Federal Court of Australia

Australian Postal Corporation v Quinn [2026] FCA 1682

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal is dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal to be agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DOWLING J:

INTRODUCTION

1    By its Amended Notice of Appeal, the Australian Postal Corporation (Australia Post) appeals from the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Stephen Quinn and Australian Postal Corporation [2024] AATA 3004 (T).

2    That decision was the result of two applications before the Tribunal. In the first (application 2022/5030), Mr Stephen Quinn, an employee of Australia Post, sought review of Australia Post’s decision of 7 June 2022 affirming its earlier decision of 20 April 2022, by which it found it had no present liability to pay him compensation under ss 16 and 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (SRC Act) in respect of his claim for a mechanical lower back strain. Australia Post had earlier, on 22 January 2021, made a determination by which it accepted liability for that claimed injury pursuant to s 14 of the SRC Act. In the second (application 2023/7789), Mr Quinn sought review of Australia Post’s decision of 9 October 2023 affirming its earlier decision of 18 August 2023, by which it rejected his claim for compensation under s 14 of the SRC Act in respect of a further lower back injury he claimed to have sustained. By its decision the Tribunal:

(1)    set aside Australia Post’s decision of 20 April 2022 (that Mr Quinn was no longer entitled to compensation for medical expenses and incapacity payments under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act in respect of his accepted claim for “Mechanical Lower Back Strain” sustained on 4 January 2021) and decided that Australia Post continued to be liable to pay compensation for Mr Quinn’s compensable injury, being the mechanical lower back strain arising from the incident on 4 January 2021, in accordance with s 14 of the SRC Act;

(2)    remitted the matter to Australia Post to assess Mr Quinn’s compensation in accordance with ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, in respect of reasonable medical expenses and incapacity for work; and

(3)    affirmed the decision of Australia Post of 18 August 2023 to reject Mr Quinn’s claim for compensation under s 14 of the SRC Act in respect of the claimed further lower back injury.

3    By its Amended Notice of Appeal Australia Post now raises four questions of law in respect of the Tribunal’s decisions to set aside and remit as described at [2](1) and (2) above. While the Amended Notice of Appeal contains six ‘grounds’ Australia Post is said to rely upon, its submissions were framed around the four questions of law, as follows:

(a)    Ground 1A: the Tribunal’s decision to remit the matter to Australia Post to assess Mr Quinn’s entitlement to compensation under s 19 of the SRC Act was legally unreasonable or irrational in light of the Tribunal’s finding (at T [131]) that it “concurred with [Australia Post] that the evidence indicated that Mr Quinn had capacity to return to his preinjury duties”;

(b)    Ground 1: the Tribunal failed to ask itself the correct questions, misunderstood or misapplied ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act or failed to perform its statutory task by failing to make findings required to be made under ss 16 and 19;

(c)    Ground 2: the Tribunal failed to consider a submission of substance (that the effects of the condition sustained by Mr Quinn on 4 January 2021 no longer resulted in a reasonable necessity for medical treatment or an incapacity for work as at 20 April 2022);

(d)    Ground 3: the Tribunal failed to provide reasons or adequate reasons for its decision to set aside Australia Post’s decision that Mr Quinn was no longer entitled to “compensation for incapacity payments under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act” and to remit the matter for determination of his entitlement to compensation under those sections.

4    For the reasons explained below, the appeal is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

5    Mr Quinn was employed by Australia Post from 16 December 2019 as a Postal Delivery Officer at Bentleigh East. On 15 October 2020, he was redeployed as a mail sorter at the Dandenong South Parcel Delivery Centre. While lifting a parcel in the course of performing duties on 4 January 2021, Mr Quinn says he hurt his back: T [5]–[7].

6    On 12 January 2021, Mr Quinn submitted a Claim for Compensation form, and by a determination dated 22 January 2021, Australia Post accepted liability under s 14 of the SRC Act for “Mechanical Lower Back Strain” with a date of injury of 4 January 2021: T [8]–[9].

7    Australia Post subsequently made a number of individual determinations on 15 February 2021, 19 May 2021, 17 August 2021, 25 October 2021, and 29 March 2022 under s 16 of the SRC Act approving liability for physiotherapy treatments, and a determination on 29 January 2021 under s 19 approving payment of compensation to Mr Quinn.

8    By a determination dated 20 April 2022, Australia Post determined that Mr Quinn had no present entitlement from that date to compensation for medical expenses and incapacity for work under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act in respect of the injury: T [11]. After that determination was affirmed in a reviewable decision dated 7 June 2022, Mr Quinn sought review by the Tribunal: T [1]–[2].

9    On 30 June 2023, Mr Quinn submitted a Claim for Compensation form in respect of a further injury he claimed to have suffered during a physiotherapy treatment session performed on 13 October 2021: T [12]. By its decision on 18 August 2023, Australia Post denied that claim, and that decision was subsequently affirmed on 9 October 2023 following a request for reconsideration by Mr Quinn. As explained, by his second review application Mr Quinn also sought review of that decision in the Tribunal. At T [133], [138]–[139] the Tribunal affirmed the decision to deny liability for that further injury. No cross-appeal has been lodged in respect of this aspect of the Tribunal’s decision and so it is not relevant to the Court’s consideration.

10    The Tribunal heard Mr Quinn’s applications for review on 24 to 26 July 2024. In the Tribunal, Australia Post contended:

(a)    Mr Quinn suffered from pre-existing degenerative changes affecting the lumbar spine and had been symptomatic with those changes before the alleged incident on 4 January 2021: T [72(a)]–[72(b)];

(b)    while on 22 January 2021 Australia Post accepted liability for the injury, it was entitled to invite the Tribunal to revisit the findings which underpinned the original acceptance of liability: T [74]–[75], [78];

(c)    in that context, the Tribunal should not have been satisfied that Mr Quinn suffered from an injury simpliciter that arose out of or in the course of Mr Quinn’s employment on 4 January 2021, as the symptoms Mr Quinn experienced were the result of his underlying pre-existing degenerative condition: T [72(c)], [79], [81]–[82];

(d)    because the incident was claimed by Mr Quinn and initially determined by Australia Post on the basis that it was solely an “injury” simpliciter (within the meaning of s 5A(1)(b) of the SRC Act), the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to then, on review, characterise the condition as a “disease” (within the meaning of ss 5A(1)(a), 5B(1) of the SRC Act) that was significantly contributed to by aspects of Mr Quinn’s employment with Australia Post: T [83]–[84];

(e)    alternatively, any contribution to Mr Quinn’s ailment by his Australia Post employment over time was not significant and therefore he did not suffer a disease for the purposes of the SRC Act: T [85];

(f)    alternatively, any contribution by employment was an exacerbation of the underlying degenerative condition which would have ceased to exist after 6 to 12 weeks: T [88];

(g)    alternatively, s 7(7) of the SRC Act operated to exclude liability for any disease suffered by Mr Quinn: T [86]–[87];

(h)    further alternatively, the effects of the condition sustained on 4 January 2021 no longer resulted in a reasonable necessity for medical treatment or an incapacity for work as at 20 April 2022 (the date of the initial determination of no present liability): T [94], [101].

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

11    The SRC Act provides for the payment of compensation to Commonwealth employees and employees of licensed corporations for employment-related injuries. Australia Post is a licensed corporation under the SRC Act.

12    The concept of an “injury” is of pivotal importance to the statutory scheme. Liability to pay compensation depends upon the occurrence of an injury: Canute v Comcare [2006] HCA 47; 226 CLR 535 at [8] (Gummow ACJ, Kirby, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ); see also Comcare v Lofts [2013] FCA 1197; 217 FCR 220 at [9] (Mortimer J). “Injury” is not used in a global sense to describe an employee’s overall condition following an incident. The SRC Act requires each particular injury to be identified and recognises that one incident may result in more than one injury: Canute at [10].

13    The SRC Act defines “injury” and “disease” as follows:

5A Definition of injury

(1)    In this Act:

injury means:

(a)    a disease suffered by an employee; or

(b)    an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, that is a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment; or

(c)    an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment), that is an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment;

but does not include a disease, injury or aggravation suffered as a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner in respect of the employee’s employment.

...

5B Definition of disease

(1)    In this Act:

disease means:

(a)    an ailment suffered by an employee; or

(b)    an aggravation of such an ailment;

that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee’s employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee.

14    Section 14(1) of the SRC Act provides:

14 Compensation for injuries

(1)    Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment.

15    A determination under s 14 establishes that Comcare, or a licensed corporation such as Australia Post, has accepted liability to pay compensation under the SRC Act in respect of that particular injury: Woodhouse v Comcare [2021] FCAFC 95; 285 FCR 14 at [104] (Derrington J, Collier and Rangiah JJ agreeing). The content, duration and means of satisfying the liability established under s 14 are determined under other provisions of the SRC Act, including ss 16 and 19. Those determinations give substance to the liability in s 14 “to pay compensation in accordance with this Act”: Woodhouse at [104]; Prain v Comcare [2017] FCAFC 143; 256 FCR 65 at [89] (Kenny, Tracey and Bromberg JJ); Australian Postal Corporation v Oudyn [2003] FCA 318; 73 ALD 659 at [31] (Cooper J); Lees v Comcare [1999] FCA 753; 56 ALD 84 at [27] (Wilcox, Branson and Tamberlin JJ).

16    Accordingly, subject to the requirements of each provision, an employee who suffers an injury for which liability is accepted under s 14 may be entitled to compensation for medical expenses under s 16 and incapacity for work under s 19. Without liability under s 14 in respect of the relevant injury, no liability under ss 16 or 19 can arise: Woodhouse at [104]; Prain at [89].

17    Section 16(1) provides:

16 Compensation in respect of medical expenses etc.

(1)    Where an employee suffers an injury, Comcare is liable to pay, in respect of the cost of medical treatment obtained in relation to the injury (being treatment that it was reasonable for the employee to obtain in the circumstances), compensation of such amount as Comcare determines is appropriate to that medical treatment.

18    Section 16(1) requires a sufficient relational connection between the medical treatment and the compensable injury. The phrase “in relation to” is broad and is not confined to a direct or proximate causal relationship: Kennon v Spry [2008] HCA 56; 238 CLR 366 at [217] (Kiefel J); Manns v Comcare [2012] AATA 462 at [22] (Presiding Member Webb, Member Wilkins). The degree of connection required is determined by reference to the text, context and purpose of the provision and the facts of the case: Minister for Home Affairs v DLZ18 [2020] HCA 43; 270 CLR 372 at [43] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ) addressing “relating to”. Whether the required relational connection exists must be determined objectively by reference to all relevant evidence: Howes v Comcare [2016] FCA 1521 at [54] (Griffiths J).

19    Section 19(1) provides:

19 Compensation for injuries resulting in incapacity

(1)    This section applies to an employee who is incapacitated for work as a result of an injury, other than an employee to whom section 20, 21, 21A or 22 applies.

20    The words “as a result of” require a causal connection between the injury and the incapacity. Whether that connection exists is a question of fact: Zdziarski v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2015] FCA 207; 146 ALD 354 at [32] (Perram J). The injury need not be the sole, direct or predominant cause of the incapacity: Zdziarski at [32]; see also Comcare v Martin [2016] HCA 43; 258 CLR 467 at [45] (French CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ).

21    Section 4(9) defines “incapacity for work” as follows:

(9)    A reference in this Act to an incapacity for work is a reference to an incapacity suffered by an employee as a result of an injury, being:

(a)    an incapacity to engage in any work; or

(b)    an incapacity to engage in work at the same level at which he or she was engaged by the Commonwealth or a licensed corporation in that work or any other work immediately before the injury happened.

22    Accordingly, an employee claiming compensation under s 19 must establish that they are incapacitated for work as a result of a compensable injury. If s 19(1) is satisfied, compensation is then calculated on a weekly basis under s 19(2)–(14).

23    Mr Quinn contended that the Tribunal’s power to remit was contained in s 42D(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). He submitted that s 42D confers a discretion on the Tribunal as to “whether it will embark upon a review”: citing N1112/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1597; 32 AAR 76 at [23] (Emmett J). However, s 42D does not appear to be the relevant power of remittal exercised by the Tribunal in this instance. Section 42D provides the Tribunal with a discretion to remit a matter for reconsideration by the original decision-maker, without the decision under review otherwise being set aside or altered. Such a power would ordinarily be exercised prior to or at an early stage of the Tribunal hearing, suspending the Tribunal proceedings until the original decision-maker makes a new decision which then becomes the subject of the review proceedings. It does not appear to be a power available once the Tribunal has made its decision on the application under review and the review proceedings have concluded. In N1112/00A at [11], Emmett J set out the observations of the Tribunal in that case in response to a request by the original decision-maker for the Tribunal to exercise the discretion in s 42D(1):

In the present case we have now traversed some five or six days of hearing of evidence and while I think it is clear … that the wording of the section is such that referral back can be made …

…

I think that it is more likely that any referral would be made at an early, rather than a later stage in the hearing in most of the circumstances that I can envisage for the exercise of the discretion. I think that the discretion might well be exercised, for example, where a new fact situation emerged which completely changed the circumstances considered by an original decision maker, which would make it more efficient, less costly, time saving, if the matter were sent back for reconsideration to take account of that new fact situation.

Justice Emmett appeared to agree with those observations that the discretion in s 42D(1) may be appropriately exercised at an early stage in a proceeding before the Tribunal: at [17].

24    Instead, the power evidently exercised by the Tribunal in this case was that in s 43(1)(c)(ii) of the AAT Act, being to set aside the decision under review and remit it for reconsideration. Section 43 of the AAT Act relevantly provided:

Tribunal’s decision on review

(1)    For the purpose of reviewing a decision, the Tribunal may exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by any relevant enactment on the person who made the decision and shall make a decision in writing:

…

(c)    setting aside the decision under review and:

(i)    making a decision in substitution for the decision so set aside; or

(ii)    remitting the matter for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.

…

(2B)    Where the Tribunal gives in writing the reasons for its decision, those reasons shall include its findings on material questions of fact and a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.

In any event, there was no dispute between the parties that the Tribunal had the power to remit to Australia Post.

THE TRIBUNAL DECISION

25    As explained, the Tribunal heard the applications on 24, 25 and 26 July 2024. Although the reviewable decision concerned Mr Quinn’s entitlement to compensation under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, significantly, Australia Post put in issue before the Tribunal the threshold question of whether Mr Quinn had suffered an “injury” arising from his employment, in the relevant sense, at all: T [75], [79], [82]. Australia Post contended before the Tribunal that Mr Quinn had “never suffered from a compensable injury” and submitted in its Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions that “liability should never have been accepted under section 14”: T [79], [82]. The principal dispute before the Tribunal, to which most of the submissions and competing medical evidence was directed and which the parties urged the Tribunal to determine, was therefore whether Mr Quinn’s continuing symptoms were attributable to a compensable injury sustained on 4 January 2021 or to a pre-existing degenerative condition. Australia Post contended that the degenerative condition accounted for his symptoms and that any work-related exacerbation had ceased.

26    The Tribunal considered documentary evidence and heard oral evidence from Mr Quinn, Mr Reece Sher, Dr Ales Aliashkevich and Dr Ashish Jonathan. Mr Sher and Dr Aliashkevich are neurosurgeons and spine surgeons, and Dr Jonathan is a consultant neurosurgeon. It also considered extensive documentary evidence from other persons who had treated or attended on Mr Quinn including a chiropractor, general practitioners, radiologists, a sonologist, a pain management physician, and a physiotherapist: T [19]–[50].

27    Consistent with the position of the parties, at [18] the Tribunal set out the “key issues for determination”. It described them as:

(1)    Has Mr Quinn suffered an injury (disease) and, if so, has his employment at Australia Post contributed to that condition(s) or the aggravation of that condition(s) to a significant degree?

(2)    Has Mr Quinn suffered an injury (other than a disease) and, if so, did it arise out of, or in the course of, his employment with Australia Post?

(3)    If the answer is yes to either of the above, is Australia Post liable to pay compensation?

28    The Tribunal relevantly found:

(a)    Mr Quinn experienced an incident on 4 January 2021 and had suffered an injury simpliciter, being a mechanical lower back strain, arising in the course of his employment: T [118], [124], [126]. The Tribunal relied on Mr Sher’s characterisation of the injury as a tear in the disc and Dr Aliashkevich’s evidence of a clear disc fragmentation: T [119], [124], [128];

(b)    although satisfied that Mr Quinn had degenerative disc disease, the Tribunal was not persuaded that it accounted for the injury experienced after the incident on 4 January 2021. It rejected Dr Jonathan’s opinion that Mr Quinn’s condition was constitutional with a genetic cause and unrelated to his employment, preferring Mr Sher’s evidence that this was an oversimplification of a complex condition: T [116]–[120], [124]–[125]; and

(c)    the evidence “indicated that Mr Quinn had capacity to return to his preinjury duties”. In making that finding, the Tribunal relied on the physiotherapist, Mr Adrian Raso’s assessment of Mr Quinn and on Mr Quinn’s evidence that he had seen a doctor who advised him he had “capacity for suitable duties” but was not receiving overtime and was mostly undertaking administrative and forklift duties: T [131].

29    The Tribunal concluded that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14 of the SRC Act to pay Mr Quinn compensation in respect of the injuries it found he suffered in the course of his duties. It set aside the decision dated 20 April 2022 and remitted the matter to Australia Post to assess Mr Quinn’s compensation under ss 16 and 19: T [135]–[136], [139].

30    Paragraphs [131] and [135] assume particular significance in the parties’ submissions. It is therefore necessary to set them out and return to them below. At [131] the Tribunal stated:

[131]    Whilst the Tribunal will remit the determination to Australia Post for consideration of Mr Quinn’s entitlements under section 19 of the SRC Act for compensation for injuries resulting in incapacity, it concurred with the Respondent that the evidence indicated that Mr Quinn had capacity to return to his preinjury duties. The Tribunal relied on Mr Raso’s assessment of 3 April 2022:

recommendations for work:

• Sit for 60minutes continuous

• Stand for 60minutes continuous

• Walk for 60minutes continuous

• Drive for 60minutes continuous

• Able to complete steps for 60minutes

• Able to lift 16kg up steps if holding at waist height

• Able to bend to the toes repeatedly without weight

• Able to get down to the floor to kneel and get back up without issues

• Able to pick up 16kg (x10 repetitions) from the ground to his waist

• Able to pick up 16kg and transfer it to a table without concerns

• Able to pick up 16kg from waist height and lift it overhead without issues

• Anything regarding hand use (grasp, manipulation, keyboard) all no issues

• Completed x10 bodyweight pulls (leaning at a 45° angle) without issues

And Mr Quinn’s statement:

In or around early February 2022 I saw Dr Teu who advised I had capacity for suitable duties from late January 2022. I was not receiving any allocation of overtime during this period. I was mostly performing administrative duties and operating a forklift.

(Emphasis in original.)

31    At [135] the Tribunal stated:

[135]    The Tribunal finds that Australia Post, in accordance with section 14 of the SRC Act, continues to be liable to pay Mr Quinn compensation in respect of the injuries suffered by him in the course of his duties.

THE NATURE OF THE APPEAL

32    This appeal was instituted by Australia Post under s 44(1) of the former AAT Act, which at the time permitted a party to a Tribunal proceeding to appeal to the Federal Court on a question of law from a decision of the Tribunal. Section 44(1) is materially equivalent to s 172(1) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), which commenced after this appeal was instituted.

33    Although termed an appeal, a proceeding under s 44(1) invokes the Court’s original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction: Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143; 131 FCR 28 at [11] (Gray ACJ and North J).

34    The question of law on which the appeal is brought is not merely a condition of the appeal. It is the subject matter of the appeal and confines its ambit: Brown v Repatriation Commission [1985] FCA 236; 7 FCR 302 at 304 (Bowen CJ, Fisher and Lockhart JJ).

GROUND 1A – WAS THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION LEGALLY UNREASONABLE OR IRRATIONAL?

35    As explained, Ground 1A complains that the Tribunal’s decision to remit to Australia Post the assessment of Mr Quinn’s entitlement under s 19 was legally unreasonable or irrational in light of its finding at T [131] that the evidence indicated that Mr Quinn had capacity to return to his pre-injury duties.

36    The principles concerning legal unreasonableness were discussed in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 at [23]–[30] (French CJ), [63]–[76] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), [88]–[92], [105]–[113] (Gageler J); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [10]–[12] (Kiefel CJ), [51]–[60] (Gageler J), [80]–[89] (Nettle and Gordon JJ), [131]–[135] (Edelman J); and Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 at [26] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ).

37    In Li at [113], Gageler J emphasised the stringency of the test and observed that judicial determinations of legal unreasonableness in Australia had in practice been rare. In SZVFW at [11], Kiefel CJ described the test as “necessarily stringent”. In DUA16 at [26], the High Court referred to the legal unreasonableness threshold as “usually high”.

38    Here Australia Post submitted that s 19(1), read with s 4(9), applies only where an employee is incapacitated for work as a result of an injury. It contended that T [131] provided a complete negative answer to whether Australia Post was liable to pay compensation under s 19 on and from 20 April 2022, being the date of its initial determination of no liability. It submitted that if Mr Quinn had capacity to return to his pre-injury duties, no compensation was payable under s 19 and there was nothing to remit for assessment. Relying on Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 at [11] (Allsop CJ), Australia Post submitted that the Tribunal offered no evident or intelligible justification for remitting the matter in the circumstances and that the remittal was therefore outside the range of possible lawful outcomes as an exercise of that power.

39    Mr Quinn submitted that the remittal was neither legally unreasonable nor irrational. He submitted that, once the Tribunal found that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14, s 19 required consideration of whether he was incapacitated for work as a result of the injury and, if so, calculation of the compensation payable under the statutory formula. He contended that the finding at T [131] did not finally determine whether he was incapacitated for work as a result of the injury within s 19(1), read with s 4(9).

40    Mr Quinn contended that Australia Post’s argument conflated capacity to perform pre-injury duties with capacity to engage in work at the same level as immediately before the injury within the meaning of s 4(9). He submitted that, as explained in Comcare v Rowe [2002] FCA 1034; 35 AAR 410 at [7] (Merkel J), s 4(9)(b) required consideration of the work in which he was engaged immediately before the injury, the level at which he performed that work and whether the injury prevented him from working at that level. Mr Quinn submitted that there was little evidence before the Tribunal about his pre-injury duties beyond anecdotal evidence that he lifted parcels and drove forklifts, or about his normal working hours and overtime.

41    Mr Quinn submitted that T [131] did no more than accept evidence that he could perform the physical tasks identified in Mr Raso’s assessment. He contended that the Tribunal’s further reference to his statement as to his post-injury capacity for suitable duties, lack of overtime, and performance of principally administrative and forklift duties, did not establish that he could engage in work at his pre-injury level.

42    Mr Quinn further submitted that the evidence did not permit the Tribunal to determine whether, and during which periods, he was incapacitated for work within s 4(9)(b), or to calculate the compensation payable under s 19. He said Australia Post, as his employer, was better placed to determine the relevant hours, overtime and earnings. He accepted, however, that the finding at T [131] provided a factual framework relevant to Australia Post’s assessment of both the questions of incapacity for work and subsequently the quantum of compensation payable, on remittal.

43    Mr Quinn submitted that the Tribunal was therefore reasonably entitled, in exercising its discretion under “s 42D” of the AAT Act, to remit the matter rather than adopt an alternative course, such as adjourning for further evidence. He contended that remittal enabled Australia Post to undertake the assessments just described without the Tribunal’s ongoing involvement and was consistent with the objective of quick and efficient resolution. Referring to Li, he submitted that it was insufficient that the Court might have preferred a different course; Australia Post was required to establish an error in the exercise of discretion or that the decision was unreasonable or plainly unjust.

44    In answer, Australia Post contended that Mr Quinn’s submissions wrongly treated Ground 1A as concerning only the calculation of compensation. It submitted that s 19(1) imposed an anterior requirement that Mr Quinn be incapacitated for work within s 4(9), and that T [131] answered that question adversely to him. Alternatively, Australia Post submitted that, to the extent that the Tribunal’s reasoning underlying the finding at T [131] was lacking, that deficiency supported Ground 3.

45    There was no dispute between the parties that the Tribunal had the power to remit to the applicant, although there was some suggestion, as noted above, that the source of that power was s 42D of the AAT Act. In my view, as explained, the source of the power actually exercised by the Tribunal was s 43(1)(c)(ii), being to set aside the decision under review and remit, though this does not alter the fact that the power to remit was open to the Tribunal. In any case, Australia Post complains that it was unreasonable or irrational for the Tribunal to exercise the power of remittal in the way it did.

Consideration

46    As explained above, a finding of liability under s 14 is a prerequisite to entitlement under s 19 but does not itself determine that entitlement: Oudyn at [26], [30]–[31]; Prain at [89]; Woodhouse at [84], [104]. To determine entitlement to compensation under s 19(1), the Tribunal would be required to determine whether Mr Quinn was incapacitated for work and, if so, whether that incapacity resulted from the injury: Riddle v Telstra Corp Ltd [2006] FCA 58; 149 FCR 348 at [23] (Edmonds J). That inquiry would call for consideration of whether, on and from 20 April 2022, Mr Quinn was incapacitated for work as a result of the injury, rather than merely whether he suffered an injury on 4 January 2021. Section 4(9)(b) would require consideration of the work in which Mr Quinn was engaged immediately before the injury, the level at which he performed that work and whether he was incapacitated from engaging in work at that same level: Rowe at [7]. This is the determination under s 19(1) to which I refer below.

47    Ground 1A turns on whether the finding at T [131] amounted to a final determination that Mr Quinn was not incapacitated for work within the meaning of ss 4(9)(b) and 19(1). If it did, the remittal would be irreconcilable with that finding because no entitlement under s 19 would remain for Australia Post to assess. That is not the preferable construction of that paragraph. T [131] begins by stating that the Tribunal would remit “the determination… of Mr Quinn’s entitlements under s 19” to Australia Post. Construing the subsequent finding as finally determining that no entitlement could arise would make the paragraph internally contradictory, when a more coherent construction is available on a fair reading of the reasons: see Pulitano v Telstra Corporation Limited (1998) 50 ALD 1015 at 1016 (Emmett J).

48    Further, capacity to return to pre-injury duties is not necessarily equivalent to full capacity to engage in all aspects of the work performed at the same level as immediately before the injury. T [131] relied on Mr Raso’s assessment of specified physical tasks and Mr Quinn’s evidence that a doctor had advised him that he had capacity for “suitable duties” but was not receiving overtime and was principally undertaking administrative and forklift duties. Those matters did not necessarily determine whether he could engage in his former work at the same level, including his normal working hours and overtime. Neither of those pieces of evidence allowed it to form a decisive view as to whether Mr Quinn was incapacitated from engaging in work at the same level at which he was engaged immediately before the injury. Reading T [131] as expressing such a decisive view would therefore be a strained reading of that paragraph.

49    The finding at T [131] nevertheless had utility. It addressed aspects of Mr Quinn’s physical capacity relevant to (albeit not determinative of) whether he could engage in work at his pre-injury level. That construction is consistent with T [135], where the Tribunal found that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14. Read together, T [131] and [135] indicate that the Tribunal did not finally determine whether Mr Quinn remained incapacitated for work in the relevant sense required by s 19(1) and s 4(9), but remitted that question to Australia Post having made the anterior finding that Mr Quinn suffered an injury simpliciter.

50    It was therefore legally open to the Tribunal to treat the finding at T [131] as relevant, but not determinative, of Mr Quinn’s entitlement under s 19 and to remit to Australia Post the outstanding questions of whether he was incapacitated for work within the meaning of s 19(1) and s 4(9)(b) and, if so, the compensation payable under s 19(2)–(14). The Tribunal had power under s 43(1)(c)(ii) of the AAT Act to adopt that course upon setting aside the reviewable decision, and Australia Post has not established that the remittal fell outside the range of legally reasonable outcomes: Li at [63]–[66].

51    Australia Post has therefore not established that the remittal was legally unreasonable or irrational. Nor has it established that the Tribunal was required, as a matter of legal reasonableness, to adjourn for further evidence rather than set aside the reviewable decision on the basis of the s 14 finding and remit the outstanding determinations under s 19 and s 4(9)(b) to Australia Post. Ground 1A is not made out.

GROUND 1 – DID THE TRIBUNAL FAIL TO PERFORM ITS STATUTORY TASK?

52    Ground 1 focused on whether the Tribunal performed its statutory task in reviewing Australia Post’s determination that Mr Quinn had no present entitlement to compensation under ss 16 and 19 on and from 20 April 2022.

53    As a preliminary note, Australia Post highlighted in its submissions that the Tribunal purported to set aside the determination of 20 April 2022, rather than the reviewable decision dated 7 June 2022. That discrepancy appears both in the conclusion at T [139] and on the cover page of the Tribunal’s decision record. Australia Post noted, however, that the Tribunal’s explanation at T [1] correctly summarised the reviewable decision. It may be that the Tribunal’s decision was framed in this way because Mr Quinn’s application to the Tribunal answered the question “Date you received the decision you want reviewed” with “20 Apr 2022”. I note that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was limited to that conferred by s 64 of the SRC Act, which provided for an application to the Tribunal “for review of a reviewable decision”. “Reviewable decision” is defined in s 60 of the SRC Act as a decision “made under subsection 38(4) [not presently relevant] or section 62”, the latter being the section that enables “second-tier” reconsideration decisions like that made by Australia Post on 7 June 2022. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review a “first-tier” decision, like the one made by Australia Post on 20 April 2022: Australian Postal Corporation v Barry [2006] FCA 1751; 44 AAR 186 at [4] (Branson J); Lees at [39] (Wilcox, Branson and Tamberlin JJ). Despite raising this discrepancy, the applicant did not appear to submit that the Tribunal’s decision was made without jurisdiction. In the absence of such a submission, it is not appropriate to consider this question further. It is apparent that the Tribunal’s decision was, in substance, made in relation to the reviewable decision of 7 June 2022, and the parties proceeded before me on that basis.

54    Australia Post submitted that, having found at T [118] that Mr Quinn “suffered from an injury simpliciter described as mechanical lower back strain which has arisen in the course of his employment”, the Tribunal was required to determine whether, on and from 20 April 2022:

(a)    medical treatment obtained in relation to that injury was reasonable for Mr Quinn to obtain in the circumstances for the purposes of s 16; or

(b)    Mr Quinn was incapacitated for work as a result of that injury for the purposes of s 19.

55    Australia Post further submitted that, having found at T [125] that Mr Quinn suffered from degenerative disc disease, the Tribunal was required to determine whether, on and from 20 April 2022, he continued to suffer from the disc tear arising from the workplace incident or whether any symptoms were attributable to the degenerative condition or some other cause. It submitted that the Tribunal failed to resolve that issue, which was capable of bearing on whether the requirements of ss 16 and 19 were satisfied.

56    Australia Post contended that, even if Mr Quinn continued to suffer from an injury, whether characterised as an injury simpliciter or a disease, the injury no longer resulted, on and from 20 April 2022, in a reasonable need for medical treatment or incapacity for work. It relied on evidence that:

(a)    Mr Quinn’s condition improved significantly following a steroid injection on 22 February 2022;

(b)    he could lift 16 kilograms;

(c)    he ceased attending doctors for treatment of the injury after March 2022; and

(d)    Dr Jonathan considered him capable of performing his pre-injury hours and duties (based on a review of material including clinical notes from March 2022 and Mr Raso’s email of 3 April 2022).

57    Australia Post submitted that the Tribunal made no findings concerning Mr Quinn’s entitlement under s 16 and did not determine the statutory question under s 19. It relied on Linfox Australia Pty Ltd v Warusawithana [2025] FCA 717; 88 AAR 175 at [16] (Horan J), where the Tribunal’s failure to make findings on the elements upon which liability under ss 16 and 19 depended was held to constitute an error of law. Australia Post submitted that the Tribunal’s failure in the present case was analogous and amounted to a failure to perform its statutory task.

58    Mr Quinn submitted that Australia Post misstated the applicable tests. He said that ss 16 and 19 did not require a finding that Mr Quinn “continued to suffer from the injury”: s 16 required a determination of whether medical treatment obtained “in relation to the injury” was reasonable for him to obtain in the circumstances; s 19 required a finding of incapacity for work “as a result of an injury”.

59    Mr Quinn submitted that Australia Post’s determination of 20 April 2022, which was affirmed on 7 June 2022, rested on Dr Jonathan’s opinion that his condition was attributable to a pre-existing degenerative disease rather than his employment. He said that the Tribunal rejected that premise at T [116]–[117] and found at T [135] that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14. In relation to s 16, there was evidence that physiotherapy and clinical Pilates had been recommended (at T [34]–[35], [38]), but insufficient evidence to determine the amount of compensation payable for ongoing treatment. He submitted that, in relation to s 19, the evidence did not permit the Tribunal to determine whether, and during which periods, Mr Quinn was unable to work at his pre-injury level or to calculate the compensation payable.

60    Mr Quinn submitted that the Tribunal performed its statutory task as far as the evidence permitted. He says that it determined the principal dispute concerning the existence of a compensable injury, found that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14, made findings relevant to Mr Quinn’s work capacity, and remitted the outstanding assessments under ss 16 and 19.

61    Mr Quinn further submitted that Warusawithana was distinguishable. Unlike the Tribunal in that case, the Tribunal here did not determine liability under ss 16 and 19 without making the requisite findings. Mr Quinn said that the Tribunal in the present case remitted those matters to Australia Post because the evidence was insufficient to permit the findings to be made.

62    In reply, Australia Post maintained that the determination under review concerned Mr Quinn’s entitlement under ss 16 and 19. All issues concerning that entitlement on and from 20 April 2022 were therefore before the Tribunal, including whether the requirements of those provisions continued to be satisfied. Australia Post submitted that the parties’ competing cases on the medical evidence squarely raised whether Mr Quinn continued to suffer from an injury on and from 20 April 2022, and that the Tribunal was required to resolve that issue.

Consideration

63    I accept, as Australia Post contends, that the reviewable decision concerned its present liability under ss 16 and 19 from 20 April 2022. The Tribunal was therefore faced with the statutory questions arising under both provisions. The Tribunal’s finding that Mr Quinn suffered a compensable injury on 4 January 2021 was a necessary prerequisite but did not itself determine his entitlement under ss 16 and 19.

64    I do not, however, accept Australia Post’s formulation insofar as it treated the relevant question as whether Mr Quinn “continued to suffer from the injury”. Section 16 required the Tribunal to consider whether medical treatment was obtained in relation to the injury and was reasonable for Mr Quinn to obtain in the circumstances. Section 19 required consideration of whether he was incapacitated for work as a result of the injury.

65    Furthermore, as explained, despite the reviewable decision concerning liability for compensation under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, Australia Post put in issue before the Tribunal the threshold question of whether Mr Quinn had suffered an “injury” arising from his employment, in the relevant sense, at all: T [75], [79], [82]. As stated, Australia Post contended that Mr Quinn had “never suffered from a compensable injury” and “liability should never have been accepted under section 14”: T [79], [82]. While I accept that the Tribunal’s reasons were largely focused on determining the threshold s 14 liability question, as exposed by the issues for determination it outlined at T [18], it did so because that was the principal dispute which the parties, and particularly Australia Post, urged the Tribunal to resolve: see Prain at [90]. I therefore do not accept Australia Post’s submission that the Tribunal was “veering away from its statutory task” by identifying those as the key issues for its determination, when Australia Post itself was directing the Tribunal’s attention to those matters.

66    Having resolved that threshold issue and found that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14, for the reasons given in relation to Ground 1A, it was legally open to the Tribunal to make the finding available to it on the evidence concerning Mr Quinn’s physical capacity at T [131] and remit the remaining determination under s 19 to Australia Post as to both the existence of an incapacity for work and the calculation of compensation payable. I accept that there was relevant evidence bearing on Mr Quinn’s physical capacity and improvement. That evidence did not, however, permit the Tribunal to determine Mr Quinn’s pre-injury level of work, whether and during which periods he was unable to engage in work at that level, or the compensation payable under s 19. In particular, the functional assessments demonstrating that Mr Quinn could undertake specified lifting and other physical tasks were relevant to his physical capacity, but did not establish the level at which he had worked immediately before the injury, including his normal hours and overtime, nor whether or from when he could work at that level. For example, Dr Jonathan’s opinion of 28 November 2023 that Mr Quinn was “capable of performing his pre-injury hours and duties as at 20 April 2022” was relevant to that question. However, that opinion was a conclusion stated without elaboration and was based on a review of material including Mr Raso’s assessment of 3 April 2022, which itself identified only Mr Quinn’s ability to perform specified physical tasks rather than establishing what his pre-injury level of work was or whether those specified tasks encompassed all of that work (as explained at [48] of these reasons above).

67    In those circumstances, the Tribunal took the determination under s 19(1) and s 4(9)(b) as far as the evidence permitted. The carrying out of the Tribunal’s statutory task included its ability, pursuant to s 43(1)(c)(ii) of the AAT Act, to set aside the decision under review and remit the matter to Australia Post for reconsideration consistent with the Tribunal’s factual findings.

68    A similar conclusion follows in relation to s 16. There was evidence before the Tribunal that physiotherapy and clinical Pilates had been recommended and undertaken in relation to Mr Quinn’s injury: T [30], [34], [38]. There was also evidence that he had ceased treatment because he could no longer afford it: T [52]. The evidence did not, however, permit the Tribunal to identify what treatment had been obtained on and from 20 April 2022 or determine, in relation to particular treatment, whether it was reasonable for Mr Quinn to obtain it in the circumstances and what amount of compensation was appropriate under s 16. It was open in those circumstances to remit that determination under s 16 to Australia Post to reconsider on the basis of the Tribunal’s finding of threshold liability for an injury simpliciter.

69    The present case is therefore distinguishable from cases in which the Tribunal made a substituted decision as to an applicant’s entitlement to compensation under ss 16 and 19 and erred by failing to make findings on factual matters necessary to underpin that assessment: cf eg Rowe at [2]–[4], [7], [10], [13] (Merkel J); Warusawithana at [12]–[16] (Horan J). Here, the Tribunal was under no obligation to make those underlying findings as it did not make a final determination in respect of the entitlements under ss 16 and 19, choosing to leave those assessments to Australia Post after determining the anterior s 14 question of liability and making only such other findings as the evidence permitted. Relevant to this point, I note that in Riddle, Edmonds J expressed at [27] that his Honour did “not think that a determination under s 14 necessarily involves the final finding — that the injury “has resulted in” death, incapacity for work or impairment. It may, but it may not. Such a finding, it seems to me, is ultimately a matter for determination under ss 17, 19 or 24, not s 14”.

70    For all the above reasons, the Tribunal performed its statutory task by determining the anterior threshold issue of liability under s 14 which the parties urged it to determine, making findings of fact relevant to the assessments under ss 16 and 19 (which depend on that threshold issue) as far as the evidence permitted, and otherwise remitting those assessments to Australia Post in accordance with its power under s 43(1)(c)(ii) of the AAT Act. Ground 1 is not made out.

GROUND 2 – DID THE TRIBUNAL FAIL TO CONSIDER AUSTRALIA POST’S ALTERNATIVE CASE?

71    Ground 2 complains that the Tribunal failed to consider Australia Post’s alternative case that, on and from 20 April 2022, the effects of Mr Quinn’s injury no longer resulted in a reasonable need for medical treatment or incapacity for work.

72    Australia Post submitted that its alternative case was potentially dispositive of Mr Quinn’s entitlement under ss 16 and 19. It contended that the Tribunal’s failure to resolve or properly address that submission amounted to a failure to consider a submission of substance worthy of serious consideration, citing Australian Postal Corporation v Hughes [2009] FCA 1057; 111 ALD 579 at [65] (Flick J) and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431 at [44], [46], [50] (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ).

73    Mr Quinn submitted that the Tribunal considered the medical evidence and the parties’ contentions in detail before finding that he suffered a compensable injury and that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14. He further submitted that Australia Post’s alternative case misstated the applicable tests. He submitted that the evidence was insufficient to make the determinations required by ss 16 or 19 or calculate the compensation payable. Once the Tribunal determined to remit the assessments under ss 16 and 19 to Australia Post, he said, the need to determine Australia Post’s alternative case fell away.

74    In response, Australia Post submitted that the Tribunal did not engage with its alternative case concerning Mr Quinn’s entitlement from 20 April 2022. It said that whether the evidence was sufficient was a matter for the Tribunal; any paucity of evidence did not permit it simply to disregard a potentially dispositive submission.

Consideration

75    At T [101], the Tribunal set out Australia Post’s alternative argument. It explained:

Regardless, Counsel contended that the evidence would now indicate that the effects of Mr Quinn’s accepted back injury sustained on 4 January 2021 no longer result in a reasonable necessity for medical treatment, or an incapacity for work as at 20 April 2022. Therefore, Counsel contended that Australia Post was no longer liable to pay compensation to Mr Quinn for medical treatment and incapacity for work under sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act in relation to the accepted back injury as at 20 April 2022 and presently.

76    At T [118], while considering and extracting the competing medical evidence, the Tribunal found that “Mr Quinn had suffered from an injury simpliciter described as a mechanical lower back strain, which has arisen in the course his employment”. At T [125], the Tribunal found that Mr Quinn “was suffering from degenerative disc disease as reported on MRI findings and concurred by all the medical experts”. At T [126], it found that the evidence indicated that Mr Quinn “suffered an injury on 4 January 2021 as a result of the reported incident”.

77    At T [136], the Tribunal set out its conclusion to remit “the matter to Australia Post to assess Mr Quinn’s compensation in accordance with sections 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, in respect of reasonable medical expenses and incapacity for work”. For the reasons explained above, the Tribunal was entitled to remit that matter and its decision to do so was not unreasonable or irrational, nor a failure to perform its statutory task.

78    The Tribunal was patently aware of Australia Post’s alternative case, having summarised the contentions underlying that case at T [94], [98] and [101]. However, for reasons explained above, the evidence did not permit the Tribunal to finally determine the questions required under ss 16 and 19, including the factual questions raised by Australia Post’s alternative case. Having determined to remit those determinations, it was therefore not necessary for the Tribunal to finally determine that alternative case. The questions raised by it formed part of what was remitted to Australia Post for reconsideration. In that sense, the decision to remit was a response to the alternative case, rather than a failure to address it.

79    In those circumstances, Australia Post has not established that the Tribunal failed to consider its alternative case. Ground 2 is therefore not made out.

GROUND 3 – DID THE TRIBUNAL FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE REASONS?

80    Ground 3 complains that the Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasons for setting aside Australia Post’s decision and remitting the assessment of Mr Quinn’s entitlement to compensation under ss 16 and 19 to Australia Post.

81    Section 43(2B) of the AAT Act provided that where the Tribunal gives in writing the reasons for its decision, those reasons shall include its findings on material questions of fact and a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.

82    Australia Post contended that the Tribunal was required to disclose the logical process by which it moved from its findings to the result: Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Homewood [2006] FCA 779; 91 ALD 103 at [40] (French J). It also relied on Wonson v Comcare [2020] FCAFC 76; 276 FCR 613 at [90], [91], [93] (Katzmann, Anastassiou and Abraham JJ) for the proposition that the duty to give reasons carries with it a duty to expose the reasoning process.

83    Australia Post submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons did not disclose why it set aside Australia Post’s decision and remitted the assessment of Mr Quinn’s entitlement under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act. It contended that the Tribunal failed to expose the logical process by which it moved from its findings to that result, thereby committing an error of law: Comcare v ZZRP [2019] FCA 952 at [18] (Flick J); Wonson at [42].

84    Mr Quinn submitted that the Tribunal gave comprehensive reasons for finding that he suffered a compensable injury and that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14, pointing to T [19]–[117], [135]. He contended that remittal was the only obvious, practicable and cost-effective course because the evidence did not permit the Tribunal to assess the cost of medical treatment or Mr Quinn’s loss of income. In those circumstances, he said, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to give reasons concerning hypothetical scenarios.

85    Mr Quinn further submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons were to be read as a whole and that s 43(2B) of the AAT Act required reasons only for findings the Tribunal actually made, not findings it did not make: Wonson at [89]. He contended that, read in that way, the basis for remittal was apparent from the insufficiency of the evidence and required no further explanation.

Consideration

86    The Tribunal’s reasons, and the evidence to which those reasons refer, disclose an important context for Ground 3. That is, the principal dispute before the Tribunal, as urged by the parties, was whether Mr Quinn’s continuing symptoms were attributable to a compensable injury sustained on 4 January 2021 or to a pre-existing degenerative condition. Australia Post contended that the degenerative condition accounted for his symptoms and that any work-related exacerbation had ceased.

87    Consistent with that focus of the parties, the Tribunal set out the “key issues for determination” at T [18]. As stated at [28] of these reasons above, it described those key issues as:

(1)    Has Mr Quinn suffered an injury (disease) and, if so, has his employment at Australia Post contributed to that condition(s) or the aggravation of that condition(s) to a significant degree?

(2)    Has Mr Quinn suffered an injury (other than a disease) and, if so, did it arise out of, or in the course of, his employment with Australia Post?

(3)    If the answer is yes to either of the above, is Australia Post liable to pay compensation?

88    Read in the context of key issues (1) and (2), and together with the Tribunal’s express conclusion at T [135], key issue (3) was directed to Australia Post’s continuing liability under s 14 of the SRC Act. Section 14 relevantly provides “Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment”.

89    Accordingly, the focus of the Tribunal was on whether Mr Quinn had suffered an injury (at key issues (1) and (2) above) and whether Australia Post continued to be liable in respect of it under s 14 of the SRC Act (at key issue (3) above).

90    I accept, as Mr Quinn contends, that the Tribunal gave detailed reasons for finding that he suffered a compensable injury and that Australia Post continued to be liable under s 14 in respect of that injury: T [109]–[130], [135]. I am satisfied that those reasons (at T [109]–[130], [135]) explain the factual basis for the conclusion under s 14, and, because the reviewable decision rested on the contrary premise that Mr Quinn’s condition was attributable to pre-existing degenerative changes rather than his employment or the incident on 4 January 2021, the basis for setting aside that decision. In other words, the reasons adequately explained the conclusion that Australia Post continued to be liable to pay compensation for Mr Quinn’s injuries in accordance with s 14 of the SRC Act.

91    However, Australia Post complains that it was also necessary for the Tribunal to identify, by reference to the evidence, the findings that explained the decision to remit the assessment of Mr Quinn’s entitlements under ss 16 and 19.

92    Although evidence and submissions bearing on the determinations required under ss 16 and 19 were before the Tribunal, they were principally directed to the anterior dispute concerning the existence and continuing effects of the compensable injury and did not provide a sufficient basis for the Tribunal to finally determine those assessments. As explained, s 16 is directed at the reasonable costs of medical treatment, including in some cases the cost of the journey to such treatment. Section 19 is directed at compensation for an injury that has resulted in the employee being incapacitated for work, with compensation calculated by reference to a formula that subtracts an amount based on what the employee actually earns, or is able to earn, from the employee’s normal weekly earnings.

93    I accept, as Mr Quinn submits, that, reading the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole, the basis for remittal of the determinations required under ss 16 and 19 was apparent from the insufficiency of the evidence and submissions on those matters. Section 43(2B) is directed to findings on material questions of fact and a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based. Here, the remittal was made in circumstances where findings necessary to determine the assessments under ss 16 and 19 had not been made and, for the reasons explained above, the evidence and submissions did not permit those findings to be made. As Wonson reminds, s 43(2B) of the AAT Act only extends to the findings the Tribunal has actually made, not to findings the Court considers it ought to have made: at [89]. I consider the same reasoning applies to findings that the Tribunal was not required to make.

94    For the reasons explained above with respect to Ground 1, the Tribunal was not required to make the factual findings that would be needed to underpin the determinations required under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act, in circumstances where it remitted those determinations to Australia Post having only determined the threshold question of liability under s 14. As those findings were not required to be made, s 43(2B) of the AAT Act did not require the Tribunal to provide reasons in respect of those findings.

95    Reading the Tribunal’s reasons fairly and as a whole, the Tribunal answered and gave reasons in respect of the key issues before it and remitted those matters on which it did not make a finding and which had not been the principal focus of the parties’ evidence and submissions. It might be that the Tribunal could have said directly that it would remit the determinations required under ss 16 and 19 because the submissions and evidence of the parties did not permit an answer to those questions, but so much is apparent when the reasons are read as a whole and fairly. In those circumstances, Ground 3 fails.

CONCLUSION

96    The appeal is dismissed.

97    The applicant must pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be agreed or taxed.

Associate:

Dated: 9 November 2026