Federal Court of Australia

Glover v Al-Talebi (Suppression) [2026] FCA 1680

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act) on the grounds referred to in ss 37AG(1)(a) and (c) of the Act, there be no disclosure (by publication or otherwise) of the Sensitive Documents and Sensitive Information except to and between Permitted persons.

2.    Pursuant to s 37AJ of the Act, Order 1 is to operate until the death of the Protected Witness.

3.    The Protected Witness shall be referred to and identified by the pseudonym OA during the course of this proceeding.

4.    In these orders:

(a)    Sensitive Documents means:

(i)    The following paragraphs of the affidavit of Amanda Glover affirmed 1 October 2026 in which the Protected Witness’ identity is disclosed:

A.    [83.3].

B.    The final word of [84].

(ii)    The following paragraphs of Document 11 of Exhibit AG-1 filed on 7 October 2026 in which the Protected Witness’ identity is disclosed or which might tend to identify the Protected Witness:

A.    [22.4].

B.    [84].

C.    Footnote number 56.

D.    The word in [125] immediately before the word ‘met’.

E.    The text in [129.1] between ‘captured’ and ‘and saying’.

F.    The text in [135] between ‘company of’ and ‘CCTV’.

G.    [144].

H.    The second sentence in [146].

(iii)    The following paragraphs of Document 14 of Exhibit AG-1 filed on 7 October 2026 in which the Protected Witness’ identity is disclosed or which might tend to identify the Protected Witness:

A.    The text in [16] between ‘(Alqudsi) and’ and ‘In 2023’.

B.    The last two sentences in [16].

C.    The text in [17] between ‘offending,’ and ‘it is likely’, between ‘Alqudsi and’ and ‘terrorism offending’ and between ‘terrorist organisation’ and ‘is a significant’.

(iv)    Annexure 15 of Document 11 of Exhibit AG-1;

(v)    Document name of tab 15 of the index to documents annexed to the SOF-For in Exhibit AG-1;

(vi)    The document filed 22 October 2026 as the confidential annexure to the interlocutory application lodged for filing on 20 October 2026 and filed 21 October 2026; and

(vii)    the affidavit of Amanda Glover affirmed on 4 November 2026 and the written submissions made in respect of this application.

(b)    Sensitive Information means:

(i)    the identity of the Protected Witness; and

(ii)    the fact that the Protected Witness has provided assistance to the police, including as a prosecution witness.

(c)    Permitted persons means:

(i)    Judges of this Court;

(ii)    Court staff (including transcription service providers);

(iii)    the parties;

(iv)    legal representatives of the parties instructed in these proceedings;

(v)    Commonwealth Ministers; and

(vi)    Commonwealth, State and Territory officers acting in the course of their duties.

(d)    Protected witness means the person identified in the confidential annexure to the interlocutory application lodged for filing on 20 October 2026 and filed 21 October 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

BROMWICH J:

1    This is an interlocutory application, originally filed on 21 October 2026, and then amended on 4 November 2026, seeking suppression orders and pseudonym orders under s 37AF(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) in relation to a very limited part of the information contained in material that is to be relied upon in the substantive proceeding commenced on 7 October 2026, plus the evidence and submissions relied upon for this application. It is convenient simply to refer to this as a suppression order application.

2    The context for this suppression order application is that, by an originating application filed on 7 October 2026, the applicant, Detective Superintendent Amanda Glover (DS Glover), an officer of the Australian Federal Police, commenced the substantive proceeding, seeking an interim control order under s 104.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth) to be made against the respondent, Mr Ali Al-Talebi (interim control order application). The interim control order application is listed for hearing on 7 December 2026. The interim control order is sought prior to Mr Al-Talebi’s release from prison on 14 December 2026, being the conclusion of his term of imprisonment for offences relating to his attempt to provide support or resources to, and to make funds available to, Islamic State, contrary to ss 102.6(1) and 102.7(1) of the Criminal Code. If an interim control order is made, DS Glover will need to decide whether to seek confirmation of the interim control order, and if so, a confirmation hearing will take place.

3    An interim suppression order was made by a registrar under s 37AI of the FCA Act on the day of the commencement of this proceeding on 7 October 2026, with effect until the first case management hearing. At the time of that first case management hearing on 21 October 2026, this proceeding having been allocated to my docket, I extended the registrar’s order, initially until 5.00 pm that day, and then by consent until either:

(a)    5.00 pm on 7 December 2026, being the date fixed that day for the hearing of the interim control order application; or

(b)    5.00 pm on any earlier day fixed for hearing of the suppression order application.

The suppression order application was listed for hearing on 9 November 2026, being the very first date I could hear it.

4    The suppression order application is in a narrow compass, seeking to protect certain sensitive information about the identity of one person and related information about that person and that person’s activities, being relevant to, but not central to, the interim control order application and the interim control orders thereby sought. That person has been a witness in the past and has been referred to as the Protected Witness.

5    The affidavit evidence and submissions in support of the suppression order are themselves reasonably detailed in relation to their narrow and specific subject matter, and of necessity must also be suppressed, but I am satisfied that this material not being publicly available is of low importance to the open conduct and determination of the interim control order application. The need for open justice is most clear and pronounced in relation to the interim control order that is sought, not least because what is sought are significant constraints being imposed on Mr Al-Talebi despite him having already served a lengthy term of imprisonment. There is a vital public interest in such an application, the evidence and submissions relied upon to have the orders sought made, and if made, the nature and extent of any such orders, being on the public record. Applying for such a significant incursion on civil liberties, as well as that actually taking effect if that is the outcome, must be as open as the proper administration of justice, and the need to protect the safety of any person, can facilitate and require.

6    Having read and considered both the evidence and the written submission for DS Glover, and having been taken to the specific information sought to be suppressed during the course of the hearing of this application, I am satisfied that the suppression order sought represents a reasonably confined and minimal incursion on the open justice principle. This has, in turn, made it much easier for me to be satisfied that the stringent test of necessity for a suppression order to be made, contained in s 37AG(1)(a) and (c) of the FCA Act, is met, namely that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice and also necessary to protect the safety of any person.

7    The only aspect of the suppression order application that has troubled me is the duration of the order sought. DS Glover seeks an order that endures until the death of the person whom it protects. That duration is asserted in affidavit evidence and submissions to be necessary for the reasons given. I am satisfied that those reasons are compelling as to the making of the orders in the first place, and I have ultimately found them to be compelling as to the event of death relied upon for their duration, because that too must meet, and in my view does meet, the test of necessity: Nicholson v Naizmand (duration of non-publication order) [2026] FCA 635 at [32]. I have concluded that the necessary duration is met by making the orders until the death of the Protected Witness.

8    Accordingly, I will make orders substantially in the form proposed in the amended interlocutory application filed on 4 November 2026.

Associate:

Dated:    9 November 2026