Federal Court of Australia

Saha v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1715

Appeal from:

Saha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1034

File number(s):

NSD 1301 of 2025

Judgment of:

LEE J

Date of judgment:

17 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from dismissal of application for judicial review – refusal of student visa – genuine temporary entrant criterion – whether Tribunal failed to consider relevant evidence – delay in determination of merits review – procedural fairness – whether applicant afforded opportunity to address concern about continued residence in Australia – alleged tentative or speculative findings – benefit of proposed further study in applicant’s home country – reference to currency exchange rates – materiality of alleged error – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 500.212(a)

Direction No 69 — Assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for Student visa and Student Guardian visa applications, cl 12

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 288; (2012) 202 FCR 417

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321

Saha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1034

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 49 ALD 640

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

34

Date of hearing:

12 November 2026

Counsel for the appellant:

The appellant appeared in person

Counsel for the first respondent:

Mr J Elliott

Solicitor for the first respondent:

Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1301 of 2025

BETWEEN:

TAMALIKA SAHA

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 NOVEMBER 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEE J:

A    INTRODUCTION

1    This is an appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) made on 3 July 2025 dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the predecessor of the second respondent (Tribunal). The primary judge’s reasons were published as Saha v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1034 (PJ).

2    The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the appellant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Student (Subclass 500) visa. The refusal turned on whether the appellant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily, as required by cl 500.212(a) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). The appellant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal. She had not filed written submissions, and I invited her to explain each ground in her own words. After hearing the Minister’s response to the matters she raised, I afforded her a further opportunity to reply and to identify anything else she wished to advance. I have considered the grounds in light of that oral address.

3    The notice of appeal raises four grounds corresponding substantially with those advanced below. They concern the Tribunal’s consideration of the appellant’s material, delay in determining the review, procedural fairness and the reasonableness of its reasoning. Although expressed as complaints that the primary judge was “unable to identify” the alleged errors, I would read them as contending that his Honour erred in rejecting those complaints.

B    THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4    The appellant, Tamalika Saha, is a citizen of Bangladesh who first arrived in Australia on 12 July 2010. Before applying for the visa presently in issue, she had obtained an advanced diploma in information technology, a bachelor’s degree in information technology, a master’s degree in technology and a Master of Business Administration.

5    On 23 October 2019, the appellant applied for a further student visa on the basis of her enrolment in an Advanced Diploma of Leadership and Management. She explained that further study would develop skills useful in establishing and managing a business in Bangladesh. The delegate refused the application on 11 December 2019, expressing concerns about the length of her residence in Australia and the proposed course’s value having regard to her existing qualifications.

6    The appellant applied for merits review on 19 December 2019. On 8 July 2021, the Tribunal invited updated information about her studies and circumstances. Her migration agent supplied further material, including evidence that she had completed the advanced diploma and had enrolled in graduate-level management studies extending to May 2023.

7    The Tribunal conducted a telephone hearing on 25 August 2021, at which the appellant was assisted by a migration agent. It affirmed the delegate’s decision the following day.

8    The Tribunal acknowledged the appellant’s academic achievements but was not persuaded by her explanation of the need for further study. It considered her proposed business and career plans insufficiently detailed, particularly given her existing qualifications. It also considered her lengthy residence, family and community ties in Australia, ties to Bangladesh and economic circumstances. Its ultimate conclusion was that it was not satisfied she genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily.

C    THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION AND THE APPEAL

9    The appellant commenced judicial review proceedings on 28 September 2021. The primary judge considered each of the four grounds advanced and concluded that no material jurisdictional error had been established. His Honour dismissed the application and ordered the appellant to pay the Minister’s costs fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.

10    Error is now alleged, and I address each ground in turn.

D    CONSIDERATION

D.1    Ground One: consideration of the appellant’s material

11    Ground one rests on the Tribunal’s statement that its reasons would refer only to information fundamental or materially significant to determining the issues. The appellant contends that the Tribunal’s inquisitorial function required it to consider and record all relevant documents and submissions.

12    There is a distinction between failing to consider a substantial contention and failing expressly to mention every document or submission in written reasons. The latter does not, without more, establish the former. As the Full Court explained in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593 (at 604–605 [45]–[47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ), the question is one of substance, and an inference of non-consideration is not too readily drawn where the reasons otherwise address the relevant issues comprehensively.

13    Here, the Tribunal addressed the appellant’s qualifications, her explanation for further study, her proposed business activities and the relationship between the proposed courses and her future career. It expressly acknowledged her multiple statements of purpose and explained why it did not find the account of her future plans persuasive. Those passages disclose engagement with the substance of her case, rather than a refusal to consider it. In her oral address, the appellant identified the financial support offered by her family in Bangladesh as the material she said the Tribunal had overlooked. She contended that the Tribunal had not mentioned that support in its reasons.

14    The primary judge recorded that the appellant had not identified what relevant matter the Tribunal had overlooked: PJ (at [20]). Her oral address in this Court identified a particular complaint, but it is contradicted by the Tribunal’s reasons. At [23], the Tribunal expressly noted “the documents filed in relation to the financial support offered by the applicant’s family for the applicant’s expenses in Australia”. It then assessed her economic circumstances by taking the evidence as a whole. The reasons therefore disclose consideration of the very material she says was overlooked. Her disagreement with the resulting assessment does not establish a failure to consider that material. Ground one does not establish appealable error.

D.2    Ground Two: delay

15    Ground two concerns the approximately 20 months between the application for merits review and the Tribunal’s decision. The appellant contends that the review should have been determined promptly and that an earlier determination would have produced a different result.

16    The question is not simply whether the review could have been determined sooner, but whether the delay deprived the appellant of a fair opportunity to present her case. Procedural fairness is concerned with a fair hearing, not a favourable outcome: Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 288; (2012) 202 FCR 417 (at 432 [76] per Bromberg J). In her oral address, the appellant described difficulties obtaining admission to further courses during the subsequent court proceedings. Those difficulties do not identify an opportunity lost in the Tribunal’s review or demonstrate that the delay impaired her ability to present her case to it.

17    The Tribunal acknowledged the time which had elapsed and invited updated information about the appellant’s studies and circumstances: Tribunal reasons (at [5]). Her migration agent supplied further material on 20 July and 23 August 2021. The Tribunal recorded that she had completed the original course and had commenced further graduate-level study, and questioned her about the reasons for that change: Tribunal reasons (at [16]). She therefore had an opportunity to place her current circumstances before it. The decision was delivered the day after the hearing, and this is not a case in which a prolonged interval between hearing and decision impaired the member’s recollection: PJ (at [22]–[23]).

18    The Tribunal’s consideration of the duration of the appellant’s residence does not, without more, demonstrate that the delay denied her procedural fairness. The applicable criterion required an assessment of her circumstances and immigration history, and Direction No 69 — Assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for Student visa and Student Guardian visa applications (Direction No 69) expressly identified the amount of time spent in Australia as relevant to whether student visas were being used primarily to maintain ongoing residence. Ground two does not demonstrate error in the primary judge’s rejection of the complaint.

19    The appellant also relied upon her completion of further study in 2026 and offered to provide the resulting certificate. I explained that those later events did not demonstrate error in the primary judge’s determination on the record before him. The certificate was not received in evidence. Her subsequent academic achievements do not establish that the Tribunal’s earlier process was unfair.

D.3    Ground Three: procedural fairness and the Tribunal’s findings

20    Ground three has two aspects. First, the appellant contends that the Tribunal failed to put to her its concern that she might be using the student visa programme to maintain residence. Secondly, she relies on the words “may be” as demonstrating that the Tribunal proceeded on assumption rather than a properly supported conclusion.

21    The first aspect must be considered in the context of the issue already identified by the delegate. The delegate’s reasons expressly questioned whether the appellant’s primary motivation was to secure ongoing residence rather than pursue further study. The Tribunal’s hearing invitation likewise identified whether she was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student as the issue for review. She was therefore on notice that her intention to remain temporarily was in question: PJ (at [25]).

22    The appellant’s statements of purpose addressed her reasons for further study and her asserted intention to return to Bangladesh. The Tribunal questioned her about her proposed studies and future business activities: Tribunal reasons (at [16], [18]). The concern was not an undisclosed new issue, and the material does not establish that the Tribunal foreclosed her opportunity to address it.

23    An obligation to afford an opportunity to address a critical issue is not an obligation to disclose every provisional reaction or proposed line of reasoning. That distinction is illustrated by Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 49 ALD 640 (at 645–646 per Tamberlin J). The primary judge did not err in applying it here.

24    The second aspect isolates language used while the Tribunal was explaining its concerns. Read as a whole, the reasons proceed from those concerns through an assessment of the evidence to a concluded state of non-satisfaction. The statutory question was whether the appellant satisfied the genuine temporary entrant criterion, not whether the Tribunal could prove conclusively that she intended permanent residence. The use of cautious language in an intermediate passage does not establish that its ultimate conclusion was speculative. Ground three fails.

D.4    Ground Four: course value and economic circumstances

25    Ground four challenges both the Tribunal’s assessment that further study would offer only marginal benefit and its reference to the exchange rate between Australia and Bangladesh. Those complaints require separate consideration.

26    Clause 12 of Direction No 69 required consideration of the proposed course’s consistency with the appellant’s existing education, its capacity to improve employment prospects in her home country and its relevance to future employment. It also required allowance for reasonable changes in career or study pathways. The inquiry was not confined to whether the course would confer any benefit at all.

27    The Tribunal’s assessment must be read in context. At [17], it acknowledged the appellant’s strong academic results and extensive existing qualifications, but considered it difficult to see further study offering more than marginal benefit. At [18], it examined her proposed business and career plans, allowed for reasonable changes in study pathways and explained why it was not persuaded that the further courses would assist those plans. At [19], it accepted that graduate-level study was more consistent with her existing qualifications. Read together, those passages concern the value of the proposed study to her stated future, including her plans in Bangladesh; they do not substitute a different statutory criterion. This aspect of the ground does not establish error in the primary judge’s reasoning: PJ (at [33]).

28    The exchange-rate complaint raises a different issue. The primary judge questioned the Tribunal’s failure to identify the source of its knowledge about exchange rates, but proceeded on the assumption that any error was not material: PJ (at [36]–[38]). His Honour did not find that a jurisdictional error had occurred and then refuse relief; his conclusion was that material jurisdictional error had not been established.

29    The governing inquiry is whether the decision actually made could realistically have been different absent the identified error. The threshold is not demanding or onerous. A reviewing court must not reconstruct the Tribunal’s reasoning or undertake its own weighing exercise to conclude that other considerations would have produced the same outcome: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 (at 328–329 [14]–[16], 332–333 [29] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ, Beach-Jones J writing separately).

30    The exchange-rate reference must be read in its context. The Tribunal did not identify a particular rate or make a calculation dependent upon it. Its discussion at [23] concerned the appellant’s economic circumstances, including her demonstrated earnings in Australia, the excess of those earnings over her expenses and the employment opportunities associated with her qualifications. The reference to exchange rates was one part of that discussion, not a separate finding upon which the refusal depended.

31    Assuming, without deciding, that the Tribunal erred by failing to identify the evidentiary basis for that reference, I am not persuaded that the error was material. That conclusion does not depend upon my assigning different weights to the remaining considerations. It follows from the limited role of the reference in the Tribunal’s own reasoning. Its concern about the appellant’s economic incentive to remain rested upon the circumstances just identified, while its ultimate conclusion expressly emphasised her lengthy residence and the explanation for further study: Tribunal reasons (at [23], [25]–[28]). The complaint does not demonstrate a realistic possibility that the decision could have been different absent the exchange-rate reference. I therefore discern no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that material jurisdictional error had not been established: PJ (at [38]).

32    Ground four fails.

E    CONCLUSION

33    None of the grounds establishes appealable error in the primary judge’s dismissal of the application for judicial review. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

34    There is no reason why costs should not follow the event.

I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Lee.

Associate:

Dated: 17 November 2026