Federal Court of Australia
Stojkovic, in the matter of MSS Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1719
File number(s): | VID 866 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | MCELWAINE J |
Date of judgment: | 16 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | CORPORATIONS – application under s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) for leave to manage a trustee company – company acts as trustee for a self-managed superannuation fund – plaintiff previously operated companies now in liquidation – personal guarantees – substantial debts owing to creditors including the Australian Taxation Office – trail of corporate destruction – insufficient evidence concerning circumstances of business failures – whether plaintiff understands the responsibilities of a director – held not satisfied that exception to statutory prohibition is justified – application refused |
Legislation: | Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 197, 206B(3), 206G(1)(c) Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), ss 120(1)(b), 126J(1)(b), 126K(4) Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), Sch 1 ss 269-5, 269-15 |
Cases cited: | Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd & Ample Funds Ltd [1995] FCA 1663; (1995) 62 FCR 504 Frigger, in the matter of an application by Frigger [2019] FCA 1730; (2019) 139 ACSR 329 Lu, in the matter of Lu [2026] FCA 841 Wake, in the matter of Wake (Bankrupt) [2025] FCA 1481 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Victoria |
National Practice Area: | Commercial and Corporations |
Sub-area: | Corporations and Corporate Insolvency |
Number of paragraphs: | 20 |
Date of last submission/s: | 21 October 2026 |
Date of hearing: | Determined on the papers |
Counsel for the Plaintiff: | The Plaintiff was self-represented |
ORDERS
VID 866 of 2026 | ||
IN THE MATTER OF MSS SUPERANNUATION FUND PTY LTD ACN 649 303 417 | ||
MICHAEL STOJKOVIC Plaintiff | ||
ORDER MADE BY: | MCELWAINE J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 16 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The originating application is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCELWAINE J:
1 The plaintiff, Michael Stojkovic, is an undischarged bankrupt who presented a debtor’s petition on 19 October 2025. A consequence is that he was automatically disqualified from managing corporations: s 206B(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). By application lodged on 24 July 2026, he seeks leave pursuant to s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act and s 126J(1)(b) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (SIS Act) permitting him to manage the MSS Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (company) for the limited purpose of the company acting as the corporate trustee of the MSS Superannuation Fund. His current trustee in bankruptcy is Andrew Scott.
2 The plaintiff is competently self-represented. His application is unopposed. He agreed at a case management hearing that I would determine the application on the papers. He relies on his affidavits of 23 July and 20 October 2026 and his written submissions of 20 October 2026, lodged on 21 October 2026.
3 The plaintiff previously operated a number of construction companies which have been wound up. His evidence is that the “relevant construction business experienced significant commercial and economic pressures, including disruption from COVID-19, significant increases in construction and material costs, supply-chain disruption, and a slowdown in available construction work” that “ultimately resulted in the company’s liquidation and my subsequent bankruptcy”. He had provided personal guarantees in connection with the businesses which he was unable to meet. The personal guarantees and taxation debts added to approximately $13.3 million. He submits that those commercial circumstances remain relevant to the assessment of his suitability to manage the company for the limited purpose of its acting as trustee of the Fund.
4 The Fund was established by deed dated 8 April 2021. It is a self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF), which according to the accounts as at 30 June 2025, has net assets of $580,063, primarily comprising real estate and bank deposits. The plaintiff is the sole member of the Fund, with an accumulated balance equal to the net assets.
5 The company was incorporated on 8 April 2021. The plaintiff is the only shareholder. The current director is Dejan Stojkovic, who was appointed on 5 February 2026. There is an obvious though unexplained familial relationship. Dejan Stojkovic was not previously concerned with the affairs of the company and on 5 July 2026 signed a document to the effect that he does not oppose the application. The plaintiff has served the application on Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and his trustee. There is no opposition to the application from the regulators or the trustee.
6 In his statement of affairs dated 19 October 2025 (SOA), the plaintiff disclosed that he began experiencing financial difficulties in October 2024. He has not previously been bankrupt. He listed his unsecured creditors as totalling approximately $13.3 million, with the primary debt owed in his capacity as guarantor of approximately $9.6 million. He also listed an outstanding liability to the ATO of approximately $474,000. He did not list any material assets.
7 Section 206G of the Corporations Act permits a person who is disqualified from managing a corporation to apply to the court for leave to manage, inter alia, a particular corporation if the person is not disqualified by ASIC. The plaintiff is not a disqualified person within the meaning of that exception. A bankrupt is a disqualified person for the purposes of the SIS Act (s 120(1)(b)) and is therefore prohibited from acting as a responsible officer (which includes being a director) of a body corporate that is a trustee of a superannuation entity: s 126K(4). Despite disqualification, a person may apply to this Court pursuant to s 126J for an order that the person is not a disqualified person. Justice Halley very usefully summarised the principles relevant to each discretion in Lu, in the matter of Lu [2026] FCA 841, drawing principally upon Wake, in the matter of Wake (Bankrupt) [2025] FCA 1481, McDonald J and Frigger, in the matter of an application by Frigger [2019] FCA 1730; (2019) 139 ACSR 329, Jackson J.
8 I proceed conformably with the views of McDonald J in Wake and Halley J in Lu that relief is available under s 126J of the SIS Act, notwithstanding the operation of s 126G of the SIS Act, which applies the Subdivision to APRA as the relevant regulator of SMSFs.
9 The plaintiff seeks limited leave to manage only the company as trustee of the Fund and is content that if leave is granted it be so limited.
10 A matter of initial concern is a Director Penalty Notice (DPN) issued by the ATO on 5 May 2025. It relates to the GST liability of VCON Group Pty Ltd and two periods of Business Activity Statements. The first is for the period 1 January 2023 to 31 March 2023 where the net disclosed amount was $213,749 and the amount the Commissioner of Taxation considered unpaid was $30,545. The second is for the period 1 April 2023 to 30 June 2023 where the net disclosed amount was $671,421 and the amount the Commissioner considered unpaid was $443,773. Section 269-15 of Schedule 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) imposes liability upon the directors of the corporation to ensure that it complies with, inter alia, its obligations under Divisions 33 and 35 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth): s 269-5. The plaintiff “submits” in his affidavit evidence:
I acknowledge that the ATO Director Penalty Notice asserts that I failed to discharge a director obligation under section 269-15 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) and identifies the resulting director penalties. The notice does not expressly allege dishonesty, fraud, phoenix activity, misuse of company property, misuse of superannuation assets or illegal early release of superannuation benefits.
11 He provides no other explanation of the circumstances which caused the failure of VCON Group to comply with the obligation to account to the Commissioner for the net amount of GST payable between 1 January and 30 June 2023. Asserting that the DPN does not allege fraud or dishonesty is not to the point. As a director of VCON Group, the plaintiff managed a corporation that for a substantial period failed to meet its taxation obligations.
12 Further, the plaintiff’s affidavit evidence pays scant attention to the circumstances that caused the insolvency of VCON Group. He asserts more than once that the cause of his bankruptcy was not fraud, dishonesty or misconduct. Beyond that assertion, the plaintiff has not provided useful evidence that permits me to assess whether he is a suitable person to manage a corporation that is trustee of a SMSF. In relation to s 206G of the Corporations Act, Jackson J observed in Frigger at [8] – [12]:
In Re Altim Pty Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 762 at 764, Street J identified the fundamental principles which informed the court’s discretion under a statutory predecessor to s 206G as follows:
The section under which this application is made proceeds upon the basis that a person who is an undischarged bankrupt is prima facie not to be permitted to act as a director or to take part in the management of a company. The Court is given jurisdiction to grant leave for such activities to be carried on, but an applicant who comes to the Court seeking leave must bear the onus of establishing that the general policy of the Legislature laid down in this section ought to be made the subject of an exception in his case. It should be borne in mind that the section is not in any sense a punishment of the bankrupt. Nor should a refusal to grant leave under the section be regarded as punitive. The prohibition is entirely protective, and the power of the Court to grant leave is to be exercised with this consideration in the forefront.
Even in the absence of a contradictor it is for the applicants for leave to place before the court evidence in appropriate form that is capable of satisfying the court that, in the given case, an exception should be made to the legislative policy underlying the prohibition in the Act. ASIC’s absence is not necessarily to be given significant weight: Watts, in the matter of Watts [2011] FCA 1185; (2011) 284 ALR 403 at [18] (Yates J).
Generally, before it can lift the disqualification the court needs to know what the applicants propose to do by way of corporate management, although this may not be necessary if the application is for leave to take part in the management of a specified corporation or corporations: Re Shneider (1996) 71 FCR 69 at 73 (Drummond J). In those cases the court will consider the structure of the companies, the nature of their businesses and the interests of their shareholders, creditors and employees, and any risks to those persons or to the public which may be involved in the applicants assuming positions on the board or in management: Adams v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] FCA 557; (2003) 46 ACSR 68 at [8] (Lindgren J).
As one would expect, the attitude of the shareholders to the application can be a relevant factor: see e.g. Jansen v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] FCA 1564 at [12] and [14] (Mansfield J).
The court will also look to the circumstances in which the debts giving rise to the bankruptcy were not paid, and the extent to which an applicant has cooperated with the trustee in bankruptcy: GRD v BJD [2018] WASC 374 at [12] (Master Sanderson), applying Chye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] FCA 1405 (Bromberg J).
13 As to s 126J of the SIS Act, Halley J in Lu at [65] – [66] observed:
It is well established that in applying s 126J of the SIS Act, the Court is entitled to have regard to the principles relevant to s 206G of the Corporations Act and the principal object of the SIS Act, as set out in s 3 of the SIS Act, to make provision for the prudent management and supervision of superannuation entities: Porter, Application under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 [2012] FCA 1431 at [29] – [31] (Foster J).
The principal considerations in applications under s 206G(1)(c) of the Corporations Act and s 126J(1)(b) of the SIS Act are the interests of the shareholders, creditors and employees of the relevant company, and the public at large. Other considerations that might be relevant include the protection of the public, the nature and reasons for the disqualification, the potential for the conduct giving rising to the disqualification to be repeated, the risk for the survival of the company, and, insofar as bankruptcy is involved, the circumstances in which the debts arose and the extent to which the bankrupt has co-operated with their trustee: Macalister at [21], citing Frigger at [34] and GFD v BJD [2019] WASC 374 at [11] – [12].
14 The plaintiff’s evidence falls well short of satisfying me as to these matters. There are no annual accounts for VCON Group. There is no statutory report of the liquidator of VCON Group, which was wound up on 6 December 2024. From the limited corporate information that can be discerned in the SOA, the plaintiff was a director of several corporations, most of which have entered into liquidation. Total Construction Solutions Pty Ltd ceased trading on 1 July 2020 with assets of $16 and liabilities of $22,000. Then a number of corporations were wound up on 12 March 2025: V-Struct Pty Ltd, V-Struct Projects Pty Ltd, V-Struct Projects (No 1) Pty Ltd, V-Struct Projects (No 2) Pty Ltd, V-Struct Projects (No 3) Pty Ltd, V-Struct (Aus) Pty Ltd. Two companies, VCON Group (sic), VCON (Aust) Pty Ltd were would up on 6 December 2024. And Element Five (Aust) Pty Ltd was would up on 13 March 2025.
15 This trail of corporate destruction weighs very heavily against a finding that the plaintiff is a person who understands the obligations and responsibilities of a director. There is also the huge quantum of disclosed debts of the corporate entities that the plaintiff guaranteed and which, on his account, caused his bankruptcy. The SOA reveals:
Type of unsecured debt | Creditor’s name | Amount owed |
Personal guarantee of company debts | AssetInsure | $9,680,753 |
Personal guarantee of company debts | FCP Corporate | $1,419,710 |
Personal guarantee of company debts | Boral Resources Vic | $109,977 |
Personal guarantee of company debts | Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance | $1,511,201 |
Personal guarantee of company debts | Finance One Commercial | $16,693 |
Personal guarantee of company debts | Shift Finance Australia | $74,679 |
Personal guarantee of company debts | Mesh & Bar | $18,081 |
Tax | ATO | $474,318 |
Tax | ATO | $[not stated] |
Personal guarantee of company debts | VMIA | $[not stated] |
Employee wages/superannuation | FEG Fair Entitlements Guarantee | $[not stated] |
Other – Insolvent trading and any other claims arising from the liquidation – disputed | VCON Group, V-Struct, V-Struct Projects, V-Struct Projects (No 1), V-Struct Projects (No 2), V-Struct Projects (No 3), Element Five (Aust), V-Struct (Aust), VCON (Aust) | $[not stated] |
Total | $13,305,412 |
16 Of course, that is not evidence of all the outstanding liabilities of the corporate group. Inferentially, the debts of the group were much larger.
17 The plaintiff has not addressed in evidence the circumstances of the incurring of those debts by the corporations, what (if any) steps he took to prevent the debts from being incurred and whether any of the corporations of which he was a director traded whilst insolvent. At the very least, the plaintiff should have placed before me this basic evidence, which could have been in the form of statutory reports of the liquidators.
18 Whilst I accept that the plaintiff served the application and his first affidavit on ASIC and the ATO, and neither has appeared to oppose, that hardly addresses the lacuna in the evidence. ASIC, on 13 August 2026 in a letter addressed to the plaintiff, simply stated that upon review of the documents it “neither opposes nor consents to the Application”. The Commissioner of Taxation likewise advised the plaintiff in an email of 8 October 2026. The officers who authored each advice were not concerned to interrogate the matters that inform the exercise of discretions conferred on this Court.
19 I simply do not accept as credible the plaintiff’s conclusory assertions in his affidavits that his companies experienced financial difficulty because of external factors. That gives rise to the principal question: to what extent, in what circumstances and did the plaintiff’s management contribute? The plaintiff’s evidence fails to grapple with and explain why in the future I should not be concerned about his fitness to once again be involved in the management of a corporation, despite the trail of corporate destruction and massive debts that were run up on his watch. On the evidence available, the public must be protected from the management of another company by the plaintiff even where the only purpose is to act as trustee of a SMSF. A director of a trustee corporation is liable pursuant to s 197 of the Corporations Act to personally discharge liabilities incurred by the company as trustee, where the company cannot discharge the liabilities, and for reasons specified in s 197(1)(b), is not entitled to be fully indemnified out of trust assets. Further, as explained by Finn J in Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd & Ample Funds Ltd [1995] FCA 1663; (1995) 62 FCR 504 at 517, when directors of a trustee company are concerned in a breach of trust of their company “they are liable to the company according to the same standard of care and caution as is expected of the company itself”.
20 For these reasons, the plaintiff has failed to discharge his evidentiary onus of satisfying me that this is a proper case to exercise the discretions at s 206G of the Corporations Act and s 126J of the SIS Act.
I certify that the preceding twenty (20) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McElwaine. |
Associate:
Dated: 16 November 2026