Federal Court of Australia
Groom, in the matter of Groom [2026] FCA 1686
File number: | SAD 237 of 2026 |
Judgment of: | FEUTRILL J |
Date of judgment: | 10 November 2026 |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to institute proceedings under r 2.27A of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – abuse of process – vexatious –manifestly untenable or confused |
Legislation: | Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 2.26, 2.27A. 39.05 |
Cases cited: | Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (receivers and managers appointed) [2018] HCA 12; 264 CLR 165 Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2015] FCA 728 Davy v Garrett (1878) 7 Ch D 473 Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39; 247 CLR 486 Groom v State of South Australia [2026] FCA 1384 Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd [1995] HCA 68; 183 CLR 563 Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCA 505 Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCAFC 183 Oldfield Knott Architects Pty Ltd v Ortiz Investments Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 255 Re Young [2020] HCA 13; 376 ALR 567 Streeter v Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] WASCA 17; 278 ALR 291 |
Division: | General Division |
Registry: | South Australia |
National Practice Area: | Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights |
Number of paragraphs: | 13 |
Date of last submission: | 29 October 2026 |
Date of hearing: | Determined on the papers |
Counsel for the Applicant: | The applicant is a litigant in person |
ORDERS
SAD 237 of 2026 | ||
| ||
STEPHEN GROOM Applicant | ||
order made by: | FEUTRILL J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 10 NOVEMBER 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application filed on 29 October 2026 for leave to file the interlocutory application dated 1 October 2026 and supporting affidavit sworn on the same date be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FEUTRILL J:
1 The applicant (Mr Groom) made an ex parte application for leave to file documents in accordance with r 2.27A of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) after a judge of this Court made an administrative direction under r 2.27(f) to the effect that an interlocutory application and supporting affidavit Mr Groom had lodged on 19 October 2026 not be accepted for filing without leave of the Court. The application for leave to file those documents was referred to me as the Filings Judge for determination.
2 The ex parte application is supported by an affidavit of Mr Groom affirmed 28 October 2026. The affidavit of Mr Groom annexes a proposed interlocutory application to be filed in proceeding SAD 137 of 2026 and an affidavit of Mr Groom sworn 1 October 2026 in support of that proposed application. The proposed application invokes r 39.05(b) of the Rules for the purpose of reopening and setting aside perfected orders of the Court made on 7 September 2026 dismissing proceeding SAD 137 of 2026. Accordingly, I have also had regard to the orders made on 7 September 2026 and the reasons for those orders to which reference is made in Mr Groom’s affidavit of 28 October 2026 as it is not easy to understand the nature of the proposed application or the assertions in Mr Groom’s affidavits without an understanding of the orders sought to be reopened and set aside and the reasons for them.
3 The principal order made in SAD 137 was an order dismissing the originating application pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(d) of the Rules: Groom v State of South Australia [2026] FCA 1384 (J). The order was made on the ground that the proceeding was an abuse of the processes of the Court because it sought to relitigate matters that had been finally determined in long-running proceedings in the State courts of South Australia: J [4], [24], [27]. The origin of that dispute evidently was an intervention order made in a Magistrates Court of South Australia confirmed on 10 December 2013. Mr Groom asserted that there was not an original copy of a complaint on the file in the Magistrates Court and that, as a consequence, the jurisdiction to make an order was not validly invoked: J [6]-[7]. The primary judge summarised the lengthy history of litigation between Mr Groom and the State of South Australia in terms that need not be restated except to note that it resulted in a judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia declaring Mr Groom a vexatious litigant: J [8]-[11]. Although Mr Groom accepted the correctness of the legal history, he took issue with the correctness of findings of fact and law made against him in various judgments over the years. In particular, he disputed a finding that had been made about the existence of a complaint relating to the intervention order: J [12]. In the course of determining that the proceeding was an abuse of process, the primary judge also considered that the allegations Mr Groom made in his statement of claim demonstrated that his claim involved an attempt to relitigate issues that had been determined against him finally in other proceedings: J [15]-[20].
4 Separately, Mr Groom had evidently made interlocutory applications seeking to invoke powers of the Court to require the State to produce an original copy of the complaint that became the jurisdictional foundation for the intervention order. As to these applications the primary judge said:
21. … There is material before me to show that, in the proceeding before Blue J, the court file then before the parties was provided to them and they each had an opportunity to inspect it and to make submissions in connection with its content. Whatever was on the court file at that time was a matter of inspection by Mr Groom.
22. Since that time, there has been an appeal to the Court of Appeal from Blue J’s decision. Anything present or missing from the court file as inspected during the proceeding before Blue J would have been or ought to have been raised before the Court of Appeal. In addition, that issue is one that would have been raised on the application for leave to commence the proceeding determined by Gray J in 2025 and indeed it appears that it was.
23. Mr Groom submitted that he does not intend to give up in relation to his pursuit for justice, because, he says, “there is always another door to open”. The legal principles (specifically the principle of finality) are such that there is not always another door to open.
24. It is an abuse of this Court’s processes to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in order to revisit an issue that has been decided. The principle applies irrespective of whether the issue has been decided correctly. Accordingly, it cannot assist Mr Groom to persuade me that there might be some error in the judgments of the Magistrates Court, Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or the High Court, putting aside the question of what this Court could do in the exercise of its jurisdiction in relation to the same subject matter.
5 Against the background of the nature of the issues raised in SAD 137 and the reasons it was dismissed as an abuse of process, Mr Groom asserts that the purpose of his proposed application is not to request the Court to re-hear the question of whether Blue J was correct, but a narrower question of ‘whether the judgment of 7 September 2026 was obtained after the documentary history and evidentiary foundation of the issue were presented to the Court in a materially incomplete or misleading way’.
6 Mr Groom asserts that in the hearing before the primary judge he raised the issue of whether the intervention order had been made in proceedings commenced upon a valid initiating complaint and whether a certificate of proof of service existed. He asserts that the State was ‘on notice’ before the judgment was pronounced that the initiating complaint and proof of service remained disputed issues. He asserts that he received an email communication from the Magistrates Court stating that there was no proof of service on the applicable court file. He asserts he inspected the file on 22 September 2026 and found photocopied versions of the complaint, but not the original. He asserts that the State made submissions to the primary judge to the effect that the validity of the complaint had been determined by Blue J and that the issue was finalised. Mr Groom asserts that, thereby, the State presented the ‘documentary foundation as conclusively resolved in earlier proceedings without adequately disclosing that proof of service remained live and specifically raised issue, that presentation or omission may have materially misled the Court’. He asserts that is material to the conclusions of the primary judge to which reference is made above (J [21]-[24]).
7 Mr Groom also asserts in his affidavit of 1 October 2026 the following:
33. The significance of the new evidence is that it bears directly on whether the documentary issue was in fact finally and reliably determined in the earlier litigation in the form represented to Charlesworth J.
34. I contend that the Respondent knew that the documentary foundation of the original proceeding remained disputed, knew that the proof-of-service issue had been expressly raised, and had access to the material in which those matters were raised.
35. If the Respondent represented to Charlesworth J, expressly or by necessary implication, that the documentary foundation of the original proceeding had been conclusively established in earlier litigation without disclosing the material proof-of-service issue and the evidence concerning the condition and changing contents of the court file, I contend that the representation was materially misleading.
36. I further contend that the representation was material because it was relied upon in support of the Respondent’s finality and abuse-of-process case, and the judgment expressly relied upon the availability and prior inspection of the court file.
37. I do not ask the Court in this affidavit to infer that any individual lawyer or officer acted dishonestly merely because a document was omitted. I ask the Court to examine the documentary sequence, the Respondent’s knowledge of the issue, the representations made to the Court, and the subsequent independent Registry confirmation.
8 In his affidavit of 28 October 2026, Mr Groom affirms that he does ‘not ask the Court to infer dishonesty merely from the absence of a document’. Rather, he requests leave so that the proposed application ‘can be considered and the Court can determine whether the legal test for relief on the ground of fraud is met’.
9 Although r 2.27A is a relatively new rule of the Court, the principles applicable to the grant or refusal of leave to file a document under a provision like r 2.27A are well-established. The rule contains a broad discretion. It is implicit in the exercise of that discretion that r 2.27A calls for a document the subject of an application for leave to be considered ‘on its face’ and that ordinarily the application falls to be determined without an oral hearing: Re Young [2020] HCA 13; 376 ALR 567 at [12] (Gageler J). The discretion to refuse leave to file a document may be exercised if the document appears on its face to be an abuse of the process of the Court, to be frivolous or vexatious or to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court. That is, if there are grounds for refusing to accept a document for filing under r 2.26 of the Rules. The concept of abuse of process cannot be confined within closed categories, but the concept, at least, ‘encompasses an attempt to invoke the original or appellate jurisdiction of the [Court] on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable’. Nonetheless, exercise of the discretion is reserved for ‘the clearest of cases’: Re Young at [13]. Here, the proposed application and supporting affidavit fall into the ‘confused or manifestly untenable’ category of abuse of process.
10 While the Court has implied jurisdiction and express power in r 39.05(b) of the Rules to reopen and set aside perfected orders obtained by fraud, it requires actual fraud reflecting the public interest in the finality of litigation. The ground is not to be diluted to allow for the judgment to be set aside for misconduct, accident, surprise, or mistake, including the discovery of fresh evidence after the judgment. Thus, before a judgment may be set aside on the narrow ground of fraud it requires pleading and proof of actual fraud: Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (receivers and managers appointed) [2018] HCA 12; 264 CLR 165 at [2], [55]-[57], [62] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
11 As mentioned, Mr Groom evidently does not assert (infer) any actual dishonesty, but requests the Court to reopen the proceeding to enquire into the possibility that fraud can be established. Moreover, no allegation of actual fraud (dishonesty) is particularised in the proposed application or supporting affidavit. The proposed application contains a bare assertion of fraud. It has long been accepted that allegations of fraud, unlawfulness, illegality, criminality, professional misconduct or other serious impropriety must be clearly and completely pleaded and particularised: Davy v Garrett (1878) 7 Ch D 473 at 489 (Thesiger LJ); Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd [1995] HCA 68; 183 CLR 563 at 573 (Brennan, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Streeter v Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] WASCA 17; 278 ALR 291 at [605]-[606] (McLure P, Buss and Murphy JJA); Oldfield Knott Architects Pty Ltd v Ortiz Investments Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 255 at [35]-[38] (Ipp J, Wallwork J agreeing); Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39; 247 CLR 486 at [26] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ). Making allegations of impropriety, in the absence of complete material facts supporting the allegations, is a basis for striking out a document as scandalous: Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCA 505 at [12] (Mansfield J) upheld on appeal in Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCAFC 183 at [28] (Spender, Graham and Tracey JJ); Crocker v Toys ‘R’ Us (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2015] FCA 728 at [9] (Reeves J).
12 Further, the relevance of the further evidence (the assertion that there was no proof of service) to the validity of the intervention order that would be adduced on the proposed reopening is not at all self-evident. To the extent that such evidence could be relevant to the validity of the intervention order, notwithstanding Mr Groom’s assertion to the contrary, it is manifestly another attempt to undermine the finality of the litigation before Blue J. That is, it is another means of attempting to relitigate the same issues that the primary judge found to be an abuse of the process if raised in the proceeding in this Court. Moreover, even if Mr Groom’s limited purpose for adducing the evidence were accepted, the proposed application seeks to reopen the proceeding for the purpose of impeaching the conclusions of the primary judge (J [21]-[24]) with further evidence about the absence of proof of service of the complaint. That is not to assert any form of fraud that could conceivably justify reopening the proceeding. In substance, it is an attempt to relitigate the application the primary judge determined against Mr Groom. Reference to evidence that was not before the primary judge is not a ground for alleging fraud even if it were evidence on a subject in respect of which Mr Groom disputed the finality of the earlier litigation in the South Australian State courts.
13 For the foregoing reasons, the proposed application and supporting affidavit relate to an untenable application and leave to file those documents should be refused.
I certify that the preceding thirteen (13) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Feutrill. |
Associate:
Dated: 10 November 2026