Federal Court of Australia

GDB25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 1698

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

Introduction

1    This is an application by GDB25 for an extension of time and for leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCOA), delivered on 25 May 2026: GDB25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 1143 (PJ). In that decision, the primary judge summarily dismissed an application for review of a Registrar’s decision to summarily dismiss the applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Tribunal). Since the primary judge’s decision was interlocutory, leave to appeal from it is required: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A); CIK23 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 896 [11] – [12].

2    Rule 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCA Rules) required any application for leave to appeal to be filed within 14 days after the date on which the order or judgment appealed from was pronounced or delivered. In this case, as the primary judge’s orders were made on 25 May 2026, GDB25’s application for leave to appeal was required to be filed on or before 8 June 2026. No such application was filed within that time. Instead, an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal was filed on 17 June 2026, being nine days after the expiry of the prescribed period.

3    For the reasons which follow, the application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal should be dismissed.

Background

4    The applicant is a citizen of Indonesia.

5    On 29 March 2020, he applied for a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa. On 12 December 2022, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Minister) refused his application.

6    On 7 January 2023, he sought merits review of the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal. In his application, he nominated an email address and a mobile phone number for the purpose of communication with the Tribunal.

7    On 27 March 2025, the Tribunal emailed the applicant at his nominated email address, notifying him that a hearing had been scheduled on 15 April 2025 at “1:30 PM (QLD time)”, by Microsoft Teams.

8    On 8 and 14 April 2025, the Tribunal sent SMS messages to the applicant’s nominated mobile phone number reminding him of the details of the hearing.

9    On 15 April 2025, he failed to attend the hearing scheduled by the Tribunal. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application consequent upon his non-appearance, pursuant to s 99 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act) (Dismissal Decision). He was notified of the Dismissal Decision on 15 April 2025 by way of a letter sent to him at his nominated email address.

10    On 14 May 2025, the Tribunal confirmed the Dismissal Decision in accordance with s 368C(5) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act), on the basis that the applicant had not applied for reinstatement within the prescribed 28-day period (Confirmation Decision). He was notified of the Confirmation Decision on the same day, by a letter transmitted to his nominated email address.

11    On 3 June 2025, he applied to the FCFCOA for judicial review of the Confirmation Decision. The matter was then referred to a Registrar to consider whether the application should be summarily dismissed pursuant to r 23.08 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

12    On 23 April 2026, the Registrar gave judgment for the Minister against the applicant for the whole of the applicant’s proceedings, and the application for judicial review was dismissed with costs. The Registrar was satisfied that there were no reasonable prospects of the applicant successfully prosecuting the proceedings.

13    On 4 May 2026, he filed an application for review of the Registrar’s decision, pursuant to s 256 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth). The grounds identified in that application were in the following terms:

1.    Tribunal refused my application because i not go to the hearing.i lost my fone and i forgot the email password until i realise my visa have expired date,and i try to find someone help me about my email.lucky i get back my email and i see the tribunal already refused my case.

2.     Please give me chance to I fight backs my case,i have all evidence to bring to the court.Plase i bagging to give me chance thank you.

The primary judge’s decision

14    On 25 May 2026, the primary judge dismissed the application for review.

15    In his reasons, which were delivered ex tempore, his Honour summarised the background to the application and the applicant’s failure to attend the Tribunal hearing. He then identified the applicant’s two grounds of review and observed that, since the Court’s role was limited to reviewing the lawfulness of the Tribunal’s decision, it did not matter whether the applicant had a good excuse for missing the hearing: PJ [11] – [12].

16    His Honour concluded that (PJ [12] – [13):

(a)    the applicant had received a valid notification of the hearing at his registered contact details;

(b)    the Tribunal’s discretion to dismiss the application under s 99 of the ART Act was enlivened when he did not appear;

(c)    there was an evident and intelligible justification for dismissing the application in all the circumstances;

(d)    notification of the Dismissal Decision was sent to the applicant’s registered email address in a timely way, which included the necessary advice about applying for reinstatement; and

(e)    as no reinstatement had been sought, there was no alternative but for the Tribunal to make the Confirmation Decision.

17    The necessary consequence was that the applicant had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting his application for review, and the primary judge was satisfied that the proceedings should be summarily dismissed. That being so, the Registrar’s decision was confirmed.

Issues before this Court

18    The questions before this Court are whether an extension of time and leave to appeal should be granted to the applicant.

Extension of time

19    The Court’s power to extend time under r 35.14 of the FCA Rules is discretionary: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 150 [19]. In exercising that discretion, the Court ordinarily considers:

(a)    the length of the delay in making the application;

(b)    the reasons for the delay;

(c)    any prejudice suffered by the respondents as a result of the delay; and

(d)    the merits of the proposed appeal.

(BVG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1483 [17]).

Length of the delay

20    As to the first consideration, the delay in this case was for a relatively short period of nine days. That said, procedural limitation periods are significant and compliance with them is conducive to the proper administration of the Migration Act.

Explanation for delay

21    The applicant’s explanation for his delay, as appears from his supporting affidavit, is that he was experiencing financial hardship, was unable to obtain legal representation and did not understand court processes. Those assertions do not provide an adequate explanation for the delay, for the following reasons.

22    Firstly, there is no evidence as to his financial capacity to commence an appeal within time: DLE16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 136 [23].

23    Second, impecuniosity is an inadequate explanation for delay in the absence of evidence that the applicant took any steps to raise an amount equal to the filing fee or seek its waiver: SZUMJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1380 [16].

24    Third, mere ignorance of time limits or court processes is, without more, not generally a satisfactory explanation for delay: see SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 135 ALD 17, 23 [38]. Nor is an inability to obtain legal assistance: Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 400 [17].

25    Overall, the explanation offered by the applicant for his delay in filing an application for leave to appeal is insufficient. It is based upon mere assertions and not supported by any evidence.

Prejudice

26    The Minister accepts that no specific prejudice would be caused to him if the application were granted. Nevertheless, that does not overcome a public interest in the finalisation of administrative decisions: Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks (2000) 75 ALJR 470, 474 [15]. Indeed, the Minister has a legitimate interest in ensuring the timely resolution of visa applications and related litigation: WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 [40] – [42]. Again, the mere absence of prejudice alone is insufficient to grant an extension of time.

Merits of the proposed appeal

27    The applicant has produced a draft Notice of Appeal which is annexed to his affidavit filed in support of the present application. It is written in the following terms:

1.    The Federal Circuit and Family Court erred in failing to properly consider whether the Tribunal’s decision involved jurisdictional error.

2.    The Court failed to properly consider the evidence and submissions relied upon by the Appellant.

3.    The Court erred in its assessment of the Tribunal’s credibility findings.

4.    The decision is affected by jurisdictional error.

28    It is apparent that none of the broadly asserted grounds sufficiently identifies any error by the primary judge. There are insufficient particulars from which a court might discern the nature of any alleged error. That deficiency is itself sufficient to justify dismissing the application. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to consider briefly each proposed ground.

Proposed ground 1

29    The first proposed ground asserts that the primary judge failed to properly consider whether the Tribunal’s decision involved jurisdictional error. This fails at a basic factual level. The primary judge correctly identified that the Court’s role was confined to reviewing the lawfulness of the Tribunal’s Dismissal Decision and Confirmation Decision: PJ [12]. His Honour specifically addressed the validity of the notification given to the applicant at his registered contact details and accepted that the Tribunal’s discretion to dismiss the application under s 99 of the ART Act was enlivened. In any event, it is undoubted, as the primary judge concluded, that there was an evident and intelligible justification for the Tribunal dismissing the application in all the circumstances.

30    Further, his Honour correctly identified that the applicant had been notified of the Dismissal Decision by email to his nominated email address in a timely manner and with the required advice: PJ [13]. As the applicant had not applied for reinstatement, the Tribunal was left with no real alternative but to make the Confirmation Decision.

31    It follows that the primary judge was correct to identify that there was no discernible error in the Tribunal’s decision in the respect alleged.

Proposed ground 2

32    The second ground, to the extent to which it can be identified, also fails. The primary judge clearly identified and had regard to the applicant’s grounds contained in his application for judicial review as well as the oral submissions made by him at the hearing.

33    There is no substance to this proposed ground of appeal.

Proposed ground 3

34    Similarly, the allegation that the primary judge erred in his assessment of the Tribunal’s credibility findings fails. The Tribunal did not make any findings regarding the applicant’s credibility. The review application was dismissed due to his non-appearance under s 99 of the ART Act.

35    It is apparent that the third proposed ground has been included without any regard to the actual circumstances of the case.

Proposed ground 4

36    The fourth proposed ground is a bare assertion of the occurrence of jurisdictional error. In the absence of any particularisation, it is invalid and does not constitute a ground of appeal: NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 [37].

37    Therefore, this ground does not disclose any arguable error.

No need to extend time

38    In the circumstances, there is no basis on which the Court might exercise its discretion to extend the time in which to seek leave to appeal the primary judge’s decision.

Leave to appeal

39    As mentioned, the applicant also sought leave to appeal. The principles relevant to that issue were identified in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398 – 399. In this case, it is quite apparent from the foregoing observations that there can be no doubt as to the correctness of the judgment from which the applicant seeks to appeal. Further, no substantial injustice was shown to result if leave were to be refused. That is sufficient to refuse to grant leave to appeal.

Conclusion

40    It follows that there is no merit whatsoever in the proposed appeal. It will inevitably fail.

41    As a result, the Court should neither extend time nor grant leave to appeal.

42    In all those circumstances, the application should be dismissed.

Non-appearance at the hearing

43    In addition to the foregoing matters, it is noteworthy that the applicant did not appear at the hearing of the present application. That was not surprising, as he had not filed any submissions in relation to the application or complied in any way with the Court’s directions. In those circumstances, it appears that the applicant has lost interest in the proceedings.

44    Rule 35.33 of the FCA Rules deals specifically with circumstances where an applicant for leave to appeal or an extension of time in which to appeal does not attend when the matter is called on. It provides:

35.33 Absence of a party

(1)     If a party is absent when an application under rule 35.12 or 35.14 is called on for hearing, any other party may apply to the Court for an order that:

(a)     if the absent party is the applicant:

(i)     the application be dismissed; or

(ii)     the application be adjourned; or

(iii)     the hearing proceed only if specified steps are taken; …

45    Were it not for the fact that I have dismissed the present application on its merits, I would have dismissed the application pursuant to r 35.33(1)(a)(i) due to the applicant’s non-appearance.

Disposition

46    In the circumstances, it is appropriate to order that the application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal be dismissed. The applicant should pay the Minister’s costs of the application, as agreed or taxed.

Note

47    These are the amended and revised reasons for judgment given on 9 November 2026. Whilst the reasons given above refine and develop those that were delivered ex tempore, the substance of what was said that day has not been changed nor has any other material change been made.

Associate:    

Dated:    11 November 2026