Federal Court of Australia

DFM17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1703

Appeal from:

DFM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 98

File number:

VID 145 of 2023

Judgment of:

WHEELAHAN J

Date of judgment:

11 November 2026

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – interlocutory application to set aside an order of the Court dismissing the appellants’ appeal pursuant to r 36.75(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the appellants’ application for a protection visa – where the appellants appealed from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing their application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision – where the appellants failed to appear at the hearing of the appeal before this Court – whether the appeal has sufficient prospects of success to warrant reinstatement – the appeal has insufficient prospects of success – application dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5H, 5J and 36

Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth) Sch 9, Pt 2, Item 15AB

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.75

Cases cited:

DFM17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1369

DFM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 98

DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1

Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541

Plaintiff M87/2023 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCASJ 42; 426 ALR 587

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362

Division:

General Division

Registry:

Victoria

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

59

Date of hearing:

11 November 2026

Counsel for the Appellants:

The first appellant appeared in person

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

J Michelon of Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The second respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

VID 145 of 2023

BETWEEN:

DFM17

First Appellant

DFN17

Second Appellant

DFO17 (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

WHEELAHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appellants’ interlocutory application seeking reinstatement of the appeal be dismissed.

2.    The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

The Court Notes That:

Pursuant to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth), Sch 16, item 10, the Administrative Review Tribunal was substituted for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal as a party to this proceeding with effect from 14 October 2024.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Ex tempore, revised

WHEELAHAN J:

1    The appellants appealed a judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) given on 16 February 2023 by which their application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was dismissed: DFM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 98 (J).

2    The appellants are unrepresented. Each appellant is an adult, and each appellant personally signed the notice of appeal, which nominated an email address for service. When the appeal was called on for hearing on 15 September 2026, there was no appearance for the appellants and on the application of the Minister I dismissed the appeal under r 36.75(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth): DFM17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1369.

3    The appellants have now applied under r 36.75(2) for an order setting aside the dismissal of the appeal. Each appellant signed the interlocutory reinstatement application. The application is supported by an affidavit of the first appellant deposing to a gastrointestinal illness on the day of the hearing which precluded him from attending Court. The first appellant stated that his failure to contact the Court before the hearing to explain his absence was due to his condition and state of distress. The first appellant annexed to his affidavit a generic medical certificate from the Dandenong Urgent Care Clinic stating that he would be unable to attend his usual occupation for the period 15 to 17 September 2026. The first appellant was not cross-examined on his affidavit, and therefore his evidence is unchallenged. There is, however, no evidence explaining the failure of the second, third, or fourth appellants to appear at the hearing.

4    The Minister did not dispute that the first appellant had provided a satisfactory explanation for his failure to appear at the hearing. I accept the first appellant’s evidence in relation to his reason for not appearing at the hearing of the appeal on 15 September 2026. The evidence in relation to the position of the second, third, and fourth appellants is not satisfactory. I am prepared to act on the assumption that, as family members, they have left the prosecution of the appeal in the hands of the first appellant.

5    For the reasons that follow, the appeal does not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant its reinstatement, and the application will be dismissed with costs.

Substantive background

6    The appellants are members of the same family who are citizens of Sri Lanka and of Sinhalese ethnicity. They departed Sri Lanka in 2007, initially entering Australia under student visas. The second appellant was the primary holder of the student visa and the first, third, and fourth appellants were dependent visa holders.

7    The appellants applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa in April 2013. The first appellant was the lead applicant who claimed protection, and the second to fourth appellants were included in the application as members of the family unit. In support of the application the first appellant provided a statement dated 26 March 2013 setting out the basis on which he claimed to satisfy the criteria for a protection visa under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary judge summarised the first appellant’s claims at J [7] as follows –

(a)    he was a journalist employed by an independent newspaper, and from 2003 to 2007 he was employed there as a sub-editor;

(b)    in this capacity, he reported on connections between ministers and underworld figures in Sri Lanka and faced threats and abuse as a result;

(c)    after the election of the Rajapaksa government in 2005, the newspaper increasingly came under pressure to write articles favourable to the government;

(d)    the first appellant and his family supported the United National Party (UNP);

(e)    in 2004, the first appellant had witnessed suspicious activities in a building near his home owned by a notorious drug trafficker which he reported to the police anonymously – the first appellant said that after this incident, and further reports he made to the police, he began to receive threatening phone calls and death threats;

(f)    the first appellant’s father was a well-known artist aligned with the UNP and he and his family were harassed by the Rajapaksa government;

(g)    in August 2007, the first appellant’s mother and sister were seriously assaulted by unknown persons;

(h)    the first appellant and his family then left Sri Lanka in 2007 to escape harm; and

(i)    if he were to return to Sri Lanka he would be identified as a failed asylum seeker and he would be identified as a former journalist who had worked for an anti-government newspaper.

8    A delegate of the Minister refused the protection visa application on 27 November 2013.

The First Tribunal Decision

9    On 21 December 2013, the appellants applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal, as it then was, to review the delegate’s decision. The review was subsequently undertaken by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: see Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth), Sch 9, Pt 2, Item 15AB. On 19 October 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

10    The first decision on review was quashed by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 25 January 2016 with the consent of the Minister on the ground that the Tribunal had failed to consider the appellants’ claims to fear harm as failed asylum seekers. The review application was then remitted to be determined again.

The Second Tribunal Decision

11    On 22 June 2017 the Tribunal, differently constituted, affirmed the delegate’s decision for the second time, and published a statement of reasons (R). The primary judge referred to this decision as the Second Tribunal Decision and it was this decision that was the subject of the application for judicial review before her Honour.

12    For the purposes of the second review, the appellants’ then representative provided a submission to the Tribunal dated 21 November 2016. The submission confirmed that the first appellant’s claims remained as set out in his 2013 statement, and it was accompanied by more recent country information: J [14]–[15]. At [8] of the submission, which the primary judge set out at J [15], the representative identified four categories of claim: (a) the reports the first appellant made to police about the activities of criminals living near his home; (b) the articles he wrote, or presided over as a sub-editor, which exposed or criticised links between criminals and politicians; (c) his support for the UNP; and (d) his position as a failed asylum seeker in consequence of those matters.

13    The Tribunal identified the issues at R [5]. The first was whether any of the appellants had a well-founded fear of being persecuted in Sri Lanka for a Convention reason. If not, the second was whether there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of their removal to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk that any of them would suffer significant harm. At R [8] the Tribunal set out, substantially in full, the first appellant’s statement of March 2013.

14    The Tribunal was satisfied that the first and second appellants were able to give their evidence without impairment: R [9]–[11]. In reaching that view it had regard to a psychological report concerning the first appellant, and to his stress, epilepsy and back pain. It also had regard to the injuries the second appellant suffered in 2007 when a rock was thrown against the window of a train carriage in Melbourne.

15    The Tribunal then addressed delay, which it treated as bearing directly on credibility: R [12]–[15]. The appellants arrived in Australia in 2007 but did not apply for protection visas until April 2013. In the meantime, they applied for a further student visa. The Tribunal did not accept the explanations given by the appellants or their representative, and it did not understand why they had not sought protection earlier if their claims were true. The delay led the Tribunal to doubt that the appellants had fled Sri Lanka in fear, to doubt the gravity of their fears, and to doubt their credibility about the events said to give rise to those fears. Having regard to the delay and to its later findings, the Tribunal reached a positive state of disbelief about the appellants’ claimed fears on leaving Sri Lanka and on return, and about much of the detail of their claims of past harm. It found that, in those respects, the appellants were not credible or witnesses of truth.

16    The first appellant’s evidence about his employment was recorded at R [18]. He worked as a proof reader and journalist from 1991 until 2003, when he was appointed a sub-editor, after which he wrote very few articles. He said that the newspaper had once been opposed to the government, but that after the election of the Rajapaksa government in 2005 it took a pro-government stance, and he was forced to write pro-government pieces. He worked the night shift and said that reporters brought him articles about underworld activity in his area knowing that he would publish and highlight them.

17    The first appellant claimed that the threats against him originated from the reporting of suspicious activity at a five-storey apartment building next door to the family home: R [16], [19]–[21]. He said that in 2004 he saw a truck enter the building in suspicious circumstances and telephoned the officer in charge at the local police station, using a pseudonym. Police attended that day and made arrests, and the newspaper published an article about the raid the next day. Some weeks later he called the same officer, under the same pseudonym, to report a larger delivery. On that occasion the officer told him not to get involved because the people were dangerous, and the police did not attend. Some time after that, the first appellant found a parcel in his garden containing what he believed to be government customs seals. He left the parcel where it was, and it later disappeared. He suspected that it had been left to test whether he would take the seals. The Tribunal observed that this seemed speculative, and he conceded that it might be.

18    The first appellant attributed the threats to these events: R [22]–[23]. He said that the owner of the building was reputed to be a drug dealer who would have known that the first appellant worked at a newspaper, and so would have connected him with the article about the raid. He could give only an approximation of the owner’s name and said that the man was hardly ever at the building. He said that threats began a few weeks later in 2004 and that, unlike earlier threats, which related to particular newspaper stories, they were frequent and significant. He linked them to the events next door because of an incident in which a van obstructed his path home at night. Someone in the van shouted that he would soon be meeting “Prince Colum”, whom he described as an underworld leader. He believed that one of the men in the van was a man whom he named and to whom I shall refer as XYZ. From then on, he drove to work.

19    The first appellant claimed that because of the threats the family moved house in mid-2005, and moved several more times after that: R [24]–[25]. Even after they moved, people in vans came looking for him. On one occasion he showed police a vehicle parked near the house, but they did not take the matter further. He claimed that his wife also received suspicious calls. The Tribunal put to him that the country information suggested that it was journalists who wrote stories who were targeted, and that his role as a sub-editor might not expose him to the same level of harm. He answered that he was targeted because he lived nearby, was known to work at the newspaper, and had aroused suspicion as the person behind the reports about the building.

20    The first appellant also claimed that a government member of Parliament, who later became a minister, came to the newspaper’s office and was shown who he was. He attributed this to a newspaper story about the member’s son and to his being regarded as an opposition supporter: R [26]. He was not clear about when this occurred and referred instead to a telephone call in December 2006 from XYZ, whom he identified, from newspaper photographs, as the member’s bodyguard and as one of the men in the van. He said that XYZ threatened to kill him before the Sinhalese New Year in April 2007. After that call he was afraid to attend work. In January 2007 he took three months’ leave, from which he did not return, and stayed at his wife’s sister’s house, where he decided that his only option was to leave Sri Lanka. The second appellant obtained a student visa, but the children did not, so the first appellant remained in Sri Lanka.

21    The first appellant claimed that on 7 August 2007, people came looking for him at his mother’s house and assaulted his mother and sister so badly that he could not recognise them: R [26]. He believed that this was revenge because he was not there. The police were unable to identify anyone. He said that the family applied for student visas in extreme fear for their lives.

22    At R [27]–[29] the Tribunal recorded that it tested aspects of the first appellant’s account. He claimed that he received two to three threatening calls a week at work, and more calls at home. The Tribunal put to him that it was odd that his employer had taken no steps in response to calls about work matters. The first appellant said that he had told the general manager, who advised him to move house, but that there was no point taking the matter further because the person above them all was a crony. The first appellant confirmed that, apart from the threats, he had not been harmed in Sri Lanka. The Tribunal asked whether he had complained to police only once, referring to an acknowledgement of complaint dated 27 December 2006. He said that he had attended the police a few times but had ensured that the death threat was recorded. He said that he had reported the death threat to a police station near his work, rather than near his home, because the call came to his office.

23    The Tribunal asked the first appellant why anyone would assault his family after he had stopped work, at a house where he had not lived for two years, when he could have been attacked during the years he was working: R [30]. He said that the attackers assumed that the best way to harm him was to hurt his family and attributed the attack to the attackers’ vengefulness. The Tribunal put to him that, if powerful people such as the government member and Prince Colum had wanted to harm him, they could have done so. The Tribunal noted that the country information he had provided showed that many journalists were harmed in that period and stated to the first appellant that it might instead conclude that he was of no interest to anyone. The first appellant responded that there were many incidents, that he had evaded his pursuers, and that he was almost in hiding.

24    At R [31]–[40] the Tribunal recorded the balance of the evidence and submissions. The first appellant claimed that, if he returned, he would have to work for a newspaper. He conceded that Prince Colum had been killed and that the government member was no longer a minister but said that underworld gangs remained active. The Tribunal put to him country information that conditions for journalists had improved under the new government. The first appellant accepted that information but said that, because of his knowledge of the underworld, he would face the same consequences as in the past. He said that he had not been involved in the media, or criticised the Sri Lankan government, while in Australia. The second appellant claimed that the family had been followed and that she had received threatening calls. She said that she resigned from her job in 2005 out of fear, although she had not reported any of these matters to police. The appellants’ representative submitted to the Tribunal that there were a number of respects in which the first appellant could have embellished his claims but had not done so. In a post-hearing submission, he argued that the country information showed only a reduction in incidents of violence against journalists, not their elimination, and that the political situation was unsettled.

25    The Tribunal accepted that the first appellant worked as a proof reader and journalist before becoming a sub-editor in 2003, and that he held that position until he resigned in April 2007: R [41]. However, he conceded that after his appointment as a sub-editor he wrote very few articles and was not directly responsible for writing articles or for deciding to publish them. He did not claim, and the Tribunal did not accept, that he was threatened because of anything he had written. His claim was that he was threatened because he lived close to the site of the arrests, which his newspaper had reported, and because he was willing to publish stories about the local underworld. The Tribunal found at R [42] that sub-editors do not select which articles are published, and that those decisions would have been made by editors. It found that the first appellant could not coherently explain how he would have influenced the selection or highlighting of particular articles. The Tribunal also found that the newspaper was pro-government and did not accept that it would have published articles critical of the government or linking it to the underworld. The Tribunal concluded at R [43] that the first appellant was not, and would not have been considered to have been, responsible for writing, or deciding to publish, articles exposing the underworld or its political connections.

26    At R [44]–[45] the Tribunal rejected the first appellant’s claim to fear harm arising from his observation and reporting of activities at the neighbouring building in 2004. The Tribunal accepted at R [44] that, in 2004, the first appellant witnessed what he took to be suspicious activity at the apartment block next door to his home and reported it anonymously to the local police. It accepted that the report led to arrests, which were covered in the newspaper by a reporter other than the first appellant. It also accepted that, on a second occasion, he again contacted the police anonymously and was warned off. Finally, it accepted that he found in his garden a package containing government seals, which he left where it was and which was later removed.

27    At R [45] the Tribunal recorded the first appellant’s claim that, regardless of his role at the newspaper, he was known as a journalist to his neighbours and to the crime boss who owned the apartment block, and that for this reason he was presumed to have been behind the exposure of the criminal activities and their publication in the newspaper. The Tribunal considered that the contention had some superficial merit but identified three difficulties with it. The first difficulty was that the first appellant could say very little about the alleged crime boss. He said only that he had met him a few times, he could give only an approximation of his name, and he said the man was hardly ever there. The Tribunal considered that this raised real doubts about how that person, or anyone associated with him, would have identified the first appellant as working at a newspaper, as a neighbour, or as being present when the suspicious activity occurred. The second difficulty was that the first appellant’s contention appeared to be a pivoting of his evidence to meet an identified concern, namely that he had given his information to the police under an assumed name and had not written the article published the next day. The Tribunal stated that in those circumstances it was highly speculative to claim that his proximity to the apartments and his employment at a newspaper would, without more, lead anyone to conclude that he had any involvement. Nor would the package of seals have increased anyone’s suspicion of him, because he had neither removed it nor reported its contents to the police. The third difficulty identified by the Tribunal was that the first appellant moved house in mid-2005 yet he claimed that the threats continued, which did not fit a claim that it was his geographical proximity that had led to the threats. The Tribunal concluded that the claims were highly speculative and not based on any clear and credible chain of events. On that reasoning, together with its findings on delay and credibility, the Tribunal did not accept that anyone had identified the first appellant as the source of the complaints to the police, that anyone knew, presumed or suspected him to have been responsible for the arrests in 2004, or that he was threatened as a result of any of those events.

28    The Tribunal found that the first appellant was never threatened in Sri Lanka, either at work or at home: R [46]–[52]. It did not accept that he received any threats before 2004 and stated that his evidence on that subject was vague and equivocal. As to the claimed threats from 2004 to 2007, the Tribunal identified the following difficulties.

29    First, it had already rejected the claimed genesis of the threats. The Tribunal considered that there was no plausible way in which the accepted events of 2004, and his role as a sub-editor living nearby until mid-2005, led to the threats.

30    Secondly, although the threats were said to have continued for two or three years and to have come from a major crime figure and from the bodyguard of a member of the government, the makers of the threats did not harm the first appellant or his family over the relevant years. The first appellant had not changed his work in response to the threats. The Tribunal did not accept that avoiding walking to work, or similar measures, would have protected him from enemies of that kind. It found his evidence about the government member’s interest in him particularly unconvincing, because he could not explain why, as a sub-editor, he would be of any interest to the government member or his bodyguard.

31    Thirdly, the only translated police record was the acknowledgement dated 27 December 2006. The other police record was untranslated, was dated September 2003, and so pre-dated the claimed threats. The Tribunal stated that the first appellant gave no clear reason for not seeking further help from the police or his employer.

32    The Tribunal found that the threats did not occur: R [51]–[52]. While the Tribunal accepted on the basis of country information that during the relevant period journalists may have been harassed, detained, threatened and intimidated, it did not accept that the first appellant, as a sub-editor, was targeted for such harm. It did not accept that the first appellant received threatening calls at work or at home, that vans attended the family’s homes, that he was threatened from a van, or that XYZ threatened to kill him in December 2006. It followed that the appellants were not forced to leave the family home, or to make any of their later moves, because of threats.

33    The Tribunal accepted that the government member came to the newspaper’s office and threatened staff over articles in 2001, but that was before the first appellant became a sub-editor in 2003: R [53]. It did not accept that, as a sub-editor, he would have been of any interest to the government member, or that he was ever pointed out to the member.

34    The Tribunal gave very little weight to the second appellant’s evidence. It accepted that she resigned from her employment, but not for the reasons claimed: R [54].

35    The Tribunal addressed documents relied on to support the claims: R [55]. It gave no weight to a psychological assessment relied on to support the claims, because the report depended on the first appellant’s self-reporting and the Tribunal had rejected the first appellant’s claims of harm. It gave no weight to a letter from the United Journalists’ Association (UJA), because it was written long after the events and depended on the first appellant’s own account. It gave no weight to a letter of support, because the first appellant could not explain why its wording did not fit his claims. It gave no weight to a 2003 police record, because it did not correspond with any claimed event. It gave no weight to a 2006 police record, because it contained little independent detail and the Tribunal had found that the death threat did not occur.

36    Addressing the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal found that the first appellant had exaggerated his role in the accepted events and had lied about the threats and about the involvement of the government member and XYZ: R [56]. It accepted that his mother and sister may have been harmed in August 2007, but not for any of the reasons claimed or for any reason connected with him: R [57].

37    The Tribunal found at R [58] that the first appellant had not been threatened or otherwise harmed in the past because of his work in the media. It accepted that he would resume similar work if he returned to Sri Lanka. However, it preferred the country information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that threats and harm to journalists had lessened since the change of government. It also noted the first appellant’s concession that the circumstances of those he claimed wished to harm him had materially changed. The Tribunal found that there was only a remote, far-fetched chance that he would be harmed if he returned and worked in the media. It also found that his knowledge of the underworld from ten years earlier would not increase that risk.

38    The Tribunal rejected the remaining claims. It found at R [59]–[62] that neither the first appellant nor his family had been harmed because of their UNP affiliation, and that there was no real chance of such harm in the future. It found at R [63]–[70] that the appellants would not be harmed on return as failed asylum seekers. At R [71] it accepted that returning would be difficult and stressful for the family, particularly the children, and might disrupt the children’s education, but held that this did not amount to serious harm, even taken at its highest. At R [72] it concluded that none of the appellants faced a real chance of serious harm for any of the reasons claimed, individually or cumulatively. For the same reasons, it found at R [73]–[76] that there were no substantial grounds for believing that the appellants faced a real risk of significant harm. In doing so, it again had regard, at R [75], to the stress and psychological hardship of return, particularly for the children, and found that it did not amount to significant harm. The Tribunal accordingly affirmed the delegate’s decision: R [77]–[78].

The primary judge’s decision

39    Before the primary judge the appellants advanced a single ground of review, namely that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. At the hearing, the primary judge refused leave to the appellants to rely on more recent country information, and there is no appeal from that refusal: J [32]. The appellants’ sole ground of review was supported by three paragraphs of particulars, which her Honour addressed in turn.

40    Particular (a) alleged that the Tribunal asked the wrong question at R [45]. The allegation was that whatever his role at the newspaper, the first appellant would have been regarded as a journalist by his neighbours, including the alleged crime boss who owned the adjoining building, who would not have known the difference between a sub-editor and a journalist, and who may have made inquiries after the police raid and identified the first appellant as the source of the complaint. The primary judge held that particular (a) did little more than seek impermissible merits review: J [40]. Her Honour held that it was clear from a fair reading of R [45] that the Tribunal understood the claim, as appeared from its statement that “regardless of his role at [the newspaper], he was known to his […] neighbours, and to the crime boss who owned the apartment block as a journalist”. Having noted that the claim had “some ‘superficial merit’”, the Tribunal identified a number of concerns with it and rejected it. Ultimately, the Tribunal “was not satisfied that the first applicant was known or suspected by anyone to have been responsible for the police arrests”: J [41]. Her Honour held that this conclusion was reasonably open on the evidence and disclosed no jurisdictional error: J [42].

41    Particular (b) alleged that the Tribunal erred by “simply dismissing” all the first appellant’s evidence at R [52] and by giving no weight at R [55] to documents which were identified by the appellants in particular (b) of the ground of review as follows –

the psychological assessment; the letter from the UJA dated 11 November 2013; letter of support from [name redacted] dated October 2013; the acknowledgement of complaint letter from the police, dated 25 September 2003; the letter relating to the death threats, 27 December 2006.

42    The primary judge held at J [43]–[46] that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons disclosed that it had not simply dismissed the evidence, but had considered the claims and explained in a detailed and comprehensive way why it did not accept them, and that it had regard to each of the documents and explained why no weight should be given to them, those conclusions being reasonably open on the material.

43    Particular (c) alleged that the Tribunal failed to give proper consideration to the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The primary judge held at J [47]–[52] that the Tribunal had set out the relevant matters at R [73] and that it was open to the Tribunal, having made factual findings on the substantive claims, to conclude that there was no real chance of serious harm on return in the reasonably foreseeable future for any of the reasons claimed or for any other reason. Her Honour held that the Tribunal also had regard at R [75] to the stress and psychological harm that might be caused to the appellants, and in particular to the children who had grown up largely in Australia but concluded that this did not constitute significant harm. The primary judge held that, read fairly and in the context of the detailed findings made, including the credibility findings, those findings were reasonably open, the Tribunal having understood its statutory task. Her Honour concluded that this aspect of the ground of review, like the other two, was no more than a disagreement with the conclusions reached and that the appellants impermissibly sought merits review.

44    The primary judge accordingly held at J [53]–[54] that the ground of review was not made out and ordered that the application be dismissed and that the first and second appellants pay the Minister’s costs.

The appellants’ grounds of appeal to this Court

45    The appellants’ single ground of appeal and its particulars correspond to the ground of review that was before the primary judge –

1.    The decision of the Federal Circuit Court is affected by jurisdictional error in that;

Particulars

(a)    In relation to Particular (a) the court has erred by maintaining the tribunal did ask the correct question in relation to paragraph (45) of its decision; and by maintaining it was merits review; the tribunal had acknowledged he was known as a journalist, but then goes on to conclude it had concerns with his claim and the Court is wrong to support the finding of the tribunal;

(b)    In relation to Particular (b), the Court has erred when it concludes that upon any reading of the decision, the tribunal is far from dismissive; We submit the court erred by concluding that the weight or non weight given to these documents was reasonably open to it on the basis of the materials;

(c)    in relation to Particular (c) the court has erred by concluding that the findings were reasonably open to the tribunal; and it reached conclusions that were reasonable [sic] open on the evidence before it;

The appellants’ submissions

46    Because the appellants are unrepresented, the Court ordered that the Minister file submissions first in time. The appellants subsequently filed an outline of submissions dated 23 June 2026. The appellants’ submissions were prepared by the first appellant on behalf of all the appellants. In his oral submissions at the hearing of this application, the first appellant added very little of relevance.

47    The appellants’ submissions addressed the procedural history and the criteria for the grant of a protection visa under ss 5H, 5J, 36(1A), 36(2), and 36(2A) of the Migration Act. The appellants identified the substance of the first appellant’s claims for protection in the March 2013 statement accompanying the protection visa application, namely that he feared harm arising from his anonymous reports to police in 2004 concerning activities at a nearby housing complex owned by a notorious drug trafficker when employed as a sub-editor by a newspaper, and that he was suspected by underworld criminals and an associated member of Parliament of involvement in newspaper articles about them. The appellants also identified documents that were provided to the Tribunal in support of those claims. The appellants then addressed the three particulars of their ground of appeal.

48    As to particular (a), the appellants submitted that the primary judge erred in holding that the Tribunal asked the correct question at R [45], and in characterising the challenge as an attempt at merits review. They submitted that the Tribunal acknowledged that the first appellant was known as a journalist but then went on to identify concerns with the claim, and that the primary judge was wrong to uphold that finding. The appellants disputed the Minister’s characterisation of their case as a re-agitation of the merits and submitted that the Tribunal should have addressed what the appellants described as the conditions then endemic in Sri Lanka, being the threats to and harassment of journalists and newspapers perceived to be opposed to the government. The appellants emphasised that the Tribunal accepted that the first appellant had worked as a proof reader and journalist before becoming a sub-editor at the newspaper in 2003, and that he remained in that position until April 2007.

49    As to particular (b), the appellants submitted that the primary judge erred in concluding that the Tribunal was “far from dismissive” of the first appellant’s evidence, and in concluding that the weight, or absence of weight, given to the identified documents was reasonably open to the Tribunal on the material before it. The words “far from dismissive” do not appear in the primary judge’s reasons. Her Honour held at J [44] that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons disclosed that it did not simply dismiss the appellants’ evidence. The appellants did not develop this particular beyond the terms of the notice of appeal.

50    As to particular (c), the appellants submitted that the primary judge erred in concluding that the Tribunal’s findings were reasonably open to it. The appellants submitted that, although the Tribunal had regard to the submissions concerning the impact of stress upon the appellants, and in particular upon the children if they returned to Sri Lanka, it wrongly concluded that those claims, taken at their highest, did not amount to significant harm. The appellants submitted that the psychologist’s report referred to by the Tribunal was prepared for the very purpose of corroborating what the first appellant was enduring, and that it was no answer to say that the report was based upon what he told the psychologist because all such reports are based upon self-reporting. The appellants submitted that the Tribunal was incorrect to conclude that there were not substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that the appellants would suffer significant harm upon removal to Sri Lanka, having regard to the first appellant’s background.

51    The Minister filed a notice of contention in relation to particular (c), contending –

In relation to the appellants’ Ground 1, particular c, that it was open to the Tribunal to find at paragraph 76, for the reasons it gave in paragraphs 74 and 75, that there are not substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicants will suffer significant harm upon being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka.

The appellants have not shown sufficiently arguable appealable error in the primary judge’s decision

52    There is no merit in the appellants’ ground of appeal.

53    As to particular (a), there was no error by the primary judge in rejecting the appellants’ claim that the Tribunal asked the wrong question at R [45], or in holding that the appellants were seeking little more than impermissible merits review. Particular (a) of the ground of review before the primary judge picked up language appropriate to a claim of jurisdictional error, but in substance it, and the submissions made to the primary judge in support, engaged with the merits of the Tribunal’s reasoning.

54    In support of particular (a) the appellants submitted that the Tribunal accepted that the first appellant was known as a journalist but then concluded it had concerns with the claim. Even on its own terms, this submission cannot be accepted. Fairly read, the Tribunal did not make a finding that the first appellant was known to his neighbours and the crime boss as a journalist. The passage from R [45] quoted by the primary judge at J [41] recorded the first appellant’s contention that he was so known, before giving three reasons for rejecting his claims built upon that contention: see [27] above. The Tribunal accepted that the first appellant had worked as a journalist but found that from 2003 he was a sub-editor who wrote very few articles and was not responsible for selecting or publishing them: R [41]–[43]. Nor did the Tribunal overlook the conditions for journalists in Sri Lanka at the time. It accepted the country information that journalists were harassed, detained, threatened and intimidated during that period, but did not accept that the first appellant, as a sub-editor, was targeted for such harm: see [32] above.

55    As to particular (b), there is no merit in this aspect of the ground. I have already noted that particular (b) was not developed by the appellants in submissions beyond the terms of the ground. The Tribunal did not “simply dismiss” the first appellant’s evidence at R [52]. There was no error by the primary judge in holding at J [43]–[46] that it was open to the Tribunal to give no weight to the documents relied on by the appellants for the reasons the Tribunal gave: see [35] above.

56    As to particular (c), this is a broad-ranging claim of legal unreasonableness and it lacks merit. The threshold for establishing legal unreasonableness is high: Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 at [26] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [11] (Kiefel CJ). It is not met by disagreement with the merits, however strong, nor by mistaken or poor reasoning. It requires reasoning or an outcome that is irrational or illogical in the sense that it makes no sense at all, which will arise only rarely: Plaintiff M87/2023 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCASJ 42; 426 ALR 587 at [27] (Steward J).

57    In substance, particular (c) and the appellants’ submissions in support rise no higher than challenging the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal’s reasoning that no weight should be given to the psychologist’s report because it was based upon the first appellant’s reporting of claims that the Tribunal had rejected was a path of reasoning that was open to it. So too was its conclusion at R [75] that the stress and psychological hardship of return, particularly for the children, did not amount to significant harm. That conclusion accorded with the definition of significant harm in s 36(2A) of the Migration Act, which by reason of the applicable definitions in s 5(1) in relevant respects requires an intentional infliction of pain or suffering, or of humiliation: SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 at [26]–[29] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ), [68] (Edelman J). Otherwise, the appellants’ submissions amounted to a generalised challenge to the Tribunal’s conclusions and did not identify any arguable jurisdictional error.

58    For completeness, the Minister’s notice of contention was directed to a point that was not raised by the appellants. The point was that at J [50] the primary judge, when addressing the complementary protection criterion, referred to findings of fact in relation to the refugee criterion. Had it been necessary to consider this point, I would have held that there is nothing in it. At most, J [50] cited the wrong paragraph of the Tribunal’s reasons and is not an error of substance that is material to the judgment. Read fairly, her Honour’s reasons do not disclose any misunderstanding of the criterion the Tribunal had to apply. The Tribunal’s conclusion on complementary protection at R [76], for the reasons given at R [74]–[75], was reasonably open, and it was entitled to rely on the findings it had made in relation to the refugee criterion: DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1 at [27] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ). Nothing raised by the Minister’s notice of contention alters my view that particular (c) of the appellants’ ground of appeal lacks merit.

Conclusion

59    The appeal does not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant its reinstatement. The interlocutory application will be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wheelahan.

Associate:

Dated:    11 November 2026


SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

VID 145 of 2023

Appellants

Fourth Appellant:

DFP17