Federal Court of Australia

eSafety Commissioner v Telegram FZ-LLC (suppression orders) [2026] FCA 1700

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to ss 37AF(1) and 37AG(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the grounds that it is necessary to protect the safety of individuals (s 37AG(1)(c)) and it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (s 37AG(1)(a)):

(a)    the company referred to in paragraph 13 of the affidavit of Ms Heidi Snell sworn on 16 October 2026 be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym “company Y” and its CEO as at the date of this order by the pseudonym “Mr X”;

(b)    the person referred to in paragraph 14 of the said affidavit of Ms Snell be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym “Person A”;

(c)    the person referred to in paragraph 15 of the said affidavit of Ms Snell be referred to in connection with this proceeding only by the pseudonym “Person B”; and

(d)    publication of any information tending to reveal the identities of Person A, Person B, Mr X or company Y and company Y’s address, be prohibited for a period of 10 years from the date of this order.

2.    Pursuant to ss 37AF(1) and 37AG(1) of the Act, on the grounds that it is necessary to protect the safety of individuals (s 37AG(1)(c)), and it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (s 37AG(1)(a)), the following parts of the following documents filed in this proceeding are to be treated as confidential and not be published (whether electronically or otherwise), disclosed or accessed by any person other than the parties, their legal representatives, counsel and the Court except pursuant to an order of the Court for 10 years from the date of this order:

(a)    paragraphs 13 to 15 of the said affidavit of Ms Snell;

(b)    the affidavit of Mr X affirmed on 15 October 2026 to the extent only that it identifies company Y, Mr X, Person A or Person B; and

(c)    the written submissions of the applicant dated 5 November 2026 but to the extent only that they identify company Y, Mr X, Person A or Person B.

3.    There be liberty to apply.

4.    Costs reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEACH J:

1    This case concerns a proceeding brought by the eSafety Commissioner against two Telegram entities concerning alleged breaches of a subordinate instrument promulgated under s 145(1) of the Online Safety Act 2021 (Cth) that it is said amount to contraventions of s 146(1) of that Act. Declarations and pecuniary penalties are sought concerning the contravening conduct that is said to have involved or facilitated access to or the distribution of class 1A material.

2    Class 1A material is defined in s 6(1) of the Online Safety (Relevant Electronic Services – Class 1A and Class 1B Material) Industry Standard 2024 (Cth) (RES Standard) to include “pro-terror material” or “extreme crime and violence material”; the RES Standard was promulgated under s 145(1) of the Act.

3    The object of the RES Standard is to improve online safety for Australians in respect of class 1A material (RES Standard, s 4), which is defined (RES Standard, s 6(1)) to mean inter–alia “pro–terror material”.

4    “Pro–terror material” has been defined as follows (RES Standard, s 6(1)):

pro-terror material means:

(a)    class 1 material that:

(i)    directly or indirectly counsels, promotes, encourages or urges the doing of a terrorist act; or

(ii)    directly or indirectly provides instruction in the doing of a terrorist act; or

(iii)    directly praises the doing of a terrorist act in circumstances where there is a substantial risk that the praise might have the effect of leading a person (regardless of the person’s age or any mental impairment that the person might suffer) to engage in a terrorist act; or

(b)    material that is known pro-terror material.

However, material accessible using a relevant electronic service is not pro-terror material if its availability on the service can reasonably be taken to be part of public discussion, public debate, entertainment or satire.

5    Since 22 December 2024, the RES Standard has applied to the service operated by the relevant Telegram entity (the Telegram Service) as a relevant electronic service (RES Standard, s 5(1)). In s 5 of the Online Safety Act, “electronic service” is defined as:

electronic service means:

(a)    a service that allows end‑users to access material using a carriage service; or

(b)    a service that delivers material to persons having equipment appropriate for receiving that material, where the delivery of the service is by means of a carriage service;

but does not include:

(c)    a broadcasting service; or

(d)    a datacasting service (within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992).

6    There is also a definition of “relevant electronic service”; see ss 5 and 13A of the Online Safety Act. Section 13A provides:

13A    Relevant electronic service

(1)    For the purposes of this Act, relevant electronic service means any of the following electronic services:

(a)    a service that enables end‑users to communicate, by means of email, with other end‑users;

(b)    an instant messaging service that enables end‑users to communicate with other end‑users;

(c)    an SMS service that enables end‑users to communicate with other end‑users;

(d)    an MMS service that enables end‑users to communicate with other end‑users;

(e)    a chat service that enables end‑users to communicate with other end‑users;

(f)    a service that enables end‑users to play online games with other end‑users;

(g)    an electronic service specified in the legislative rules;

but does not include an exempt service (as defined by subsection (2)).

Note 1:    SMS is short for short message service.

Note 2:    MMS is short for multimedia message service.

Exempt services

(2)    For the purposes of this section, a service is an exempt service if none of the material on the service is accessible to, or delivered to, one or more end‑users in Australia.

7    Now in her statement of claim, the Commissioner has alleged that between various dates, end-users in Australia identified 12 instances of class 1A material on the Telegram Service, three of which were “known pro-terror material” (see RES Standard, s 6(1)). Each instance was reported to the provider of the Telegram Service, but seven days later 10 instances had not been removed from the Telegram Service. “Known pro–terror material” is defined to mean “material that has been verified as pro–terror material” (RES Standard, s 6(1)).

8    The instances of class 1A material on the Telegram Service are the factual foundation for the Commissioner’s allegations that the relevant Telegram entity: (a) failed to have systems and processes for responding to a breach of terms of use in respect of class 1A material (RES Standard, ss 14(2) and 15(2)); (b) failed to implement appropriate systems, processes and technologies to detect, remove, disrupt and deter known pro-terror material (RES Standard, ss 20(2) and 21(2)); and (c) failed to provide any notification in response to the complaints (RES Standard, s 29(4)).

9    A description of the content of the 12 instances of class 1A material is in a spreadsheet exhibited to an earlier affidavit filed in this proceeding; the description of the content concerns various videos. Moreover, based on the descriptions of the content of the 12 instances of class 1A material, and the further detail of the content of 10 of the instances, some of the material may be “violent extremist material” within the ambit of s 474.45A of the Commonwealth Criminal Code (the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)) because the material depicts serious violence, provides instructions on engaging in serious violence and/or supports serious violence, and a reasonable person would consider that in all the circumstances the material is intended to advance a religious or ideological cause and to encourage or induce a person to associate with an organisation that is directly engaged in the doing of an intimidatory act, or that is preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of an intimidatory act. I need not elaborate or give further colour to this material.

10    The Commissioner has sought the following declarations and orders:

A.    A declaration that, during the period 21 August 2025 to 18 December 2025, the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent contravened section 13(2)(b) and/or section 13(7)(c) of the RES Standard, by reason that the Terms of Service for the Telegram Service failed to require in an account holder to ensure that the Telegram Service was not used, by the account holder, or by an end-user in Australia, to access or distribute class 1A material on Telegram Private Channels or Telegram Private Groups.

B.    A declaration that, during all or part of the period 27 September 2025 to 24 October 2025, the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent contravened section 14(2) of the RES Standard, in not implementing systems and processes that ensured that, if the provider of the Telegram Service became aware that there had been a breach of an obligation under the Terms of Service for the Telegram Service in respect of class 1A material, the provider would take appropriate action to ensure that the breach ceased and the risk of further such breaches was minimised.

C.    A declaration that, during all or part of the period 27 September 2025 to 24 October 2025, the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent contravened section 15(2) of the RES Standard in failing, upon becoming aware that the Telegram Service was being used on 10 occasions to access or distribute an instance of class 1A material on the Telegram Service, to:

(a)    as soon as practicable, remove the material or cause the material to be removed from the Telegram Service; and

(b)    to take appropriate action to ensure that: the Telegram Service no longer permitted access to or distribution of the material; any related breach of the Terms of Service for the Telegram Service ceased; and the risk of further such breaches of the Terms of Service for the Telegram Service was minimised.

D.    A declaration that, during all or part of the period 10 July 2025 to 24 October 2025, the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent contravened section 20(2) of the RES Standard, in not implementing appropriate systems, appropriate processes and appropriate technologies, or any appropriate alternative action, to:

(a)    detect and identify known-terror material that is stored on the Telegram Service, or is being distributed to an end-user in Australia using the Telegram Service; and

(b)    remove known pro terror material from the Telegram Service as soon as practicable after the provider become aware of it.

E.    A declaration that, during all or part of the period 10 July 2025 to 24 October 2025, the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent contravened section 21(2) of the RES Standard, in not implementing systems or processes that:

(a)    effectively deterred end-users of the Telegram Service from using the Telegram Service; and

(b)    effectively disrupted attempts by end-users of the Telegram Service to use the Telegram Service,

to access, distribute or otherwise make available pro-terror material.

F.    A declaration that, during all or part of the period 27 September 2025 to 24 October 2025, the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent, contravened section 29(2)(b) of the RES Standard on 10 separate occasions, in failing to take appropriate and timely action to investigate the reports.

G.    A declaration that, during all or part of the period 27 September 2025 to 29 July 2026 or, the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent, contravened section 29(4) of the RES Standard on 12 separate occasions, in not notifying the complainant of the outcome of an investigation into a report.

H.    A declaration that:

(a)    each contravention of section 13(2)(b) and/or 13(7)(c) of the RES Standard;

(b)    each contravention of section 14(2) of the RES Standard;

(c)    each contravention of section 15(2) of the RES Standard;

(d)    each contravention of section 20(2) of the RES Standard;

(e)    each contravention of section 21(2) of the RES Standard;

(f)    each contravention of section 29(2)(b) of the RES Standard; and

(g)    each contravention of section 29(4) of the RES Standard,

was a breach of section 146(1) of the Online Safety Act 2021 (Cth).

I.    An order that the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent pay to the Commonwealth such pecuniary penalty, or pecuniary penalties, as the Court determines to be appropriate in respect of that conduct declared to be in contravention of section 146(1) of the Online Safety Act 2021 (Cth).

11    The trial of this proceeding has been set down by me for the period 9 to 12 February 2027.

12    In that context, the Commissioner now seeks pseudonym orders pursuant to s 37AF(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and relies on the grounds set out in ss 37AG(1)(a) and (c).

13    In support of her application, the Commissioner relies on an affidavit of Ms Heidi Snell, General Manager of Regulatory Operations at the Office of the Commissioner and an affidavit of Mr X, CEO of company Y, the employer of the two individuals the subject of the application who are sought to be referred to as Person A and Person B and who are proposed to be witnesses at the trial.

14    The Commissioner says that pseudonym orders are necessary to protect the safety of these witnesses in the proceeding from online harm and more specifically from doxing and from the prospect of actual physical harm. The Commissioner says that the pseudonym orders are also necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice because the publication of the identities of the two witnesses is likely to have a chilling effect on the Commissioner’s ability to determine whether services are complying with the Online Safety Act and to successfully prosecute civil penalty proceedings in the event of non-compliance.

15    Further, the Commissioner seeks non-publication orders over parts of Ms Snell’s affidavit and the whole of the affidavit of Mr X.

Some provisions and principles

16    Now Division 2 of Part VAA of the FCA Act concerns suppression and non-publication orders. In determining whether to make such an order, s 37AE requires the Court to take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. Section 37AF empowers the Court to make a pseudonym order for a witness in a proceeding. Section 37AG specifies the grounds upon which the Court may make such an order.

17    Sections 37AE, 37AF and 37AG are in the following terms:

37AE    Safeguarding public interest in open justice

In deciding whether to make a suppression order or non-publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice.

37AF    Power to make orders

(1)    The Court may, by making a suppression order or non-publication order on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:

(a)    information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court;

(b)    information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is:

(i)    information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or

(ii)    information obtained by the process of discovery; or

(iii)    information produced under a subpoena; or

(iv)    information lodged with or filed in the Court.

(2)    The Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1).

37AG     Grounds for making an order

(1)    The Court may make a suppression order or non-publication order on one or more of the following grounds:

(a)    the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice;

(b)    the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security;

(c)    the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person;

(d)    the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in a criminal proceeding involving an offence of a sexual nature (including an act of indecency).

(2)    A suppression order or non-publication order must specify the ground or grounds on which the order is made.

18    The information to be made subject to an order must be identified with sufficient particularity to ensure that the order is confined to what is necessary to achieve the statutory purpose (s 37AH(5)). Further, a suppression order or non-publication order is to operate for a specified period, which is to be no longer than reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose (s 37AJ).

19    Now the relevant principles in relation to the making of non-publication orders under s 37AF are well settled. Let me make six albeit overlapping points.

20    First, non-publication orders should only be made in exceptional circumstances. In the context of an application on the ground set out in s 37AG(1)(a), in Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377 Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ observed (at [8]):

Suppression or non-publication orders should only be made in exceptional circumstances: Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311 (Rinehart v Welker) at [27]; Rinehart v Rinehart (2014) 320 ALR 195 (Rinehart v Rinehart) at [23]. That is both because the operative word in s 37AG(1)(a) is “necessary” and because the court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice: Rinehart v Welker at [32]; Rinehart v Rinehart at [25]. The paramount consideration is the need to do justice; publication can only be avoided where necessity compels departure from the open justice principle: Rinehart v Welker at [30]; Rinehart v Rinehart at [26].

21    Second, a suppression order is not to be made unless it is necessary for one or more of the purposes specified in s 37AG. But the word “necessary” in the context of ss 37AG(1)(a) or (c) is not to be too narrowly construed as that Full Court explained (at [9]).

22    Further, but in a different context, Murphy, Gleeson and Beach JJ in Money Max Int Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance Group Ltd (2016) 245 FCR 191 at [162] and [163] said of the word “necessary”:

… [The] word “necessary” and similarly the phrase “to ensure” depend upon and must be construed in their context. In Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at [101] Gummow and Crennan JJ approved a passage from McCulloch v Maryland 17 US 316 at 413-414 (1819) where the Supreme Court of the United States said of the term “necessary”:

Does it always import an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that one thing to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist without that other? We think it does not. If reference be had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable. … [The word “necessary”] has not a fixed character, peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison; and is often connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports.

In Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52 at [8] Bathurst CJ said:

… Basten JA has expressed the view that the meaning of “necessary” depends on the context in which it is used. I agree that what is necessary in any given case will depend upon that context … Although it is not sufficient, in my opinion, that the orders are merely reasonable or sensible, I agree that the word “necessary” should not be given a narrow construction. What was said by Hodgson JA in R v Kwok [2005] NSWCCA 245; (2005) 64 NSWLR 335 at [13] adopting the remarks of Mahoney JA in John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) v Local Court (NSW) (1991) 26 NSWLR 131, are equally applicable to the legislation in question.

23    Third, the applicant bears a heavy onus of persuading the Court to make the order. The threshold to be met by an applicant seeking to demonstrate that a non-publication order is necessary is high.

24    Fourth, whether an order is necessary will depend on the particular circumstances of the case.

25    Fifth, it is not sufficient merely to show that the restriction or publication or other disclosure would be desirable or convenient for the parties, or that publication or disclosure would just cause inconvenience or embarrassment.

26    Sixth, once the Court is satisfied that an order is necessary, the order should be made. In other words, there is no exercise of discretion or any balancing exercise residually involved as the balance is struck by the legislation itself.

Whether pseudonym orders are necessary to protect the safety of witnesses: s 37AG(1)(c)

27    In Fletcher v Brown (No 2) [2021] FCA 725, Jackson J identified (at [37] and [38]) the specific principles relating to s 37AG(1)(c) as follows:

In relation to the specific ground of suppression in relation to the safety of a person, in AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) [2019] HCA 6; (2019) 364 ALR 202 at [15], Nettle J said of an equivalent provision (s 77RF(1)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)):

The criterion is not one of necessity to prevent harm to a person but of necessity to protect the safety of a person. And safety is a protean conception which is certainly informed by the nature and gravity of apprehended harm and the risk of its occurrence. … To repeat, the provision is not concerned with trivialities. But what it is intended to convey is that, because the idea of safety invariably entails the assessment of risk, it should be regarded as sufficient to satisfy the test of 'necessary to protect the safety of any person' that, upon the evidence, the court is satisfied of the existence of a possibility of harm of such gravity and likelihood that, without the order sought, the risk of prejudice to the safety of the person would range above the level that can reasonably be regarded as acceptable.

So it is not necessary to show that, absent the order being made or extended, it is probable that a person will suffer harm. Rather, the necessity for such an order will be informed by the nature, imminence and degree of the likelihood of harm occurring to the relevant person …

28    In Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 36, Besanko J at [16] and [17] said the following:

There is an issue in this application concerning the proper construction of s 37AG(1)(c) of the Act. The issue is whether, to obtain an order, it is necessary to show that, absent an order being made, it would be probable that the person in question will suffer harm, or whether all the section requires is for the Court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the order sought is necessary to protect the person’s safety. As Bathurst CJ (with whom McColl JA and McClellan CJ at CL agreed) noted in D1 v P1 [2012] NSWCA 314 (at [49]), the first construction may be put in this way:

… is it a precondition to the operation of the section that as a matter of probability the person in question would suffer harm if an order was not made?

The alternative construction may be put in this way (at [51]):

… On this construction proof of the probability of harm is not a precondition. The necessity for such an order will be informed by the nature, imminence and degree of the likelihood of harm occurring to the relevant person. If the prospective harm is very severe, it may be more readily concluded that the order is necessary even if the risk is a possibility as opposed to a probability.

In my opinion, the second construction is the correct one. It enables the Court to apply the criteria in a way which will achieve its purpose and is consistent with the law’s general approach to risk of considering not only the possibility or probability of an event occurring, but also the likely extent of the consequences if it does. It would seem incongruous to have a test which founds an order where it is probable an assault will occur, but not in a case where there is a 49% risk of a death occurring.

29    Mr Philip Solomon KC for the Commissioner submitted that the evidence of both Mr X and Ms Snell establishes that a pseudonym order is necessary to protect the safety of Person A and the safety of Person B and that the use of pseudonyms for Person A and Person B would not unduly interfere with the principle of open justice. I agree.

30    If the identity of Person A becomes publicly known, Ms Snell has assessed there to be a high likelihood that Person A will be exposed to online harm, particularly doxing but also harassment, abuse, intimidation, trolling or threats. Further, Ms Snell has assessed there to be a high likelihood of exposure to online harm if the identity of Person B is publicly known.

31    Doxing is the intentional online exposure of an individual’s identity, private information or personal details without their consent with the intent of causing harm. The exposure of personal information through doxing can compromise an individual’s safety, for example, by physical harassment, direct threats, or serious emotional, psychological and physical harms. In Ms Snell’s experience, personal details being made available publicly online can create a fear of physical harm. The disclosure of personal information can increase risks of harassment, stalking, identity theft and offline intimidation.

32    Trolling refers to the online mass harassment or abuse of an individual and can result in psychological harm.

33    Ms Snell has said, which I accept, that it is difficult to identify the perpetrators of doxing or other online harm. But in the case of Person A and Person B Ms Snell considers that those persons may include extremists and terrorists, and individuals or groups who wish to view violent material online or oppose such material being removed.

34    I also accept Ms Snell’s assessment of the risk of harm to the safety of Person A and Person B in the event their identities were disclosed, and her assessment that there are no alternate means to protect their safety. Ms Snell’s assessment is based on her considerable experience which I do not need to detail.

35    Further, in Mr X’s assessment, in the absence of a pseudonym order each of Person A and Person B are at risk of harm. There is “a real and foreseeable risk that, if the identities of Person A or Person B were made public, Person A and Person B and their families could be targeted by terrorist and extremist groups, actors and/or their supporters in retaliation for their role in the eSafety Project or in the proceeding”. Further, the most likely form of harm by terrorists or extremist organisations or their supporters against Person A or Person B would occur online, which could involve exposing the family information of Person A or Person B or harassing Person A or Person B, potentially to a level beyond what the individual can handle. Further, terrorist or extremist organisations or their supporters may use the telephone to harass or intimidate Person A or Person B or, if there is a local actor, threaten or cause physical harm.

36    Mr X acknowledged that the probability of harm is difficult to quantify, but assessed the gravity of the potential harm as high. In explaining his assessment he said:

Even if the probability is small, the gravity of the potential harm is high. The motives and acts of terrorist or extremist organisations and their supporters can be extreme. If terrorist or extremist organisations or their supporters do take action against [Person A or Person B], it could be life-altering for that person because of the threat of harm or the realisation of harm.

37    I accept Mr X’s assessment given his over 20 years’ relevant experience including intelligence training about extremist and terrorist groups, actors and supporters including their operating methods, motivations and causes.

Whether pseudonym orders are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice: s 37AG(1)(a)

38    The wording of s 37AG(1)(a) is essentially identical to its predecessor provision, s 50 of the FCA Act, except that the word “proper” now appears before the word “administration” as Perram J pointed out in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430 at [18]. Section 50 was comprehensively explained in Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651 at [30] to [33] and it would be supererogation on my part to elaborate further on any general themes.

39    The pseudonym orders are necessary to protect the proper administration of justice because successfully commencing and prosecuting proceedings of this kind depends on the prospect of witnesses being willing to provide evidence without fear for their personal safety or wellbeing.

40    Further, the public identification of Person A or Person B would likely inhibit the Commissioner’s ability to determine whether services are complying with the Online Safety Act and to successfully prosecute civil penalty proceedings in the event of non-compliance. External analysts are unlikely to undertake relevant work for the Commissioner if their identity may be disclosed and other persons with relevant evidence are likely to be discouraged from cooperating with regulatory authorities or government agencies or are likely to be discouraged from providing evidence in proceedings of this kind.

Non-publication and suppression orders

41    Given that pseudonym orders for Person A and Person B are necessary to protect the safety of Person A and Person B and to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, other non-publication and suppression orders are also necessary incidents and may be justified for similar reasons.

42    Non-publication orders are necessary in respect of any information tending to reveal the identities of Person A or Person B, including the name of their employer and their employer's address. And suppression orders are necessary over the following information: (a) [13] of the Snell affidavit which identifies company Y that employs Person A and Person B; (b) [14] of the Snell affidavit which identifies Person A; (c) [15] of the Snell affidavit which identifies Person B; and (d) the affidavit of Mr X which contains information that identifies company Y and of course Mr X’s identity. The affidavit of Mr X contains information capable of identifying company Y and, through it, Person A and Person B: including Mr X’s name, his job title, and the address of company Y. That information would likely enable company Y, and in turn Person A and Person B, to be identified or located.

Conclusion

43    For the foregoing reasons I will make the orders sought but with some adjustments to accord with my reasons.

Associate:

Dated:    11 November 2026