Federal Court of Australia
Kahu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1716
Review of: | Decision of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship under s 501BA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (22 September 2025) |
File number: | WAD 442 of 2025 |
Judgment of: | FEUTRILL J |
Date of judgment: | 13 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | MIGRATION – judicial review – decision to cancel visa under s 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – asserted ‘no evidence’ to support findings of fact – asserted unwarranted assumption of facts – asserted findings of fact founded on ‘stale’ evidence |
Legislation: | Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 55 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 4, 500, 501, 501BA, 501CA, 501G |
Cases cited: | ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34; 269 CLR 439 ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109 Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Splendido [2019] FCAFC 132; 271 FCR 595 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; 170 CLR 321 Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1949] HCA 26; 78 CLR 353 BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; 268 CLR 29 Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; 289 FCR 21 EUF20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 130; 298 FCR 492 Fetelika v Assistant Minister for Immigration [2025] FCA 1249 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54; 211 CLR 540 Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33; 263 CLR 1 GRCF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 415 Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 267 FCR 628 Hood v Assistant Minister for Immigration [2025] FCA 1336 Luong v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCAFC 6; 315 FCR 159 Manebona v Assistant Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 1342 Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 259 ALR 429 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v XMBQ [2026] FCAFC 19; 315 FCR 207 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SSVJ [2026] FCAFC 45; 315 FCR 435 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12 Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane [2021] HCA 41; 274 CLR 398 Palmer v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 154; 306 FCR 156 Po’oi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCAFC 192; 314 FCR 376 R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd [1944] HCA 42; 69 CLR 407 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Western Australia |
National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |
Number of paragraphs: | 58 |
Date of hearing: | 18 June 2026 |
Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms L McIntosh (Pro Bono) |
Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr B Kaplan SC |
Solicitor for the Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
WAD 442 of 2025 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | HOANE JOSEPH KAHU Applicant | |
AND: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP Respondent | |
order made by: | FEUTRILL J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 13 NOVEMBER 026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the respondent’s decision under s 501BA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on 22 September 2025 to set aside the decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal dated 14 May 2025 and cancel the applicant’s visa.
2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FEUTRILL J:
Introduction
1 The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand who has resided in Australia since he was four years of age. In his later years of adolescence and earlier years of adulthood he committed and was convicted of a number of criminal offences. The last in that series was for a terrifying rape of a 15-year-old girl in 2005. He was convicted of the last crime in 2006 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight years and six months. In 2010 he was released from prison on parole and evidently conducted himself as a lawful member of the Australian community until 2020. Then, between 2020 and 2024, he committed and was convicted of numerous further criminal offences largely involving stealing or like offences in connection with financing illicit substance abuse (methamphetamine). For these offences he received a range of sentences including short terms of imprisonment (less than 12 months) for the more serious of those otherwise relatively minor offences.
2 While serving a term of imprisonment of seven months for the last offences in the last series, on 15 July 2024, a delegate of the respondent (Minister) cancelled the applicant’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant made representations to the Minister to revoke the cancellation of his visa in accordance with an invitation to do so made under s 501CA(3)(b). On 18 February 2025 a delegate of the Minister made a decision refusing to revoke the cancellation and the applicant then applied to the Administrative Review Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision under s 500(1)(ba). On 14 May 2025 a member of the Tribunal made a decision to revoke the cancellation decision for ‘another reason’ under s 501CA(4). The applicant was then released from immigration detention into the Australian community where he remained until the Assistant Minister made a decision under s 501BA(2) to cancel the applicant’s visa and the applicant was once again taken into immigration detention.
3 Section 501BA applies, relevantly, if the Tribunal makes a decision under s 501CA to revoke a decision to cancel a visa made under s 501(3A): s 501BA(1). The Minister may set aside the Tribunal’s decision and cancel the visa if the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test, relevantly, because the visa holder has a substantial criminal record (sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more) and the Minister is satisfied that cancellation is in the national interest: s 501BA(2). The rules of natural justice do not apply to such a decision and the cancellation power may only be exercised by the Minister personally and is not reviewable by the Tribunal: s 501BA(3)-(5). Although the decision was made by the Assistant Minister, the Minister is named as the respondent in the proceeding and nothing evidently turns on the fact that power in this case was exercised by the Assistant Minister rather than the Minister. Therefore, in these reasons the decision under review is treated as a decision of the Minister.
4 The applicant applies to this Court for an order quashing the Minister’s decision to cancel his visa for jurisdictional error on four grounds. Although expressed in different ways, the central issue is whether the Minister’s decision was unreasonable because:
(1) there was no evidence to support certain findings of fact; and (or)
(2) certain findings of fact were based on unwarranted assumptions arising from stale information,
and the applicable findings or assumptions were material to the formation of the Minister’s state of satisfaction that cancellation of the applicant’s visa was in the national interest.
5 For the reasons that follow, there was jurisdictional error of the kind asserted and, consequently, the Minister’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501BA(2) must be quashed because he lacked authority to exercise the cancellation power under that section.
Ground 1: Was there ‘no evidence’ to support material findings of fact?
6 The applicant contends that there was no evidence to support certain findings of fact upon which the Minister based his conclusion that cancellation of the applicant’s visa was in the national interest. These findings concerned the applicant’s culpability for convictions for traffic offences, reoffending while on bail, lack of insight and remorse for his sexual offences until the Tribunal hearing, failure to avail himself of support services and abstinence from illicit drug use since his most recent offences. The applicant contends that in the absence of evidence to support these findings the decision of the Minister lacked an evident or intelligible basis, was unreasonable and was affected by jurisdictional error.
Applicable legal principles
7 There are a number of preconditions to the exercise of power under s 501BA(2) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person. First, there must have been a decision of a delegate or the Tribunal under s 501CA to revoke the cancellation of a visa under s 501(3A): s 501BA(1). Second, the Minister must be satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of s 501(6)(a) on the basis of s 501(7)(a), (b) or (c), or because of the operation of s 501(6)(e): s 501BA(2)(a). Third, the Minister must be satisfied that cancellation is in the national interest: s 501BA(2)(b). These are ‘jurisdictional facts’: Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54; 211 CLR 540 at [183] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12 at [37] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). The first must exist as a matter of objective fact. The second and third must exist as a matter of the state of mind or opinion of the decision-maker.
8 There is a general and deeply rooted common law principle of statutory interpretation that such decision-making authority as is conferred on a person by legislation must be exercised according to law and to reason within the limits set by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation: see, e.g., Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 at [90] (Gageler J). Thus, where a jurisdictional fact involves the formation of an opinion, such as whether cancellation of a visa is in the national interest, it is well established that there is an implied requirement of the legislature that the state of satisfaction be formed ‘reasonably’. That is, an opinion formed by a reasonable person who correctly understands the law under which that person acts. An opinion that is not formed reasonably is equivalent to an opinion that is arbitrary, capricious, irrational or not bona fide: R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd [1944] HCA 42; 69 CLR 407 at 430, 432 (Latham CJ); Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1949] HCA 26; 78 CLR 353 at 360 (Dixon J). ‘A decision upon jurisdictional fact which has these characteristics is treated as a failure to exercise jurisdiction. There has been a purported exercise of power in the absence of the necessary jurisdictional fact’: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [24] (footnotes omitted) (Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J, in dissent, but not as to this statement of principle).
9 The implied obligation to form the state of satisfaction reasonably is informed by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation. In this respect, s 4 sets out the object of the Migration Act. It includes to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens: s 4(1). To advance that object the Migration Act provides for visas permitting non-citizens to enter or remain in Australia and for the removal or deportation of non-citizens from Australia: s 4(2), s 4(4). The concept of the ‘national interest’ is also central to the formation of the Minister’s state of satisfaction in s 501BA(2)(b). That concept is broad and evaluative: Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33; 263 CLR 1 at [57] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). The Migration Act does not stipulate any factor to which the Minister must have regard in determining what is in the national interest for the purposes of s 501BA and the Minister has broad decisional freedom to be satisfied that cancellation is in the national interest: Luong v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCAFC 6; 315 FCR 159 at [32]-[33] (Charlesworth, Kyrou and Neskovcin JJ). While the concept is not unbounded, it is largely a political question: Palmer v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 154; 306 FCR 156 at [42]-[44] (Derrington and Hespe JJ). The implied requirement of reasonableness in s 501BA(2)(b) is also informed by the nature of the cancellation power in s 501BA(2) and the provisions that condition the exercise of that power.
10 The rules of natural justice do not apply to the exercise of the power: s 501BA(3). Therefore, at least the hearing rule aspect of natural justice is not the ‘lens’ through which to assess whether the Minister has formed the state of mind reasonably: e.g., BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; 268 CLR 29 at [34] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); Palmer at [40]-[41]. Further, like similar cancellation powers based on the Minister’s state of satisfaction about the national interest, the absence of any requirement of natural justice means that s 501BA contemplates that the Minister will form a state of satisfaction on less than complete evidence or information: EUF20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 130; 298 FCR 492 at [36]-[37] (Abraham, O’Sullivan and Raper JJ).
11 Although the rules of natural justice do not apply, the Minister is nevertheless required to give the former visa holder a written notice that sets out the decision and the reasons for the decision under s 501BA: s 501G(1). However, no part of the statutory power conferred under s 501BA obliges the Minister to make actual findings of fact. Deciding whether or not cancellation is in the national interest might be the product of fact finding, predictions about the future, or assessments or characterisation of facts such as the visa holder’s past offending. Nonetheless, if the Minister exercises the power conferred under s 501BA(2) and in giving reasons makes a finding of fact, the Minister must do so based on some evidence or other supporting material, rather than on no evidence or no material unless the finding is made in accordance with the Minister’s personal or specialised knowledge or by reference to that which is commonly known. The Minister is also free to adopt the accumulated knowledge of the applicable department: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane [2021] HCA 41; 274 CLR 398 at [14]-[21] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ) (while addressing the Minister’s state of satisfaction of ‘another reason’ under s 501CA(4)(b), their Honours’ reasoning is equally applicable – with all necessary modifications – to the Minister’s state of satisfaction of the national interest under s 501BA(2)(b)).
12 The concept of ‘no evidence’ is usually taken to mean ‘not a skerrick of evidence’: Viane at [17]. The question of whether there is any evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Likewise, the question whether a particular inference can be drawn from facts found or agreed is a question of law. In the context of judicial review, making findings or drawing inferences in the absence of evidence is an error of law. However, a want of logic is not synonymous with an error of law. So long as there is some basis for an inference – a particular inference is reasonably open – even if that inference appears to have been drawn as a result of illogical reasoning it is an error of fact and not an error of law that has taken place: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; 170 CLR 321 at 355-356 (Mason CJ). When the process of reasoning need not be and is not disclosed, there will be a discernible breach of the duty to act judicially (to decide without arbitrariness, irrationality or unreasonableness) if a decision of fact is unsupported by probative material. When the process of reasoning is disclosed, there will be a discernible breach of the duty if findings of fact upon which a decision is based are unsupported by probative material and if inferences of fact upon which such a decision is based cannot reasonably be drawn from such findings of fact. Breach of the duty to act judicially constitutes an error of law vitiating the decision: Bond at 367 (Deane J). Put another way, there must be evidence or other material that could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of a past fact or future event: see, e.g., s 55 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). See, also, Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Splendido [2019] FCAFC 132; 271 FCR 595 at [107], [111] (Mortimer J), [129]-[132] (Wheelahan J) (Moshinsky J agreeing at [113]-[114]); Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225; 267 FCR 628 at [32], [44]-[47] (Allsop CJ), [54] (Markovic J agreeing), [55] (Steward J agreeing).
13 Nonetheless, the range of permissible evidence, information and material upon which the Minister may rely, the wide decisional freedom the Minister has in forming an opinion about the national interest and the absence of any requirement for the Minister to apply the rules of natural justice, are all indications of the nature of the decision-making process that a reasonable person can employ to reach an opinion that cancellation is in the national interest. That process of reasoning and what standard of evidence or information may be considered rationally probative is necessarily not of the same kind that would be considered probative in the context of judicial decision-making. It is also not necessarily the reasoning process and standard of evidence or information that would be considered probative in the context of a decision of an administrative tribunal or decision-maker in an administrative proceeding where there is a requirement to accord procedural fairness and the rules of natural justice apply. Thus, the nature of the decision-making process under s 501BA informs both what may be appropriately described as ‘findings of fact’ and what may be regarded as ‘rationally probative’ evidence or material from which a reasonable decision-maker could make findings of fact.
14 Although the core of the applicant’s complaint centred on assertions of ‘no evidence’, at times during his oral submissions, these strayed into characterisation of the Minister’s process of reasoning with respect to fact-finding as ‘illogical’ or ‘irrational’. It has been observed – more than once – that characterising a finding of fact as illogical or irrational in that way may be no more than an expression of emphatic disagreement with that finding and may involve review of the outcome of a finding that the decision-maker was permitted to make within authority rather than review of the process by which that finding was made to ascertain whether that process was authorised. While there was a consensus that illogicality or irrationality in the process of reasoning by which a decision-maker forms a state of satisfaction that is a precondition to the exercise of legislative power can result in jurisdictional error, divergent views were expressed in SZMDS regarding the precise kind of illogical or irrational reasoning process that comprises jurisdictional error.
15 Traditionally, the terms ‘arbitrary, capricious, irrational’ as well as ‘not bona fide’ have been used to stigmatise an erroneous formation of the state of satisfaction: R v Connell at 430, 432. A decision upon a jurisdictional fact that has these characteristics has been treated as a failure to exercise jurisdiction and a purported exercise of public power in the absence of the necessary jurisdictional fact: SZMDS at [23]-[24]. Thus, an illogical and irrational process of reasoning can result in formation of a state of satisfaction that is equivalent to an arbitrary, capricious, irrational or non-bona fide opinion.
16 Illogical or irrational reasoning can also result in a legally unreasonable exercise of a discretionary power where the decision-maker has authority (jurisdiction) to exercise the power: Li at [26] (French CJ), [72] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). An implied requirement to exercise a discretionary power reasonably within jurisdiction is a similar, yet distinct, concept to the formation of a state of satisfaction reasonably as a precondition to the exercise of power: SZMDS at [38]-[39] (Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J). Without drawing any apparent distinction between implication of reasonableness as a condition of the exercise of a discretionary power and as a condition of a state of satisfaction, in Li Gageler J made the following general observations regarding the implied requirement of legal reasonableness:
91 The implied condition of reasonableness is not confined to why a statutory decision is made; it extends to how a statutory decision is made [Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 290]:
“Just as a power is exercised in an improper manner if it is, upon the material before the decision-maker, a decision to which no reasonable person could come, so it is exercised in an improper manner if the decision-maker makes his or her decision in a manner so devoid of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken that course.”
17 Justices Hayne, Kiefel and Bell also focussed on how the decision was made expressing the view that ‘[e]ven where some reasons have been provided … it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification’: Li at [76].
18 The basic principle that underpins the implied requirement of reasonableness is the notion that public powers must be exercised ‘according to law, and not humour’, which imposes requirements as to the reasoning as well as the result. ‘This makes it essential for the Court to understand as best it can the decision-maker’s reasons for coming to a state of satisfaction and points to the irrelevance of matters that the decision-maker did not in fact consider.’ Thus, where there is a statutory duty to give reasons, ‘what is and is not discussed in those reasons must at least ordinarily be determinative of whether the decision-maker’s state of satisfaction had a rational basis’: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SSVJ [2026] FCAFC 45; 315 FCR 435 at [37] (Perry, Kennett and Shariff JJ). Of course, in undertaking an assessment of the reasons of the decision-maker, they must be read fairly, as a whole, and not with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 271-272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
19 Without always maintaining an obvious distinction between the contexts, since SZMDS and Li numerous Full Courts of this Court have considered what kinds of illogical and irrational reasoning comprise jurisdictional error both in the context of formation of a state of satisfaction and in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power within jurisdiction. Without attempting to be comprehensive, the explanations of the applicable principles in the following authorities are regularly cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437 at [43]-[52] (Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 at [4]-[13] (Allsop CJ), [50]-[62] (Griffiths J), [91]-[92] (Wigney J agreeing); ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109 at [44]-[47] (Griffiths, Perry and Bromwich JJ); Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; 289 FCR 21 at [29]-[35] (Allsop CJ, Besanko and O’Callaghan JJ). More recently and specifically in the context of s 501BA or other similar visa cancellation powers, the applicable principles have been restated and summarised (again without attempting to be comprehensive) in the following authorities: EUF20 at [38], [64]-[66] (Abraham, O’Sullivan and Raper JJ); Po’oi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCAFC 192; 314 FCR 376 at [64]-[66] (Kyrou and Needham JJ); Luong at [41]-[51] (Charlesworth, Kyrou and Neskovcin JJ); SSVJ at [18]-[23], [37] (Perry, Kennett and Shariff JJ). A consistent theme running through all these authorities is that the characterisation of a state of satisfaction (or exercise of a discretionary power) as legally unreasonable because of illogicality or irrationality is not easily made. ‘Ultimately, the question is whether the satisfaction of the relevant state of affairs or matter was irrational, illogical or not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds’: Djokovic at [35].
Traffic offences
20 The applicant contends that there was ‘no evidence’ to support the Minister’s conclusions expressed in a number of paragraphs of his reasons to the effect that the applicant had been convicted of offences relating to driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol (M [55], [99], [119], [179]). The relevant information before the Minister comprised the reasons of the Tribunal and a National Criminal History Check dated 30 June 2025.
21 The Tribunal said that the applicant’s criminal history was set out in a National Criminal History Check of 17 July 2024: T [44]. An updated National Criminal History Check was in the materials upon which the Minister relied. The Tribunal reasons include the following statements:
53. The Applicant also has a history of traffic offences including speeding, drink driving and driving while [a] relevant drug is present (Methylamphetamine). The Applicant's evidence is that in September 2021 a vehicle he had rented was stolen and subsequent traffic infringements were wrongly attributed to him. The offences include three counts of exceed speed limit by more than 40km/h. With the Respondent's consent, I have disregarded those offences in coming to my decision.
(Emphasis original.)
22 No traffic offences were referred to in the National Criminal History Check.
23 The Minister’s reasons acknowledge that the details of the traffic offences were not available and it is evident that he relied upon statements in the reasons of the Tribunal (T [53]): M [44]. While the Minister’s reasons do not acknowledge that the applicant gave evidence to the Tribunal that certain traffic offences were incorrectly attributed to him and that certain offences had been disregarded by the Tribunal with the Minister’s consent, the Minister’s reasons do not suggest that he took into account any offences that the Tribunal had disregarded in reaching the Minister’s conclusions about the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s offending.
24 Specifically, in the Minister’s consideration of the seriousness of the applicant’s offending he drew attention to the traffic offences and said:
55. I note that [the applicant’s] driving offending constitutes a serious risk of physical harm or death to other road users, particularly when under the influence of drugs and alcohol, and is reflective of [the applicant’s] disregard for the law.
25 When assessing the risk the applicant poses to the Australian community, the Minister returned to the traffic offences and said:
99. As noted by the [Tribunal], 'further sexual offending of a similar nature would have the potential to cause devastating physical and psychological injuries to a victim. Further fraud, stealing and related offences by the Applicant [Mr KAHU] would cause financial harm to Australian businesses and individuals. Further traffic offending has the potential to cause significant physical and psychological harm to other road users.' Attachment D. I agree with the [Tribunal’s] finding, further noting that driving offences, particularly driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol, not only risks physical harm to other road users, but also death.
(Emphasis original.)
26 The applicant contends that the conclusion of the Minister that the applicant has not addressed substance abuse as the main driver of his offending behaviour (M [119]) was, in part, affected by his conclusions about the applicant’s traffic offences. Similarly, the applicant contends the overall conclusions of the Minister about the applicant’s offending were affected by the same conclusion (M [179]).
27 The Minister was entitled to rely on statements or findings made in the reasons of the Tribunal and evidence and other materials that were before the Tribunal and the Minister. In the case of the traffic offences, the Tribunal appears to have accepted that the applicant committed a number of traffic offences involving speeding, drink driving and driving under the influence of methylamphetamine, but disregarded offences committed in September 2021 that included speeding. There was no direct evidence of the nature or seriousness of the traffic offences, the applicant’s explanation for them, or his denial of criminal responsibility for the offences committed in September 2021 in the materials before the Minister. However, in substance, the Minister drew an inference from the statement in the Tribunal’s reasons that the applicant had a ‘history of traffic offences including speeding, drink driving and driving while [a] relevant drug is present’ that the applicant was convicted of and criminally culpable for unspecified traffic offences. There was probative material before the Minister from which a reasonable decision-maker could have reached that conclusion.
Breaches of bail conditions
28 The applicant contends that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the applicant had reoffended while on bail (M [56], [58]). The applicant submits that while there was evidence that he had breached bail conditions and other orders, which were offences, these could not be characterised as ‘reoffending’ while on bail because the conditions that were breached were not ones that involved committing further offences. The breaches involved failures to attend police stations at the times and on the days specified in the bail conditions.
29 The National Criminal History Check refers to convictions on 18 July 2022 for offences for failures to appear in accordance with undertakings on 24 November 2021 and 1 June 2022; a conviction on 5 December 2023 for an unspecified breach of a bail condition between 28 March 2023 and 6 April 2023, and a failure to appear in accordance with an undertaking on 6 April 2023. The Minister described these offences in his reasons when addressing the seriousness of the applicant’s offending: M [20], [26]. As to these offences, the Minister said:
56. I consider that [the applicant] has reoffended whilst he was under terms of conditional liberty, which further demonstrates a disregard for the laws of Australia and a disregard for the safety of members of the community.
30 While the accuracy of the characterisation of these offences as ‘reoffending’ and the conclusion that they demonstrate ‘a disregard for the safety of members of the community’ is doubtful, there was probative evidence or material to support that characterisation and conclusion. There was also evidence to support the conclusion, and it was open to conclude, that the offences demonstrate a ‘disregard for the laws of Australia’. These are not characterisations and conclusions that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach on the evidence and materials before the Minister.
Lack of insight or remorse
31 The applicant contends that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the applicant had not gained insight or remorse for the rape offence since he was convicted of that offence in 2006 and that the remorse shown at the time of the Tribunal hearing was not genuine (M [76], [81], [107], [109]).
32 The Minister considered, by reference to the representations the applicant had made to the Minister under s 501CA(3), that he made no mention of remorse for his rape offence nor did he acknowledge the impact his offending had on the 15-year-old victim. The Minister said that he found ‘this concerning and indicative of a lack of insight into the very serious nature of the offending’: M [75]. The Minister then said:
76. At the time of his conviction, the Court in 2006 noted, 'I have seen not the slightest suggestion that you are the slightest bit sorry for what you have done to this poor, young girl. The only thing you seem to be sorry for is what might happen to you, yourself' Attachment B1. Additionally, the Supreme Court noted [the applicant] '... has not demonstrated the slightest remorse' Attachment B2. I concur with the Court and also note, that since his Court appearances, [the applicant] has not gained insight or remorse for the rape conviction which is concerning.
77. At the [Tribunal] hearing, it was noted that the parole board assessment in 2010 (approximately five years after the Rape offending occurred) 'observed discrepancies between the official version [of the Rape offence] and his [the applicant’s] version of events' Attachment D. [The applicant] reportedly stated he initially did not realise his actions were non-consensual and took the victim's lack of resistance as permission to continue Attachment D.
…
80. I note that at the [Tribunal] hearing, when asked about these discrepancies, [the applicant] stated he was ignorant at the time, and he '...now appreciates the harm he has caused to the victim [of the Rape conviction] and can understand why she was so upset. He believes his actions may have caused her to be judged by others in the community and potentially ruined her life.' Attachment D.
81. While I acknowledge the statement above, I do not consider [the applicant’s] remorse to be genuine. In particular, I note all mention of remorse for this offence occurred at the [Tribunal] hearing and in the context of a visa cancellation decision process Attachments K1, K2 and L.
(Emphasis original.)
33 This part of the Minister’s reasoning was central to his disagreement with the Tribunal’s conclusion that ‘The evidence does not support there being a measurable risk of further sexual offending’ (T [68]). The Minister said: ‘I consider [the applicant’s] lack of remorse and insight in relation to the rape conviction concerning and I do not accept the ART’s finding’: M [107]. Ultimately, the Minister concluded that there was an ongoing risk that the applicant ‘will reoffend’: M [111]. In context, that conclusion must be understood to include the risk of sexual offending.
34 Insofar as the Minister expressed his concurrence with the remarks of the sentencing judge in 2006, it is somewhat unclear whether the Minister is concurring at the time of those remarks or at the time of his decision. However, in context, that statement is to be understood as expressing the Minister’s concurrence at the time of his decision. That is, the Minister was of the view that the applicant had not demonstrated the slightest remorse in 2006 and, in effect, nothing had changed at the time of the Minister’s decision in September 2025.
35 The Minister relied on statements in the Tribunal’s reasons (Attachment D) to reach his conclusions and make the ‘findings’ about the applicant’s lack of remorse. Relevantly, the Tribunal’s reasons include the following statements:
59. The Applicant accepts his convictions and says he takes full responsibility for his offending, which he acknowledges is very serious. He appreciates his criminal conduct has had a major impact on his mental health and well-being, his family and the community.
60. A parole board assessment dated 21 May 2010 (the parole assessment) is in evidence. When considering the Applicant's insight into his sexual offending, the assessment observed discrepancies between the official version and his version of events. He reportedly stated he initially did not realise his actions were non-consensual and took the victim's lack of resistance as permission to continue offending. Asked about this at the hearing, he said that he was ignorant at that time. He now appreciates the harm he has caused to the victim and can understand why she was so upset. He believes his actions may have caused her to be judged by others in the community and potentially ruined her life.
…
62. The parole board assessment recorded the Applicant had completed recommended interventions aimed at addressing his sexual offending and substance abuse, demonstrated appropriate institutional conduct, had not incurred any breaches or negative incidents, and demonstrated appropriate victim empathy during the interview panel. The report also concluded the Applicant accepted responsibility for his offences. Following his release from prison in 2010 the Applicant was placed on parole for almost four years. The evidence is that he complied with the parole conditions without breach.
(Emphasis original.) (Footnotes omitted.)
36 The parole board assessment dated 21 May 2010 is referred to in footnotes 10, 11 and 12 of the Tribunal’s reasons and is identified as ‘TB6’ (T [60]). That is, the parole board assessment that resulted in the applicant’s release from prison in 2010 was the source of all the statements the Tribunal made about the applicant’s insight into his sexual offending (T [60], [62]). The ‘hearing’ to which the Tribunal referred (T [60]) is somewhat ambiguous. The Minister concluded that the ‘hearing’ was the hearing before the Tribunal, but that is unclear, because, in context, the relevant paragraph of the Tribunal’s reasons contains a description of the parole board assessment and not the hearing before the Tribunal. Further, an absence of insight or remorse until the hearing before the Tribunal is not consistent with reference to the applicant demonstrating ‘appropriate victim empathy during the interview panel’ in 2010 and the conclusion of the parole board that he had accepted responsibility for his offences (T [62]). Except for the statements of the Tribunal summarising the contents of the parole board assessment, that document was not evidence before the Minister. The ambiguity of the ‘hearing’ to which the Tribunal made reference could not reasonably or rationally be resolved without reference to the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal or the parole board assessment.
37 Having regard to the direct statement in the Tribunal’s reasons that the applicant had demonstrated appropriate victim empathy during the parole board interview panel in 2010 and the parole board assessment conclusion that he had accepted responsibility for his offences, there was no probative evidence or material before the Minister from which a decision-maker could reasonably have concluded that ‘all mention of remorse for this offence [the rape offence in 2005] occurred at the [Tribunal] hearing and in the context of a visa cancellation decision process’ (M [81]) or could have so concluded on logical or rational grounds. Further, albeit made in the context of a visa cancellation process, before the oral hearing in the Tribunal, the applicant also said in the representations that he made to the Minister in 2024 that he took ‘full responsibility’ for his actions, he was ‘very sorry for all [he had] affected’ and he felt ashamed and wished he could take it back. He also expressed remorse for his actions, regretted how he had made his victims feel and apologised to them.
38 It follows that a reasonable decision-maker could not have made the findings about the applicant’s lack of genuine remorse on the evidence and materials upon which the Minister relied for those findings.
Lack of use of support services
39 The Minister found that the applicant had not taken up support services after his most recent release from prison:
85. [The applicant] has submitted a copy of a letter from Centacare Post Release Service dated 8 July 2024, indicating they had received [his] letter and consent form and noting the next steps. Centacare is a service that provides support to prisoners and their families during the release process Attachment N. I note [the applicant] did not indicate to the [Tribunal] that he engaged with the service post release from prison.
(Emphasis original.)
40 The applicant contends that there is an implicit finding or inference in that statement of the Minister that the applicant had not utilised support services by his choice which reflects detrimentally on his character and willingness to rehabilitate himself. The applicant also contends that the implicit finding or inference is reflected in the concern the Minister later expressed about the applicant not engaging in further rehabilitation programs: M [178].
41 It is accepted that the Minister made an implicit adverse finding or inference against the applicant for not engaging with Centacare after his release from prison; namely, the applicant was unwilling to obtain support after his release from prison. It is also accepted that an adverse finding or inference of that kind was illogical in circumstances in which the applicant’s visa was cancelled in July 2024 and he was taken into immigration detention at the time of his release from prison in July 2024. However, a lapse in logic in reaching a finding or drawing an inference is not the same as a finding or inference for which there is no probative evidence. Reviewing the logic of an implicit finding or inference runs the risk of reviewing for error based on disagreement with the finding or inference as opposed to whether there was any probative evidence or material that could rationally support the finding. A lapse of logic of this kind is one that a reasonable decision-maker could make in forming a state of satisfaction about the national interest. Further, that adverse finding or inference was not material to the formation of the Minister’s state of satisfaction about the national interest. It is a passing comment and it is not accepted that it informed the ultimate view the Minister expressed about the applicant’s failure to engage in rehabilitation programs.
Untested abstinence from illicit drug use
42 The applicant contends there was no evidence to support the Minister’s conclusion that the applicant’s ability to abstain from illicit drug use in the community, where illicit drugs are more readily available, has not been properly tested (M [103]). There was evidence that the applicant had been in the community for five months (he was on parole between December 2023 and May 2024) in the period before the delegate cancelled his visa (he was taken into custody in May 2024 where he remained when his visa was cancelled in July 2024) and then the applicant was in the community a further four months between the Tribunal decision to revoke the cancellation and the Minister’s decision to cancel it again (May 2025 to September 2025). Therefore, so the applicant submits, it was illogical or irrational for the Minister to pick the 12 months that the applicant was in prison or immigration detention as the period of abstinence and ignore the nine months (in total) that the applicant was in the community (M [103]). These contentions are not accepted.
43 The Minister expressed a view about the applicant’s statement at the Tribunal hearing that he had not used methamphetamines for a year. However, for that year (May 2024 to May 2025), he was either in police custody or immigration detention. The Minister acknowledged that the applicant was released in May 2025 and observed that the applicant’s abstinence had been achieved in the controlled environments of prison and immigration detention and his ‘ability to abstain from illicit substances in the community where it is more readily available has not yet been properly tested’: M [103] (emphasis added).
44 As mentioned, the applicant was convicted of a number of offences in December 2023 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven months. In July 2024 his visa was cancelled under s 501(3A). It could not have been cancelled under that provision unless he was serving a term of imprisonment on a full-time basis. Therefore, there was probative evidence or material from which a decision-maker could reasonably conclude that the applicant was in custody or immigration detention for at least a year from May 2024 to May 2025. Whether the Minister’s statement about the applicant’s ability to abstain is taken to be at the time of the Tribunal hearing or at the time of the Minister’s decision (assuming in favour of the applicant he abstained from May to September 2025), there was probative evidence or material from which a decision-maker could reasonably conclude that the applicant’s ability to abstain in the community had not yet been properly tested.
Conclusion
45 There was no evidence in the relevant sense to support the Minister’s finding that the applicant had not expressed remorse for the sexual offences committed in 2005 until the Tribunal hearing and in the context of a visa cancellation process. That finding was material to the Minister’s findings about the risk the applicant poses to the Australian community. That was a central element of the Minister’s consideration of the national interest. The making of that finding, without any material to found it, given its central importance in the reasoning, is a sufficient basis to conclude that there has been jurisdictional error: Hands at [46] (Allsop CJ, Markovic and Steward JJ agreeing). Put another way, a reasonable person who correctly understands the law under which that person acts could not have formed the state of satisfaction under s 501BA(2)(b) based on findings of fact for which there was no evidence.
Ground 2: Were findings made on unwarranted assumptions?
46 The applicant contends that the Minister made findings or drew inferences from the absence of evidence which were illogical, irrational or unreasonable in the absence of any process by which evidence, if it existed, would be expected to come before the Minister. Specifically, the applicant contends that the Minister made present findings of fact about the applicant’s failure to address substance abuse, lack of remorse, breaches of bail and disregard for laws, and risk to the community that were based on inferences drawn from ‘stale’ evidence.
Applicable legal principles
47 While the Minister is not required to apply the rules of natural justice before exercising power under s 501BA(2) (s 501BA(3)), that does not prevent the Minister from requesting further information or representations from a visa holder: Palmer at [72] (Derrington and Hespe JJ), [154]-[155]. In the context of an exercise of power within jurisdiction, there can be circumstances in which a decision-maker transgresses the bounds of reasonableness by treating particular information as the reason or part of the reason for the decision made without first exercising powers to request further information even where there is no requirement to exercise such powers: ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34; 269 CLR 439 at [20] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ). ‘The failure of an administrative decision-maker to make inquiry into factual matters which can readily be determined and are of critical significance to a decision made under statutory authority, has sometimes been said to support characterisation of the decision as an exercise of power so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so exercised it’: Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 at [26]-[29] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 259 ALR 429 at [20]-[25] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Likewise, in the context of the formation of a state of satisfaction under s 501BA(2)(b), there may be circumstances in which, notwithstanding the absence of any requirement to accord a visa holder natural justice, it is legally unreasonable for the Minister not to make inquiry into factual matters of material significance to the Minister’s determination of whether cancellation is in the national interest: SSVJ at [42]-[51] (Perry, Kennett and Shariff JJ).
48 Nonetheless, forming a state of satisfaction under s 501BA(2)(b) on the basis of ‘stale’ information is not in and of itself ‘unreasonable’. The statutory scheme contemplates that a decision may be made on ‘a less than complete picture’: EUF20 at [44], [64]; Luong at [47]. Thus, the Minister may be able to confine consideration of a particular topic or fact to incomplete information: e.g., GRCF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 415 at [51] (Bennett J); Manebona v Assistant Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 1342 at [50], [56] (Wheatley J); Fetelika v Assistant Minister for Immigration [2025] FCA 1249 at [54] (Goodman J).
49 Further, there is no implied requirement that the Minister exercise the power under s 501BA(2) expeditiously or within a reasonable period of time. Thus, something more than mere delay in exercise of the power is necessary to attract the label of unreasonableness: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v XMBQ [2026] FCAFC 19; 315 FCR 207 at [13], [26], [31]-[34] (Thawley J, Bromwich J agreeing), [75]-[76], [117] (Kennett J, Bromwich J agreeing). However, at some point delay, combined with reliance on out-of-date information, may be sufficiently extreme to render formation of the state of satisfaction unreasonable in that the decision would be arbitrary, capricious, perverse or lacking intelligible justification: Luong at [48]; XMBQ at [27], [31], [75]; see, also, Hood v Assistant Minister for Immigration [2025] FCA 1336 at [43] (Kennett J).
50 In SSVJ the Minister was found to have formed the state of satisfaction unreasonably because he expressed views about the visa holder’s circumstances at the date of his decision that did not have a rational basis. The Minister’s decision lacked rationality because he expressed the view that there was ‘no evidence’ that the visa holder had started or completed a course directed to rehabilitation of sex offenders and drug and alcohol misuse. No inference could logically be drawn about those matters in the absence of any process by which such evidence, if it existed, would be expected to come before the Minister. The Minister found that the visa holder was, at the time of his decision, ‘an untreated sex offender’. That finding was material to the Minister’s assessment of risk to the Australian community and was evidently based on information before the Tribunal and the absence of evidence of a change of position. But, not having caused any inquiry to be made about whether a change of position had taken place, the Minister had no rational basis to express a view about the visa holder’s current state of rehabilitation: SSVJ at [48].
Lack of remorse, breaches of bail and risk to the community
51 The contentions with respect to lack of remorse, breaches of bail and risk to the community are not accepted. Although the Minister expressed his findings in the present tense as to lack of remorse (M [76], [107]), disregard for laws (M [110]) and risk to the community (M [133]) these were all based on findings of fact that related to historical events. The Minister was not purporting to express a current view based on an assumption that ‘stale’ or historical information remains current at the time of the decision. Nor was the Minister expressing a view on the basis of an inference drawn from a lack of current evidence in the absence of any process for obtaining such evidence.
Failure to address substance abuse
52 As to failure to address substance abuse, the Minister made the following statements:
102. Of concern, as noted at the [Tribunal] hearing, [the applicant] has undertaken no further rehabilitation courses related to a main driver of his reoffending: his methamphetamine addiction.
…
109. While the [Tribunal] considered the decade [the applicant] did not reoffend, I find that [the applicant] has already demonstrated that an eight year and six month prison sentence and a formal written warning by the Department did not act as a deterrent to [his] reoffending. [The applicant] has not addressed the main driver of his offending, his substance abuse, and I note that this was also considered by him to be a main driver to his offending in the early to mid-2000s. While the substance of abuse has changed, and the nature of his offending has changed, what has not changed is that harm has continued to be caused to the Australian community by [the applicant’s] continued criminal behaviour.
…
178. I have given very significant weight to matters weighing in favour of cancellation. In doing so, I considered the very serious nature of the crimes [the applicant] has committed. I acknowledge that [the applicant] has completed various rehabilitation programs (including the Moderate Intensity Sex Offenders Program (MISOP), the SMART drug and alcohol program, a sex offender program, and seeing a psychologist over four appointments) prior to 2014. I note with concern, however, that following his latest imprisonment and time in immigration detention, [the applicant] has not engaged in any further rehabilitation programs relating to the main driver of his offending: his methamphetamine addiction. This was also noted by the [Tribunal] Attachment D.
(Emphasis original.)
53 While these statements are all expressed in the present tense, the evidence or information upon which the Minister relies for those statements is that which was available to the Tribunal. The nature of the information (lack of rehabilitation courses) is inherently transient in that it was possible that the applicant could have undertaken some courses between May and September 2025. But, the transient nature of the information and the passing of four months is not sufficient in and of itself to render it unreasonable for the Minister to rely on the evidence and information available to the Tribunal to form a view, current at the time of the decision, about the applicant based on his past failure to undertake rehabilitation courses. It was permissible for the Minister to find that the applicant had not undertaken rehabilitation courses up to the time of the Tribunal hearing. The Minister could have taken the view that the reasons why that had happened were less important than the fact it had happened: SSVJ at [48]. The Minister could have confined himself to incomplete evidence or information about the steps that the applicant had taken, if any, to undertake rehabilitation courses. The Minister could have drawn conclusions or inferences rationally arising from that incomplete evidence or information: GRCF at [51]. However, contrary to the Minister’s submissions, the relevant views the Minister expresses are only in the present tense and include views or concerns relating to the applicant that are not confined to those based on past evidence or information.
54 The Minister does not confine his present state of mind to his opinion about the national interest or views about what the applicant had or had not done in the past. The Minister expresses conclusions about a present state of affairs or facts: the applicant ‘has undertaken no further rehabilitation courses related to a main driver of his reoffending’ (M [102]), ‘has not addressed the main driver of his offending, his substance abuse’ (M [109]) and ‘following his latest imprisonment and time in immigration detention, [the applicant] has not engaged in any further rehabilitation programs relating to the main driver of his offending: his methamphetamine addiction’ (emphasis added) (M [178]). These are not expressed to be present concerns because the applicant ‘had not’ undertaken rehabilitation in the past (as of May 2025), which would have been permissible, but present concerns because the applicant ‘has not’ undertaken rehabilitation as of September 2025. This does not involve reading the Minister’s reasons with an eye keenly attuned to error. It involves reading the Minister’s reasons as expressing his reasons in the words the Minister has used. Therefore, it is implicit that the Minister made a finding of fact or made an assumption of fact to the effect that the applicant had not undertaken rehabilitation between May 2025 and September 2025.
55 The Minister could only logically and rationally find or conclude that the applicant ‘has not engaged in any further rehabilitation programs relating to the main driver of his offending: his methamphetamine addiction’ as of September 2025 if the Minister had evidence or information that the applicant had not undertaken any programs in the period between May and September 2025. Self-evidently, in that period, the applicant was not in prison or immigration detention and could have undertaken rehabilitation programs. There is nothing to suggest that the Minister implemented any process to ascertain whether the applicant had undertaken rehabilitation programs in that period. No inference could logically be drawn from the evidence and information upon which the Minister relied that the applicant had not undertaken any rehabilitation programs between May and September 2025. Moreover, there was no rational basis for expressing a view about the current state of affairs (failure to undertake rehabilitation programs) at the time of the Minister’s decision.
Conclusion
56 It follows that the Minister’s findings about the current state of affairs are properly characterised as illogical or irrational or not supported by logical grounds. These findings could equally be characterised as based on ‘no evidence’ in the sense that an inference as to the current state of affairs was not open in the absence of up to date information or a rational basis for concluding the applicant had not undertaken any rehabilitation programs between May and September 2025. In either case, a reasonable decision-maker could not have concluded that the applicant had not, as of September 2025, engaged in any further rehabilitation programs relating to the main driver of his offending. That was a material finding that informed the Minister’s consideration of the risk to the Australian community and his conclusion that cancellation of the applicant’s visa was in the national interest.
Grounds 3 and 4: Other grounds of review
57 Having regard to the conclusions reached on the grounds of review to which reference has been made it is unnecessary to deal with the remaining grounds of review. In any event, these grounds merely build on the earlier grounds and emphasise the centrality of the challenged findings to the Minister’s process of reasoning.
Disposition
58 For the foregoing reasons the Minister’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501BA(2) should be quashed. The Minister should pay the applicant’s costs of the application.
I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Feutrill. |
Associate:
Dated: 13 November 2026