Federal Court of Australia
ESX21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1717
Appeal from: | ESX21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 58 |
File number: | WAD 53 of 2023 |
Judgment of: | FEUTRILL J |
Date of judgment: | 13 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | MIGRATION – appeal – judicial review – decision by Administrative Appeals Tribunal not to adjourn hearing following non-attendance by appellants’ representative – whether failure to adjourn hearing legally unreasonable |
Legislation: | Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 3, ss 5, 5H, 5J, 36, 65, 496, 499; (former Pt 7, Div 4; ss 276, 277, 280, 411, 420, 422B, 425, 426, 427, 429A, 441G) |
Cases cited: | BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 40; 163 ALD 127 Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill [1991] HCA 28; 172 CLR 319 Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; 213 CLR 543 Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; 177 CLR 292 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 67; 201 CLR 49 Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52; 165 CLR 543 Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 267 FCR 628 Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181; 64 NSWLR 561 Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; 241 CLR 594 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41; 183 FCR 575 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR [2003] FCAFC 126; 128 FCR 553 New South Wales v Canellis [1994] HCA 51; 181 CLR 309 Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1265; 101 FCR 20 Re Farnaby v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2007] AATA 1792; 97 ALD 788 SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 64; 159 FCR 1 WABZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 30; 134 FCR 271 Waterford v Commonwealth [1987] HCA 26; 163 CLR 54 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Western Australia |
National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |
Number of paragraphs: | 46 |
Date of hearing: | 20 October 2026 |
Counsel for the Appellants: | Mr S Stagliorio |
Solicitor for the Appellants: | Hayden Lawyers and Associates |
Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr T Liu |
Solicitor for the First Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
Counsel for the Second Respondent: | The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs |
ORDERS
WAD 53 of 2023 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | ESX21 First Appellant ESY21 Second Appellant | |
AND: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS First Respondent ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL Second Respondent | |
order made by: | FEUTRILL J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 13 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The first respondent’s name be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
2. The second respondent’s name be amended to ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. The orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) pronounced on 6 February 2023 be set aside and in lieu thereof there be the following orders.
1. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 3 December 2021.
2. A writ of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to determine the applicants’ application for review filed on 4 January 2018 according to law.
3. The first respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the proceeding, if any, to be taxed if not agreed.
5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FEUTRILL J:
Introduction
1 The appellants are a married couple who are citizens of Vietnam. They originally entered Australia in 2011 on working visas and worked as farm labourers. In May 2017 the wife applied for a protection visa with the husband as the secondary applicant. In 2018 a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refused to grant the visas and the appellants applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of that decision under Pt 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). In December 2021 a member of the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision and the appellants applied to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for judicial review of the Tribunal decision. In February 2023 a judge of the Circuit Court dismissed that application: ESX21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 58 (J). This proceeding is an appeal from that judgment. (All references in these reasons to sections, Parts or Divisions are references to the Migration Act unless otherwise stated.)
2 The Tribunal accepted that the wife would be subject to discrimination in Vietnam on the ground that she was the child of a person (her father) who had been an employee of the government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and, in effect, collaborated with the government of the United States of America during the Vietnam War. As a consequence, the wife was discriminated against in that she was denied employment as a police officer in Vietnam. However, the Tribunal found that the wife was not denied the ability to subsist and the kind of discrimination to which she was likely to be subject ‘did not rise to the level of persecution’. As a consequence, the wife did not meet the criteria for a refugee protection visa described in s 36(2)(a). The Tribunal also found that the relevant discrimination was not ‘significant harm’ and, therefore, the wife also did not meet the criteria for a complementary protection visa described in s 36(2)(aa).
3 The appellants were represented in the Tribunal by an Australian legal practitioner as was permitted under the applicable provisions of the Act. After the Tribunal invited the appellants to attend a hearing to give evidence and present arguments, the appellants’ lawyer was not available on the listing date and not in attendance at the hearing on that date. Although the Tribunal had earlier refused an application to adjourn the hearing to a date upon which the lawyer would be available, the lawyer’s non-attendance at the hearing was unexpected from the perspective of the appellants. The appellants made no application to adjourn the hearing and the Tribunal did not exercise its power to do so on its own motion.
4 In the proceeding before the primary judge the appellants advanced three grounds of review:
(1) the Tribunal had concluded that the relevant discrimination was not ‘significant harm’ without separately considering and applying the criteria in s 36(2)(aa) and (or) had misconstrued and misapplied s 36(2)(aa);
(2) the Tribunal had failed to accord the appellants procedural fairness in that they were not afforded an opportunity to make submissions to the Tribunal regarding the necessity for them to be represented by their lawyer at the hearing; and
(3) in circumstances in which they were not aware that their lawyer would not be attending the hearing, it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal not to have adjourned the hearing.
The primary judge dismissed each of these grounds of review. In the notice of appeal the appellants essentially contend the primary judge erred in failing to accept one or more of the grounds of judicial review.
5 For the reasons that follow, the primary judge made an error of law in dismissing ground 3 of the application for judicial review. The failure of the Tribunal to exercise its power under s 427(1)(b) of the Act to adjourn the hearing, in all the circumstances of this case, was legally unreasonable. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the other grounds of appeal.
Statutory framework
6 At the relevant time, if the Minister was satisfied that an applicant for a protection visa was a non-citizen in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations because the person was a refugee, the Minister was obliged to grant the applicant a protection visa (refugee protection criteria): s 65(1), s 36(2)(a). Relevantly, a person was a refugee where that person was outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, was unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country: s 5H(1), s 5J(1). Alternatively, if the Minister was satisfied that the visa applicant was a non-citizen in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations because the Minister had substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there was a real risk that the non-citizen would suffer ‘significant harm’, the Minister was obliged to grant the applicant a protection visa (complementary protection criteria): ss 65(1), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A) (definition of ‘significant harm’), 5 (other relevant definitions). The powers of the Minister under these provisions could have been, and were usually, delegated to another person and exercised by the delegate in accordance with written directions of the Minister: s 496(1), s 499(1). Part 7 made provision for the review by the Tribunal of Part 7-reviewable decisions. Relevantly, a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant a protection visa under s 36 and s 65 of the Act was a Part 7-reviewable decision: s 411(1)(c).
7 On a Pt 7 review the Tribunal was not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence and was required to ‘act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case’: s 420. Part 7 Div 4 contained certain provisions relating to the procedure the Tribunal was to employ in the conduct of the review. The provisions of that Division were taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it dealt with: s 422B(1). But, in applying that Division, the Tribunal was required to act in a way that was ‘fair and just’: s 422B(3).
8 The Tribunal was required to invite the visa applicant to appear before the Tribunal and give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review: s 425(1). The visa applicant was entitled to give the Tribunal written notice that the person wanted the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from a person or persons named in the notice: s 426(2). The Tribunal was required to have regard to the visa applicant’s wishes, but was not required to obtain evidence (orally or otherwise) from a person named in the visa applicant’s notice: s 426(3). Power was conferred on the Tribunal to allow the giving of evidence by telephone or any other means of communication: s 429A. Section 427(1)(b) provided that ‘[f]or the purpose of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may adjourn the review from time to time’. A person appearing before the Tribunal to give evidence was not entitled to be represented before the Tribunal by any other person: s 427(6).
9 If the review applicant gave the Tribunal written notice that another person was authorised by the applicant to receive documents in connection with the review, the Tribunal was required to give the authorised recipient (representative) any document that it would otherwise have given to the applicant and, in so doing, the Tribunal was taken to have given the document to the applicant: s 441G(1)-(2). Subject to certain exceptions, Pt 3 of the Act prohibited a person who was not a registered migration agent from giving immigration assistance and charging fees for immigration assistance or immigration representations: s 280(1), s 276(1). The prohibitions did not apply to an Australian legal practitioner giving immigration assistance and charging fees in connection with legal practice: s 280(3).
Applicable legal principles
10 What was ‘fair and just’ for the purposes of s 422B(3) was to be ascertained by reference to the actions of the Tribunal in the conduct of a Pt 7 review. The actions of the Tribunal may have involved a step taken in the satisfaction of a duty imposed by Pt 7 Div 4 and may have been the exercise of a discretion such as the discretion under s 427(1)(b) (to adjourn the review). What was fair and just may be discerned, to an extent, from the purpose of the provision which required that an act be done or which conferred a discretionary power on the Tribunal to perform the act, as well as from the purpose of surrounding provisions and Div 4 as a whole. The duty to invite the visa applicant to appear before the Tribunal was central to Div 4 and the review for which that Division made provision. Therefore, the concept of what was fair and just extended to more than merely issuing an invitation, but to giving effect to the evident purpose of that invitation which was to afford the visa applicant a meaningful chance to present his or her protection claim. In that context, if a visa applicant was not provided an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments, it might be concluded that the hearing contemplated by s 425 did not take place and the exercise of the power of review was not authorised: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 at [58]-[62] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (although dealing with the former Pt 5 of the Act, their Honours’ reasoning is equally applicable to the former Pt 7). Put another way, s 425 imposed on the Tribunal a statutory obligation to provide a ‘real and meaningful’ invitation: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR [2003] FCAFC 126; 128 FCR 553 at [37] (Gray, Cooper and Selway JJ).
11 It follows that the exercise of the discretionary power in s 427(1) in a manner that deprived a visa applicant of a meaningful chance to present his or her protection claim under s 425(1) may have resulted in a failure to accord a visa applicant procedural fairness within the exhaustive requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in Div 4. Further, such a failure may have resulted in a failure to conduct the review according to law and the former Pt 7 of the Act and constituted jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437 at [50]-[52] (Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ).
12 Separately, it is implicit that Parliament intended that the discretionary power conferred on the Tribunal by s 427(1)(b) be exercised reasonably: Li at [29] (French CJ), [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), [88] (Gageler J). There are two contexts in which the standard of legal unreasonableness in administrative decision-making is employed. Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a court exercising supervisory jurisdiction after identification of a particular jurisdictional error in the decision-making process. Various well-recognised categories of jurisdictional error such as: mistakenly asserting or denying the existence of jurisdiction; misapprehending or disregarding the nature or limits of functions or powers where jurisdiction otherwise exists; failing to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration; taking into account a consideration required to be disregarded; bias; fraud; and bad faith, are all particular kinds of errors that may also be described as legally unreasonable. However, legal unreasonableness can also be outcome focussed without necessarily identifying any particular jurisdictional error. The latter occurs within ‘an area of decisional freedom’, but has the character of a decision that is ‘arbitrary, capricious or without common sense’. In circumstances of legal unreasonableness in outcome, a court exercising supervisory jurisdiction may infer jurisdictional error because the manner in which the decision was arrived at according to law cannot be identified. The exercise of the power may be regarded as lacking ‘an evident and intelligible justification’: Singh at [44]; Li at [27]-[28], [72], [105].
13 Where no reasons for the decision under review have been given by the decision-maker, all a supervising court can do is focus on the outcome of the exercise of power in the factual context presented and assess whether the outcome is justified or intelligible according to law. However, where reasons are given, a supervising court is able to follow the reasoning process of the decision-maker through and identify any divergence, or any factors, in the reasons that make the exercise of the power legally unreasonable. The ‘intelligible justification’ should lie in the reasons given for the exercise of the power, at least, where a discretionary power is involved. ‘Where there are reasons, either the reasons given by the decision-maker demonstrate a justification or they do not. It would … be a rare case where the reasons demonstrate a justification but the ultimate exercise of the power would be seen to be legally unreasonable’: Singh at [45]-[47].
14 In Singh the Full Court made the following further important and apposite observations:
48 The standard of legal reasonableness will apply across a range of statutory powers, but the indicia of legal unreasonableness will need to be found in the scope, subject and purpose of the particular statutory provisions in issue in any given case. As we have said, unlike some other grounds for review of the exercise of power, the reasoning process in review for legal unreasonableness will inevitably be fact dependent. That is not to diminish the importance of the supervising court maintaining an approach which does not involve the substitution of its own judgment for that of the decision-maker. Rather, it is to recognise that any analysis which involves concepts such as “intelligible justification” must involve scrutiny of the factual circumstances in which the power comes to be exercised.
49 In the case of discretionary powers vested in either the Refugee Review Tribunal or the Migration Review Tribunal under the Act, the location of those powers in the statutory scheme as aids to the performance of a review function is important. As French CJ observed in Li at [10], in these tribunals there is no contradictor, the review is not adversarial and therefore a balancing exercise by the tribunal in terms of prejudice to other parties is unlikely to be necessary. As the plurality observed in Li at [80] the position of the tribunal cannot be equated with that of a party to litigation who may be prejudiced by the delay of another: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175. It might be said there is a different kind of balancing required as between the statute’s exhortation to the tribunals to discharge their functions in ways which are “fair, just, economical, informal and quick” (see ss 353(1), 420(1)), and “according to substantial justice and the merits of the case” (ss 353(2), 420(2)), and the interests of individual applicants. However, the entire function of a review under Pt 5 or Pt 7 of the Act (and, indeed, any similar statutory administrative merits review process) is to make the correct or preferable decision in respect of an individual applicant or application: Li at [93] per Gageler J; Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 at 425. In reality, no tension exists between provisions like ss 353 and 420, which are facultative rather than restrictive (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [49] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J; Li at [15] per French CJ, at [52] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), and the manner in which these tribunals are required to perform their functions and exercise their powers:
That context makes clear that it [s 353] cannot operate to allow the MRT to act other than according to the law set out in the Act in the exercise of its function of review, including the exercise of the powers and discretions conferred upon it in aid of that function. The MRT is not excused from compliance with the criteria of lawfulness, fairness and rationality that lie at the heart of administrative justice albeit their content is found in the provisions of the Act and the corresponding regulations and, subject to the Act and those regulations, the common law.
(Li at [14] per French CJ.)
15 Ultimately, even if the outcome of the exercise of the discretionary power falls within the range of objectively reasonable outcomes in the circumstances, if the decision-maker has adopted an illogical or irrational process of reasoning, the exercise of the power would lack evident and intelligible justification. It would be tantamount or equivalent to a ‘toss of a coin’ or an arbitrary decision and the visa applicant would be deprived of the chance of a different outcome based on a decision made according to law.
Tribunal hearing
16 The representation of the appellants in the Tribunal proceeding was, for a time, the subject of a degree of confusion and uncertainty. Initially the appellants purported to lodge two applications for review by two different agents, but later one agent purported to represent the appellants in both proceedings (T [10]-[15]). The Tribunal sent that agent an invitation under s 425 on 7 October 2021 notifying the appellants of a hearing of both review applications on 28 October 2021. That agent sent an email to the Tribunal in which he requested an adjournment of the hearing. The Tribunal refused that adjournment and gave reasons. It appears that a lawyer, Mr Au, was then instructed and he requested that the hearing be rescheduled to allow sufficient time for him to review the matter and advise the appellants. The Tribunal refused that request without giving reasons.
17 Mr Au then attended the hearing on 28 October 2021 with the appellants. Towards the end of that hearing there were exchanges between Mr Au and the presiding member about documents that had been the subject of a Freedom of Information Request. The presiding member said that the Tribunal would provide Mr Au with certain documents that he had requested and these would be provided to him that day. The presiding member then said:
MEMBER: I'm going to adjourn the proceedings for 14 days. If when you have a look at the documents, Mr Au, you think there is a compelling reason for a further adjournment, if something strikes you that requires following up, please notify the Registry. But given the history of this matter I want some significant detail about why it warrants an adjournment.
The member later adjourned the hearing and said that the registry would be in touch with a new hearing listing.
18 The Tribunal notified the appellants that the hearing had been relisted on 15 November 2021 by an email to Mr Au enclosing a letter dated 29 October 2021. Mr Au responded with an email requesting a rescheduling of the hearing to a date after 21 November 2021 on the ground that he would be on annual leave from 9 to 21 November 2021. By a letter dated 3 November 2021 the Tribunal notified Mr Au that the hearing would proceed on 15 November 2021 and gave the following reasons for that decision.
…
At the conclusion of the hearing on 28 October 2021 the Member clearly informed the parties that the matter would be adjourned for a period of 14 days, and that if any further adjournment was considered necessary by the agent or the applicants, then a request for further adjournment should attach detailed explanation as to why the adjournment was necessary and, in the case of a health-related issue, attach medical evidence.
On 29 October 2021 we sent a letter inviting you to attend a further hearing on 15 November 2021 to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in your case.
On 2 November 2021 we received a request that the hearing be postponed on the basis that the agent is on annual leave from 9 November until 21 November 2021.
The Member has taken note of the following matters:
- This is the third request for the case to be adjourned to suit the convenience of the various agents instructed on this matter;
- At the conclusion of the previous hearing the agent did not mention that he had planned a period of leave that would prevent him attending if the hearing was relisted in 14 days;
- The request for an adjournment does not contain sufficient detail as to why an adjournment is necessary. In particular, it has not set out:
o when the agent booked his annual leave;
o what (if any) attempts have been made to secure alternative representation;
o why there would be any harm if the current agent is unable to attend the hearing, noting that the current agent has only been on record since 20 October 2021, and only been the agent of record on this current matter since 28 October 2021.
…
19 The reference to the ‘third request’ has to be understood in a context in which none of the earlier requests was granted and the hearing on 28 October 2021 was evidently adjourned by the Tribunal, in the absence of any request, for the reasons given in the letter of 3 November 2021. Otherwise, in substance, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the grounds for the requested adjournment or rescheduling of the first hearing or second hearing were sufficient to warrant postponement of the hearing.
20 Mr Au sent an email to the Tribunal on 3 November 2021 attaching a Tribunal document headed ‘Response to hearing invitation’. That document stated, amongst other things, that Mr Au would not be participating in the hearing and that the appellants would not be relying on documents or witness evidence at the hearing. The document recorded that it was signed on behalf of and with the consent of the appellants. The appellants were not addressees of Mr Au’s email to the Tribunal and there is no other evidence that the email was sent to them.
21 The appellants attended the hearing on 15 November 2021. Mr Au was not in attendance, but an interpreter was present throughout to assist the appellants. At the commencement of the hearing the presiding member commenced with an explanation of who she was, what the hearing was about and key elements of the refugee and complementary protection criteria. There was then the following exchange between the member and the appellants through the interpreter.
…
MEMBER: I have the file of the Department of Home Affairs which includes the material that you gave to the Department. The Tribunal has not received any submissions from you or from your agent. Are you aware of any submissions that the Tribunal should have received from you or your agents?
INTERPRETER: Yeah, I understand
MEMBER: Should we have received anything from you? Any submissions about your case?
INTERPRETER: I believe I gave everything to my representative and I believe he send everything to the Tribunal.
MEMBER: Was there anything different that you gave the Tribunal to what you had already given to the Department?
INTERPRETER: I gave them all.
MEMBER: So in making my decision I'm going to rely on the information in the files, what you say to me today, and the country information about your home country. The purpose of this hearing is for you to give evidence in support of your case. It is an opportunity for me to obtain the information that I need to make a decision. I will be asking you some questions and I will discuss with you any concerns that I have about your case. Then I will give you the opportunity to raise any other matters that you think are relevant. If you would like or need a break at any time, please let me know.
We are working with an interpreter today. The role of the interpreter is to allow us to speak to each other. The interpreter can only interpret what we have said, she cannot give you advice or comment on what you say. Are you having any troubles understanding what your interpreter is saying?
INTERPRETER: No problem.
MEMBER: The hearing today is confidential. Nothing you say will be made public in any way that might identify you. Thank you. This matter was previously before the Tribunal on the 28th of October this year.
INTERPRETER: Yes.
MEMBER: That hearing was adjourned because of concerns I had about your representation and your health.
INTERPRETER: Yes.
MEMBER: Are you feeling well now?
INTERPRETER: Yeah, I'm well. Thanks, Member.
MEMBER: Very good. At the hearing on the 28th of October I foreshadowed that the matter would be relisted in 14 days. You were represented at that hearing by Mr Andrew Au who raised no objection to the hearing being adjourned for 14 days. On the 29th of October we sent you, via Mr Au, a notice of hearing that the matter had been listed for the 15th of November. On the 1st of November Mr Au wrote to the Tribunal requesting an adjournment because he was on leave from the 9th to the 21st of November. On the 3rd of November the Tribunal wrote back to Mr Au and told him that he had not provided enough details of when his leave was booked and any efforts that had been made to secure another agent. The Tribunal also noted that Mr Au had not provided any information about why there was any harm to you in him being unavailable when he had been very recently appointed as your agent. The Tribunal also noted in that letter that Mr Au had not told the Tribunal at the hearing on the 28th of October that he was going to be on a prolonged period of leave during the period that the Tribunal was proposing to relist.
On that basis the Tribunal rejected the application for an adjournment. The same day that that letter was sent to Mr Au by email, being the 3rd of November, we received the response to hearing form back from Mr Au. In that response to hearing it said that you would not have a representative with you today and that you would not be calling any witnesses today. Were you expecting Mr Au to be here today?
INTERPRETER: He was here on the 28th of October so I thought he will be appear today as well.
MEMBER: Did he tell you that he could not attend today?
INTERPRETER: No, I haven't heard anything from him.
MEMBER: Have you heard anything from him at all since the previous hearing of this matter?
INTERPRETER: He did send me some emails. I think - I thought that's all the documents finished for me, but I didn't know today he didn't appear.
MEMBER: The Tribunal is going to proceed with the hearing today in the absence of your agent. I will ask you at the end of the hearing if there is anything else that you want to tell me about your matter and I will give you the opportunity to tell me if you think there is any problem that has arisen because you did not have an agent today. At the previous hearing Mr Au indicated that there was a freedom of information request to the Department. Do you know if that - if those documents have been received?
INTERPRETER: I don't know because I received his emails all in English.
MEMBER: Do you have someone who can translate emails for you?
INTERPRETER: I did ask my sister. She said that that's all the documents that he finished and just let me know.
MEMBER: Okay. Let's talk about your protection claims. Tell me about your father's parents. Do you remember them?
…
22 In the statement of reasons the Tribunal summarised the preceding events under a heading ‘History of representation for the applicants’ (T [9]-[30]) and, amongst other things, the Tribunal recorded the following observations.
9. It is worth setting out the [appellants’] representation, given that the [appellants] were ultimately unrepresented at the hearing of the matter, allegedly against their expectations. The [appellants] did not seek an adjournment because of the non-attendance of their agent.
…
27. Mr Au subsequently filed a hearing certificate confirming that he would not be attending the hearing. Notwithstanding that prior confirmation to the Tribunal, the [appellants] indicated that they were surprised by his absence at the hearing. However, they did not seek to adjourn the proceedings on the basis that their representative had not appeared.
28. The Tribunal has real concerns about the conduct of this matter by the various agents for the [appellants]. The [appellants] do not appear to the Tribunal to have the sophistication necessary to hold their representatives to proper account. The consequence is that the Tribunal has been reluctant to use discrepancies in the history of the matter to test the credibility of the [appellants] or the consistency of their claims. It is plausible that the [appellants] have not been aware of the content of the various documents filed by their representatives and/or have not been accurately advised on what information and evidence needs to be before the Department and Tribunal.
23 The appellants contend that the Tribunal had an obligation, arising from circumstances in which Mr Au’s absence was unexpected from the perspective of the appellants, to consider whether to exercise the power conferred on it under s 427(1)(b) to adjourn the hearing. Further, the failure to consider exercising that power, alternatively failure to exercise that power, was legally unreasonable.
Was there a failure to consider exercising the power to adjourn?
24 The appellants submit that the Tribunal’s failure to consider exercising the power to adjourn can be inferred from the fact that reasons were given, in writing, for refusing the earlier applications for adjournments and the absence of any reasons for considering and refusing an adjournment given orally at the hearing or in the Tribunal’s statement of reasons. The Minister submits that no inference can properly be drawn from the absence of reasons because the Tribunal was under no obligation to give reasons for procedural decisions.
25 The primary judge accepted that the Tribunal was under no obligation to give reasons for procedural decisions: J [73] citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; 241 CLR 594 at [69] (Gummow J). There is no appeal from that conclusion, therefore, it may be accepted for the purposes of this appeal.
26 The primary judge considered the relevant paragraphs of the reasons of the Tribunal (T [9]-[28], in particular T [27]-[28]) and concluded that the reasons do not indicate that the Tribunal failed to consider whether or not to adjourn the hearing upon the appellants indicating their surprise at their representative’s non-attendance and there was nothing in the reasons from which her Honour could infer that the Tribunal member had not turned her mind to whether or not to adjourn the hearing: J [76]-[79]. Her Honour also reviewed the transcript and expressed the view that there was nothing in that transcript that gives rise to an inference that the Tribunal failed to consider the exercise of the discretion to adjourn the hearing: J [80]-[81]. Ultimately, her Honour concluded that the appellants had not discharged their onus of proving that the Tribunal had failed to consider the exercise of the power of adjournment.
27 There is nothing in the primary judge’s reasons or analysis of the facts to indicate that her Honour made any error in failing to draw an inference that the Tribunal had not considered exercising the power to adjourn. In addition to the reasons of the primary judge, the statement of reasons of the Tribunal makes two references to the appellants not having made an application for an adjournment at the hearing (T [9], [27]). Further, the presiding member said at the hearing that the ‘Tribunal is going to proceed with the hearing today in the absence of your agent’ and that an opportunity would be given to ‘tell [her] if [the appellants] think there is any problem that has arisen because [they] did not have an agent today’. Those references suggest that the Tribunal member had actually turned her mind to the possibility of an adjournment, but, in the absence of any application by the appellants, decided to proceed with the hearing. Thus, no error has been demonstrated in the primary judge’s conclusion that the appellants had not proved that the Tribunal failed to consider exercising the power to adjourn the hearing on 15 November 2021.
Was the failure to exercise the power to adjourn unreasonable?
28 The primary judge concluded that any decision not to adjourn the review was not legally unreasonable for five reasons. First, the primary judge rejected an assertion the appellants had made to the effect that a decision not to adjourn was irreconcilable with the Tribunal’s view that the appellants were unsophisticated and possibly did not know what documents were before the Tribunal. The primary judge was of the view that the asserted unreasonableness (based on not having representation at the hearing) was a separate issue to whether the appellants were able to hold their representatives to account and were properly advised. Therefore, the failure to adjourn and the view about lack of sophistication could be reconciled. Second, the Tribunal had regard to all the evidence that had been provided and conducted a lengthy hearing in which detailed evidence was elicited from the appellants. Third, the Tribunal expressed the view at the end of the hearing that the appellants were not disadvantaged by the non-attendance of their representative. Fourth, the appellants were given an opportunity to make oral submissions at the hearing and did not request an opportunity to make submissions after the hearing. Last, an evident lack of urgency was not a basis for inferring that a refusal to adjourn was unreasonable in the circumstances of the case: J [85]-[90]. With due respect to the primary judge, I have come to a different conclusion.
29 The question of whether the ‘decision’ not to adjourn the hearing was legally unreasonable must be assessed at the time that power was exercised or should have been exercised, not at the conclusion of the hearing and after the appellants had given evidence and presented arguments unaided and unassisted by their lawyer. Legal unreasonableness is also not to be assessed through the lens of procedural fairness. Whether ‘the implied requirements of legal reasonableness have been satisfied requires a close focus upon the particular circumstances of the exercise of the statutory power’: Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 at [26] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ). The conclusion is drawn ‘from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power’: Li at [76]. Therefore, the manner in which the Tribunal conducted the hearing and its view about the potential disadvantage to the appellants is irrelevant to and has no bearing upon the question of whether or not it was legally unreasonable to embark upon that hearing, in the circumstances of this case, after the Tribunal learned that the appellants were not aware that their lawyer would not be attending the hearing.
30 In any event, it is not correct that the Tribunal had expressed the view that the appellants were not disadvantaged. At the end of the hearing after all the evidence had been given and arguments presented, the Tribunal member said:
… I don’t think you’ve been disadvantage by not having an agent today, but I’m going to give that some thought. I’m going to adjourn the hearing now and I will either make a decision or will write to your agent and give him the opportunity to make some submissions. I haven’t decided which one of those I’m going to do yet. The Tribunal will adjourn now and you will hear from us one way or the other. …
31 The Tribunal member proceeded to make a decision without writing to the appellants’ agent and giving him the opportunity to make submissions on their behalf. While it may be inferred that the Tribunal subsequently decided that the appellants were not disadvantaged, no view was expressed in those terms in the statement of reasons of the Tribunal or otherwise.
32 At the time the Tribunal decided to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the appellants’ lawyer, the appellants were confronted with two sources of disadvantage and potential unfairness. First, the appellants were evidently not aware that their lawyer would not be attending and representing them at the hearing on 15 November 2021. That placed them in the position in which they could not have been prepared, before the hearing, to give evidence and present arguments unassisted by their legal representative. Second, and relatedly, the appellants were deprived of the advice and skill of their lawyer with respect to the evidence given and arguments presented at the hearing. In contrast there was no evident disadvantage or prejudice to the Tribunal, Minister or public in a short adjournment of the hearing to a date upon which the appellants’ lawyer was available or to allow the appellants time to prepare to give evidence and present arguments without legal assistance. The review application had been made in January 2018. Almost four years later the Tribunal invited the appellants to attend a hearing in October 2021. Plainly, there was no urgency or necessity to hold an oral hearing on a date at which the appellants’ lawyer was unavailable or immediately.
33 As has been recognised in many decisions of this Court, there is no doubt that a decision refusing a non-citizen a protection visa is a very serious matter with profound consequences for the unsuccessful visa applicant where the decision of the delegate or Tribunal may literally be a matter of life and death: Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1265; 101 FCR 20 at [33] (Sackville, Marshall and Lehane JJ). It is self-evident that the absence of legal representation was likely to have an adverse effect on the evidence given and arguments presented by a review applicant in response to an invitation under s 425. As has also been observed, the legality of the exercise of public power (such as the powers under Pt 7, including the power to adjourn a hearing under s 427(1)) ‘takes its form and shape from the terms, scope and policy of the statute and fundamental values anchored in the common law’. As a result, ‘where decisions might have devastating consequences visited upon people’ the exercise of public power ‘must be approached [honestly] confronting what is being done to people’ with ‘genuine consideration’ of the very real ‘human consequences’ of administrative decision-making: Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 267 FCR 628 at [3] (Allsop CJ).
34 Although a person appearing before the Tribunal to give evidence, including an applicant, was not entitled to be represented before the Tribunal by any other person: s 427(6)(a); WABZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 30; 134 FCR 271 at [67] (French and Lee JJ), the Act contemplated that visa applicants would receive assistance from agents and regulated that assistance: Pt 3. It is not insignificant that prior to the commencement of the Migration Amendment (Regulation of Migration Agents) Act 2020 (Cth) Australian legal practitioners with unrestricted practising certificates were not permitted to represent visa applicants and review applicants: former ss 276(1), 277, 280(1) and 280(3). Therefore, the amendment to remove the prohibition on lawyers with an unrestricted practising certificate giving immigration assistance is an indication that the legislature recognised the importance of permitting visa and review applicants to have legal assistance in relation to applications under the Act including Pt 7 review proceedings in the Tribunal.
35 Nonetheless, the common law of Australia does not recognise any right of a litigant in criminal proceedings or a party in civil proceedings (including administrative proceedings) to be provided with legal representation at public expense. Further, while there is a principle that a court may grant an adjournment or order a permanent stay of proceedings at trial until such time as an indigent person charged with a serious criminal offence is provided with legal representation necessary for a fair trial or with resources for such representation, no such principle applies in civil proceedings: Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; 177 CLR 292 at 297-298 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 317 (Brennan J), 330 (Deane J), 343 (Dawson J), 356 (Toohey J), 364 (Gaudron J); New South Wales v Canellis [1994] HCA 51; 181 CLR 309 at 328 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). Likewise, the Dietrich principle does not apply to proceedings before the Tribunal: Nguyen at [24]. Additionally, the rules of procedural fairness do not require that legal representation be provided to a party in civil proceedings at trial: Canellis at 330, or in the Tribunal: Nguyen at [28]-[36]. It follows that, although the Tribunal was bound to invite the appellants to give evidence and present arguments in a meaningful way, it was not obliged to ensure that the appellants were legally represented in the Pt 7 review proceeding.
36 On the other hand, it has been recognised that there is a public interest in litigants not being deprived of their lawyers of choice without ‘due cause’: Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181; 64 NSWLR 561 at [76] (Brereton J). Further, there is a public interest in the proper administration of justice associated with the manner in which lawyers conduct proceedings before courts: Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52; 165 CLR 543 at 556 (Mason CJ). Public interest in the proper administration of justice is also the foundation for the substantive common law principle of legal professional privilege: Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; 213 CLR 543 at [9] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 67; 201 CLR 49 at [35] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). In administrative proceedings before tribunals where legal representation is permitted, particularly those with serious or substantial consequences for the person affected by the decision, similar considerations apply. For example, although not authoritatively decided by this Court or the High Court, the members of the Tribunal had accepted that legal professional privilege extended to proceedings in the Tribunal: see, Re Farnaby v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2007] AATA 1792; 97 ALD 788 at [2]-[3], [15]-[16], [25]-[35] (Downes P and Groom DP) citing Waterford v Commonwealth [1987] HCA 26; 163 CLR 54 at 63-64 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 101 (Dawson J); Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill [1991] HCA 28; 172 CLR 319 at 322 (Brennan J) and SZHWY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 64; 159 FCR 1 at [15], [37] (Lander J).
37 While Pt 7 Div 4 is an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule: s 422B; and a hearing does not conform to the requirements of s 425 ‘merely because the applicant might, if better advised, have chosen to present a more compelling case’: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41; 183 FCR 575 at [30] (Keane CJ), the requirements of Div 4 and s 425 do not exhaust or delimit the requirements of legal reasonableness. Here, the appellants were, in effect, ‘better advised’ and deprived of the opportunity of presenting a more compelling case not through lack of advice or choice but by the Tribunal’s decision not to adjourn the hearing. Therefore, the central issue is not so much whether the failure to adjourn deprived the appellants of a real and meaningful invitation for the purposes of s 425, but rather whether it arbitrarily or capriciously deprived them of the opportunity to be represented, at their expense, at the hearing by their chosen legal representative and, thereby, the opportunity to present a more compelling case on a matter with significant and very real human consequences for them: see, e.g., BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 40; 163 ALD 127 at [68] (Mortimer J).
38 The Minister submits, in substance, that the Tribunal expressed the view that the non-attendance of Mr Au was ‘allegedly against their expectations’ and, otherwise, the Tribunal could not have been satisfied that the appellants were not actually aware that Mr Au would not be attending the hearing for two reasons. First, Mr Au signed the ‘Response to hearing invitation’ document stating that he would not be in attendance ‘on behalf of, and with the consent of’, the appellants. Accordingly, the Tribunal would not lightly infer that Mr Au made a false statement. Second, s 441G(2) provided that if the Tribunal gave a document to Mr Au, as the appellants’ authorised recipient, the Tribunal was taken to have given it to the appellants. Therefore, the appellants were taken to have received the Tribunal’s rejection of the adjournment on the ground that Mr Au could not attend the hearing on 15 November 2021. These submissions are not accepted.
39 Section 441G operates to deem documents given to an authorised recipient to have been given to a review applicant for the purposes of requirements under the Act to give documents to the review applicant. It does not operate to defy reality where the Tribunal is called upon to exercise the power to adjourn a hearing in circumstances in which a review applicant does not have actual knowledge of a relevant communication between the Tribunal and the applicant’s authorised representative.
40 Although the Tribunal fell short of making a positive finding that it accepted that the appellants were not aware, before the hearing, that Mr Au or another representative would not be in attendance, the Tribunal also made no positive finding that it disbelieved the appellants’ allegations. Indeed, in light of the views expressed about the plausibility of their representative failing to provide them with information, it would stand to reason that it was equally plausible that they were not aware that their representative would not be attending. In short, there was no evident reason for the Tribunal not to accept the appellants’ statement to the effect that they were expecting Mr Au to attend and had not received a communication from him to the contrary. In these circumstances, the decision of the presiding member to proceed with the hearing on 15 November 2021 is inexplicable and astonishing.
41 As already mentioned, the appellants could not possibly have prepared for the hearing on the basis that they, and not their lawyer, would be representing them at the hearing. In effect, on the information before the Tribunal, the appellants had received no notice that they would be required to give evidence and present arguments unassisted by a lawyer in circumstances in which the Tribunal accepted that it was plausible that the appellants were unaware of the information before the Tribunal and had not been accurately advised on what information and evidence needed to be before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also observed that there were discrepancies in the ‘history of the matter’ which the Tribunal could have used to test the credibility of the appellants and the consistency of their claims. Although the Tribunal ultimately decided not to challenge the appellants on the basis of the discrepancies (T [28]-[29]), that was not a reason to refuse an adjournment and proceed with the hearing in the absence of the appellants’ lawyer. The existence of discrepancies and problems with the previous representation of the appellants was all the more reason for considering that the appellants’ desire to be represented in the Tribunal by Mr Au (a new lawyer) was reasonable and warranted a short adjournment of the hearing.
42 Otherwise, the Tribunal provided no explanation of the steps, if any, that the Tribunal had taken to be satisfied that the appellants were aware of the nature and content of the documents that their representatives had provided to the Tribunal. Likewise, the Tribunal provided no explanation of the steps, if any, taken to be satisfied that the appellants were prepared to or were otherwise in a position to give evidence or present arguments to the Tribunal, in the absence of their lawyer, on information about which it was plausible that they had no knowledge.
43 There had been considerable delay on the part of the Tribunal in inviting the appellants to appear as was required under s 425. In making that observation no criticism of the Tribunal is intended. The Tribunal had an enormous case load and the pressures of listing, hearing and deciding the thousands of reviews in each of its divisions were no doubt unrelenting. The delay in extending an invitation to the appellants reflected those realities and the limited resources of the Tribunal. But, as a matter of objective fact, the invitation was not made until three years and nine months after the application for review was made and there is no evidence that any of that delay was attributable to the appellants. Moreover, Mr Au was available after 21 November 2021 and, therefore, subject to the availability of the Tribunal, an adjournment was only required for about a week. In context, any delay resulting from a second adjournment paled into insignificance to the Tribunal’s own delay. In these circumstances, the Tribunal could not possibly have refused an adjournment on the ground that to adjourn would result in unreasonable delay notwithstanding the general obligation of the Tribunal to deal with proceedings expeditiously.
44 There was no other evident ‘due cause’ for depriving the appellants of not only their lawyer of choice but, in effect, of legal representation at the hearing which was otherwise permitted and contemplated albeit not required. It is true that, in the absence of their lawyer, the appellants were afforded an opportunity to ‘give evidence’, but on the facts stated in the reasons, the Tribunal could not have been satisfied that the appellants were in a position, at least, to ‘present arguments’ meaningfully on the information before the Tribunal.
45 It is possible that the unfairness and practical injustice could have been remedied by adjourning the hearing to another date to allow the appellants to give further evidence or present arguments with the assistance of their lawyer or otherwise allowing the appellants an opportunity to provide written submissions after the hearing, but the Tribunal made no provision for the appellants, at least, to ‘present arguments’ in one or more of those ways and evidently decided against so doing on the ground that the appellants had not been disadvantaged. Although procedural unfairness of this kind was not a basis for a ground of review or appeal, it is a reason for considering that the Tribunal’s failure to exercise the power of adjournment in the absence of a specific request from the appellants for an adjournment was unreasonable. The practical unfairness of not adjourning the hearing at the outset or at a later time to allow the appellants to present arguments with knowledge of all the information before the Tribunal was, or ought to have been, obvious to the Tribunal and was, in the circumstances of this case, a powerful factor in favour of an adjournment.
46 Having regard to the foregoing circumstances, it was legally unreasonable not to adjourn the hearing after the Tribunal became aware, and evidently accepted, that the appellants were not represented at the hearing against their expectations.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Feutrill. |
Associate:
Dated: 13 November 2026