Federal Court of Australia

Abideen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1708

Appeal from:

Abideen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 852

File number(s):

VID 787 of 2025

Judgment of:

WHEELAHAN J

Date of judgment:

11 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application to extend time within which to seek leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) – where the applicant’s application for a student visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister – where the applicant’s application for review of the delegate’s decision was dismissed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal because he failed to appear on dates fixed for the hearing of his application – where the applicant’s application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision was summarily dismissed by a Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) – where a Judge of that Court affirmed the Registrar’s decision on a de novo review – where the applicant seeks an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal the Judge’s decision – where the applicant’s proposed grounds of appeal differ from the grounds of review advanced before the Judge – the applicant’s failure to apply for leave to appeal is adequately explained by delay in publication of the Judge’s ex tempore reasons – the proposed grounds of appeal have no merit – application to extend time dismissed

Legislation:

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 256

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 362B

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 13.13

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13

Cases cited:

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

20

Date of hearing:

11 November 2026

Counsel for the Applicant:

The applicant appeared in person

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Ms C Hill of MinterEllison

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The second respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

VID 787 of 2025

BETWEEN:

MUHAMMAD ZAIN UL ABIDEEN

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

WHEELAHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s application to extend time within which to seek leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Ex tempore, revised

WHEELAHAN J:

1    The applicant seeks an extension of time within which to file an application for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) (Circuit Court) which affirmed a decision of a Registrar of that Court summarily to dismiss the applicant’s claim for judicial review on the ground that it had no reasonable prospect of success. The revised reasons of the primary judge have been published: Abideen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 852 (J).

2    The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who applied unsuccessfully for a student visa. The delegate’s reasons for refusal included that the applicant had submitted a bogus document relating to a prior educational qualification the applicant had claimed to have achieved in Pakistan. The applicant then failed to appear before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on two occasions that had been fixed for the hearing of his application for review as a consequence of which the Tribunal dismissed the application for review.

3    The background was summarised by the primary judge at J [5]–[11]. In the following extract I have corrected and marked in underlining some immaterial typographical errors in relation to dates and a provision of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) cited by the primary judge –

5    On 15 March 2019, the applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa to undertake studies in a Master of Business Administration in Sydney (CB 20-34). The application was made with the assistance of a registered migration agent and sought a Higher Education Sector (Subclass 500) visa for a period of study between 13 May 2020 and 28 April 2022.

6    On 14 August 2019, the application for the visa was rejected by a delegate of the Minister. One of the reasons for which the delegate refused the application for the visa was that reliance was placed upon a document that was deemed to be a bogus university degree from a university in Pakistan.

7    On 2 September 2019, the applicant applied to the Tribunal to review the decision of the delegate and appointed legal representation (CB 80-1).

8    On 30 September 2021, the Tribunal sent an invitation to the applicant inviting him to attend a hearing scheduled for 21 October 2021 (CB 97-110).

9    On 20 October 2021, the day before the proposed hearing date, the solicitor for the applicant requested an adjournment because the applicant was said to have been unwell and having personal issues. On the day of the scheduled hearing, there was no appearance by the applicant or his solicitor. The Tribunal adjourned the hearing of the application for review, and a further invitation to attend a hearing was sent to the applicant’s solicitor on 3 November 2021 (CB 121-9).

10    On 18 November 2021, there was a further hearing before the Tribunal, however, again there was no appearance of the applicant and or by his legal representative. On that occasion, the Tribunal dismissed the application for review for non-appearance pursuant to s 362B(1A)(b) of the [Migration] Act. At that time, the applicant and his legal representative were informed of the right to seek reinstatement of the application for review, but no application for reinstatement was made on behalf of the applicant within the time provided which was fourteen days.

11    On 5 December 2021, the Tribunal dismissed the application for review, as it was required to do (Decision).

4    By way of explanation, the Tribunal’s decision of 5 December 2021 was to confirm its decision to dismiss the application pursuant to s 362B(1E) of the Migration Act because the applicant did not apply within the 14-day period provided for by s 362B(1B) to reinstate the application.

5    On 8 January 2022 the applicant filed an application for judicial review in the Circuit Court. The grounds of the application were as follows –

1.    The Administrative Appeals Tribunal made a jurisdictional error whilst making decision on application.

2.    The Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to accord procedural fairness and thereby erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction to review the decision of the delegate.

3.    The Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to consider all circumstances of the case and to observe the principles of natural justice.

6    Upon the application of the Minister, a Registrar of the Circuit Court in the exercise of delegated power summarily dismissed the application for judicial review pursuant to r 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth). The applicant then sought a de novo review by a judge of the Registrar’s exercise of delegated power pursuant to s 256 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), which is regulated by Division 21.2 of the Rules.

7    By orders made on 20 May 2025, the primary judge affirmed the summary dismissal of the proceeding. His Honour delivered ex tempore reasons which were subsequently published in writing on 4 June 2025. His Honour affirmed the decision to dismiss the proceeding under r 13.13(a) of the Rules because the application for judicial review had no reasonable prospect of success, as there was no material jurisdictional error apparent from the Tribunal’s decision or the Court Book. The Tribunal had dismissed the application for review under s 362B(1A)(b) of the Act because neither the applicant nor his representative appeared at the hearing, and no reinstatement was sought. The primary judge recorded at J [20] that the applicant had correctly conceded that the Tribunal had not erred in doing so and that the applicant was unable to identify any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal or any failure to afford the applicant procedural fairness, or any error of law of the kind identified in grounds of review in the application for judicial review.

8    The applicant now seeks an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal the primary judge’s order affirming the summary dismissal of the proceeding below. The application for extension of time was filed on 17 June 2025, which was within 14 days of publication of the written reasons, but more than 14 days from the date of the orders the subject of the application: see Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 35.13. The applicant has filed a proposed notice of appeal that sets out the following grounds –

1.    The Federal Circuit and Family Court failed to find that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal fell in jurisdictional error in determining without a logical and probative basis that all the evidence upon which his claim was based was false.

2.    The Federal Circuit and Family Court failed to find that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal fell in misapprehending the evidence and then use its erroneous findings about the evidence.

9    I made an order on 16 October 2026 fixing the hearing of the application for extension of time for today, and if the extension is granted, the application for leave to appeal. I ordered that the applicant file and serve an outline of submissions by 4.00 pm on 30 October 2026. The applicant did not file any submissions.

10    The applicant read to the Court an affidavit that was dated 21 May 2025, but which was filed on 17 June 2025. The affidavit did not appear to be sworn. Notwithstanding this irregularity, the Minister did not object to it.

11    At the hearing the applicant sought to tender some documents which he described as original documents evidencing “higher school of education” from the University of Cambridge. In response to questions from the Court the applicant stated that he received the original documents in 2024, and he acknowledged that he had the documents prior to the hearing before the primary judge and that he did not seek to deploy them before the primary judge. The Minister objected to the tender of the documents. I ruled that the documents were not admissible because they were not relevant. The underlying issue on this application is whether there was any arguable jurisdictional error by the Tribunal in dismissing the application for review because the applicant failed to attend the two hearings that had been fixed which would justify an extension of time and leave to appeal.

12    In order to advance an appeal against the primary judge’s orders the applicant would require the leave of the Court at three levels. First, the applicant requires an extension of time to make the application for leave to appeal. Secondly, the applicant requires leave to appeal pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) because the primary judge’s order was interlocutory. Thirdly, the applicant would likely require the leave of the Court to advance his grounds of appeal because they do not correspond to the grounds of review advanced in the Circuit Court.

13    In relation to the application to extend time, the relevant principles were identified in BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 (Yates, Wheelahan and O’Bryan JJ). Considerations that may inform the discretion to extend time include the length of the delay, whether it has been satisfactorily explained, and the merits of the proposed appeal.

14    In relation to the question of leave to appeal, the relevant principles were stated in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–399 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ). Leave to appeal is discretionary. The Court will generally consider whether the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong.

15    In relation to raising a new argument on appeal, leave to raise a ground of appeal that was not argued at first instance is granted only where it is expedient in the interests of justice, having regard to whether the failure to raise the point below is explained, whether any party would be prejudiced, and whether the new point has merit, while bearing in mind that it is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues are ordinarily settled at trial: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ); O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310 at 319 (Mason J); VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588 at [46] (Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ). Where a new point has little merit, that may be a sufficient reason to refuse leave, particularly where the effect of granting leave would be to engage the appellate jurisdiction of this Court by way of a de facto rehearing de novo without any acceptable justification for doing so.

16    As I have noted, the applicant did not file written submissions and at the hearing of the application he did not advance any oral submissions which engaged with the above issues, except to say that his intention in seeking the extension of time was to provide the additional documents to the Court which I ruled to be inadmissible.

17    The applicant appears to have a satisfactory reason for the delay, being that the primary judge’s written reasons were not available within the 14-day period within which to seek leave to appeal. While this is not an explanation that the applicant deposes to, I am prepared to infer it from all the circumstances.

18    The absence of any merit in the proposed application for leave to appeal is determinative of the application to extend time. Each proposed ground proceeds on a false premise. The Tribunal made no finding that the applicant’s evidence was false and did not assess the evidence at all. It dismissed the application for review because the applicant did not appear, expressly without further consideration of the application or the information before it and then confirmed the dismissal because no application for reinstatement was made. The applicant conceded before the primary judge that the Tribunal did not err in doing so.

19    I refuse the application for the extension of time on the ground that the extension would be futile. There is no reasonable prospect that the applicant could succeed in his application for leave to appeal because he has not identified any arguable error in the primary judge’s decision, still less any arguable jurisdictional error in the decision of the Tribunal to dismiss his application for review on the basis of his non-appearance. Had I granted the extension of time then, for the same reasons, I would have dismissed the application for leave to appeal which is also before the Court today.

20    The application for extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding twenty (20) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wheelahan.

Associate:

Dated:    11 November 2026