Federal Court of Australia

Grabovsky v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [2026] FCA 1674

File number(s):

NSD 1156 of 2026

Judgment of:

OWENS J

Date of judgment:

10 November 2026

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for judicial review of Registrar’s decision to refuse to accept documents for filing – Registrar refused documents on the ground that they are an abuse of the process of the Court or are frivolous or vexatious – no grounds for review established – application dismissed

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 35A(5), 35A(6)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), 39B(1A)(c), 56

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 2.26, 3.11, 8.05(1)

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75; (2018) 261 FCR 164

Ogbonna v Young [2026] FCA 610

Palmer v Shipton [2026] FCAFC 90

Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156; (2017) 254 FCR 1

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

43

Date of hearing:

21 October 2026

Counsel for Applicant:

The Applicant appeared in person

Counsel for Respondent:

The Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

NSD 1156 of 2026

BETWEEN:

IGOR GRABOVSKY

Applicant

AND:

HELEN DONOVAN JUDICIAL REGISTRAR FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

order made by:

OWENS J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 November 2026

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The originating application dated 30 June 2026 is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

OWENS J:

1    On 22 June 2026, a Registrar of this Court, in an exercise of the power conferred upon her by rule 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), refused to accept an originating application and various associated documents sought to be filed by the applicant, Mr Grabovsky. By these proceedings, Mr Grabovsky seeks to have the Registrar’s decision set aside. He also claims certain other interlocutory and ancillary relief.

2    The originating application that the Registrar refused to accept for filing named as respondents: the Commonwealth, the State of New South Wales, four individuals identified as landlords of the premises at which Mr Grabovsky resided, and two companies identified as the managing agents of those premises. The final relief that was claimed was in the following terms:

1.    A declaration that the NCAT Internal Appeal Panel determination dated 13 August 2025 in the Housing Dispute was made in jurisdictional error, in bad faith, and is void ab initio.

2.    A declaration that the primary NCAT proceedings and the subsequent Housing Dispute proceedings are structurally void due to a complete absence of a legal contradictor, by reason of the concealment of the true identity of the Second Respondent’s [i.e., the State of New South Wales] administrative entity (“Housing Pathways”).

3.    A declaration that the First Respondent (Commonwealth) and the Second Respondent (State of NSW) constructively failed to discharge their mandatory statutory duties and protective functions, directly resulting in the systemic suppression of material evidence of immense public interest and public safety.

4.    Judgment against the Respondents, jointly and severally, for damages, including:

(a)    Compensatory damages for fundamental breach of the residential tenancy contract, absolute denial of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, and attempted illegal enrichment by the Third through Eighth Respondents [i.e., the landlords and managing agents];

(b)    Financial loss, economic deprivation, and legal costs;

(c)    General damages for personal injury (acute cerebrovascular accident/stroke) arising from breaches of the duty of care; and

(d)    Aggravated and exemplary damages for civil conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, and targeted malice.

3    That originating process was not, despite including a claim for damages, accompanied by a statement of claim in accordance with rule 8.05(1). Rather, it was accompanied by an affidavit that stated the matters relied upon as giving rise to an entitlement to the relief claimed. I will return to the content of that affidavit later.

4    The critical reasoning of the Registrar, contained in a letter to Mr Grabovsky dated 22 June 2026, was as follows:

I have carefully considered the Documents and, pursuant to rule 2.26, have decided to refuse to accept the Documents for filing as I am satisfied that the Documents are an abuse of the process of the Court or are frivolous or vexatious.

The document does not set out a recognisable category of legal claim under Commonwealth legislation. You have not demonstrated in the Documents how the Federal Court of Australia has jurisdiction to stay proceedings that are before the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal. You refer to the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) in the Documents however you do not demonstrate how you have a claim under that legislation that can be brought direct to the Federal Court of Australia for determination (i.e. bypassing the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission). … By reason of the language that is used in the document it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow the document to be filed.

Accordingly, I refuse to accept the Documents for filing, as I am satisfied that the Documents, if they were accepted for filing, would constitute an abuse of process of the Court or would be frivolous or vexatious within the meaning of rule 2.26.

5    The originating application filed in these proceedings was framed as an application for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision, pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by section 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The statement of claim that was filed with that originating application, however, identified the relevant power of the Court to review the Registrar’s decision as that conferred by section 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (and rule 3.11 of the Rules). At no time has Mr Grabovsky sought judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Mr Grabovsky’s written and oral submissions maintained reliance on section 35A of the Federal Court Act (although in written submissions filed after the hearing he appears to have acknowledged the inapplicability of that provision). There is a fundamental difference between the two possibilities: review under section 35A(5) of the Federal Court Act involves a de novo determination of the Registrar’s exercise of power (see section 35A(6)), whereas judicial review is concerned with the legality of the Registrar’s decision, and not its merits.

6    The Registrar’s decision is not reviewable pursuant to section 35A(5) of the Federal Court Act. That is because the power conferred by rule 2.26 of the Rules is not a “power of the Court” within the meaning of section 35A. The Registrar made a decision of an administrative nature, and not of a judicial character. See generally Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75; (2018) 261 FCR 164 at [31]-[37] (Barker, Banks-Smith and Colvin JJ). That has an important consequence in relation to understanding the nature of the decision that was made by the Registrar. As the Full Court observed in Nyoni at [38]:

[A] Registrar acting under r 2.26 does not have power to adjudicate under the substantive law whether an application that a party seeks to bring is an abuse of process (or is frivolous or vexatious). The Registrar has no judicial power to determine substantively whether a claim must be dismissed because it is an abuse of process (or is frivolous or vexatious). Rather, r 2.26 is the means by which an administrative requirement is expressed that all documents filed in the Registry must not in their form and content (irrespective of any substantive assessment of their merit) be an abuse of process of the Court or frivolous or vexatious.

7    In support of his application, Mr Grabovsky read three affidavits affirmed by him. The third of those affidavits was filed after the date by which I ordered all of his evidence to be filed, and was directed to supporting a new ground of review. Mr Grabovsky filed an interlocutory application seeking leave to rely on that affidavit (and, in effect, to supplement his grounds of review accordingly). Although, as will be seen, I am not persuaded that there is any substance in the relevant argument, I have had regard to the affidavit, and dealt with the new ground on its merits.

8    Mr Grabovsky filed two sets of written submissions before the hearing. He supplemented those submissions with oral argument. He then filed a further set of written submissions following the hearing. Although he did so without leave, I have nonetheless had regard to those submissions and taken them into account.

9    The Registrar has not participated in the proceedings in any way.

10    In all, Mr Grabovsky advanced five grounds upon which he submitted it should be found that the Registrar’s decision involved error. Perhaps unsurprisingly, he did not focus on the question whether those errors, if established, were of a kind that would justify the intervention of the Court on an application for judicial review. Ultimately, though, that does not matter, as I am not persuaded that Mr Grabovsky has established any of the asserted errors. The principles in accordance with which an application of this kind is to be determined are uncontroversial, and have been collected in many decisions of the Court. One recent example, to which reference, without quotation, will suffice is Ogbonna v Young [2026] FCA 610 at [21]-[27] (Banks-Smith J).

Ground 1: Jurisdiction of the Court in relation to claims against the Commonwealth

11    The first error that Mr Grabovsky contended had been made by the Registrar concerned the conclusion that the documents filed by him should be rejected because they did not “set out a recognisable category of legal claim under Commonwealth legislation”.

12    It is first important to be clear about what the Registrar was saying in that sentence. I would not understand the Registrar to have made her decision on the basis that it was necessary, in order for Mr Grabovsky’s documents to be accepted for filing, that they must disclose a statutory cause of action under Commonwealth legislation.

13    Consistently with the nature of the power being exercised, the Registrar’s reasons were expressed succinctly, with the central purpose being to inform Mr Grabovsky of the fundamental reason why his documents had been rejected. It would be wrong to scrutinise them “minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error”: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

14    It is readily apparent that the decisive matter informing the Registrar’s decision to refuse to accept Mr Grabovsky’s documents for filing was that they did not, on their face, disclose any basis upon which it might appear that the Court’s jurisdiction had been regularly invoked. Thus, when the Registrar said that the documents did not “set out a recognisable category of legal claim under Commonwealth legislation”, I would understand that to mean that the Registrar had been unable to discern on the face of the documents any basis upon which the Court might have jurisdiction pursuant to section 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act (i.e., jurisdiction in a matter “arising under any laws made by the Parliament”). As was observed in Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156; (2017) 254 FCR 1 at [18] (Allsop CJ, Besanko and White JJ):

A matter will “arise under” a law of the Parliament in a number of ways. These include cases where a cause of action is created by a Commonwealth statute; where a Commonwealth statute is relied upon as establishing a right to be vindicated; where a Commonwealth statute is the source of a defence that is asserted; where the subject matter of the controversy owes its existence to Commonwealth legislation – that is where the claim is in respect of or over a right which owes its existence to federal law; where it is necessary to decide whether a right or duty based on a Commonwealth statute exists even where that has not been pleaded by the parties, or where a federal issue is raised on the pleadings but it is unnecessary to decide ...

15    While Mr Grabovsky first submitted that this Court had jurisdiction in relation to his claim against the Commonwealth independently of section 39B(1A)(c), by reason of section 56 of the Judiciary Act, that submission cannot be accepted. Section 56 does not confer any jurisdiction at all on the Federal Court of Australia. Indeed it may be observed generally that the mere fact that the Commonwealth is a respondent to proceedings does not confer jurisdiction upon this Court.

16    No alternative source of the Court’s jurisdiction, apart from section 39B(1A)(c), was identified by Mr Grabovsky. Insofar as jurisdiction by reason of that section is concerned, Mr Grabovsky accepted that it was only his claim against the Commonwealth that could be argued to “arise under any laws made by the Parliament”. That is to say, while he submitted that the claims he sought to bring against respondents other than the Commonwealth were within the Court’s jurisdiction, that was only because they were part of the same “matter” as his claim against the Commonwealth. He thus acknowledged that any attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under section 39B(1A)(c) depended ultimately on his claim against the Commonwealth being one arising under any law made by Parliament.

17    Mr Grabovsky said that his documents did disclose such a claim on their face. He pointed to the fact that his originating application claimed damages against the Commonwealth for misfeasance in public office (and, relatedly, sought a declaration in relation to the Commonwealth’s failure to perform its statutory duties and functions that lay at the heart of that claim in tort). He submitted that the tort of misfeasance in public office was a well-established tort, and that the Registrar erred in determining that it was necessary for there to be an explicit statutory provision conferring a right of action before a person could bring proceedings for such a cause of action.

18    The first answer to that submission is that, consistently with what I have just said about how the Registrar’s decision is to be understood, the Registrar did not decide that it was necessary for Mr Grabovsky’s documents to disclose a statutory cause of action. The Registrar must be understood to have decided that the documents did not disclose on their face a cause of action (including the cause of action for misfeasance in public office) “arising under any laws made by the Parliament” in the sense explained in Rana.

19    So how did Mr Grabovsky say that his documents did disclose on their face that his claim for misfeasance in public office arose under a law of the Commonwealth Parliament?

20    He relied, as I understood it, on two aspects of the affidavit he had sought to file accompanying the originating application. In that affidavit:

(a)    Mr Grabovsky stated that he had had interactions over a ten-year period with various Commonwealth Ministers, Departments, Agencies and other entities, namely:

Between 2013 and 2023, I provided formal notifications, evidence, and complaints of critical public interest and safety to [the Commonwealth] via the entities identified in paragraph 2 regarding ongoing systemic offences.

I claim that [the Commonwealth], through its respective agencies, failed to exercise its statutory duties, powers, and protective functions to investigate or act dynamically upon my disclosures.

It is clear enough from the affidavit as a whole that the subject matter of the disclosures to which Mr Grabovsky referred related to what he contended were unlawful practices in aged care facilities that had led to the deaths of residents.

(b)    He described various proceedings to which he had been a party in the Fair Work Commission:

Between 2014 and 2022, I initiated thirty-seven (37) distinct proceedings and applications within the Fair Work Commission (the FWC Proceedings).

The FWC Proceedings arose out of, or were connected to, systemic and systematic failure in the Aged Care sector of the Australian economy and the subsequent reprisal actions deployed against me and my family.

He complained in particular about a decision that he said “barred [him] from addressing or presenting evidence regarding … suspicious deaths of aged care residents”. The affidavit went on to say:

Following the suppression of my evidence, I maintained the subsequent 36 applications identified in paragraph 10 for the primary purpose of overturning or correcting what I contend was a criminally flawed regulatory precedent.

21    Overall, as I understood it, Mr Grabovsky was alleging that a large number of emanations of the Commonwealth not only failed to investigate the matters that he had raised, but sought to suppress or conceal the fact and content of his disclosures, and to retaliate against him for bringing the issue to light.

22    Whatever substantive issues might attend the claim that Mr Grabovsky has sought to formulate, the critical problem of present relevance is that nowhere did the rejected documents either expressly identify any law made by the Commonwealth Parliament that his claims were said to “arise under”, or articulate the cause of action (or the material facts said to constitute it) in such a way as to reveal, as a matter of substance, the basis upon which the Court’s jurisdiction might be seen to be attracted.

23    That is to say, none of the rejected documents identified the particular acts or omissions of any individual Commonwealth officer that were alleged to constitute misfeasance in public office. No specific statutory powers or duties were identified. All that was said was that, in an undifferentiated way, a large number of Commonwealth officers had acted in such a way that the Commonwealth “through its respective agencies, failed to exercise its statutory duties, powers, and protective functions” (but without identifying what those statutory duties, powers, and protective functions were).

24    Of course, misfeasance in public office is a tort of personal liability, which cannot be established by aggregating the acts and knowledge of different officers: Palmer v Shipton [2026] FCAFC 90 at [83] (Beach and Abraham JJ)). Furthermore, it is a tort committed by persons exercising public powers (and not by the polity whose powers are being exercised). By naming the Commonwealth, and not any particular repository of public power, as the first respondent, it might be inferred that Mr Grabovsky was seeking to assert that the Commonwealth was vicariously liable for the misfeasance of individual officers. Framing the case in that way, in addition to whatever other issues might be involved, does not avoid the problem that, with the claim articulated at the level of generality found in the rejected documents, it is simply not possible to know what exactly any particular Commonwealth officer is alleged to have done, in the exercise of what power, so as to give any clue as to whether there might be a “law of the Parliament” under which the claim might be said to arise (in the sense explained in Rana).

25    Perhaps the closest the documents come to doing that is the reference to the thirty-seven proceedings in the Fair Work Commission. Mr Grabovsky submitted that that was sufficient to identify the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) as a law of the Commonwealth under which his claims arose. The problem, though, is that while the rejected documents might have asserted, in a conclusory way, and at a very high level of generality, that Commonwealth officers had engaged in misfeasance in public office in the course of Mr Grabovsky’s various Fair Work Commission proceedings, they do not come even close to identifying the material facts that would be necessary to disclose on their face the existence of a non-frivolous or vexatious invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court. That is to say, while the rejected documents might assert that there was a failure properly to discharge a statutory duty, they do not identify either the power in question, or the material facts and circumstances that are relied upon in order to establish its unlawful exercise. It follows that, at best, the rejected documents assert a basis upon which the Court’s jurisdiction might be attracted, but do not disclose on their face a non-frivolous or vexatious invocation of that jurisdiction.

26    In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Registrar erred (at all, let alone in such a way as to entitle Mr Grabovsky to succeed on an application for judicial review) in concluding that, in circumstances where the rejected documents, at best, simply asserted, in the absence of any statement of material facts, the unlawful exercise of an unspecified power, no “recognisable category of legal claim under Commonwealth legislation” had been set out.

27    I would emphasise once more that the Registrar’s decision did not involve any adjudication under the substantive law of the existence of jurisdiction, or of the fact that Mr Grabovsky’s proposed proceedings would have been an abuse of process, or frivolous or vexatious. The Registrar’s concern was with the administrative requirement that documents filed in the Registry must not, in their form and content, be an abuse of process of the Court or frivolous or vexatious. The Registrar determined that those documents did not, on their face, disclose a regular invocation of the jurisdiction of the Court and rejected them on that basis. No error has been shown in relation to that conclusion.

Ground 2: Jurisdiction of the Court in relation to claims against the State

28    The second error that Mr Grabovsky contended had been made by the Registrar concerned the conclusion that the documents filed by him did not demonstrate “how the Federal Court of Australia has jurisdiction to stay proceedings that are before the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal”.

29    Mr Grabovsky informed me, however, that he would no longer seek any order directed to quashing or staying any decisions of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, with the result that any difficulties in relation to a claim for relief of that kind could be put to one side.

30    The focus of Mr Grabovsky’s submissions in this context was thus a more general concern to show that the rejected documents disclosed on their face the existence of a claim within jurisdiction against the State of New South Wales for misfeasance in public office (once again, presumably on the basis that it is vicariously liable for the torts of individual officers). It is not necessary to delve into the detail of that claim as Mr Grabovsky had sought to articulate it in the rejected documents. The sole basis upon which he contended that this Court would have jurisdiction to determine that claim was that it formed part of the same “matter” as his claim for misfeasance in public office against the Commonwealth. The Registrar did not make any separate determination about that topic. It follows that, on the Registrar’s reasoning, consistently with Mr Grabovsky’s submissions before me, the fate of the misfeasance claim against the State of New South Wales travelled with the fate of the claim against the Commonwealth. My finding in relation to Ground 1 above is thus sufficient to deal with that aspect of Mr Grabovsky’s case.

31    Precisely the same reasoning disposes of the claims against the landlord and managing agent respondents. That is to say, Mr Grabovsky accepted that the Court’s jurisdiction over those claims could exist only to the extent that they were part of the same “matter” as the claims against the Commonwealth. They too were thus disposed of by the reasoning of the Registrar that I have dealt with in connection with Ground 1.

Ground 3: the (ir)relevance of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

32    The third error that Mr Grabovsky contended the Registrar had made was that she had wrongly understood, by reason of the references in the rejected documents to his medical conditions, that he was attempting to advance a claim under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). Mr Grabovsky did not deny that such a claim could only be brought following the termination of a complaint made to the Australian Human Rights Commission. He said that the rejected documents were not intended to advance such a claim. He emphasised that the only purpose of the references to his medical conditions in the rejected documents was as part of the articulation of his damages claim. That is, he alleges that those medical conditions were caused by the tortious conduct of the respondents, and that he is thus entitled to damages in respect of them.

33    This asserted error, even if it were made, can go nowhere. The effect of the Registrar’s decision in this respect was simply to exclude one possible source of jurisdiction that Mr Grabovsky agrees he was not seeking to invoke. Even if the Registrar did think that Mr Grabovsky was seeking to bring a claim for disability discrimination, that error did not cause her to overlook, or deny, some other source of jurisdiction.

34    Ground 3 thus provides no basis upon which to set aside the Registrar’s decision.

Ground 4: abuse of process

35    The fourth asserted error concerned the Registrar’s conclusion that “[b]y reason of the language that is used in the document it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow the document to be filed”.

36    The Registrar’s reasons do not identify which language in the rejected documents would constitute an abuse of process. Mr Grabovsky submitted that the content of those documents was objective, and not offensive, inflammatory or emotive. While it is true that the tone of the rejected documents was measured, they contain serious allegations that are made without the precision and disclosed basis that would be expected in a proper pleading (as I have already explained, the rejected documents assert misfeasance in public office without an adequate statement of the material facts relied upon). I consider that the Registrar’s decision in this respect was concerned with the potential for abuse of the Court’s processes where such serious allegations are made without proper detail and in the absence of a demonstrated basis for invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction (and not, as Mr Grabovsky apprehended, with inappropriately offensive, emotive or inflammatory language).

37    I am not satisfied that Mr Grabovsky has demonstrated jurisdictional error in relation to the Registrar’s conclusion. In any event, in light of my other conclusions the disposition of this ground of review cannot make any difference to the ultimate outcome of these proceedings. That is, having found that the Registrar’s decision to reject the documents on the basis that they did not disclose on their face a regular invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction, the fate of this ground of review could not possibly lead to a different outcome.

Ground 5:

38    The fifth ground of review advanced by Mr Grabovsky concerned what he called the “illegitimacy of the registry decision trajectory”. The point related to the sequence of events that Mr Grabovsky said took place between his presentation of his documents for filing at the Registry counter, and the decision of the Registrar to refuse to accept those documents.

39    The critical events as Mr Grabovsky perceived them were as follows:

(a)    Mr Grabovsky arrived at the Registry counter at 9:15am and sought to file his documents.

(b)    At 9:35am, the staff member who had been dealing with Mr Grabovsky “refused to accept the documents for standard administrative intake and processing”. In Mr Grabovsky’s submission, this staff member had a “non-discretionary clerical duty to accept and file” the documents, and by refusing to do so he “engaged in an unauthorized, ad-hoc legal assessment of the merits of the claim”.

(c)    Between 9:35am and 11:15am, Mr Grabovsky sought to persuade the Registry counter staff that they should accept his documents (and other documents directed to securing an immediate hearing of his matter) for filing and refer the matter to a Duty Judge, and that their failure to do so was causing him to experience adverse medical symptoms.

(d)    At 11:30am, Mr Grabovsky interrupted proceedings in a Courtroom, and implored the Judge to help him. He then collapsed.

(e)    Between 11:45am and 3:30pm, Mr Grabovsky continued to interact with staff at the Registry counter about the progress of his attempt to file his documents.

(f)    After Mr Grabovsky left the Registry counter, he went home. He later discovered that the letter informing him of the Registrar’s decision had been emailed to him shortly after he had left the Court building.

40    Mr Grabovsky submits that this sequence of events shows that “there are only two possible administrative scenarios that could have occurred within the Registry”:

(a)    First, that the staff at the Registry counter made the decision to refuse to accept his documents for filing at 9:30am. On this scenario, it was submitted, what the Registrar was doing was purporting to conduct a review of a decision that had already been made absent authority. A Registrar has no power to initiate or perform such a review, and so her decision would be invalid or ineffective.

(b)    Secondly, that the Registrar made the decision to refuse to accept his documents for filing, and the counter staff then “engaged in a deliberate, bad-faith deception to obscure her identity”. In relation to this possibility, it was submitted that a “decision born from administrative deception and procedural infection cannot be deemed legitimate”.

41    I am not persuaded that there is any merit to Mr Grabovsky’s contentions. It is clear that what happened was that the counter staff at the Registry referred consideration of whether the documents Mr Grabovsky sought to file should be accepted to the Registrar for her personal decision. The staff at the counter do not, as Mr Grabovsky submitted, have a “non-discretionary clerical duty to accept” documents for filing. There is no evidence that there was any attempt to conceal from Mr Grabovsky the fact that a Registrar was considering his documents. On his own account, the counter staff told him that “the Registrar required more information”. No basis for impugning the process by which the Registrar’s decision was made has been demonstrated.

42    In connection with this ground of review, Mr Grabovsky sought various ancillary orders, directed to preserving evidence (including CCTV footage) of his interactions with Registry staff, and the process by which the Registrar’s decision came ultimately to be made. For the reasons I have given, I am not satisfied that this ground of review has any merit, and it follows that no basis for the making of any of the ancillary orders sought by Mr Grabovsky has been demonstrated.

Conclusion

43    It follows that Mr Grabovsky has not demonstrated any error in relation to the Registrar’s decision, and his application for judicial review must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Owens.

Associate:

Dated:    10 November 2026