Federal Court of Australia

SGM MLIA Gold Investment Pty Ltd, (as Trustee for the SGM MLIA Unit Trust) v Leviathan Resources Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 1681

ORDERS

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.    Orders 1 to 3 below are the subject of reasons given on the transcript of the interlocutory hearing on 3 November 2026.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Security for costs of first to fifth respondents

1.    Pursuant to s 56(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act), the applicant provide security in a form acceptable to the first to fifth respondents in the additional amount of $722,850 (Additional Security), to be paid into Court by 4.00 pm on 1 December 2026 (such that the total security payable on that date be $922,850).

2.    If the applicant fails to pay the Additional Security pursuant to order 1 above by 4.00 pm on 1 December 2026, the paragraphs added in the further amended statement of claim and in the amended originating application filed by the applicant on 21 October 2026 are to be struck out.

3.    The costs of the interlocutory application of the first to fifth respondents for further security for costs filed on 29 October 2025 be reserved.

Security for costs of sixth and seventh respondents

4.    Pursuant to s 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 56 of the Act and rule 19.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the applicant provide security for the sixth and seventh respondents’ (receivers) costs of this proceeding in the amount of $473,991.20, to be paid into Court by 4.00 pm on 1 December 2026 (Security) in a form acceptable to the receivers.

5.    If the applicant fails to pay the Security pursuant to order 4 above by 4.00 pm on 1 December 2026, the paragraphs added in the further amended statement of claim and the amended originating application filed by the applicant on 21 October 2026 are to be struck out.

6.    The applicant is to pay the costs of the receivers of and incidental to the receivers’ interlocutory application for security for costs filed on 29 October 2026.

Other

7.    The matter be listed for a case management hearing at 9.30 am on 28 January 2027.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from the transcript)

HALLEY J:

A.    Introduction

1    By an interlocutory application dated 29 October 2026, the sixth and seventh respondents (receivers) seek an order that the applicant provide security for their costs of the proceeding in the amount of $1,445,220.39.

2    The receivers rely upon an affidavit of their solicitor, Jeffrey David Malone sworn 29 October 2026 and an affidavit of Thomas Donald Birch (the sixth respondent) sworn 28 August 2025 in support of their application. The principal affidavit on which the receivers rely is the affidavit of Mr Malone.

3    The two issues that arise for determination are, first, whether any order should be made for the provision of security for the costs of the receivers, and second, if any order is to be made, the quantum of security that should be ordered.

B.    Background

4    In July 2025, the applicant commenced these proceedings against the first to fifth respondents (Leviathan parties) and the receivers. The applicant advanced claims against the receivers in relation to the process by which the assets of a joint venture between the applicant and the first two respondents with respect to the Stawell Gold Mine in Victoria were sold, and alleged breaches by the receivers of their duties under s 420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act).

5    On 1 August 2025, the receivers filed an interlocutory application seeking security for their costs but ultimately did not press that application.

6    On 8 December 2025, the applicant filed an amended statement of claim which introduced allegations about the knowledge of the receivers.

7    By an interlocutory application dated 30 September 2026, the applicant sought leave to amend its originating application and its amended statement of claim (further pleading amendments).

8    At the hearing of the interlocutory application in relation to the applicant’s further pleading amendments on 19 October 2026, I granted leave to the applicant to file and serve its further amended statement of claim (FASOC) and further originating application. Such leave was granted on the express basis that the applicant is not to seek to further amend its pleadings, file any additional evidence (other than the evidence which was already contemplated), or seek any further discovery from the respondents. As a result of the expanded scope of the applicant’s pleaded case, I also made orders extending the length of the hearing, which was originally listed for two weeks commencing on 1 February 2027, to three weeks.

9    Finally, I indicated to the parties that the significant scope of the amendments to pleadings would likely raise issues with respect to further applications for security for costs. It is in that context that the receivers’ application for security for costs falls to be considered.

C.    Should orders for security for the costs of the receivers be made?

C.1.    Legal principles

10    It is well established that the court has a broad discretion to order security for costs, with the only relevant limitation being that the discretion must be exercised judicially: Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corp (1984) 2 FCR 1 at 3 (Sheppard, Morling and Neaves JJ).

11    In All Class Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd (in liq) v Chubb Insurance Australia Ltd [2020] FCA 840, Allsop CJ stated (at [42]):

The matter which lies at the heart of the discretion is one of fairness, both in terms of whether security should be granted, and if so, in what amount: Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61; 212 FCR 1 at 21 [92]. The Court aims to achieve a “balance between ensuring that adequate and fair protection is provided to the defendants, and avoiding injustice to an impecunious plaintiff by unnecessarily shutting it out or prejudicing it in the conduct of the proceedings”: Rosenfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bain & Co (1988) 14 ACLR 467 at 470 (Giles J).

12    In KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189 at 197-198, Beazley J identified a number of factors that the court typically takes into account in determining whether to exercise the broad unfettered discretion to order security for costs, and if so, the form the security should take. These factors relevantly for present purposes include (a) whether the application has been brought promptly, and (b) whether the applicant’s impecuniosity was caused by the respondent’s conduct the subject of the claim.

C.2.    The applicant opposes any order for security for costs

13    The applicant contends that no orders should be made providing for any security for the costs of the receivers, notwithstanding the further pleading amendments.

14    The applicant advances three principal submissions in support of that contention.

C.3.    Impecuniosity

15    First, the applicant contends that its impecuniosity has been directly caused by the receivers’ conduct in selling the applicant’s assets at an undervalue. The applicant submits that this circumstance disentitles the receivers to security.

16    The circumstances in which the conduct of the party seeking security may be relevant to the question of impecuniosity, and in turn, whether any order for security should be ordered, were addressed in general terms by Gleeson J in Austcorp Project No 20 Pty Ltd v LM Investment Management Ltd (in liq) [2014] FCA 1371.

17    A party seeking to resist the provision of security is required to demonstrate that the conduct of the party seeking security caused, or at least materially contributed, to the claimant’s inability to meet an order for security for costs: Austcorp at [37]-[40] (Gleeson J) citing BPM Pty Ltd v HPM Pty Ltd (1996) 131 FLR 339 at 346 (Anderson J); Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad [2007] NSWCA 291; (2007) 65 ACSR 276 at [94] (McClellan CJ at CL, Mason P and Basten JA agreeing); Dal Pont GE, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003).

18    Impecuniosity and the circumstances in which that impecuniosity arose, however, are not in themselves sufficient to disentitle the party alleged to have caused or contributed to the impecuniosity from obtaining security for costs. As Ball JA observed in Vergan Enterprises Pty Ltd v Edwards O Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1198, the conduct of the wrongdoing party must have the effect of stultifying the proceedings. His Honour stated (at [16]):

As Anderson J said in BPM Pty Ltd v HPM Pty Ltd (1996) 131 FLR 339 at 346 (a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia), in a passage cited with approval by White J in Litmus Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Paul Brian Canty [2007] NSWSC 670 at [33]:

Anyway I doubt this factor can be taken in isolation. It must be considered together with the assertion that the effect on the plaintiff of an order for security will be to stultify the action. If that will not be or is not shown to be the effect of the order, that is, if other parties who will benefit from the plaintiff’s success are financially able to provide the security and it is reasonable that they do so, the fact that the defendant has caused the plaintiff’s own impecuniosity will hardly be good reason to decline security.

19    In this case, I accept that the applicant has pointed to objective evidence from which one could infer that the conduct of the receivers has materially contributed to or caused the plaintiff’s impecuniosity, at least on an impressionistic and holistic level. Namely, the receivers are said to have sold the applicant’s 40% proprietary interest in the Stawell Gold Mine at a value significantly less than contemporaneous valuations.

20    The authorities, however, require something further – the plaintiff must demonstrate that the effect of an order for security “will be to stultify the action” (Vergan at [16], citing BPM at 346). In this case, no evidence has been advanced by the applicant to the effect that any order that it provide security to the receivers will stultify the litigation. I therefore do not consider that this contention is sufficient to disentitle the receivers from obtaining security for their costs.

C.4.    Deed of indemnity

21    Second, the applicant contends that because the receivers’ costs of the proceedings are being met by the first respondent, Leviathan Resources Pty Ltd (Leviathan) in accordance with a deed of indemnity between Leviathan and the receivers dated 19 November 2024 (Deed of Indemnity), there is no relevant exposure of the receivers to costs. The applicant contends that the receivers intend to grant Leviathan a lien over the funds paid into Court and, upon their release, immediately pay to the Leviathan any amounts advanced under the Deed of Indemnity. The applicant further relies on a contractual arrangement by which Leviathan is subrogated to the rights of the receivers in respect of any amounts that might be recovered in these proceedings, to assert that security for the receivers’ costs is in reality security for Leviathan’s costs payable under the Deed of Indemnity.

22    The applicant points to clause 2.1 of the Deed of Indemnity, which relevantly provides:

2.1    Indemnity

Subject to clauses 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, Leviathan agrees to indemnify and keep indemnified at all times the Receivers in respect of all:

(i)    Liability properly incurred by them in the course of the receivership;

(ii)    Claims arising out of and relating to the receivership[.]

23    The applicant further points to Leviathan’s right of subrogation arising from clause 4.1 of the Deed of Indemnity, which provides:

4.1    Subrogation

Leviathan will be subrogated to the rights of the Receivers in relation to any Liability discharged by it under this deed and the Receivers, to the extent of any amount paid by Leviathan, agree to take all steps to enable Leviathan to recover against MLIA or any other person under the rights of indemnity, or otherwise of the Receivers.

24    The applicant submits that, in reality, security for the receivers’ costs would be security for Leviathan’s costs payable under the Deed of Indemnity.

25    I am not satisfied that any entitlement of the receivers to an indemnity for costs incurred in connection with the proceedings disentitles them to an order for security. The arrangement between Leviathan and the receivers is entirely unexceptional. As would be expected, such arrangement carries with it an obligation on the receivers to seek recovery of their costs, rather than simply seeking, in the first instance, to rely on the Deed of Indemnity.

C.5.    Explanation for delay

26    Third, the applicant points to the receivers’ delay in bringing the application, and what is alleged to be the absence of any explanation for that delay.

27    I dealt above with the question of impecuniosity. Turning, then, to the question of whether the application has been brought promptly, it is well established that applications for security must be made promptly: Devenish v Jewel Food Stores Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 35; (1990) 94 ALR 664 at 666 (Mason CJ); Bryan E Fencott & Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497 at 514 (French J).

28    There are sound reasons for this requirement. It is imperative for plaintiffs to know in advance if they will be required to put up funds for the potential cost exposure of a defendant, before legal costs are expended: Big Review TV Ltd (in liq) v FC Securities Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 222 at [30] (Moore J). Further, as Moore J noted at [31], an application for security for costs “is not a card that the defendant can keep up its sleeve and play at its convenience”, citing Christou v Stanton Partners Australasia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 176 at [20] (Newnes JA with Murphy JA agreeing).

29    Had the receivers sought in this application to obtain security for costs incurred prior to the applicant obtaining leave to rely on the further pleading amendments, the above principles would weigh strongly against the award of any security for costs.

30    The receivers submit that they are seeking security for costs at this stage because of what they contend is a fundamental change in the nature of the claim brought against them, by reason of the inclusion of a claim for damages in the amended originating application. I averted to the potential need for further security in considering whether I would, shortly prior to the trial of the proceedings, grant leave to rely on the further pleading amendments.

31    In ACN 117 641 004 Pty Ltd (in liq) v S&P Global, Inc (No 3) [2024] FCA 1238, Shariff J was concerned with an application for further security for costs. There, the respondent alleged that the additional amount of security sought was relatively insignificant having regard to the quantum of costs that had already been incurred, and this was a factor that the Court should consider in determining the request for additional security. As Shariff J stated at paragraph 68:

Whilst this approach might be useful in identifying the scale of the litigation, it is ultimately a distraction. That is because the task with which I am presently confronted is not to entertain a re-litigation of security ordered in the past, but to make an order for further security having regard to a relevant change in circumstances. That relevant change in circumstances in the present case is said to be the Amendments which it is claimed brought about the necessity of further security being ordered. Ultimately, the focus must be on ordering a sum of further security reflecting, in a broad-brush way, the further costs arising only by reason of the Amendments.

32    This is the relevant task to be confronted in the present case.

33    For these reasons, I am satisfied that it is appropriate that an order for security for costs be made in favour of the receivers to reflect the relevant change in circumstances in the present case, most significantly, the addition in the amended originating application of the claim for damages against the receivers.

D.    What is the appropriate quantum of security?

D.1.    Mr Malone’s estimate of costs

34    The quantum of the security sought by the receivers and the explanation for and reasoning underlying those claims are set out in the affidavit of Mr Malone. After giving evidence of his professional experience and correspondence with the applicant seeking a resolution of the security for costs issue, Mr Malone identifies the matters that he had regard to in estimating the receivers’ recoverable costs for defending the proceeding from 19 October 2026 until the conclusion of the trial.

35    Mr Malone deposes that his current best estimate of defending the proceeding from 19 October 2026 until conclusion of the trial is $1,458,789.88 (including counsel’s fees) in respect of legal fees and $324,000 in respect of disbursements, including fees payable to expert witnesses.

36    He then applies a broad brush discount of 40% to solicitors’ estimated fees of $709,800 to yield an amount of $425,880. He also applies a 5% discount to counsel’s estimated fees of $748,989.88 to yield an amount of $711,540.39, and a 5% discount to estimated disbursements of $324,000 to yield an amount of $307,800. In total, this amounts to the discounted amount of $1,445,220.39 sought by the receivers.

37    At this point, it should be noted that Mr Malone’s estimate is for all costs incurred from 19 October 2026 until the conclusion of the trial, rather than in respect of costs over and above the costs that would be incurred but for the amendments made by the further pleading amendments. That distinction will ultimately become relevant in assessing the relevant quantum to be ordered for security for costs.

38    I accept, as submitted by the receivers, that there careful and significant attention needs to be given to the impact of the amendments introduced by the further pleading amendments. It is important, however, to emphasise that although damages may not have been sought previously in the originating application and the statement of claim, serious allegations of breaches of duty by the receivers pursuant to s 420A of the Corporations Act were advanced against the receivers. It is therefore unsurprising that, in their proposed but ultimately abandoned application for security for costs in August 2025, the receivers envisaged that it would be necessary to retain both senior and junior counsel at the hearing, and for them to be involved in the preparation of expert and lay evidence, and, in particular, the preparation of pleadings.

39    I accept, as submitted by the receivers, that many of the costs contained in the original estimate in the previous abandoned application for security for costs may well have already been incurred, and therefore it is not simply a case of comparing what previously had been estimated with what is now estimated. In those circumstances, it is necessary to look at each relevant category of costs with some care.

40    While I accept that a claim for damages may well cause a party to look more carefully at allegations made against it, bearing in mind proportionality and the overarching purpose, the fact remains that the allegations made in the statement of claim from the outset were serious allegations of breaches of fundamental duties of receivers. The seriousness of those allegations is magnified in circumstances where it was alleged that a significant asset was sold by the receivers at an undervalue to a related corporation of the first and second respondents.

41    Further, in assessing the cost estimate prepared by Mr Malone, I also take into account a forensic decision that appears to have been taken by the receivers not to press for security for costs until the further pleading amendments were allowed, including a claim for damages against the receivers.

42    I turn now to the categories of costs claimed by the receivers and the basis for those costs as identified by Mr Malone in annexure JDM 11 to his affidavit. In approaching the categories, I do so by applying what is typically described as a broad brush. I note that such a broad brush must take into account the relevant principles with respect to awarding security for costs, including that it is not to be a full indemnity and they are generally to be assessed by reference to party and party costs. Further, it is necessary to have regard to the inherent uncertainty in arriving at any estimate of future costs given the inevitable vagaries and vicissitudes of significant commercial litigation such as this.

43    The applicant submits that given the “modest amendments” introduced by the further pleading amendments, the receivers’ total cost estimate of $1,458,789.88 for legal costs and $324,000 for disbursements is “plainly excessive”. Further, the applicant urges me to exercise significant caution in addressing the estimates provided by the receivers, given the generality with which those estimates are advanced.

44    Nevertheless, I am satisfied for present purposes that the identification of work and estimates made by Mr Malone fall within what typically would be expected in an application of this kind. There is nothing particularly unusual or exceptional about the manner in which Mr Malone has advanced the estimates, subject to several matters which I point to below when I am addressing each of the categories of costs that are being sought.

45    I note that the receivers have sought costs for both a special counsel and a senior associate without providing any explanation of the specific work that each is to undertake. The difference in hourly rate between them was only $20, suggesting they were of almost equivalent seniority and experience. In the absence of any explanation of any delineation of the work to be undertaken between two fee earners of equivalent seniority, it is more difficult to be satisfied that there will be no unnecessary duplication of work undertaken on particular tasks. If fee earners are of more clearly different seniority and experience, it may more readily be inferred that work will be allocated to reflect those differences in seniority and experience.

D.2.    Pleadings

46    Turning, first, to the question of pleadings. An amount of $128,454.60 is sought for pleadings, including the reading of the FASOC, considering the co-respondents’ amended defences, and drafting an amended defence. I accept that work is substantial, but I am not persuaded that it is quite as novel as is claimed by the receivers. The issue appears to be more a revisiting of material that previously has been considered. Nonetheless, I do accept that the inclusion of a claim for damages may lead to some necessity to review material that has already been looked at.

47    In all the circumstances, in particular having regard to the fact that the substance of most of the allegations had already been the subject of consideration (albeit I accept there are additional and more specific allegations now advanced in the FASOC), I consider that a discount of 50% to the amount sought for pleadings reflects both the likely discount on recoverable costs, but also the difficulty of identifying with precision additional work, given the decision earlier not to seek security for costs with respect to the extensive claims brought against the receivers, in at least the amended statement of claim. That leaves a figure of $64,227.30 for pleadings.

D.3.    Interlocutory and case management hearings

48    Turning, then, to interlocutory and case management hearings. An amount of some $100,872.80 is sought for “Interlocutory applications and case management conferences, directions/status hearings, consent orders”.

49    As matters currently stand, I am not satisfied, or at least I would not expect that the parties will be advancing any further interlocutory matters, not least because the basis upon which the applicant was given leave to rely on the FASOC and amended originating application was that no further applications for discovery would be made and no further evidence would be permitted to be advanced. I accept, however, there may be some further interlocutory and case management hearings, and I therefore propose to allow 25% of the figure sought, being a figure of $25,218.20.

D.4.    Lay and expert evidence

50    I turn, next, to lay evidence. An amount of $92,054.60 is sought for “further witness proofing; drafting amended lay evidence”.

51    As matters currently stand, there may well be a necessity to consider whether additional lay evidence is required, and that certainly is consistent with the evidence given by Mr Malone in his affidavit. No decision, however, has yet been made that any particular witnesses will be called, and I consider that relevant to the level of discount to be given to the estimate to achieve a figure that is fair to all the parties. I will therefore reduce the amount sought by 50% to reflect the need for some level of witness preparation. This yields a figure of $46,027.30.

52    At this stage, I note that the Leviathan parties in their application for further security for costs applied a blanket 40% discount to all anticipated costs. I consider that a discount of 50% is greater than but not significantly greater than the amount of the discount applied by the Leviathan parties. Given the additional factors relevant to the receivers, in particular, the difficulty of precisely identifying work that would have been done in any event and work caused by the amendments, I consider an additional 10% discount to be a fair and reasonable adjustment in order to do justice between the parties with respect to security.

53    Similar issues arise, in my view, with respect to expert evidence. There is a need, as established by Mr Malone, to consider whether and the extent to which further expert reports are required. I am not satisfied, however, that the figure sought of $134,172.80 is necessarily the cost that will ultimately be expended in that regard. Given that no decision has yet been made as to whether the receivers will require additional expert evidence to address the further pleading amendments, I will apply a discount of 50% to the figure of $134,172.80, leaving a figure of $67,086.40 for expert evidence.

D.5.    Conferences with client and counsel

54    The next category of costs sought was conferences with client and counsel of some $68,402.28. The description for that was simply “attending conferences with client and conferences with counsel”. In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that those conferences would otherwise not have been necessary irrespective of the amendments. In any event, to the extent that further work was required in the amendments, I think it is sufficiently covered by the particular categories considered earlier without having to add an additional amount to reflect additional conferences that might otherwise not have been necessary.

D.6.    Trial preparation

55    I then come to trial preparation. The amount sought by way of trial preparation is $321,036.80. That is on an estimate of a 15-day trial. The receivers’ original estimate for trial preparation the subject of the proposed but ultimately unpursued application for security on the basis of a 20-day anticipated trial was $494,886.00. This sum was an aggregate of fees for a senior counsel, a junior counsel, a partner, a special counsel/senior associate, and a solicitor. Bearing in mind that the original estimate was for a 20-day trial, it was nonetheless higher than the amount now sought by the receivers for trial preparation.

56    In part, that might be due to the compressed time in which counsel and solicitors engaged in the matter will be performing these tasks in the relatively short period now to the commencement of the hearing on 1 February 2027. The reality, however, is the amount that had been sought for trial preparation, even taking into account it was for a 20-day, not 15-day, hearing, is less. In part, this fact reinforces my view that the receivers recognised that there were already material and significant allegations made against them prior to the further pleading amendments notwithstanding the absence of any express claim for damages in the originating application. A decision had been made at an early stage to retain full representation for the hearing. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the further pleading amendments have caused any additional costs to be incurred with respect to trial preparation.

D.7.    Trial attendance

57    I turn, then, to trial attendance. The figure claimed for trial attendance is for senior counsel, two junior counsel, a partner, a special counsel, and a solicitor in an aggregate amount of $613,796.00.

58    As stated at [45] above, where the receivers have sought costs for both a special counsel and senior associate without delineating their two roles, I have increased the discount to reflect the potential for duplication. In contrast, where there are clear differences in seniority and role between fee-earners, it is must easier to infer that there is unlikely to be any material overlap. With respect to the trial, there is to be no overlap in the roles of solicitors, because only the special counsel, Mr Davidson, is proposed to attend.

59    I also note that Mr Malone includes an allowance for Ms Scott as a second junior counsel for the receivers at trial. By contrast, in the original abandoned application for security, there was only provision for a single junior counsel. I am satisfied, in all the circumstances, that the addition of a second junior counsel at the trial can be attributed to the breadth of the further pleading amendments.

60    In those circumstances, I consider it appropriate that the whole of the claim for Ms Scott’s attendance at the trial of 15 days should be included in the security for costs to be awarded. That amounts to $71,250. However, since the other fee earners were originally anticipated to attend the hearing, the only costs occasioned by the further pleading amendments are the additional five days of attendance at the trial. Therefore, security should be ordered for the additional five days of attendance for each fee earner, rather than the 15 days sought in the annexure to the affidavit of Mr Malone. That amounts to an additional $200,182. Accordingly, a total of $271,432 should be provided to cover the receivers’ trial attendance costs.

D.8. Disbursements

61    Finally, it is necessary to consider what are described as disbursements. The difficulty with the disbursements is the lack of any explanation for how they might arise.

62    An amount of $180,000 is claimed for expert witness fees, including accommodation. No additional explanation is provided. It is simply not possible on the material before me to perform any allocation, however broad brush, between how much is claimed to be required for accommodation, how much is claimed to be attributed to the preparation of any prospective expert reports, and any amounts claimed for experts’ attendance at trial. In part, this is perhaps because there is no evidence at this stage that any additional expert has been retained or that any existing expert has been asked to or has confirmed they might be in a position to provide an additional report. In these circumstances, it is simply not possible to allocate any figure for “expert witness fees”.

63    Further, in respect of the “running transcript” cost being sought in relation to a real-time transcript, I am not satisfied that that is an amount in respect of which security should be ordered. Nor am I satisfied that the receivers have provided any justification for document management/eDiscovery platform monthly hosting fee of $1,400 and consultancy fees of $1,100 to be included in an order for security for their costs.

64    Finally, that brings me to the disbursement for travel and accommodation, a figure of some $85,000 is claimed by the receivers. There is no breakdown of that figure. I note that the receivers have retained solicitors based in Western Australia and counsel based in Victoria. I appreciate a party is entitled to retain whatever legal representation they believe appropriate in all the circumstances. I am not persuaded, however, particularly in the absence of any breakdown of those costs, that the receivers’ unsubstantiated claim for travel and accommodation should be the subject of an order for security for costs.

E.    Disposition

65    For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that orders should be made for the provision of security for the receivers’ costs.

66    As to quantum, adding together the figures for which I am satisfied security for costs should be ordered results in an aggregate figure of $473,991.20. The receivers have confirmed that the order that they now seek is for that sum to be paid by 1 December 2026. If the applicant fails to pay that additional security, then the receivers submit, and I accept, that the paragraphs added in the FASOC and amended originating application pursuant to the further pleading amendments be struck out.

67    I make orders accordingly.

Associate:

Dated:    3 November 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES