Federal Court of Australia
Netdeen Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Gold-J Unit Trust v Wattle Court Homes Pty Ltd (Abuse of process) [2026] FCA 1713
File number(s): | QUD 820 of 2025 |
Judgment of: | PERRAM J |
Date of judgment: | 16 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – estoppel – where breach of contract claims alleged against third respondent – where proceeding arises out of a franchising dispute heard by the Supreme Court of New South Wales – where respondents allege that breach of contract claims give rise to an Anshun estoppel – where third respondent not a party to previous proceeding – whether claims substantively determined in previous proceeding – whether third respondent was a privy of a party to the previous proceeding PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – abuse of process – whether unreasonable for applicant to have failed to raise breach of contract claims against third respondent in prior proceeding – whether there is a risk of inconsistent findings – whether permitting claims to be made would bring the administration of justice into disrepute |
Cases cited: | Directed Electronics OE Pty Ltd v Isuzu Australia Limited [2022] FCA 254 Lindfield NSW Pty Ltd v Netdeen Pty Ltd (No 4) [2026] NSWSC 370 Lindfield NSW Pty Ltd v Netdeen Pty Ltd t/as G.J. Gardner Homes (No 3) [2024] NSWSC 1305 Netdeen Pty Ltd t/as GJ Gardner Homes v Lindfield NSW Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCA 196 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; 147 CLR 589 Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | Queensland |
National Practice Area: | Intellectual Property |
Sub-area: | Copyright and Industrial Designs |
Number of paragraphs: | 39 |
Date of hearing: | 3 November 2026 |
Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr S Couper KC with Mr J Elks |
Solicitor for the Applicant: | Thomsons |
Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr A Fox SC with Mr J Tsaousidis |
Solicitor for the Respondents: | Addisons |
ORDERS
QUD 820 of 2025 | ||
| ||
BETWEEN: | NETDEEN PTY LTD ACN 071 116 802 AS TRUSTEE FOR THE GOLD-J UNIT TRUST Applicant | |
AND: | WATTLE COURT HOMES PTY LTD ACN 672 997 385 First Respondent WATTLE COURT HOMES IP PTY LTD ACN 672 997 474 Second Respondent MATTHEW DAVID HOPE Third Respondent | |
order made by: | PERRAM J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 16 November 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The respondents’ interlocutory application filed on 24 July 2026 be dismissed.
2. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to that application as taxed, assessed or agreed.
3. The applicant be granted leave to file the amended originating application and the amended statement of claim in the form annexed as JNL-28 and JNL-29 respectively to the third affidavit of Mr James Lawrence dated 27 October 2026.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRAM J:
Introduction
1 There are two applications before the Court. The first is an application by the respondents for a permanent stay of part of the proceeding and the second is an application by the applicant to amend the originating application and statement of claim. Both applications are resisted.
2 The applicant is Netdeen Pty Ltd (‘Netdeen’). It sues the first and second respondents (‘Wattle Court’), and the third respondent, Mr Matthew David Hope, on various bases. These include a claim for damages for breach of contract against Mr Hope. Mr Hope (supported by the other respondents) now seeks to have the claim against him insofar as it relates to that contract claim permanently stayed, or alternatively, struck out. He does so on the basis that the claim cannot be maintained against him because there is an estoppel of the kind described in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; 147 CLR 589 at 602–603 per Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ (‘Anshun estoppel’) or alternatively because the pursuit of the claim constitutes an abuse of process.
3 Netdeen seeks to amend its originating application and statement of claim. Some of the proposed amendments relate to the contract claim against Mr Hope but some do not. Mr Hope does not oppose the amendments insofar as they do not concern the contract claim but resists the proposed contract claim amendments on the same bases as the permanent stay is sought.
The prior proceeding
4 The issues between the parties arise out of a franchising dispute heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Netdeen is the franchisor of GJ Gardner Homes. The master franchisee for New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory was Lindfield NSW Pty Ltd (‘Lindfield’). The franchise was granted under an agreement known as the Master Franchise Agreement or ‘MFA’. Lindfield was a company controlled by Mr Hope. Under the MFA Mr Hope was a ‘Specified Person’ and a ‘Guarantor’, and as such, executed a deed of guarantee and indemnity in favour of Netdeen securing the performance by Lindfield of its obligations under the MFA.
5 The MFA contained an option in favour of Lindfield permitting it to extend the operation of the MFA for a further 10 years. On 3 July 2023, Lindfield exercised the option. But on 20 July 2023, Netdeen resolved not to renew the MFA relying on a contractual entitlement to do so arising if it held the honest and reasonable opinion that, based on matters relating to Lindfield’s performance of the MFA, it was in the best interests of Lindfield’s sub-franchisees and Netdeen not to renew the MFA. This entitlement was conferred by cl 4.7. Netdeen later served a notice of termination on Lindfield on 27 May 2024.
6 Lindfield then sued Netdeen in the Supreme Court alleging that the refusal to renew was invalid because the requirements of cl 4.7 had not been satisfied. It also alleged that Netdeen had acted in breach of the Franchising Code (as prescribed pursuant to s 51AE of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)), including by terminating for an improper purpose, and had acted unconscionably contrary to certain statutory stipulations. Lindfield sought an award of damages.
7 In its defence, Netdeen denied all of this and claimed that it was entitled to terminate the MFA not only on the basis of cl 4.7 but also because Lindfield had breached the terms of the MFA in a way which amounted to a repudiation of the contract. Lindfield’s breach was alleged primarily to arise through Mr Hope’s conduct in setting up Wattle Court, which was said to be in breach of Lindfield’s duty of good faith and loyalty in cl 8.39 of the MFA. Mr Hope was not a party to the proceeding.
8 At trial, Lindfield was successful: Lindfield NSW Pty Ltd v Netdeen Pty Ltd t/as G.J. Gardner Homes (No. 3) [2024] NSWSC 1305. The trial judge held that:
(a) Clause 4.7 was to be construed as imposing an obligation on Netdeen in exercising the power it conferred to take into account the best interests of Lindfield. There was no real contest that Netdeen had not taken those interests into account so, on this basis, Lindfield was entitled to damages for breach of contract ([21]–[57]);
(b) If cl 4.7 was not to be construed in the fashion in (a), his Honour considered Lindfield’s submission that Netdeen had not made a ‘genuine’ decision at the board meeting at which it resolved not to renew the agreement, but rather, that decision had been made well before Lindfield made its renewal application. His Honour found that the meeting was a genuine meeting, despite the board members coming to the meeting with the view that there should be no renewal. However, it is unclear whether his Honour did, or did not, find that the good faith requirements of cl 4.7 had been satisfied ([58]–[181]);
(c) It was not necessary to consider Lindfield’s claims under the Franchising Code since they added nothing to the claims for breach of contract and statutory unconscionability ([185]–[193]);
(d) The statutory unconscionability claim was made good ([194]–[217]);
(e) Lindfield was entitled to $20 million in damages for breach of contract and statutory unconscionability ([218]–[265]);
(f) As to whether Lindfield, through Mr Hope’s conduct in setting up Wattle Court, had repudiated the MFA prior to its termination, his Honour concluded that Netdeen had been in breach of the MFA which gave rise to Lindfield’s entitlement to damages for breach of contract well before the termination ([289]);
(g) As to whether Lindfield had repudiated the MFA after its termination on 27 May 2024, the evidence concerning that had only been admitted as to the credit of Mr Hope ([282], [288]); and
(h) In either case, it was not necessary to deal with Netdeen’s case that Lindfield had breached the MFA in a way that constituted a repudiation ([290], [296]).
9 It will be seen from those findings that Netdeen’s case that it was entitled to terminate the MFA because Lindfield had repudiated it was not determined by the trial judge.
10 The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judge’s orders: Netdeen Pty Ltd t/as GJ Gardner Homes v Lindfield NSW Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCA 196. It rejected the trial judge’s view that the power in cl 4.7 had to be exercised in the best interests of Lindfield. Since the trial judge’s findings on whether the power in cl 4.7 had been properly exercised were unclear and new findings could not be made on appeal, it remitted the matter to a different trial judge to make appropriate findings. It also concluded that the unconscionability claim failed.
11 On the issue of whether Netdeen was entitled to terminate the agreement on the basis that Lindfield had repudiated it, the Court of Appeal reasoned that if (which could not be known at that stage) Netdeen had not been entitled to refuse to renew the MFA under cl 4.7 then it did not have a right to terminate in May 2024 on the basis of the alleged breaches of the MFA by Lindfield. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning on this turned on the proposition that the conduct of Mr Hope said to constitute the breaches all occurred after Netdeen had refused to renew the contract on 24 July 2023. A close reading of the pleadings may suggest that this view may not be correct and that conduct in breach of the MFA before 24 July 2023 was alleged. However, as will be seen, nothing turns on this as the key issue for present purposes is what the Court of Appeal determined.
12 Before me, Mr Hope submitted that the Court of Appeal did, in fact, find that Lindfield had breached the MFA pointing to [155] and [161]. Also relevant are [162] and [163]. Paragraphs [155] and [161]–[163] are as follows:
[155] By grounds 23 to 27 of the notice of appeal, Netdeen challenges many of the primary judge’s findings regarding Wattle Court. Netdeen claims that the evidence was clear that, between December 2023 and May 2024, Mr Hope was actively promoting his own interests and that of Wattle Court to Netdeen’s detriment by encouraging Sub-Franchisees to follow Mr Hope if Lindfield failed to renew the MFA.
…
[161] We reject Netdeen’s claims. To understand why, it is critical to understand the following sequence of events:
(1) Mr Hope set up Wattle Court in November 2023, with a view to carrying on a separate business as franchisor of home building franchisees. This occurred after Lindfield sought to exercise the renewal option on 3 July 2023 and, more significantly, after Netdeen had refused the renewal, a decision which it conveyed to Lindfield on 24 July 2023; and
(2) necessarily, therefore, Mr Hope’s conduct in setting up Wattle Court and seeking to entice GJ Gardner Homes Sub-Franchisees to join his new rival venture all occurred after Netdeen refused the renewal sought by Lindfield.
[162] The primary judge found at PJ3[289] that the fundamental difficulty with Netdeen’s claim that Mr Hope’s conduct in respect of Wattle Court amounted to a repudiation of the MFA was that Netdeen itself was in breach of the MFA well before 27 May 2024. Although his Honour made no express reference to cl 4.2, that finding is supported by that provision. The effect of cl 4.2 of the MFA was to give Lindfield an option to renew the MFA as long as it had duly complied with all its obligations under the MFA and subject to cll 4.6 and 4.7. Lindfield exercised that option on 3 July 2023 and the subsequent refusal by Netdeen to grant the renewal occurred on 24 July 2023. Thus, Mr Hope’s conduct in relation to Wattle Court post-dates that period. Despite being given the opportunity to do so, senior counsel for Netdeen was unable to point to any authority which supported its claim that Lindfield was not entitled to exercise the option in cl 4.2 having regard to Lindfield’s conduct which took place after Netdeen itself had refused the renewal.
[163] If the true position was that Netdeen was not entitled to refuse renewal, then it breached the agreement on 24 July 2023, when it purported to serve a notice exercising its rights under cl 4.7. At that time, Lindfield became entitled to damages flowing from that breach, which would normally be assessed as at the date of the breach: see Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351 at 367; [1988] HCA 64; Tok v Rashazar [2025] NSWCA 94 at [51]. Those damages were the value of the renewal. Apart from the possibility that Netdeen might have cured the breach subsequently (which it never did), nothing could affect that right. On the assumption that Netdeen breached cl 4.7, it is likely that Lindfield also obtained a right to terminate the MFA, which it did not exercise at that time. Consequently, it remained bound by the terms of the MFA. If it breached those terms subsequently, that may have given Netdeen a right to claim damages and a right to terminate the contract, which ultimately it purported to exercise on 27 May 2024. But that termination, even if valid, could not affect rights already accrued under the contract, including the right to sue for damages for breach of cl 4.7. The fact that Lindfield may have breached the MFA subsequently may also have given Netdeen a right to claim damages. However, no such claim was ever made by Netdeen.
13 I do not accept that these constitute a finding by the Court of Appeal that there had been a breach of contract by Lindfield. Rather, the reasoning is that any such breach could not constitute a repudiation for timing reasons.
14 In any event, having concluded that the repudiation claim had to fail, the Court of Appeal did not remit that issue to the new trial judge.
15 On remitter, the second trial judge, Peden J, concluded that Netdeen had complied with cl 4.7 in refusing to renew the contract: Lindfield NSW Pty Ltd v Netdeen Pty Ltd (No. 4) [2026] NSWSC 370. Lindfield has now lodged a notice of intention to appeal from this judgment.
16 The consequence of this is that neither trial judge made any finding that Lindfield breached the MFA. The Court of Appeal concluded that the alleged breaches could not have entitled Netdeen to terminate. In reasoning that way it did not, however, find that there had been (or that there had not been) breaches by Lindfield of the MFA.
The proceeding in this court
17 The MFA contained provisions denoting a ‘Specified Person’ who was Mr Hope. Attached to the MFA was a deed of covenant (Annexure E) under which the Specified Person, Mr Hope, promised not to compete with Netdeen during the term of the MFA. Annexure F was a deed of guarantee and indemnity given by Mr Hope in respect of the obligations of Lindfield under the MFA. Both deeds were executed by Mr Hope.
18 In the present proceeding, Netdeen now seeks to sue Mr Hope under both deeds. To a large, but not complete, extent it relies on the same breaches of contract as it relied upon against Lindfield to show that Lindfield had repudiated the MFA.
19 Mr Hope now submits that the claims under both deeds should have been pursued in the Supreme Court proceeding, and therefore they cannot now be pursued, either on the basis of an Anshun estoppel or because the present proceeding constitutes an abuse of process. Put another way, Mr Hope submits that it was unreasonable for Netdeen not to join him to the Supreme Court proceeding and claim damages for breach of contract.
Anshun estoppel
20 I do not accept that there can be an Anshun estoppel. An Anshun estoppel will only be available if Mr Hope and Lindfield are privies in interest: Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507 at 518 [23] per French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ (‘Tomlinson’). They will be privies only if they have the same legal interest: Tomlinson at [31]–[35]. Parties will not be privies in interest merely because they have the same economic interests: Tomlinson at [35] per French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ and [105] per Nettle J.
21 The liability of Mr Hope not to compete with Netdeen arises from the deed in Annexure E. The liability of Lindfield not to compete arises under cl 8.14 of the MFA. However, Lindfield is also a party to Annexure E. Notwithstanding that, Lindfield’s and Mr Hope’s legal interests are distinct. As such, I do not think that they can be privies.
22 The liability of Mr Hope to guarantee the performance by Lindfield of its obligations under the MFA and to indemnify Netdeen for any loss arising from any such failure by Lindfield arises under the deed of guarantee and indemnity in Annexure F. This is a separate liability to that of Lindfield and is insufficient to constitute Mr Hope the privy in interest of Lindfield.
23 Mr Fox SC for Mr Hope submitted that this problem was overcome because both deeds were annexures to the MFA, and that the agreement is to be understood as a whole, including various provisions which equated Mr Hope’s conduct to that of Lindfield. Whilst it is true that both deeds are annexed to the MFA, this fact is not capable of altering the legal characterisation of the legal liabilities generated by them. I therefore do not accept this submission.
24 Since Mr Hope is not the privy in interest of Lindfield for the purposes of the MFA, it is not possible for an Anshun estoppel to apply.
Abuse of Process
25 Mr Hope then submitted that it is an abuse of process for Netdeen now to pursue him for breach of contract when it could have done so before the Supreme Court by bringing a cross-claim against him (noting he was not then a party). It was not suggested that the outcome of the abuse of process argument differed as between the claims under the non-compete deed and the deed of guarantee and indemnity.
26 Both parties proceeded on the basis that the relevant principles were accurately set out in the reasons of Rofe J in Directed Electronics OE Pty Ltd v Isuzu Australia Limited [2022] FCA 254 at [30] which I will incorporate by reference into these reasons. Particularly pertinent is [30(b)]:
(b) The court’s power to stay a proceeding as an abuse of process is enlivened where either of two conditions are met:
(i) where the use of the court’s procedures occasions unjustifiable oppression to a party; or
(ii) where the use serves to bring the administration of justice into disrepute: UBS AG at [1] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), [62] (Gageler J), [92] (Nettle and Edelman JJ);
27 I do not accept that there is any abuse of process involved for four reasons.
28 First, Netdeen’s claims for breach of contract have not been resolved. Although Netdeen advanced a case that Lindfield, by Mr Hope’s conduct, had breached the terms of the MFA, as events transpired, no court has determined whether Lindfield did, in fact, do so. Neither trial judge made such a determination and the Court of Appeal only concluded that any such breaches (as it understood them) could not have entitled Netdeen to terminate the MFA. It is true, as the Court of Appeal noted at [163], that a claim for damages was not pursued by Netdeen, but this was merely to state what was a certain fact.
29 The case does not present the risk, therefore, of inconsistent findings on the question of whether there were any breaches of contract by Lindfield, because no such issue has been determined.
30 Secondly, whilst it is true that Lindfield was put to the trouble of defending the alleged breaches of contract and that Mr Hope will now be put to that trouble too if the claims are allowed to proceed, I do not accept that this will bring the administration of justice into disrepute where the breach of contract claims have not been resolved. To the contrary, it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if Netdeen, because the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal did not resolve its breach of contract allegations, was now put out of Court in relation to those allegations against Mr Hope.
31 Thirdly, I do not think it is open to Mr Hope to argue that it is oppressive to him to permit the contract claims to proceed against him because of the litigation which took place between Lindfield and Netdeen. This is because Mr Hope has expressly agreed that the guarantee and indemnity are enforceable against him regardless of what happens between Netdeen and Lindfield. This emerges from cll 5, 6 and 7 of the deed of guarantee and indemnity which are as follows:
5. This guarantee shall be enforceable against me by you notwithstanding any action that you may take against the Master Franchisee in pursuance of your rights under the agreement or any such related agreement.
6. You may at any time grant to the Master Franchisee any time or indulgence and may compound or compromise with or release the Master Franchisee without releasing discharging or affecting the liability of us under this guarantee irrespective of whether I have consented to or received notice of any such act matter or thing.
7. You may act as though I were the Master Franchisee and I hereby waive any and all of my rights as surety which may at any time be inconsistent with the provisions of the guarantee herein contained.
32 For example, if Netdeen had pursued Lindfield for contract damages and that case had been compromised, these provisions would prevent Mr Hope setting up any such compromise as a bar to the present proceeding. It is difficult to see that Mr Hope can somehow be in a better position where contract claims made against Lindfield were not even resolved.
33 Fourthly, it was reasonable for Netdeen not to claim damages for breach of contract against Lindfield (or Mr Hope) in the Supreme Court proceeding. Lindfield sued for breach of the MFA claiming that Netdeen had not been entitled to terminate it under cl 4.7. When the case came on for hearing, matters were known to Netdeen which showed that Mr Hope had been canvassing to set up a new business in competition with Netdeen in the event that Lindfield lost the case. These actions were, in fact, alleged to be breaches of contract in the Supreme Court litigation.
34 However, by the time of the trial, these canvassing efforts had not resulted in any of the sub-franchisees signing up to the new business which was called Wattle Court. After the trial, Wattle Court did succeed in signing up some sub-franchisees. In the Supreme Court proceeding, Netdeen could not and did not rely on these subsequent events because they had not happened. But it does rely on them now. I do not think it was reasonable to expect Netdeen to sue in relation to events which had not happened. Mr Fox SC, for Mr Hope, submitted that the various particulars given for the allegations raised in the Supreme Court showed that subsequent events were brought into the case, including by Netdeen preserving the option to provide further particulars to supplement its breach of contract case with allegations of continuing conduct and by defining time periods with the open-ended expression ‘at least from’. I do not accept this submission. It is evident that the manner in which the trial was conducted did not involve an examination of these subsequent matters.
35 In relation to the antedating canvassing activities, since these had not yet resulted in any sub-franchisees signing up, it is difficult to see what Netdeen’s damages would have been. In the context of a suit in which it was alleged that Netdeen had failed to comply with cl 4.7, I do not think it was unreasonable for Netdeen not to draw into the litigation a series of speculative damages claims with the very real potential of complicating the proceeding for no real advantage.
36 I therefore reject Mr Hope’s submission that the pursuit of the contract claims in this proceeding is an abuse of process. I would reject the alternative claim to strike out the relevant parts of the pleadings on the same basis.
37 In reaching that conclusion I have not overlooked Mr Hope’s submissions founded on the following propositions:
(a) Mr Hope was cross-examined about Wattle Court at the first trial; and
(b) Subpoenas were issued by Netdeen which sought material post-dating the termination.
38 In relation to (a), the first trial judge permitted this but only on the basis that it went to credit. Whilst there may be some debate about whether this was legally effective as a matter of the law of evidence, I do not think that it matters. As a matter of substance, Netdeen did not run a case based on events occurring after 27 May 2024. As to (b), when the subpoena was called it was limited to events prior to 27 May 2024.
Result
39 I would dismiss the respondents’ interlocutory application and permit Netdeen to advance its proposed amendments. The respondents should pay Netdeen’s costs as taxed, agreed or otherwise assessed. The orders I will make are these:
(1) The respondents’ interlocutory application filed on 24 July 2026 be dismissed.
(2) The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to that application as taxed, assessed or agreed.
(3) The applicant be granted leave to file the amended originating application and the amended statement of claim in the form annexed as JNL-28 and JNL-29 respectively to the third affidavit of Mr James Lawrence dated 27 October 2026.
I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Perram. |
Associate:
Dated: 16 November 2026