant.

(6)    Direction 110 imposed a specific obligation to assess the risks associated with each available outcome. Where there is a level of risk on either decisional outcome, the risk should be assessed if the permanent visa was granted as compared to the prevailing risk arising from the applicant being in the community on a BVR. The task of the Tribunal was put in the following terms in DVRL at [87]:

The Tribunal is obliged to do its best to undertake the assessment of risk to the Australian community as required by the Direction. In doing so, it may be obliged to consider substantial issues raised by the material before it, even where those issues are not the subject of submissions by the parties: see Hong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 47 at [66] (Bromwich and Wheelahan JJ); see also PJ [35].

66    Although it did not refer to DVRL, the High Court in EGH19 at [26] recorded that one of the plaintiff’s contentions was that the delegate in that case had mechanically applied para 8.1 of Direction 110 without accounting for the plaintiff’s irremovability, and that a decision maker would need to account for the fact of irremovability in assessing para 8.1 of the Direction: EGH19 at [64]–[65]. Those contentions were rejected by the High Court: EGH19 at [66].

67    As the Full Court emphasised in DVRL, the nature of the evaluation required by Direction 110 depends on the specific circumstances. The circumstances which compelled an explicit and detailed comparative risk analysis in DVRL having regard to the terms of Direction 110 were the following:

(1)    It was common ground in DVRL that refusal of the protection visa in that case would not alter the fact that the applicant in that case would remain living in the community. Each of the available decisional outcomes in that case involved some degree of risk to the community.

(2)    Both the applicant and the Minister advanced submissions squarely directed to matters the Tribunal was required to evaluate under Direction 110, including the risk posed to the Australian community (and, in turn, the comparative services and supports available to the applicant depending on whether he remained in the Australian community on a bridging visa or a protection visa) and the legal consequences of the Tribunal’s decision.

(3)    The material before the Tribunal in DVRL provided the information and evidence on the risk of the non-citizen re-offending which the Tribunal was required to take into account: DVRL at [103]. Before the Tribunal, the applicant had contended that granting him a protection visa would better serve and protect the Australian community (cf refusing to grant him a protection visa and thereby having him remain in the community on a bridging visa) because, chiefly, a protection visa afforded certain benefits which would ultimately reduce his risk of re-offending while the conditions and nature of the BVR were said to have increased his risk features: DVRL at [104]. That contention involved two distinct ideas: the protective benefits of a protection visa and the detrimental effects of the bridging visa. The applicant in DVRL made submissions directly addressing each of the benefits and the detriments as well as indirectly addressing those matters in the submissions made in connection with contentions on other considerations: DVRL at [105]–[108]. The applicant also led expert evidence on the differences in the level of support entitlements under each of the protection visa and the BVR: DVRL at [109].

(4)    The Minister had before the Tribunal addressed the applicant’s case on risk on its merits.

(5)    The Tribunal nonetheless expressly refused to undertake the analysis required by the Direction notwithstanding that the case advanced by the applicant in DVRL made such an analysis centrally relevant: DVRL at [80]. There was no doubt that DVRL advanced a case that granting him a protection visa would reduce the risk to the Australian community.

68    The Full Court in DVRL held that it was part of the Tribunal’s task to assess whether either of the two decisional outcomes (grant of the permanent visa or the applicant remaining in the community on a BVR) gave rise to any real difference in terms of risk. The assessment needs to take account of the manner in which the parties conducted the case before the Tribunal and the materials that were before the Tribunal. Based on the arguments and materials before the Tribunal in DVRL, the evaluative task for the Tribunal in relation to the risk posed by the non-citizen under the two decisional outcomes in that case was comparatively complex. What is necessary to perform the evaluative task identified in DVRL can vary depending on the evidence and arguments before the Tribunal.

69    In the present case, although it was accepted before the Tribunal that the applicant would remain in the community on a BVR if the Partner Visa was not granted, the applicant did not present evidence or arguments in support of a contention that the risk to the Australian community would be lower were he to be granted the Partner Visa as opposed to holding his BVR. Nor did such a submission emerge (even less than clearly) from the materials before the Tribunal. For example, there was nothing in the materials before the Tribunal that suggested that the applicant’s offending was somehow related to levels of stress and that being granted a Partner Visa would in some way address those stress factors in the applicant’s life, thereby mitigating a risk of re-offending. Nor was there any information before the Tribunal about any conditions imposed in connection with the applicant’s BVR that were impacting the applicant. The facts that made the comparative risk analysis of central relevance in DVRL were not present in this case.

70    It is axiomatic that the Tribunal’s reasons must be read fairly and as a whole: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 291 (Kirby J). The Court is not to infer that in dealing sequentially with topics, the Tribunal was unaware of what was to come to be stated later in its reasons: Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2; (2024) 280 CLR 265 at [50].

71    The Tribunal in the present case was clearly alive to the fact that the Partner Visa, if granted, would confer on the applicant a right to remain in Australia permanently: TR [71]. The Tribunal was also clearly alive to the fact that the applicant could not be removed to Pakistan (TR [104]), had been granted a BVR (TR [14], [106]) and had been residing in the community since his release from immigration detention on 14 November 2024 (TR [106], [110]). The Tribunal acknowledged that the applicant’s right to remain in Australia would cease upon the applicant being given notice that his removal was reasonably practicable or he had breached a condition of his visa and that the applicant as a BVR holder was a removal pathway non-citizen. The Tribunal also recognised that:

[108]    A BVR holder under the Act is a ‘removal pathway non-citizen’…

[109]     … in addition to the Minister being able to decide that a non-citizen is no longer a person in respect of whom any protection finding would be made, the government can arrange for the non-citizen to be received by a third country. In other words, while the applicant cannot be removed to Pakistan, arrangements can be made for him to be removed to a third country at some unspecified time in the future…

72    The Tribunal assessed the risk to the Australian community in the following terms (emphasis added):

[70]    On the basis of the evidence already referred to, until relatively shortly prior to his release from prison, the applicant had maintained that the sexual activity with the victim was ‘mutual’ and expressed disagreement with the agreed facts for sentencing. He was assessed in prison as being an ‘average risk’ of committing a further sex offence and there is limited evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the applicant during the period of his imprisonment and detention and following his release into the community. I have significant concerns regarding the applicant’s expressions of remorse with respect to his appreciation of the seriousness of the nature of the offence and his level of culpability. I have found above that the applicant’s remorse is primarily focussed on the suffering and shame he brought to his family and himself. Nevertheless, I consider the torment he has caused and perceives to have caused his family is immense and I am of the view that this factor, as well as the continuing support he is receiving from his family, would significantly reduce any risk of reoffending.

[71]    However, I am also mindful that I must have regard to the Government’s view that the Australian community’s tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases, and that some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable. Given the fact that applicant has applied for a Partner [V]isa, which would enable him to stay in Australia, the nature of harm to individuals or the Australian community if the applicant’s conduct were to be repeated, and considering the fact that there is limited evidence of rehabilitation achieved and that the applicant has spent very little time in the community since his last offence, I am of the view that any risk that the applicant’s conduct may be repeated is unacceptable.

[72]    I find that the primary consideration in paragraph 8.1 weighs significantly in favour of exercising the discretion to refuse the applicant’s visa.

73    The Full Court in DVRL held that it was part of the Tribunal’s task to evaluate risk in respect of the two decisional outcomes. The Tribunal’s reasons in the present case demonstrate that it appreciated that the difference in the applicant being granted a Partner Visa or in continuing to hold a BVR was the difference between him having an entitlement to be in the community permanently, and being in the community for an indefinite and as yet unknown period, but with no right to remain in Australia permanently.

74    There are a number of dimensions to risk. One dimension is the possibility or likelihood of re-offending. Another is the consequence to the community if re-offending occurs. Yet another dimension of risk is the duration of the period of time in which the community is exposed to the possibility or likelihood of re-offending: see for example, Asad v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1477 at [48] (Bromwich J).

75    The Tribunal assessed the risk posed by the applicant if the Partner Visa was granted in terms of the nature of the harm that would follow if the applicant were to reoffend, the likelihood of re-offending and in terms of the duration of the community’s exposure to that risk of re-offending. Although the Tribunal did not express a view on differences in risk based on the likelihood of re-offending, the Tribunal’s reasons recognised that the grant of the Partner Visa would result in the applicant having an entitlement to remain in Australia. Reading the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole, it is open to conclude that the Tribunal’s assessment of risk took into account the fact that the grant of the Partner Visa created a permanent risk in circumstances where the Tribunal recognised that the applicant’s BVR had at least the potential for non-permanence.

76    Read as a whole, in circumstances where there was nothing in the materials before the Tribunal that suggested that holding the BVR would increase the risk to the community in terms of the likelihood of reoffending, or that holding the permanent Partner Visa would decrease that risk to the community, it is not clearly obvious that the Tribunal failed to perform the task required of it. It is open to conclude that the Tribunal considered that the protection of the Australian community was promoted by the refusal of the Partner Visa because of the prospect (albeit not in the reasonably foreseeable future) of the applicant’s removal if the Partner Visa was not granted and the applicant remained on his BVR. There is a reasonable basis to conclude that inferentially, the Tribunal comparatively assessed the risk to the Australian community from the grant of a Partner Visa as opposed to the applicant remaining in the community on a BVR based on the permanent nature of the Partner Visa compared to the non-permanent nature of the applicant’s BVR.

77    Whilst it may be open to construct an argument based on DVRL, I do not consider that there is a strong case that the decision in DVRL results in a conclusion that the Tribunal in the present case clearly failed to perform the task required by Direction 110 or that the Tribunal failed to undertake the consideration of the matter referred to in para 8.1.2, particularly having regard to the facts, materials and submissions before the Tribunal.

78    I am not satisfied that an extension of time of more than nine months, in the circumstances where the explanation for the delay is inadequate, is justified by ground 3 of the proposed substantive application.

Conclusion

79    For the reasons given above, the circumstances in this case do not justify a grant of an extension of time in the order of more than nine months. The applicant had been aware since the middle of March 2025 of the time limits for an application and there is no satisfactory explanation for the lengthy delay. In these circumstances, the strength of the proposed grounds do not justify an extension of the length sought in the interests of the administration of justice. The application for an extension of time is to be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding seventy-nine (79) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hespe.

Associate:

Dated:    13 November 2026